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1 Abbreviations and Definitions 
AC Antigen capture (as in "AC testing") 
AI Avian influenza 
APHIS Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (USDA:APHIS) 
BWG Broiler Working Group 
CEAH Center for Epidemiology and Animal Health (USDA:APHIS:VS:CEAH) 
CFR U.S. Code of Federal Regulations 
C&D Cleaning and disinfection, or cleaned and disinfected 
DPI Days post-inoculation 
EA/AM Eurasian/American 
EPA U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
GIS Geographic Information System 
GLEWS Global Early Warning System for Major Animal Diseases Including Zoonoses 
HA Hemagglutinin 
HI Hemagglutination inhibition 
HPAI Highly pathogenic avian influenza 
IAV-S Influenza A virus of swine 
ICS Incident Command System 
ILT Infectious laryngotracheitis 
IP Infected premises 
IVPI Intravenous pathogenicity index 
LPAI Low pathogenic avian influenza 
NA Neuraminidase 
NAHLN National Animal Health Laboratory Network 
NAHMS National Animal Health Monitoring System (USDA) 
NPIP National Poultry Improvement Plan 
NVSL National Veterinary Services Laboratory (USDA) 
OIE  World Organization for Animal Health (formerly Office International des 
Epizooties) 
PBA Perimeter Buffer Area 
PM Particulate matter 
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PMIP Pre-Movement Isolation Period 
PPE Personal protective equipment 
PRRSV Porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome virus 
RH Relative humidity 
rRT-PCR Real-time reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction 
SAHO State animal health official 
SPF Specific Pathogen Free 
TWG Turkey Working Group 
U.S. United States of America 
USDA United States Department of Agriculture 
UV Ultraviolet light 
VS Veterinary Services (USDA:APHIS:VS) 
WHO World Health Organization 
 
AERMOD 
Aerosol dispersion model developed by the EPA and recommended to be used for 
regulatory decisions associated with air quality. 
BID50  
50% bird infectious dose. One BID50 unit is the amount of virus that will infect 
50% of inoculated birds. 
Biosecurity  
A comprehensive set of measures to prevent the introduction of disease agents 
into a specific area.  
Breeder farm 
A farm with breeder flocks that produce hatching eggs. The hatching eggs from a 
breeder farm are transported to a hatchery. 
Broiler Sector Working Group (BWG) 
A working group, which is made up of representatives from the broiler industry, 
academia, SAHOs, and USDA:APHIS, to support permits for the movement of 
broiler hatching eggs, chicks, or birds during an HPAI outbreak.  
Brooder premises  
Premises with facilities that raise poults (young turkeys) during the first few 
weeks of production. Day-old poults from a hatchery are transported to a brooder 
farm, some of which may also include grow-out barns. 
Buffer zone 
The zone immediately surrounding the infected zone; the buffer zone and the 
infected zone constitute the Control Area. 
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CID50 
50% chicken infectious dose. One CID50 unit is the amount of virus that will 
infect 50% of inoculated chickens. 
Contact Rate 
The rate at which susceptibles meet infecteds, measured as individuals per unit 
time. 
Control Area 
An area, consisting of an infected zone and a buffer surveillance zone, established 
to ensure the rapid and effective containment of the disease. The potential modes 
of transmission of HPAI are considered when determining the minimum size and 
shape of a Control Area. Movement control—through the use of permits—should 
be maintained until the disease is eradicated. 
Downtime for Visitors 
For purposes of this assessment, downtime refers to the time interval between 
when a visitor enters the poultry house and the time of last contact with other 
domestic poultry, other avian species, and/or related organic material from the 
Control Area. 
EID50   
50% chicken embryo infectious dose. One EID50 unit is the amount of virus that 
will infect 50% of inoculated embryos. 
ELD50  
50% chicken embryo lethal dose. One ELD50 unit is the amount of virus that will 
be lethal to 50% of inoculated embryos. Since most HPAI viruses are embryo 
lethal, the ELD50 estimates would be similar to EID50. 
Fomite 
An inanimate object, such as boots, clothing, etc., that, when contaminated with a 
viable disease agent, can serve as a source of infection for a susceptible host. 
Free Area Any area outside of the Control Area. The Surveillance Zone is part of the Free 
Area.  
Free Premises 
Poultry premises that are not in an HPAI Control Area and are not Contact or 
Suspect premises. 
Hatchery  
A commercial establishment that produces day-old offspring from hatching eggs. 
Commercial turkey hatcheries receive hatching eggs from off-site breeder farms 
and produce day-old poults that are shipped to brooder operations. 
Incident Command System (ICS) 
A management system designed to enable effective and efficient domestic 
incident management by integrating a combination of facilities, equipment, 
personnel, procedures, and communication within a common organizational 
structure. 
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Infected zone 
In an outbreak of HPAI, the infected zone encompasses the perimeter of all 
presumptive or confirmed positive premises (“infected premises”) and include as 
many “contact premises” as the situation requires logistically or 
epidemiologically. Activities in an infected zone include: 
• Preventing products from birds and other susceptible animals from leaving the 
zone unless a risk assessment determines that such movement can be 
permitted. 
• Preventing movement of vehicles, equipment, and non-susceptible animals out 
of the zone unless appropriate biosecurity procedures (as determined by a risk 
assessment) are followed. 
Infectious Period  
The period of time that an individual bird is infectious (i.e., shedding HPAI virus 
at sufficient levels that transmission could result if there is adequate contact with 
a susceptible host).  
Latent Period  
The period of time between infection of a bird and when it becomes infectious. 
Line of Separation (LOS) 
The LOS is a functional line separating the poultry house(s) and the poultry inside 
from exposure to potential disease sources. Generally, it is defined by the walls of 
the poultry building with practical deviations to account for entry points, 
structural aspects, or outside access areas.   
Local area spread 
Refers to risk pathways which have an increased likelihood for disease 
transmission with proximity to infected flocks. 
Movement permit 
A VS Form 1-27, a state-issued permit, or a letter—customized to the applicant’s 
situation—generated by the Permit Team and issued at the discretion of Incident 
Command to allow the movement of poultry industry products from a premises or 
a geographic area described in a quarantine order. 
National Poultry Improvement Plan (NPIP)  
A cooperative state-industry-federal program that establishes guidelines for 
evaluation of poultry products and poultry production relative to disease and 
eligibility for interstate/international trade.  
Observation period  
The time interval between moving birds from a brooder house to the placement of 
new birds into the brooder house during an HPAI outbreak where the previously 
raised flock is observed (in the grow-out barn) for clinical signs of HPAI. The 
purpose of observation time is to gain confidence that birds previously raised in 
the brooder house were not infected. 
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Perimeter Buffer Area (PBA) 
The perimeter buffer area on a poultry premises is a functional zone surrounding 
the poultry houses or poultry raising area that separates them from areas unrelated  
to poultry production on that site and/or adjoining properties. It is composed of 
the poultry houses and poultry raising areas as well as nearby structures and high-
traffic areas involved in the daily function of the poultry farm. This would usually 
include, but not be limited to, such things as feed bins, manure sheds, composting 
areas, egg rooms, generators, pump rooms, etc.   
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)  
Special clothing and equipment designed to act as a barrier between an individual 
and a hazard; in this case, the hazard is a highly contagious pathogen (HPAI). 
PPE in the event of an HPAI outbreak serves to prevent the spread of the disease 
agent between animals and locations. For purposes of this report, appropriate PPE 
is considered protective boot covers, clothing, and gloves. 
Poult 
A young turkey. 
Premises 
A geographically and epidemiologically defined location, such as a ranch, farm, 
plant, or other establishment. 
Pre-Movement Isolation Period (PMIP) 
The PMIP is a critical biosecurity component that involves a defined period of 
greatly intensified biosecurity for n entire premises prior to permitted movement 
of live poultry within, into, or out of a regulatory Control Area during an HPAI 
outbreak. The PMIP starts a specified number of days prior to the scheduled 
movement date and ends when load-out begins (i.e., the hours or days of load-out 
are not considered part of the PMIP). 
Secure Broiler Supply (SBS) Plan 
A science-based plan that is composed of outbreak measures and protocols 
proposed by the broiler sector working group to mitigate the risk of HPAI spread 
associated with the movement of hatching eggs and day-old chicks into, within, 
and outside of a Control Area.  
Secure Egg Supply (SES) Plan 
A science-based plan that is composed of risk-based preparedness and response 
components to provide guidance on permitting the movement of egg industry 
products from a Control Area during an HPAI outbreak.  
Secure Egg Supply Working Group (SES WG) 
A working group, which is made up of representatives from the egg industry, 
academia, SAHOs, and the USDA:APHIS, to support permits for the movement 
of table eggs, egg industry products and byproducts, hatching eggs, day-old 
chicks, pullets, or spent hens during an HPAI outbreak. 
Secure Poultry Supply (SPS) Plan 
A harmonized plan to facilitate poultry industry and state regulatory agency 
preparedness for poultry product movement in an HPAI outbreak. 
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Secure Turkey Supply (STS) Plan  
A strategic plan, containing science-based outbreak measures and protocols 
developed by the Turkey Sector Working Group, to mitigate the risk of HPAI 
spread associated with the movement of turkeys, turkey eggs, and turkey semen in 
an HPAI Control Area. 
Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) 
Established or prescribed methods to be followed routinely for the performance of 
designated operations in a designated situation. 
Turkey Sector Working Group (TWG) 
A working group, which is made up of representatives from the turkey industry, 
academia, SAHOs, and the USDA:APHIS, to support permits for the movement 
of turkey hatching eggs, poults, or birds during an HPAI outbreak. 
TCID50  
50% tissue culture infectious dose. One TCID50 unit is the amount of virus that 
will cause cytopathic effects in 50% of exposed host cells. The Madin-Darby 
Canine Kidney cell line is often used to estimate TCID50 for HPAI viruses. 
Zoonosis 
A disease caused by an infectious agent that can be transmitted between (or 
shared by) animals and humans. 
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2 Executive Summary 
In the event of a highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) outbreak in the United States, poultry 
industry, local, state, and federal authorities will implement a foreign animal disease emergency 
response. In these circumstances, permit requests to move poultry and poultry products must be 
supported by risk assessments which demonstrate that the risk of HPAI spread associated with 
the movement is acceptable. Performing the risk assessments prior to an HPAI outbreak can 
enhance emergency response and facilitate timely movement permitting decisions during an 
outbreak. This document assesses the risk that the movement of point of lay pullets out of the 
pullet barn (e.g., to the driveway of the pullet premises not to a specific destination), during an 
HPAI outbreak, from a premises located within the Control Area, will result in the movement of 
infectious but undetected birds and the likely number of infectious birds at the time of 
movement. The purpose of this assessment is to provide regulators and industry with an 
objective and defensible method of assessing the disease risk associated with the movement of 
pullets off a farm in a Control Area (i.e., the likelihood of moving infectious and undetected 
birds as well as the likely number of infectious birds at the time of movement). Movement of 
pullets to a specific destination, such as a layer premises with other birds present, may require a 
separate and specific risk assessment.  
This risk assessment is a joint effort of the Secure Egg Supply (SES) working group, which is 
made up of representatives from the egg industry, academia, State Animal Health Officials 
(SAHOs), and the United States Department of Agriculture Animal and Plant Health Inspection 
Service (USDA-APHIS), to support permits for the movement of table eggs, egg industry 
products and byproducts, hatching eggs, day-old chicks, pullets, or spent hens during an HPAI 
outbreak. This assessment is applicable to intensively raised, confined commercial or contract 
grow-out pullet premises that do not have other poultry species on the premises. These pullet 
facilities must participate in the USDA National Poultry Improvement Plan (NPIP) and follow 
the SES and Secure Poultry Supply (SPS) Plans in the event of an HPAI outbreak. The SES Plan 
contains science-based outbreak measures developed by the SES working group to mitigate the 
risk of HPAI spread associated with the movement of egg industry products.  
This risk assessment assumes that applicable current industry practices and biosecurity measures 
(e.g., the NPIP) as well as outbreak-specific measures stipulated within the USDA HPAI 
Response Plan (The Red Book) and Secure Poultry Supply (SPS) Plan are implemented and 
strictly followed. The main categories of outbreak measures considered include:    
• Establishing all criteria needed to meet the definition of an avian influenza (AI) 
Monitored Premises 
• Active surveillance (e.g., rRT-PCR [real-time reverse transcription polymerase chain 
reaction] testing, detection of abnormally high mortality)  
• Observing the greatly enhanced biosecurity measures of the Pre-Movement Isolation 
Period (PMIP) 
• Following specific infection mitigation measures pertaining to load-out vehicles, crews, 
and equipment  
The PMIP is a critical biosecurity component that involves a defined period of greatly intensified 
biosecurity for an entire premises prior to permitted movement of live poultry within, into, or out 
of a regulatory Control Area during an HPAI outbreak. The PMIP starts a specified number of 
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days prior to the scheduled movement date and ends when load-out begins (i.e., the hours or days 
of load-out are not considered part of the PMIP). The PMIP duration to move pullets off a 
premises is set at 8 days and includes the following stipulations: 
• No live or dead poultry will be moved onto or off the premises. 
• Only feed delivery and emergency operational visits to the premises will continue. 
• Manure, litter, and garbage will not be removed from the premises; the producer is 
responsible for managing the risks associated with any on-site movement or handling of 
manure, litter, and garbage that must occur.  
• Enhanced biosecurity will be implemented for people, vehicles, and equipment entering 
the premises; no off-site equipment will be pre-staged on-site. 
The length of the PMIP decided upon by the SES working group is 8 days, which is expected to 
provide a high probability (i.e., >95%) of detection for nearly all HPAI strains, though the 
possibility exists that an 8-day PMIP may not be sufficient either due to an especially 
problematic HPAI strain or reduced contact rate (rate of within-house spread). 
We assume that movement of infected pullets to a layer facility would pose a high likelihood of 
HPAI spread to susceptible poultry and have high adverse consequences and, therefore, we rated 
the overall risk according to the likelihood of moving infected and undetected birds as well as the 
likely number of infectious birds at the time of movement. The probability of detection before 
movement improves as the number of days after exposure increases. As HPAI moves through a 
flock, there is an increase in mortality due to the virus, which consequently increases the 
likelihood of including at least one infected bird in the pooled mortality sample taken for 
diagnostic testing or of observing the increased total mortality. Thus, the PMIP serves a dual 
purpose of: (1) reducing the chances of exposure to HPAI close to the time of movement, and (2) 
allowing sufficient time for the infection to manifest itself within the flock and be detected prior 
to movement. 
To assess the overall risk of moving pullets out of a pullet barn in a Control Area, this risk 
assessment evaluated the possible pathways for virus transmission to pullet premises. Each 
pathway may consist of combinations of several activities. We have grouped these pathways into 
several categories: (1) components of local area spread; (2) people, vehicles, or equipment; and 
(3) load-out processes. Local area spread refers to risk pathways which cause an increased 
likelihood of disease transmission with proximity to infected poultry flocks. If, due to a lapse in 
PMIP biosecurity practices or other unforeseen events, pullets are moved out of the barn within a 
short time after being exposed to the HPAI virus, it is unlikely that HPAI would be detected by 
the time of movement. Therefore, pathways for HPAI infection of pullets close to scheduled 
movement combined with the likelihood of detecting the infection prior to movement and the 
likelihood of infection during the load-out process were considered in order to evaluate the 
overall risk of spread associated with movement of pullets out of the barn. The pathways and 
their corresponding likelihood and risk ratings are described below. The overall finding and 
conclusion qualitatively integrates the results from the pathway assessments and the estimation 
of likelihood of detection, taking into account the assumed high consequences. 
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2.1 Likelihood of Pullet Flock Becoming Infected with HPAI via 
Components of Local Area Spread Resulting in Infected but 
Undetected Movement Out of the Barn 
• Insects. The likelihood of a pullet premises becoming infected with HPAI virus via insect 
transmission varies with distance and with source premises infection status, where 
proximity to a known infected premises directly influences likelihood. Of note, for 
premises located closer than 1.5 km to an infected flock, there are too many variables to 
accurately assess the risk of becoming infected with HPAI via insect transmission. The 
following is a breakdown for the likelihood of HPAI spread to a pullet flock via insect 
transmission: 
Source premises type 
Composite likelihood rating (insects) 
Distance from source (km) 
1.5 2 >3 
Known infected premises Negligible to 
moderate 
Negligible to 
low 
Negligible 
Infected but undetected premises Negligible to 
low 
Negligible to 
low 
Negligible 
 
• Aerosols. The likelihood of a pullet premises becoming infected with HPAI virus via bio-
aerosols varies with distance and viral load at the source premises. Literature review and 
most previous outbreak reports indicated that aerosol transmission was not an important 
factor at distances more than 1.5 km from an infected flock. However, there is some 
evidence of aerosol transmission over short distances and both expert opinion and 
exploratory dispersion modeling indicate possible risk of transmission beyond 2 km. The 
following is a breakdown for the likelihood of HPAI spread to a pullet flock via bio-
aerosol transmission (the presence of additional risk factors, such as high winds or 
infected carcass disposal, will influence where the true risk lies within the given ranges): 
Source premises type 
Composite likelihood rating (aerosols) 
Distance from source (km) 
<3 >3 
Infected poultry premises Low to Extremely high Negligible to low 
 
• Wild birds. The likelihood of HPAI virus spread to a pullet premises via wild birds 
depends upon the type of wild birds and exposure to the wild birds. Aquatic species and 
larger non-aquatic species have not been known to gain entry to poultry barns, while 
passerine birds may access the inside of a pullet barn. With an effective PMIP including 
increased barn-to-barn biosecurity and the use of LOS-specific footwear, the likelihood 
of HPAI infection via wild aquatic birds and via non-passerine non-aquatic birds may 
decrease, as they and their waste are unlikely to access or be tracked into a pullet barn. 
Given that passerine birds may access the inside of pullet barns (even during a PMIP) and 
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have been shown to be capable of shedding the virus, the likelihood of HPAI spread to a 
pullet flock via each of these bird categories is described below: 
Wild bird category Composite likelihood rating 
(wild birds) 
Aquatic wild birds Low 
Non-aquatic wild birds (passerine-type) Low to moderate 
Non-aquatic wild birds (non-passerine) Low 
 
• Live-haul routes. The risk of HPAI virus spread to pullet premises near poultry live-haul 
routes via feathers, feces, and other fomites is both distance- and source flock-dependent. 
Given that poultry and live-haul vehicles passing a premises within the Control Area may 
originate from within or outside the Control Area, the following risk ratings are provided: 
                                                                                    Risk rating at given distance 
                                                                     (between live-haul road and poultry premises) 
Characteristics of live-haul vehicle 
<100 
meters 
100-1000 
meters 
>1000 
meters 
Truck hauling birds that had no PMIP and no tests  High  Moderate  Low 
Truck hauling birds that had less than optimum 
PMIP and tests (e.g., 80% effective PMIP; delayed testing; 
or load-out >24 hours) 
 Low  Very low  Negligible 
Truck hauling birds that had a PMIP & rRT-PCR 
negative birds (i.e., 100% effective PMIP; two tests within 
24 hours of move and completion within 24 hours) 
 Very low  Negligible  Negligible 
  
 
2.2 Likelihood of Pullet Flock Becoming Infected with HPAI via Movements 
of People, Vehicles, or Equipment, Resulting in Infected but 
Undetected Movement Out of the Barn 
• Feed and Emergency Operational Visits. Operational visits will be limited during a 
PMIP; however, delivery of feed during this period is likely and the potential for 
emergency maintenance visits and service visits for bird health also exists. Provided the 
biosecurity stipulations of the PMIP are in place and strictly followed, the likelihood of a 
pullet flock becoming infected with HPAI via feed and emergency operational visits 
during a PMIP was assessed as follows: 
Feed or emergency operation component Composite likelihood rating  
Contaminated feed Negligible to low 
Feed delivery (i.e., driver and/or vehicle) Low 
Other emergency operations visitors (i.e., 
personnel and/or vehicle) 
Low to moderate 
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• People and Their Vehicles. During the PMIP, vehicle and visitor traffic to a poultry 
premises may include only growers, employees, and emergency or feed delivery visitors. 
Provided the SPS PMIP measures for people are implemented and strictly followed (e.g., 
use of LOS-specific clothing and footwear), we rate the likelihood of a pullet flock 
becoming infected with HPAI via people (namely growers or employees; see above for 
emergency and feed delivery visitors) and their vehicles during the PMIP as follows: 
Person type Composite likelihood rating 
(people) 
Growers/employees and their vehicles Low 
 
• Shared Equipment (other than load-out equipment). Previous poultry disease 
outbreaks demonstrate a known risk for virus spread as a result of movement of 
contaminated and shared equipment. Equipment that is brought onto a poultry premises 
may contaminate the ground or personnel who work with poultry, or if used inside a barn, 
may come into direct contact with live poultry. During the PMIP, no off-site equipment 
will be pre-staged and only equipment associated with feed delivery or emergency 
operational visits may be brought to the premises. Provided the biosecurity stipulations of 
the PMIP are in place and strictly followed, the likelihood of a pullet flock becoming 
infected with HPAI virus via shared machinery or equipment during the PMIP is low. 
Pathway Composite likelihood rating 
(shared equipment) 
Shared equipment Low 
 
• Dead Bird Disposal. The risks of HPAI introduction associated with off-site dead bird 
disposal methods, such as rendering, are well documented, and off-site disposal of dead 
birds must be discontinued during a PMIP. Nevertheless, the risky practice of off-site 
dead bird disposal may still occur in the Control Area on other premises, and on a pullet 
premises in the days leading up to a PMIP. Off-site dead bird disposal methods prior to a 
PMIP result in possible premises contamination, although the implementation of a PMIP 
does reduce the likelihood that such contamination will be tracked inside a pullet barn 
during the PMIP. Additionally, many scavenger species can biologically or mechanically 
carry HPAI virus and have home ranges of adequate size to contain adjacent poultry 
farms. As a result, access to any on-farm dead bird storage container or disposal method 
represents a pathway for HPAI spread. Provided the SPS PMIP measures—specifically 
discontinuing any off-farm mortality disposal and utilizing LOS-specific footwear—are 
implemented and strictly followed, we rate the likelihood of a pullet flock becoming 
infected with HPAI via dead bird disposal as follows: 
 
Mortality disposal practice Composite likelihood rating 
(dead bird disposal) 
Likelihood of a pullet flock becoming infected 
via the mechanical or biological transfer of 
Low to moderate 
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HPAI virus from on-farm dead bird disposal 
during PMIP 
Likelihood of a pullet flock becoming infected 
via the mechanical or biological transfer of 
HPAI virus from off-site dead bird disposal 
that takes place prior to the PMIP 
Moderate 
 
• Garbage Management. Multiple types of potentially contaminated items have been 
reported to be disposed of in garbage on poultry operations, and there is potential for 
HPAI virus associated with garbage management to be tracked into the pullet barn. 
During a PMIP, no off-site movement of garbage is allowed. Provided the SPS PMIP 
measures (specifically discontinuing any off-farm garbage disposal and utilizing LOS-
specific footwear) are implemented and strictly followed, we rate the likelihood of a 
pullet flock becoming infected with HPAI via garbage management during the PMIP as 
low. 
Pathway Composite likelihood rating 
(garbage) 
Garbage management Low 
 
2.3 Likelihood of Pullet Flock Becoming Infected with HPAI via Load-out 
Crews, Vehicles, or Equipment Resulting in an Infected but Undetected 
Movement Out of the Barn 
Load-out. Previous outbreaks have implicated contaminated load-out crews and 
equipment in the spread of AI. If a flock were infected via contaminated load-out crews 
or equipment, this infection could remain undetected until after arrival at the destination 
facility. Given that PMIP enhanced biosecurity and SPS Plan testing measures are strictly 
implemented, and that additional load-out mitigation measures are in place premises-
wide for the duration of load-out, the risk of a pullet flock becoming infected with HPAI 
virus via load-out operations and resulting in an infected but undetected movement out of 
the barn is estimated to be range between low and high. While the likelihood of moving a 
large number of infectious pullets (>80 birds) is likely to be low.  
Pathway Composite risk rating    
(load-out) 
Load-out activities Low to high 
 
This assessment aids, but does not replace, the judgment of on-scene officials. This document is 
an evolving product-specific risk assessment that will be reviewed and updated as necessary 
before and during an outbreak to incorporate the latest scientific information and preventive 
measures. If the Incident Command System is activated in response to an HPAI outbreak, APHIS 
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(and Incident Command staff) will review this risk assessment with respect to the situation in 
order to assess industry requests for movement of pullets off premises.    
 
Overall Finding and Conclusion 
The risk that movement of pullets out of a pullet barn within a Control Area during an 
HPAI outbreak results in the movement of infected but undetected birds is likely to be 
extremely high unless significant mitigation measures are in place. Provided that all 
applicable preventive measures from the Secure Poultry Supply Plan, in particular the 
Pre-Movement Isolation Period (PMIP) and additional load-out mitigations, are 
implemented and strictly followed the risk is estimated to range between low and 
extremely high; however, the likelihood of moving a large number of infectious pullets 
(>80 birds) is rated to be low. Individual pathway risk ratings are noted in the executive 
summary above. 
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3 Introduction 
In the event of a highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) outbreak in the U.S. poultry industry, 
local, state, and federal authorities will implement a foreign animal disease emergency response. 
This response consists of a control and eradication strategy utilizing depopulation, quarantine, 
and movement control measures within a Control Area to prevent further spread of HPAI virus. 
State and/or federal authorities may also issue official permits to allow movement of birds and 
their products from premises not known to be infected within the Control Area to promote 
business continuity. A request for a movement permit must be supported by a risk assessment (or 
some scientifically based logical argument) to demonstrate that the risk of HPAI spread 
associated with the movement of the product in question is acceptable; ultimately, whether or not 
the assessed risk level is acceptable will be determined by regulatory authorities and industry. 
Completing these types of risk assessments in a timely manner during an outbreak can be 
challenging. Integrated poultry systems precisely manage poultry growing facilities to maximize 
poultry product value and minimize cost of product production. Extended movement restrictions 
may result in delays to processing, increased cost of production, loss of product value or loss of 
birds entirely in addition to many potential unintended consequences (e.g., animal welfare issues, 
increased waste streams, product shortages for customers, etc.). Proactive risk analysis identifies 
areas of risk and incorporates mitigation steps in order to minimize the spread of infection. 
Evaluating risk before an outbreak occurs facilitates timely emergency response and movement 
permitting decisions and minimizes unintended disruptions to business continuity.   
Previous assessments have explored the risk of HPAI infection of day-old chicks at the hatchery 
via horizontal transmission from breeder premises and the risk of HPAI infection of day-old 
chicks due to local area spread (See [Layer] Hatching Eggs risk assessment and Broiler Hatching 
Eggs and Day-Old Chicks risk assessments). These pathways were evaluated to be negligible to 
low when the outbreak measures specified in the SPS Plan are implemented. 
The purpose of this assessment is to provide regulators and industry with an objective and 
defensible method of assessing the disease risk associated with the movement of pullets out of 
the pullet barn in a Control Area (i.e., the likelihood of moving infectious and undetected birds 
as well as the likely number of infectious birds at the time of movement). Movement of pullets to 
a specific destination, such as a layer premises with other birds present, may require a separate 
and specific risk assessment.  
Pullets are generally moved between 12 and 20 weeks of age. HPAI infection early in the 
growing period may likely be detected before movement. However, it is less likely that HPAI 
would be detected by the time of movement if they became infected during load-out or in the 
days leading up to movement, due to a delay between infection and the manifestation of clinical 
signs or mortality.  
In order to evaluate the risk of movement of pullets in a Control Area, plausible pathways were 
identified for the spread of HPAI infection. This analysis evaluated pathways for HPAI infecting 
a pullet flock in the days leading up to movement (an assessment of HPAI virus introduction 
onto pullet farms at or before scheduled time of movement). Each pathway may consist of 
combinations of several activities. These pathways have been grouped into three categories: (1) 
local area spread; (2) people, vehicles, or equipment; and (3) load-out.  
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Local area spread refers to risk pathways that pose an increased likelihood for disease 
transmission due to proximity to an infected premises. The components of local area spread 
considered in this analysis include transmission of HPAI virus via:  
• Insects; 
• Bio-aerosols generated from neighboring infected flocks;  
• Wild birds (aquatic and non-aquatic); and  
• Fomite transmission from poultry live-haul roads. 
Other pathways considered in this analysis include transmission of HPAI virus through: 
• Feed delivery; 
• People and vehicles associated with feed and emergency operational visitors;  
• Fomites associated with people (e.g., premises employees who may have had contact 
with infected poultry or poultry waste); 
• Shared machinery or equipment; 
• Mechanical or biological transmission from dead bird disposal activities and sites;  
• Garbage collection and disposal; and 
• Equipment and crews used for load-out.   
This assessment applies only to the movement of pullets off premises located in the Control 
Area. This assessment considers current industry practices and biosecurity measures as well as 
outbreak-specific measures applicable for the movement of poultry in the risk evaluation. 
Specific biosecurity measures may vary widely by farm and geographic area. Categories of 
outbreak-specific measures from the SPS Plan considered here include a Pre-Movement Isolation 
Period (PMIP) for flocks prior to movement. Other measures include:  
• Limiting visitors to feed delivery and emergency operations  
• Specific feed truck and driver biosecurity measures 
• Biosecurity measures for farm personnel and other essential visitors 
• Measures for persons collecting surveillance samples 
• Load-out truck and crew biosecurity, including truck routing 
• Following PMIP, specific downtime measures 
This assessment is an evolving product-specific risk assessment that will be reviewed and 
updated as necessary before and during an outbreak to incorporate the latest scientific 
information and preventive measures. If the Incident Command System (ICS) is activated in 
response to an HPAI outbreak, U.S. Department of Agriculture Animal and Plant Health 
Inspection Service (USDA:APHIS) and Incident Command staff will review this risk assessment 
regarding the situation in order to assess industry requests for movement of pullets.  
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4 Scope 
This section describes the scope of the assessment regarding the type of movements addressed 
and the facilities covered. 
4.1 Facilities Covered under this Risk Assessment 
This risk assessment is applicable to intensively raised, confined commercial or contract grow-
out facilities producing pullets that meet all of the criteria listed below: 
• Are in an HPAI Control Area.  
• Participate in the USDA APHIS National Poultry Improvement Plan (NPIP) as stated in 
9CFR145 and 9CFR147 and in conjunction with NPIP Program Standards (Standard E – 
Biosecurity Principles).2,3 
• Implement the SES and SPS Plan in the event of an HPAI outbreak.  
• Do not have other poultry species on the premises.  
• Have total confinement so that no pullets have access to the outdoors, wild birds are 
excluded, and effective pest control is implemented. 
4.2 Types of Movements Addressed under this Risk Assessment 
This risk assessment addresses only the pathways that may potentially affect movement of 
pullets off of premises within the Control Area (specific destinations for such a movement may 
require separate risk assessment[s], for example when moving pullets to another facility with live 
birds). 
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5 Overview of Data Analysis Approaches 
This assessment follows the general qualitative risk assessment principles recommended by the 
World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) import risk analysis guidelines.4 However, the 
organization of this risk assessment has been modified from that proposed in the OIE import risk 
analysis handbook as appropriate for the movement of pullets off a premises but not to a specific 
destination. Many of the described pathways may play a role in both the entry of HPAI virus 
onto pullet farms at or before the scheduled time of movement (e.g., similar to an entry 
assessment) and the spread of HPAI to another poultry flock as a result of the movement of an 
infected but undetected pullet flock off a premises (e.g., similar to an exposure assessment). A 
consequence assessment was assumed to be high as the risk of moving infected pullets could 
have considerable adverse consequences with regard to HPAI spread. 
The assessment utilizes an evaluation approach that rates the likelihood of individual pathways 
on a qualitative scale. The likelihood for each pathway was assessed and categorized using the 
descriptive scale in Table 1. The qualitative ratings for the pathways were determined using 
multiple data sources and evaluation approaches such as literature review, expert opinion, 
quantitative simulation model predictions, and past outbreak experiences. Quantitative 
simulation model results from previously completed proactive risk assessments were used to 
estimate the prevalence of infectious birds in potentially infected but undetected poultry flocks 
located near the pullet facility. Steady-state aerosol dispersion models recommended by the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) were used to partially inform the risk of aerosol spread 
from infected and undetected farms, along with other approaches. To determine the overall risk 
rating for pathways involving a chain of events in which all have to occur for the pathway to be 
completed, relatively more weight was given to events with lowest likelihood in the chain.  
Table 1. Descriptive scale to estimate the likelihood for an event to occur 
Likelihood Rating Description 
Extremely high The event is almost certain to occur 
High There is more than an even chance that the event will occur 
Moderate The event is unlikely but does occur 
Low It is very unlikely that the event will occur 
Very low There is a remote chance that the event will occur 
Negligible The likelihood that the event will occur is insignificant,  
not worth considering 
Uncertainty within the likelihood/risk estimations was accounted for by using a range defined by 
the terms in the descriptive rating scale provided in Table 1. A risk estimate of negligible to low 
includes the true risk, which is not deterministically known, where the interval between the two 
ratings represents the uncertainty in the analysis. For example, a low to extremely high rating if 
the premises is located within 3 km from an infected poultry farm was used with regard to 
aerosol transmission where there is considerable uncertainty in the aerosol dose-response 
relationship in chickens and the particle size distribution of aerosols generated in poultry houses 
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depends on the ventilation design, production type, and age of the birds. Other areas of 
uncertainty were handled similarly during the analysis. 
The overall risk estimate for the movement of pullets out of the pullet barn in a Control Area was 
determined by qualitatively combining the likelihoods of the individual pathways and the 
likelihood of detection assuming that all applicable preventive measures from the Secure Poultry 
Supply Plan (SPS Plan), in particular the Pre-Movement Isolation Period and additional load-out 
mitigation measures, are strictly followed (see Figure 1 below).  
 
Figure 1: Diagrammatic representation of the assessed risk with the relative amount of risk 
increasing as the width of the figure increases (the risk of component parts is not to scale). The 
risk assessment is based on consideration of the steps needed to move pullets off a farm and the 
pathways that could lead to infection of a flock, the subsequent likelihood of detection of the 
infected flock, and potential movement of an infected but undetected flock. 
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6 Significant Assumptions Used in the Risk Assessment 
This assessment is proactive in nature and cannot address the specific circumstances surrounding 
an outbreak in detail. Therefore, we must make some assumptions to establish context and 
applicability. These assumptions are that: 
• An HPAI outbreak has been detected, APHIS is implementing the HPAI Response Plan, 
and some form of local and state planning has taken place. The APHIS HPAI Response 
Plan is intended to complement regional, state, and industry plans. APHIS recommends 
their continued development.  
• Pullet farms may have undetected HPAI infection in their flocks. If there were absolute 
certainty that a pullet flock had no HPAI infection, there would be no risk of HPAI 
spread from movement of birds off a pullet farm. On the other hand, if HPAI infection 
has been detected on the premises, it is assumed that Incident Command would 
quarantine the premises. If infection were detected, the movement of pullets off the farm 
would not be allowed (and the facility would be depopulated, cleaned, and disinfected 
before resuming production). 
• Movement of infected and undetected pullets to lay facilities would have a high 
likelihood of spreading HPAI to susceptible poultry and, depending on location and lay 
farm size, have high adverse consequences (though the specific consequences of such 
spread were not evaluated), and therefore we rated the risk according to the likelihood of 
moving infected and undetected birds out of a pullet barn in a Control Area but not to a 
specific destination. Movement of pullets to specific destinations may require separate 
consequence and risk assessment. 
• The movement of pullets off a farm in the Control Area is in accordance with NPIP 
biosecurity and all relevant recommended preventive measures from the SES and SPS 
Plans are implemented and strictly followed. The assessment does not evaluate the risk 
that the preventive measures are incorrectly implemented either intentionally or 
unintentionally.  
• Other mechanisms outside of the SES and SPS Plans may be utilized for HPAI control at 
the discretion of the Incident Commander. Risks associated with movement of pullets out 
of the barn using additional mitigation measures on a case-by-case basis falls outside the 
scope of this Risk Assessment (see Appendix 14, Potential Mitigations to Lower Risk). 
• The assessment evaluates the risk of moving HPAI infected but undetected pullets out of 
a pullet barn in a Control Area. Although the risks of further spread to humans, wildlife, 
and other livestock associated with the production or movement of live poultry are 
critical concerns that should be addressed, they are outside the scope of this assessment. 
The Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Response Plan has personnel safety measures 
designed to mitigate the risk to humans. 
• The pullet premises does not have other poultry species on the premises. It is also 
assumed that the perimeter buffer area (PBA) excludes any other livestock species.    
• The risk assessment applies to HPAI virus strains that cause clinical infection and 
increased mortality in infected chickens. The risk assessment may not apply to strains 
that do not cause clinical signs representative of HPAI infection (i.e., AI strains that are 
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classified as highly pathogenic on a molecular basis only). For such strains, this risk 
assessment would have to be revised to reflect the biological characteristics of the virus. 
• The disinfectants used to implement various C&D measures during an outbreak have 
been approved by the Incident Command and are applied according to the manufacturer’s 
label directions or recommended procedures. 
• This assessment does not evaluate the risk of transmitting poultry diseases other than 
HPAI. Risk management decisions for poultry diseases other than HPAI are not directly 
supported by this work.  
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7 Background & Industry Characterization  
7.1 Definition of the Pullet Growing Process 
A pullet is a young female chicken that is raised for the eventual production of eggs. A pullet 
farm receives chicks from a hatchery typically within one day after eggs are hatched.5,6 
Depending on breed and conditions, pullets will begin producing eggs around 18-19 weeks of 
age. The predominant type of pullet grown for egg production in the U.S. is a white leghorn. The 
following information uses this breed as a reference point although many of the general 
statements apply to various breeds. 
At the pullet production farm, the chicks go through the brooding period for the first few weeks 
of age in a facility where proper temperatures are provided because they cannot fully regulate 
their body temperature. Brooding is followed by the grow-out period until the chickens reach the 
desired maturity, typically between 16-18 weeks of age. Pullets are then caught and transported 
to the layer farm. 
7.2 Overview of Pullet Production in the United States 
For 2017, the average number of hatching eggs which were targeted for table egg laying farms 
was 45.5 million per month.3 The annual average number of pullets placed on a monthly basis 
from 2013 to 2017 was 20.4 million birds; for the first 8 months of 2018 this number is projected 
to average 22.2 million pullets.3,10 These pullets are grown to support the U.S. egg laying hen 
flock which was estimated to be 321.4 million birds in January 2018.10 
Pullets needed to replace spent hen flocks represent the second largest cost of egg production.5 
The estimated cost of growing pullets in 2017 was $3.70/pullet, and there were 254.38 million 
pullets grown in 2017; therefore, the cost of growing all these pullets was 941 million dollars. 
(M. Ibarburu, personal communication, June 2018). As of January 2018, cage-free shell egg 
production accounted for 15.6% of current table egg layer flock (or 50.2 million hens). Of this, 29% were 
organic (14.6 million hens) and 71.1% were non-organic cage-free (35.7 million hens).7   
7.2.1 Vertical Integration 
There are several different business models that describe the pullet growing industry in the U.S. 
In all cases, pullet growing begins with the farm receiving day-old chicks from the hatcheries 
and growing them to maturity. Some pullet growers are independent farmers who secure day-old 
chicks from a National Poultry Improvement Plan (NPIP)-approved commercial hatchery and 
then sell the mature pullets to an egg producer. Most growers are part of an integrated system 
which may include a number of pullet farms and egg layer farms. Typically, a single company 
owns or controls pullet farms, feed mills, layer farms and/or a contract grower network for pullet 
growing and egg layers, and egg processing plant(s). Some companies also own hatcheries but 
most egg producers purchase day-old chicks from commercial primary producer multiplier 
flocks and hatcheries with a variety of genetic potential (SES WG, personal communication, 
June 2018). In the case of contract pullet growing, the integrator provides and retains ownership 
of the feed and the chickens, while the farmers receive payment when the flock is grown and 
moved to the layer house (SES WG, personal communication, April 2018). 
Commercial pullet flock size ranges from under 40,000 to over 300,000 birds (S. Malladi, 
personal communication, Sept 2017) with most pullets being raised in wire cages in 
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brooder/grow-out buildings.5 The size and number of rearing houses required depends upon the 
size and number of layer houses being supplied with replacement pullets and the number of egg 
production cycles in the laying house(s). On average, a single rearing house can grow 3 flocks on 
an annual basis.  
In conventional systems, “day-old chicks are initially placed in cages on one or two tiers, but 
around 4 weeks of age the flock is subdivided and chicks are moved into cages on the remaining 
one or two tiers. Pullets are transferred to a laying house, typically at 16-17 weeks of age, where 
they will stay for the remainder of their productive life. Moving at this age provides adequate 
time for pullets to recover from the stress of moving before egg laying begins.”5 
The length of the productive life of a laying hen depends upon the number of egg production 
cycles utilized on the egg farm. Typically, the productive life of laying hens ends at 78-80 weeks 
in a one-cycle system, at 102-106 weeks in a two-cycle system, and at 140-150 weeks in a three-
cycle system.  
7.2.2 Flock Service Managers and Poultry Health Monitoring 
Flock service managers/technicians are a critical part of pullet flock husbandry. They are 
employed by the company and act as a liaison between contract growers and company 
management. Company expectations and policy changes are presented to the growers by flock 
service managers. Flock managers assist with scheduling chick arrivals, feed deliveries, 
vaccinations, house environment, and other factors until final load-out for delivery to the layer 
farm. Typically, service managers visit each farm routinely (e.g., weekly or per company 
guidelines), provide advice on best management practices for the pullets, and support in-flock 
health, biosecurity, and animal welfare initiatives (SES WG, personal communication, April 
2018). 
Integrated producers and contract producers closely monitor factors affecting flock livability and 
the cost of production. These factors include morbidity, mortality, weight gain, feed conversion, 
and flock uniformity.5,8  Flock managers, under the guidance of company veterinarians or 
independent veterinarians, and often in conjunction with poultry nutritionists, closely monitor 
flock status. Noted disease or other factors impacting the flocks’ failure to thrive are addressed. 
Integrated companies are closed marketing systems and do not buy or sell birds in open livestock 
markets except in unforeseen circumstances where an integrator ends up with too many/too few 
birds for the planned system (e.g., fire/weather causing housing failure, change in density 
requirements). Biosecurity programs limit access to poultry houses and encourage use of 
dedicated clothing and boots, discourage sharing of equipment, and prohibit contact with other 
birds including pets and other poultry (SES WG, personal communication, April 2018).3 
7.2.3 Pullet Distribution and Logistics 
The majority (97%) of the U.S. table egg layers are housed in flocks with 30,000 or more hens.10 
Approximately 163 million hens, or about 53% of layer flocks over 30,000 birds, are located in 
the Midwest States, defined as Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Ohio, 
South Dakota, and Wisconsin.10  Northeastern states, Southeastern states and South Central 
states each have approximately 30-38 million laying hens.10 Heavily rural states have 
economically available land and feed grains. Chicks are transported to the pullet farms in 
hatchery trucks. The pullets are moved to the layer farm via company-owned equipment and 
company personnel, or via contract crews and contract equipment. Most pullets are generally 
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grown within 50 miles of egg production facilities; however, this distance is highly variable (e.g., 
can be less than 10 miles to more than 120 miles interstate) and may depend on scheduling and 
availability (SES WG, personal communication, April 2018). Thus, pullet numbers will reflect 
egg production and layer numbers by state. The leading egg-producing states are listed in Figure 
2 and the distribution of layer farms (both small and large) in the U.S. is diagrammed in Figure 3 
below. 
 
Figure 2.  Leading egg production states in recent years.  Source: Egg Industry Council Report. 
 
  
Figure 3. Geographic overview of layer farms in U.S. Dots represent numbers of layer farms, 
not numbers of individual birds. Image courtesy of USDA (Census of Agriculture 2012).9  
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7.3 Overview of Major Steps in Production of Pullets During Routine 
Operations 
7.3.1 Pullet Facility Operations 
There is a wide diversity in the profiles of pullet farms. Some pullets are grown on a single-age 
farm where all pullets are the same age and are moved onto the farm and off of the farm in single 
transfer movements. More common-place are pullet-growing farms with multiple flocks of 
varying ages (see Appendix 1, Poultry Industry Survey on Pullet Growing Management 
Practices). On these multi-age premises, when fully-grown pullets are moved off the farm, other 
flocks remain on the farm to continue the grow-out process.   
Most pullet houses have no arrangement for collection of eggs. This means that if pullet 
movement is delayed, the pullets may begin laying eggs in the pullet house, but there are no 
mechanical means for gathering the eggs. 
7.3.1.1 Pullet House Preparations 
Downtime is the period after the existing flock is removed and before the new flock arrives. 
Downtime is generally recommended for at least three weeks.8 During this time the houses are 
cleaned which includes the removal of any feed from the previous flock, and the cleaning of 
cages, perches and manure removal belts, when present. Depending on the type of building, 
floors, ceilings and walls may also be swept or blown-down and then washed. If used, all wood 
shavings or other types of litter are removed during the clean out process. Accumulated manure 
is removed from the building unless it is not allowed by local and state ordinances. Water lines 
undergo a cleaning procedure, trash is removed, and additional insect and rodent control 
measures are put in place. This is also a time to address maintenance issues not attended to 
during the previous flock grow-out period. After cleaning is completed, the house may be 
disinfected and then closed up until the next flock arrives. The effectiveness of the cleaning, 
disinfection, and fumigation should be checked by environmental testing of the house surfaces 
for coliform and Salmonella bacteria.5,8 
7.3.1.2 Receiving the Chicks 
Chicks are delivered to the pullet farm in a climate-controlled vehicle with the aim of keeping 
the temperature in the chick box between 78-84°F and the relative humidity at 70% (Figure 3). 
Upon delivery of chicks, all personnel involved in 
transferring the chicks into the pullet house must 
follow the farm’s biosecurity guidelines and wear 
clean clothing and footwear. Drivers may 
participate in unloading the chick carts from the 
truck but typically do not aid in placing the chicks 
in the pullet house. Once empty, the chick boxes are 
removed and returned to the hatchery for washing 
and disinfection. Chick box papers and cardboard 
chick boxes should be disposed of on the pullet 
farm or, rarely, they may be securely transported  
off-site for laboratory testing before disposal  
(SES WG, personal communication, April 2018). 
Figure 4. Chicks are loaded into boxes 
at the hatchery to be transported to 
farms. Photo courtesy of GNP 
C  
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7.3.1.3 Brooding 
In modern pullet houses, automated, computer-controlled environments maintain proper 
temperature, light, and humidity. Optimum environmental temperatures are highest during the 
brooding period when they will range from 85 to 95°F.5 Controlled ventilation and insulation are 
necessary to maintain proper temperatures and humidity.  
Newly hatched chicks are not capable of fully regulating their body temperature until a few 
weeks of age. Proper brooding temperatures and ventilation must be provided. Pullets which are 
grown for use in alternative layer housing systems are raised in the same system for which they 
are destined. Pullets must know how to move about the system and how to find feed and water 
when placed in the laying house.5 
Two systems are commonly used to control the temperatures during the brooding period, as 
follows: (SES WG, personal communication, April 2018)  
• Whole-house heating system  
○ Cage-grown pullets: The recommended house air temperature when the chicks are 
placed is in the range of 89-95°F with some slight variation between breeds.  
○ Cage-free pullets: Chicks placed into multi-tiered cage-free systems are provided 
with temperature management strategies very similar to the cage-grown pullets. 
• Localized brooding system: This system is less common but may be used for floor-grown 
pullets. This system uses hover (pancake) or radiant brooders. Because the heating is 
localized, temperatures need not be exact, as chicks can move toward or away from the 
heat source to seek a comfortable location.  
7.3.1.4 Other Early Flock Activities 
7.3.1.4.1 Beak Treatment 
Most chicks destined for egg-laying farms undergo a process to dull the point of the beak in 
order to lessen the harmful impact of natural pecking displayed between birds. There are two 
options used to accomplish the change in the beak profile. The first is an infrared treatment 
applied to the beak at the hatchery. This process causes the very tip of the beak to stop growing 
and to slough off during eating and foraging.10 Hatchery personnel are tasked with providing this 
treatment, rather than a contracted crew. A second process involves the use of a heated blade to 
cut and cauterize the beak when the chicks are approximately 7-10 days old at the pullet 
premises. This beak trimming process may be done by the producer and employees, or by 
contracted crews brought in for the task (SES WG, personal communication, April 2018). 
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7.3.1.4.2 Re-Distribution to all Tiers 
For cage-grown birds, at about 2 weeks of age chick papers are removed from the cage bottoms 
and chicks are divided, or split, between tiers of cages in order to provide more space (Figures 5 
and 6).  
 
 
 
 
 
Most chicks are raised to mature pullets in the same building that they are placed into as day-old 
chicks; however, in limited situations, the pullets may be moved into a second pullet house for 
the second part of the grow-out period.   
7.3.1.4.3 Vaccination 
Pullets are routinely vaccinated for a variety of diseases during their growth period and are often 
affected by company protocol and local disease conditions. These vaccinations may be delivered 
by a variety of routes: in drinking water, via droplet spray, or via individual bird handling (i.e., 
injection or eye drop) (see Appendix 10: Pullet Industry Survey on Vaccination Practices). While 
some vaccination methods may be accomplished by the grower or internal personnel, 
administration of injections or eye drop vaccines require the use of a specialized crew trained in 
bird handling (SES WG, personal communication, Mar 2018). 
Many diseases affect floor-raised birds more than cage-raised birds. In particular, infectious 
bursal disease and coccidiosis must be well controlled to ensure good uniformity and weight 
gain. Veterinarians with knowledge of the local disease burden should be consulted to implement 
an appropriate control program.8 
Figure 5.  Chicks are divided amongst all tiers of the 
pullet house cages at about 2 weeks of age.  Photo 
courtesy of Big Dutchman 
 
Figure 6.  8-week-old pullets. Photo 
courtesy of Big Dutchman 
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7.3.1.5 Feed and Water 
For cage-raised pullets, “water pipes and feed troughs extend the length of the cage rows and 
provide feed and water to chickens in each cage. One or two nipple or cup drinkers in the rear or 
upper part of each cage are attached to a water pipe (Figure 7). Feed troughs pass along the front 
of each cage and feed is mechanically moved along the trough by a chain or auger system 
(Figure 8). Feed troughs are filled and are regulated by [an automated system]. Changes in feed 
formulations (starter to grower to developer) should be based upon achieving target body 
weights,”5 in consultation with a nutritionist. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
During the pullet grow-out period, close attention is paid to the quality and nutritional value of 
the feed as a critical part of the maturation process of the flock. The same is true for water and 
lighting. Water must be provided on demand and be of good quality to encourage adequate 
hydration. For a successful feeding program, the feed mixing system and coordination of feed 
delivery are important. Pullet feed is not pelleted but rather it is in mash form. Feed is mixed in 
automated mills and delivered in covered hopper trucks to feed tanks at the pullet farm. 
Ingredients are stored in separate bins, weighed with a computerized batch control system, and 
mixed under the direction of the batching system (SES WG, personal communication, June 
2018).5 
7.3.1.6 Lighting 
Lighting schedules are varied throughout the growing period to encourage health and growth to 
support the eventual demands of egg production. Care is taken to manage light exposure and 
intensity so that the pullets do not begin to lay eggs before they have the optimum body weight 
and skeletal mass. “Day length can be used to prevent or delay onset of egg production in 
underweight pullets or to encourage early onset of egg production. Most brooder/grow-out 
houses are light-proof and all light exposure comes from electric light bulbs. Typical lighting 
programs provide a constant 10- to 12-hour day length from about 10-18 weeks of age. If 
optimum average pullet weights are attained, light stimulation begins at 17-18 weeks with initial 
weekly increases in day length of 30 minutes followed by adding an additional 15 minutes of 
light each week until 16 hours of light per day is attained. If maximum egg size is desired, 
reducing day length by 15 minutes per week between 10 and 15 weeks and delaying light 
stimulation until 19 or 20 weeks of age will delay sexual maturity until pullets have heavier body 
Figure 7.  Example water pipe and 
drinker for pullets. Photo courtesy of 
Big Dutchman 
 
Figure 8.  Example feed trough for pullets. 
Photo courtesy of Big Dutchman 
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weights resulting in larger eggs, fewer cloacal prolapses, and fewer eggs over the production 
cycle. To promote greater feed consumption, the light period can be reduced more slowly to 
provide more feeding time. To maximize egg numbers, chickens can be exposed to early light 
stimulation at 15-16 weeks of age which results in egg production 7-10 days earlier than normal 
and smaller eggs during the production cycle.”5 
7.3.1.7 Ventilation 
Air quality affects overall flock health and performance. Industry standards have been 
established as follows: ammonia <25ppm, carbon dioxide < 5000ppm, and carbon monoxide 
<50ppm (SES WG, personal communication, April 2018). Most pullet houses include 
mechanical ventilation systems which are programmed to automatically manage ventilation and 
provide a supply of fresh air. Naturally ventilated houses rely on natural air movement through 
the building via the building design, construction, and predominant wind direction. Because 
chicks are susceptible to air quality problems and drafts, maximum ammonia levels and air speed 
have been established. Draft speed ranges from 0.3 meters per second for 0- to 14-day-old birds 
to 1.75-3.0 meters per second for birds 28 days and older.11 For floor birds, circulation fans 
should be directed toward the ceiling to minimize the downward draft.   
7.3.1.8 Mortality 
Normal mortality is about 2-5% for the pullet rearing period from day one to 18 weeks (SES 
WG, personal communication, April 2018).  
7.3.2 Load-out 
7.3.2.1 Removal of Birds from Pullet House 
Pullets are a high-value link in the egg production chain. Therefore, when it comes to moving the 
pullets off the pullet farm, experienced handlers and equipment built for bird transfer should be 
used (SES WG, personal communication, May 2018). In the days leading up to the move, 
targeted attention is given to lighting schedules, feed, and temperature management. Planning for 
the move also includes considerations for weather factors such as avoiding the heat of the day or 
providing for extra protection from cold weather.11 
Pullets are caught by hand and loaded into carts, batteries (dollies), coops, or crates which are 
then placed on the live-haul trucks. Biosecurity considerations during the bird moves include 
avoidance of other poultry flocks, clothing and footwear for the handlers, and cleaning and 
disinfection protocols for vehicles and equipment (SES WG, personal communication, May 
2018).  
7.3.2.2 Transportation of Pullets to an Egg Production Facility 
Trucks and trailers carrying the moving cage batteries do not arrive on the pullet farm until the 
farm is ready to start the load-out process. In normal operations, this equipment may arrive the 
night before load-out begins to optimize crew time the next morning. Cages are routinely cleaned 
and disinfected before beginning load-out at a new farm. This process may take place at an off-
site sanitization facility or upon arrival at the pullet premises. Transport trucks will traverse back 
and forth between the pullet and layer farm until all of the birds have been moved (SES WG, 
personal communication, May 2018).  According to a survey of the SES WG, pullet moves take 
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on average 3-5 days to complete but may take up to 10 days (see Appendix 1, Poultry Industry 
Survey on Pullet Growing Management Practices). Factors influencing the length of the move 
include the availability of handlers and vehicles and also the distance between the pullet and 
layer farms. 
Trucks and battery cages used for transporting pullets to the egg production facility are usually 
dedicated for the purpose of moving egg layer pullets or less often may also be used for hauling 
spent layer hens to slaughter. Equipment may be owned by a company or by a contracted 
transport service. In some cases, pullet moving equipment is only used within one company, and 
some operations have such equipment dedicated to a single operation (SES WG, personal 
communication, May 2018). 
For UEP-certified flocks, equipment used to move pullets must be clean and well-maintained 
before loading birds.9 Pullet dollies or carts are usually washed and disinfected after the final 
load of pullets has been moved to the layer farm, but there is no current requirement to do so. In 
the case of an HPAI outbreak, washing and disinfecting vehicles and equipment after unloading 
the final load of birds is likely to become standard practice (SES WG, personal communication, 
May 2018). 
7.4 Overview of Current Disease Prevention and Biosecurity Efforts in 
Poultry Production 
To prevent disease introduction, as well as onward transmission to other premises if infection 
occurs, sanitation and biosecurity measures are addressed at all farms, though to varying degrees. 
Conceptual biosecurity involves evaluating the potential location of new poultry operations 
including regional poultry density, proximity to other poultry/animal facilities, flyways, 
prevailing winds, potential for flooding or other adverse weather events, and movement of 
poultry in the region. Structural biosecurity is achieved through the physical construction and 
maintenance of a facility and is the most reliable. However, it may require extensive changes to 
existing premises and, therefore, take time to execute. Operational biosecurity, in which standard 
operating procedures (e.g., pest control, farm/barn access requirements, C&D, etc) are 
implemented, can readily be updated, but relies on compliance and is thus less consistent. 
Following the 2015 H5N2 outbreak, many operational biosecurity recommendations were 
updated, and a Biosecurity Officer or Coordinator is now recommended for all commercial 
operations.2 The Biosecurity Coordinator is responsible for the development, implementation, 
maintenance and ongoing effectiveness of the biosecurity program and should be knowledgeable 
in the principles of biosecurity. 
Biosecurity involves procedures that reduce the probability of disease outbreaks and includes 
two components: (1) bioexclusion (keeping pathogens out) and (2) biocontainment (keeping 
pathogens from leaving an infected flock) after an outbreak occurs. Modern farms with naïve 
poultry populations are vulnerable to diseases, which have the potential to ruin an entire flock. 
Loss of the flock as well as the income from disease can be an enormous burden on producers, so 
the importance of biosecurity cannot be overstated.12  
7.4.1 Current Disease Prevention and Containment Measures in Commercial 
Poultry Operations during Normal (non-outbreak) Situations 
The National Poultry Improvement Plan (NPIP) is a cooperative industry-state-federal program 
focused on disease prevention and control in poultry and safety of poultry products throughout 
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the country. It operates through a memorandum of understanding with each of the 50 states and 
includes an H5/H7 LPAI program. Participation by poultry operations in NPIP programs is 
voluntary and widespread. The NPIP provides participants with standardized guidelines for 
poultry and egg management, as well as biosecurity practices. NPIP regulations (in 9CFR parts 
145 and 146) contain requirements that must be observed by flocks that participate in the NPIP 
and the NPIP Program Standards document describes specific tests and sanitation procedures.2 
According to the NPIP, biosecurity programs should include a designated Line of Separation 
(LOS) and Perimeter Buffer Area (PBA), and provisions to address personnel biosecurity 
practices, control of wild birds, rodents and insects, equipment and vehicle management, 
mortality disposal, manure and litter management, replacement poultry practices, water supplies, 
feed and replacement litter management, morbidity and mortality reporting, and regular 
biosecurity auditing. How individual producers meet these guidelines is variable, depending on 
farm layout and resources. Additional biosecurity plans and standards may be set by integrators 
and company policy.  
The following sections describe some recommended sanitary and biosecurity measures, though 
they may not be implemented in all facilities. 
7.4.2 Conceptual and Structural Biosecurity 
• Conceptual and structural biosecurity includes planning and building poultry grower sites 
in a way that limits disease transfer. Some key concepts employed in the poultry industry 
include12:  
○ Locating farms so they are isolated from other premises with poultry. Geographic 
relationship of sites to lakes, ponds, rivers, public roads, hatcheries, and feed mills 
should be considered. 
○ Siting farm access points and building roads so as to allow clean vehicles and 
personnel to approach poultry houses and to divert potentially contaminated vehicles 
and people away from the houses.  
○ Constructing farm buildings and other structures (e.g., houses, fences, gates, feed 
storage areas, etc) to provide for appropriate sanitation, to allow for quarantinable 
units, and to exclude wild birds, rodents, and other pests. 
7.4.3 Operational Biosecurity 
Operational biosecurity involves management decisions and routine procedures intended to 
prevent introduction of disease agents.12 
7.4.3.1 Secured Farm Entry 
• Only essential visitors (such as veterinarians, poultry crews, repair and maintenance 
personnel, and service personnel) are allowed on the farm.12,13   
• Non-essential visitors (e.g., sales representatives and tour groups) are limited and usually 
allowed onto farm premises only with authorization.12 
• Farms keep a record of all visitors and their previous farm visits.12,14-16  
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• All visitors should wash their hands and put on protective outer clothing, including clean 
footwear and head gear, before working with the flocks.12,13,17 
• Any visitors having birds of their own should not be allowed to be near the flocks.18  
• Farm gates, although becoming more prevalent, are not standard equipment on all farms 
but are recommended. Doors to the poultry houses should be kept locked during non-
business hours and secure from inside when working inside.12,13 Signs at farm entrances 
to should announce that the area is a biosecure zone and unauthorized entry is 
prohibited.13 
• Facilities should establish an LOS and PBA aimed at reducing the potential for virus to 
enter and contaminate the production site.19 
○ A PBA, an outer control boundary around the poultry houses, should be clearly 
delineated such that nonessential vehicles do not enter into it and farm personnel do 
not leave it in the course of their daily tasks. 
7.4.3.2 People 
• Biosecurity training stresses the importance of not owning (and avoiding contact with): 
other poultry not owned by the business; wild birds; upland gamebirds; waterfowl; 
backyard poultry; pet birds; or show birds.12  
• In the case of hunting waterfowl or inadvertent contact with non-company birds, some 
companies require that personnel let 72 hours pass before contact with company birds 
(SES WG, personal communication, May 2018).  
• Personnel or any visitors entering the PBA should put on cleaned and disinfected 
footwear or new, disposable footwear and disposable gloves or apply hand sanitizer as 
they leave their vehicle within the PBA or as they cross into the PBA.20 
• Disposable items used during flock visits should be disposed of in a biosecure manner.  
• Before entering the flock area and handling the birds,  all personnel should wash hands 
with soap, water and apply disinfectant.12,18  
• Feed delivery drivers should put on clean footwear (e.g., rubber boots or disposable 
covers) before getting out of the vehicle.12 Feed truck drivers do not enter the poultry 
houses (SES WG, personal communication, Feb 2018).  
• Any uncovered or spilled feed should be cleaned up and disposed of to avoid attracting 
wild birds, rodents, and other pests.12 Spilled feed is not to be fed to the poultry flocks as 
it may become contaminated on the ground (SES WG, personal communication, Feb 
2018). 
7.4.3.3 Sanitation Facilities on Farm 
• Hand washing and/or hand-sanitizing facilities and a place to change footwear and outer 
clothing should be provided at the entrance to each LOS to allow for a biosecure entry to 
poultry houses.20  
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• Full showers and changing rooms may or may not be provided on the farms for visitors 
and employees, however, donning clean farm specific coveralls/clothing and footwear 
should be required for crossing a LOS (SES WG, personal communication, March 2018). 
7.4.3.4 Cleaning & Disinfection (C&D) 
7.4.3.4.1 Vehicles and Drivers 
• Wheel dips or wheel spraying facilities, while recommended structural biosecurity 
attributes, are not commonly provided at farm entrances for all vehicles coming onto the 
farm.  
• Service technicians and company personnel should spray tires and underside of vehicles 
with an antimicrobial solution between farm visits.12  
• After returning from a location where birds are present, including a feed store, all 
equipment, truck tires, clothing, and shoes should be cleaned and disinfected.18 
7.4.3.4.2 Equipment 
• Sharing of equipment or supplies with other poultry premises should be minimized.19 If 
sharing is necessary, the items should be thoroughly cleaned and effectively sanitized 
between uses.  
• Equipment that comes in contact with birds or their droppings should be thoroughly 
cleaned and disinfected before entering poultry houses13,15,18 and before being placed 
back into a vehicle.12  
• Organic matter such as manure, litter, debris, and feathers must be removed before 
disinfecting for disinfection to be effective.18  
7.4.3.4.3 Water Supplies 
• Water should come from deep wells or sources that have been treated to eliminate any 
potential contamination with live virus.19,21 
• If water comes from a surface source for use in cleaning, cool cells (i.e., evaporative 
cooling systems), or flock drinking, experts in water treatment should be consulted on 
how to monitor and continuously treat water to eliminate viable virus.15,19 
7.4.3.4.4 Housing Area  
• After the flock is removed, unused feed is then removed from the feed system, including 
all bins and augers (SES WG, personal communication, Feb 2018).  
• Doors should be secured even when houses are empty and all possible entries for wild 
birds should be sealed and checked frequently.12  
• When litter or manure is removed from the house, it should be transported in covered 
vehicles.  
• When manure/litter is completely removed from the house, the building may be C&D 
(using disinfectant or heat) before birds are reintroduced.21 
• When manure/litter is reused, a modified C&D procedure may be used.21  
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7.4.3.4.5 Flock Transport 
• Transport trucks and the associated bird moving equipment should be C&D prior to 
arrival on farm. 
7.4.3.5 Animal, Pest, Insect Control 
• Feed should be stored securely and spilled feed cleaned up immediately to limit attracting 
wild birds and pests to the property.12 
• Operations should have control measures to protect poultry from wild birds, their feces, 
and their feathers.19 
• If a pond or surface water source is on the property, steps should be taken to deter 
waterfowl from entering the area.  
• Poultry houses should have wild bird, insect, and rodent control programs in place19 
including a practice of bait rotation.12 
• Dogs and cats should not be allowed in poultry houses.12 
7.4.3.6 Dead Bird Disposal 
Disposal of dead birds is regulated by local, state, and federal governments to control the impact 
of carcass disposal on air quality, water quality, and the spread of disease. Disposal of mortality 
is a daily necessity since dead birds can harbor pathogenic microorganisms with potential 
transmission to other poultry. Cost of supplies, labor reliability, maximum anticipated daily 
mortality, and degree of biosecurity associated with each method must be assessed.12  
• Composting requires a solid floor and covered roof system that has adequate primary and 
secondary bin capacity to meet the predicted mortality level for the farm. The area should 
be managed so carcasses are covered to prevent access by wild animals and to maintain 
adequate temperatures for composting.12 
• On site disposal should be performed daily. If off site methods are used, stored carcasses 
should be protected to prevent exposure to insects and wild animals.12,19  
• Trucks moving manure or dead birds should be covered and follow a designated 
approved route. Trucks should be cleaned and disinfected after deliveries and before 
entering another farm.12  
• Disposal methods should avoid the potential for cross-contamination with dead birds 
from other facilities.19 
7.4.3.7 Manure and Litter Management 
• Manure and spent litter should be removed in a manner that prevents exposure of 
susceptible poultry, either on or off the farm of origin, to disease agents.19 
• Fresh litter should be stored and handled so it cannot be contaminated by insects, wild 
birds, or rodents.19  
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8 Hazard Identification: HPAI overview 
Hazard identification consists of listing the pathogenic agents associated with the species from 
which a commodity is derived and whether the agents can be classified as hazards for further 
consideration in the risk assessment.22 For this risk assessment of the movement of pullets out of 
the barn, the pathogenic agent of concern is HPAI virus. Properties of HPAI viruses, including 
environmental persistence, transmission characteristics, and physical and chemical inactivation, 
have been extensively reviewed in comprehensive texts.23 This section is a brief summary of the 
key properties of HPAI viruses from published scientific literature and expert opinion, with 
emphasis on the variability between HPAI virus strains and transmission characteristics in 
poultry.  
8.1 Agent   
AI viruses are negative-sense, segmented, ribonucleic acid viruses of the family 
Orthomyxoviridae. The Orthomyxoviridae family includes several segmented viruses including 
the Type A, B, and C influenza viruses. The Type A influenza viruses, which include all AI 
viruses, can infect a wide variety of animals including wild ducks, chickens, turkeys, pigs, 
horses, mink, seals, bats, and humans. The type B and C viruses primarily infect humans and 
occasionally pigs.23-25 
Two surface glycoproteins of the influenza A virus, hemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase 
(NA), are the most important antigenic sites for the production of protective immunity in the 
host; however, these proteins also have the greatest variation. For AI viruses there are sixteen 
known different subtypes of HA (H1 to H16), ni e known different subtypes of NA (N1 to N9), 
and 144 different HA:NA combinations (H17N10 and H18N11 have thus far only been isolated 
from bats).23,25 Although relatively few of the 144 subtype combinations have been isolated from 
mammalian species, all subtypes, in the majority of combinations, have been isolated from avian 
species.  
8.1.1 Definition of Highly Pathogenic Notifiable Avian Influenza 
For the purpose of disease control programs and international trade in domestic poultry products, 
HPAI is defined in the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 9, Section 53.126 as: 
1) Any influenza virus that kills at least 75% of eight 4- to 6-week-old susceptible chickens 
[or 6 out of 8 birds], within 10 days following intravenous inoculation with 0.2 ml of a 
1:10 dilution of a bacteria-free, infectious allantoic fluid; 
2) Any H5 or H7 virus that does not meet the criteria in paragraph 1 of this definition, but 
has an amino acid sequence at the hemagglutinin cleavage site that is compatible with 
HPAI viruses; or 
3) Any influenza virus that is not an H5 or H7 subtype and that kills 1 to 5 [out of 8 
inoculated] chickens and grows in cell culture in the absence of trypsin. 
The World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) Terrestrial Animal Health Code Article 10.4.1 
defines HPAI viruses to be AI viruses that “have an IVPI [intravenous pathogenicity index] in 6-
week-old chickens greater than 1.2 or, as an alternative, cause at least 75% mortality in 4- to 8-
week-old chickens infected intravenously. H5 and H7 viruses which do not have an IVPI of 
greater than 1.2, or cause less than 75% mortality in an intravenous lethality test, should be 
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sequenced to determine whether multiple basic amino acids are present at the cleavage site of the 
haemagglutinin molecule (HA0); if the amino acid motif is similar to that observed for other 
high pathogenicity avian influenza isolates, the isolate being tested should be considered as high 
pathogenicity avian influenza virus.”27 
In the United States, all H5 or H7 virus isolates of both low and high pathogenicity, and all HPAI 
virus isolates regardless of subtype, are reportable to state and national veterinary authorities and 
to the OIE.28,29 Although other low-pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) viruses may cause 
considerable morbidity and production losses, they are not reportable diseases to the OIE (but 
may be reportable in some states). 
8.1.2 Host Range 
Wild waterfowl are considered the natural reservoirs of LPAI viruses, but the role of wild birds 
as reservoirs for most HPAI viruses responsible for high mortality in domestic birds is not fully 
elucidated.30 Surveillance and phylogenetic analyses, however, suggest that migratory waterfowl 
are important in the maintenance, reassortment, and spread of HPAI viruses.31-33 The phrase 
“highly pathogenic for chickens” does not indicate or imply that the AI virus strain is highly 
pathogenic for other bird species, especially wild ducks or geese (Anseriformes). However, if a 
virus is highly pathogenic for chickens, the virus will usually be highly pathogenic for other 
birds within the order Galliformes, family Phasianidae, such as turkeys and Japanese quail.  
Most HPAI viruses for chickens are generally non-pathogenic for ducks and geese in 
experimental studies.24 However, the lethality of HPAI viruses has changed since the re-
emergence of H5N1 HPAI viruses in Hong Kong in 2002, as some strains have become highly 
lethal in some naturally and experimentally infected waterfowl.30 For example, the 2017 H5N6 
HPAI outbreak on a domestic meat duck commercial farm in the Netherlands was associated 
with high mortality.34 The evolving H5 HPAI viruses spread throughout Asia and Europe 
between 2005 and 2014.35 In late 2014, the Eurasian H5 clade 2.3.4.4 viruses were detected in 
North American wild birds32,36,37 and reassorted with American AI viruses, and similar 
Eurasian/American HPAI H5 viruses were identified during the domestic poultry outbreak in 
2015 in the United States.38  
Characterization of the Eurasian/American HPAI H5 viruses found in wild birds was done by the 
National Wildlife Health Center and USDA National Veterinary Services Laboratory. 
Researchers at these agencies suggest identifying these HPAI H5 viruses as intercontinental 
group A (icA) to differentiate this changing subset of viruses from other Asian H5N1 HPAI.36 
Some wild birds—including ducks and geese—that were found to be positive for icA H5N8 and 
icA H5N2 exhibited morbidity/mortality at the time of sample collection.39 Experimentally, both 
strains—H5N8 (A/GF/WA/14) and H5N2 (A/NP/WA/14)—led to some mortality in domestic 
geese (Chinese geese) but not in domestic ducks (Pekin) (M. Pantin-Jackwood, personal 
communication, August 2016). An icA HPAI H5N2 strain isolated from infected turkeys in 
Minnesota in 2015 (A/Tk/MN/12582/2015) was experimentally inoculated into mallard ducks  
and caused mortality in individual birds in each group at medium (104) and high (106) 
inoculation doses, with a mean death time of 9 days.40 Thus, the host range affected by icA H5 
viruses is broad and the clinical signs in each host are variable. 
HPAI strains are known to emerge in poultry after the introduction of LPAI viruses from wild 
birds, and after circulation of virus for varying lengths of time in domestic poultry.41 This is 
Workin g Draft 
Pullets Out of the Barn Risk Assessment 
Page 43 of 296 
likely what occurred in the U.S. turkey industry in early 2016 when the first HPAI caused by an 
H7N8 virus (in any species), A/turkey/Indiana/2016, was detected in commercial turkeys.42 
Subsequent detections of H7N8 LPAI occurred on additional turkey premises; all HPAI and 
LPAI viruses were found to be of North American wild bird lineage. In 2017, a similar situation 
occurred in Tennessee when an H7N9 HPAI outbreak emerged following the circulation of an 
H7N9 LPAI virus in commercial poultry in the same area.43 The 2008 identification of an H5N2 
virus with an HPAI genotype—with evidence of non-lethal infection in wild waterfowl and 
without evidence of prior extensive circulation in domestic poultry—suggests that some AI 
strains with potential high pathogenicity for poultry could be maintained in a wild waterfowl 
community prior to introduction.30  
Host adaptation is a key determinant of the ability of an HPAI virus to maintain transmission 
within domestic poultry. Once adapted to gallinaceous birds, HPAI viruses are unlikely to 
circulate again among wild birds because they are adapted to poultry.44 However, the emergence 
of Asian-origin HPAI H5 strains has led to increased uncertainty regarding the role of wild birds 
as reservoirs in the maintenance of HPAI viruses in nature.31,45 Prior to the outbreak of HPAI 
H5N1 virus in Europe, Asia, and Africa starting in late 2003, HPAI viruses had only rarely been 
isolated from wild birds—usually associated with outbreaks in domestic poultry—with one 
exception: An outbreak of HPAI H5N3 (A/Tern/South Africa/1961) in South Africa in 1961 was 
observed in a population of terns.46 Now, Eurasian HPAI H5 strains have been isolated from 
multiple species of wild birds, both from healthy birds and from sick, moribund, or dead 
birds.33,47,48 However, despite extensive global wildlife surveillance efforts, infection with H5N1 
HPAI viruses has been detected in healthy wild birds in only a few isolated cases.46,48 The 
significance of wild birds as a source of infection and their influence on the epidemiology of 
HPAI viruses are yet to be fully established.30,33  
Additional hosts also may play a role in the epidemiology of these viruses as they continue to 
spread and reassort. Experimental studies have shown that various LPAI and HPAI viruses can 
infect and replicate in multiple mammalian species (e.g., cats, ferrets, mink, pigs, rabbits, 
raccoons, skunks).49-52 Several species of concern (e.g., wild animals that may have contact with 
commercial poultry premises such as rabbits, skunks, and raccoons) have been shown to be 
capable of shedding AI virus and, in some cases, of experimentally transmitting the virus to 
ducks via indirect contact (under conditions meant to simulate contact in a natural 
environment).51,53 
8.2 Geographic Distribution of H5 and H7 HPAI 
• The current list of all confirmed affected countries with H5 or H7 infection in animals is 
maintained by the OIE at http://www.oie.int/en/animal-health-in-the-world/update-on-
avian-influenza/2018/.26 
• A Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) publication graphically displayed 
the outbreaks of HPAI virus, H5 subtype, that occurred in the United States in 2014-2015 
both in relation to time and to poultry distribution and wild bird migratory patterns; the 
maps can be viewed at http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/22/1/15-1053_article#tnF1.54  
• The Global Early Warning System for Major Animal Diseases Including Zoonosis 
(GLEWS)—a joint effort of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
(FAO), OIE, and the World Health Organization (WHO)—provides a regular update on 
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global H5N1 HPAI events in the Global Animal Disease Intelligence Report, which can 
be viewed at http://www.glews.net/.55 
8.3 Virus Shedding  
HPAI viruses have been isolated from respiratory secretions, blood, feces, and feathers, as well 
as the eggshell surface, albumen, yolk, meat, and other tissues (e.g., spleen and lung) from 
infected poultry. Estimates of HPAI virus concentrations in chicken and turkey secretions, feces, 
feathers, and other tissues generally range between 103 and107 EID50 per gram or per milliliter, 
although higher concentrations have been observed in some cases.56-64 
H5N2 HPAI (A/chicken/Pennsylvania/1370/1983) viruses have been isolated from the eggshell 
surface, yolk, and albumen of eggs laid by experimentally inoculated hens.65 In these 
experimental studies, H5N2 HPAI viruses were not recovered from eggs laid on the first day 
post-inoculation of hens. This may have been due to the developing egg being protected from 
exposure in the shell gland (uterus) during the later stages of eggshell formation (about 15 
hours), in combination with the latently infected period of at least 6 hours in individual birds in 
this study. In contrast, HPAI virus was recovered from the yolk and albumen of eggs forming in 
the oviduct of dead chickens at postmortem, 35 to 37 hours after being experimentally infected 
with an HPAI virus strain (Dutch East Indies) isolated from chickens.66 Italian HPAI H7N1 
(A/chicken/Italy/445/99) viruses have also been isolated from eggs laid by infected hens.67 
In an experimental study, the concentration of H5N2 HPAI (A/chicken/Pennsylvania/1370/1983) 
virus ranged from 0.97 to 105.9 EID50/eggshell, from 0.97 to 106.1 EID50/ml in albumen, and from 
0.93 to 104.8 EID50/ml  in yolk of eggs laid by infected hens.65  
As compared to chickens, AI viruses in turkeys demonstrate a relatively high degree of affinity 
for oviduct tissue, relative to respiratory and digestive tissue.68 A predilection for replication 
within these tissues may explain the precipitous drops in egg production reported in turkey 
breeder hen flocks during natural outbreaks.69-72 Narayan et al.(1969) recovered AA 5-
turkey/Ontario 7732/66 HPAI virus from the yolks of each of three eggs laid by 30-week-old 
turkey hens that were infected through contact with a hen experimentally infected with an HPAI 
virus.73 In turkey breeder hens experimentally inoculated with swine-origin LPAI H3N2 
(A/turkey/Ohio/313053/04), virus was recovered from eggshells and egg contents.68 In this 
study, the percentage of viral detection on shell surfaces was significantly higher (P<0.005) than 
in albumen, when shell-less eggs were excluded from the analysis.  
8.4 Chemical and Physical Inactivation 
AI viruses are inactivated by physical factors such as heat, extremes of pH, hyper-isotonic 
conditions, and dryness; however, their infectivity can be maintained for several weeks under 
moist, low-temperature conditions.  
Due to their lipid envelope, AI viruses are relatively sensitive to disinfection agents and 
inactivation by lipid solvents such as detergents. The EPA maintains a list of disinfectants with 
label claims for AI viruses. These products include halogens, aldehydes, quaternary ammoniums, 
phenols, alcohols, peroxides, and some detergents.74-76 To ensure effective disinfection, 
appropriate operational conditions as recommended by the manufacturer have to be maintained. 
Operational conditions such as disinfectant concentration, temperature, contact time, pH, and 
organic load may impact the degree of virus inactivation. 
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8.5 Persistence of HPAI Virus in Manure and Other Media 
Persistence of AI viruses at various humidity levels and temperatures and on various substrates is 
summarized in Appendix 2: AI Virus Survival at Various Humidity Levels, at Various 
Temperatures, and on Various Substrates. The HPAI virus shed by infected birds may be 
protected environmentally by accompanying organic material that shields the virus particles from 
physical and chemical inactivation. Specific environmental conditions such as cool and moist 
conditions increase survival times in organic media and on surfaces. For example, H5N2 virus 
(A/chicken/Pennsylvania/1370/1983) remained viable in wet poultry manure in a barn up to 105 
days following bird depopulation in the Pennsylvania 1983-1984 outbreak (presumably in winter 
under freezing conditions). Experimentally, an HPAI strain from this outbreak survived for at 
least 35 days under moist conditions, but only 9 to 21 days under dry conditions at 4ºC 
(39ºF).77,78 H5N1 HPAI virus was viable in allantoic fluid for 10 days at 25 to 32ºC (77 to 90ºF) 
when kept out of direct sunlight, but was killed within 30 minutes of placing the sample in 
sunlight (32 to 35ºC; 90 to 95ºF).79  
8.6 Transmission 
Contact with migratory waterfowl, water birds, or shore birds is a risk factor for introduction of 
AI virus into domestic poultry populations.80 Because AI virus can be isolated in large quantities 
from feces and respiratory secretions of infected birds, an important mode of transmission is the 
mechanical transfer of infective feces.23 Once introduced into a flock, AI virus can spread 
directly from flock to flock by movement of infected birds and indirectly via contaminated 
equipment, egg flats, feed trucks, off-site mortality disposal, garbage trucks, service crews, or 
other means. Windborne transmission may occu when farms are closely situated and appropriate 
air movement exists.81,82 Wild animals such as raccoons and foxes have also been implicated in 
local area spread; some wild animals, specifically skunks and cottontail rabbits, have been shown 
experimentally capable of transmitting virus to birds via indirect contact through shared 
environments.53,83 Other mechanisms of transmission are outlined below. 
8.6.1 Vertical Transmission in Chickens and Turkeys 
Evidence of vertical transmission of AI virus from infected hens to day-old chicks or turkey 
poults has been lacking thus far, as most strains are lethal to embryos.84-87 Groups of turkey hens 
in egg production, with no clinical evidence of influenza A virus infection, were inoculated 
intravenously, or intratracheally, or were inseminated with semen contaminated with two LPAI 
viruses (T/Calif/meleagrium/64, T/Calif/5142/66), and virus was not recovered from poults 
hatched from eggs laid by exposed turkey hens.88 Chicks hatched from eggs produced by two 
broiler breeder flocks infected with HPAI H7N3 (A/Chicken/Canada/AVFV2/04) tested negative 
for AI during an outbreak in British Columbia in 2004. The outbreak report of the Canadian 
Food Inspection Agency states, “Because avian influenza does not survive long at incubator 
temperatures, day-old chicks are not a likely source of infection for broiler growers.”89 In the 
1983 Pennsylvania HPAI H5N2 (A/chicken/Pennsylvania/1370/1983) outbreak, eggs from four 
severely infected layer breeder flocks were incubated and assayed for AI virus. None of the dead 
embryos yielded HPAI virus in this study.90 Also, the 214 chicks hatched from these eggs 
showed no sign of AI disease and had not developed AI antibodies.90 
Transmission of HPAI or LPAI viruses from infected breeder flocks to day-old poults via 
hatchery dissemination has not been observed in previous outbreaks. Turkey industry 
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veterinarians and AI experts have stated that although there have been several LPAI outbreaks in 
the United States, vertical transmission or hatchery transmission has not been observed.91 In a 
small-scale survey conducted by the University of Minnesota, turkey industry representatives 
provided reports of 26 flocks that had undergone avian and other influenza A virus infections  
and where eggs from those flocks were set and not removed from incubation.91 There was no 
evidence of horizontal or vertical transmission of AI within the hatchery to day-old poults in any 
of these instances. 
8.6.2 Transmission via Artificial Insemination in Turkeys 
As compared to chickens, there is an additional risk in turkeys of viral transmission via the 
artificial insemination process. It is not anatomically or practically possible to collect semen 
without the collection device touching the cloaca; semen could also be contaminated during the 
semen preparation process in the laboratory. Contaminated fomites, such as hands or equipment 
of insemination crews and contaminated turkey semen, have been implicated in the spread of AI 
viruses between commercial turkey breeder operations and to commercial turkeys from 
humans.92-95 Although semen was implicated in the spread of AI in field outbreak investigations, 
isolation of AI virus from tom turkey semen was not reported in these studies.  
AI virus has previously been isolated from tom turkey semen, but titer levels were not reported.96 
It was unclear whether this virus came from the semen per se, or from the cloaca contaminated 
by fecal material.97 Other studies have demonstrated that AI viruses can be transmitted to turkey 
breeder hens through artificial insemination with semen experimentally contaminated with AI 
virus on the day of collection.98 Pantin-Jackwood et al. (2010) transmitted pandemic H1N1 
(A/Chile/3536/2009) virus to hens by intracloacal or intrauterine inoculation, demonstrating that 
transmission is possible through contamination of these mucosal surfaces by semen or fomites.99  
HPAI virus antigen has been observed in testes, suggesting that virus could be present in 
semen.100 In a 2013 study, tom turkeys were inoculated intranasally with 106 TCID50/0.5ml of 
triple-reassortant H3N2 influenza A virus of swine (IAV-S) A/Turkey/OH/313053/2004.101 Low 
viral titers were detected in the reproductive tract (testicles, epididymis, vas deferens, and 
phallus) and semen by rRT-PCR, but virus isolation was unsuccessful. The authors suspect that 
the low virus titers and/or the seminal environment may have adversely affected virus isolation. 
Nonetheless, based on the presence of viral RNA in the reproductive tract and semen, there 
remains a potential for venereal transmission of influenza virus in turkeys.  
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8.7 Dose Response 
8.7.1 Dose Response in Turkeys 
Both intraocular and intranasal inoculation were used in an experimental study of infectious and 
lethal doses of two HPAI strains in turkeys.102 In this study, turkeys were inoculated with H5N1 
(A/turkey/Turkey/1/05) and H7N1 (A/ostrich/Italy/984/00) strains, and all birds shown to be 
infected died. The ID50 and LD50 were thus equal; the median was 101 EID50 (or less) for H5N1 
and 102.2 EID50 for H7N1. Turkeys were found to be more susceptible than chickens by over 200-
fold for both H5N1 and H7N1.  
In another study, turkeys were inoculated with different doses of A/ostrich/Italy/984/2000 H7N1 
HPAI by a combined intranasal/intraocular route.103 Although ID50 and LD50 were not explicitly 
measured, the latter can be extrapolated from their data and was shown to be both dose- and 
time-dependent. There was no mortality with 101 EID50 by 7 days post-inoculation (PI), but there 
was greater than 50% (4/5) mortality with 106 EID50 at 48 hours PI. At 72 hours PI, the LD50 was 
103 EID50, and it was 102 EID50 by 96 hours PI. 
In their studies using a highly poultry-adapted LPAI strain (A/turkey/Ohio/313053/04), Pillai et 
al. (2010) demonstrated a markedly lower ID50 for turkeys (101.4 EID50) than for chickens (102.6 
EID50).68 They cautioned that virus strain as well as genetic make-up of the study birds may 
affect the minimum infectious dose, such that it may not be possible to generalize results from a 
few isolates in a certain breed of turkey.  
As stated above, the infectious dose for turkeys through intranasal inoculation for HPAI viruses 
(H5N1 and H7N1) has been found to be 2 to 3 lo s lower than that for chickens.102 Given a 50% 
chicken infectious dose of 5 to 6 log EID50 for aerosol transmission from the dose-response 
models, it is possible that the turkey infectious dose is between 3 and 4 log EID50. Transmission 
of LPAI (A/turkey/Wisconsin/1966) to turkeys has been demonstrated via an estimated aerosol 
dose between 3 and 4 log EID50.104 Data from this experimental study suggests that the 50% 
aerosol infectious dose is close to or less than 3 to 4 log EID50. 
HPAI infection via the gastric route is not well-documented in turkeys. In one small study, 50-
day-old turkeys were inoculated by the direct esophageal route with A/turkey/Italy/4580/1999 
HPAI H7N1 in a dose of 2 g of 103.6 EID50/0.1g infective meat homogenate (for a total dose of 
104.9 EID50).62 Tracheal and cloacal swabs collected up to day 7 remained negative, as did serum 
samples up to day 21, and no clinical signs were observed. These results imply that the infective 
dose for HPAI via esophageal inoculation is likely more than 20 times 103.6 EID50. However, 
since the choanal cleft was bypassed, no inference can be made as to the infective dose with 
exposure that may occur through natural feeding. 
Although transmission of HPAI via artificial insemination is strongly suspected in turkeys, data 
on dose response to such exposure are lacking.  
8.7.2 Dose Response in Chickens 
Most experimental studies in chickens used intranasal inoculation as an entry point. For the 
intranasal route, in one study, the 50% chicken infectious dose (CID50) for 11 H5 and H7 HPAI 
strains (of chicken and turkey origin) varied between 101.2 and 104.7 EID50 with a geometric 
mean of 102.9 EID50.105 All but one strain (A/chicken/Rostock/1934 HPAI H7N1, which was 
endemic in Europe in the early 1900s) in this study had a mean CID50 above 102 EID50 with 
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strains less adapted to chickens having the higher CID50 values. Other studies have also found 
similar estimates for the CID50 through the intranasal route, with higher CID50 values indicating a 
lack of adaptation for infection in chickens.64,105,106 The initial cases in wild birds in the U.S. 
with Eurasian HPAI H5N8 (A/GF/WA/14) and reassortant H5N2 (A/NP/WA/14) viruses had 
high CID50 values (i.e., near or above 104.7) and thus were likely poorly adapted to chickens, 
possibly explaining why poultry outbreaks were limited in the Pacific flyway during the 2014-
2015 outbreak.64 
Single-hit dose-response models (e.g., exponential) have been used for HPAI virus in chickens 
and mammals.107,108 These models assume that each virion has the capacity to independently act 
and cause infection in the host. Dose-response models enable us to estimate the probability of 
infection when a bird is exposed to a dose different from the 50% infectious dose. For example, 
given a CID50 less than 102.82 EID50, a chicken exposed to 10 EID50 would have a 1% chance of 
infection according to the single-hit exponential dose-response model. 
Given limited data, there is greater uncertainty regarding the infectious dose for other routes such 
as oral consumption of infected material. Kwon and Swayne (2010) found a substantially higher 
50% infectious dose for HPAI H5N1 (A/Whooper Swan/Mongolia/244/) via oral consumption of 
chicken meat (107 EID50) or drinking of contaminated water (106.7 EID50).109 However, in this 
study, a group of 3 to 5 chickens were fed contaminated meat with a single virus concentration, 
and details regarding the uncertainty in the estimates were not provided. The study also found 
higher infectious doses for the intragastric inoculation route by gavage (106.2 EID50 for liquid and 
107.4 EID50 for meat) compared with the intranasal route.  
In Swayne and Beck (2005), feeding of finely chopped meat from chickens infected with H5N1 
HPAI viruses at higher doses (107.8 EID50/bird) resulted in transmission of H5N1 HPAI 
(A/chicken/Korea/ES/2003) virus.110 However, feeding of HPAI H5N2 (A/chicken/ 
Pennsylvania/1370/1983)-infected chicken breast or thigh meat to Specific Pathogen Free (SPF) 
chickens at lower doses (103.5–3.6 EID50/bird) did not produce infection. The authors reasoned that 
lack of direct exposure of the respiratory tract (i.e., minced meat likely did not pass through the 
choanal cleft and contact nasal surfaces) could explain the lack of infection in H5N2 trials with 
lower doses. Moreover, a reference is made to a feeding trial by Purchase et al. (1931), in which 
0.5 g of blood fed to chickens resulted in HPAI transmission, whereas feeding 5 g of meat did 
not, suggesting that transmission is more likely if a feedstuff is conducive to passage into the 
nasal cavity.111 However, in the Purchase et al. study, the HPAI concentration in blood was not 
estimated, and it may have been sufficient to cause infection via the intragastric route. 
Sergeev et al. (2013) found a CID50 for H5N1 HPAI (A/Chicken/Suzdalka/Nov-11/2005) virus 
of 103.9 EID50 for oral inoculation and 105.2 EID50 for intragastric inoculation via gavage tube.112 
The authors suggested contamination of the nasal mucosal membranes from the oral cavity via 
the choanal slit as a possible internal mechanism for transmission via the fecal-oral route.  
There is considerable uncertainty regarding the infectious dose via the aerosol route. Direct 
aerosol data from Spekreijse et al. (2013) suggest very low transmission rates, even after 24 
hours of exposure to H5N1 HPAI (A/turkey/Turkey/1/2005) virus in a concentration of more 
than 103 EID50/m3 in air coming from a room housing infectious chickens.113 When we fit 
exponential and logistic dose-response models to data from Spekreijse et al. (2013), maximum 
likelihood estimation suggested a CID50 for the aerosol route between 5 and 6 log EID50.113 An 
Workin g Draft 
Pullets Out of the Barn Risk Assessment 
Page 49 of 296 
estimate of 5 to 6 log EID50 is more consistent with the lower transmission rates for AI observed 
between chickens housed in adjacent cages in most studies.114  
Sergeev et al. (2013) found considerably lower CID50 estimates (approximately 1 log EID50) for 
various HPAI H5N1 strains when susceptible chickens were exposed to 0.5- to 2-micrometer 
(µm) diameter aerosols generated from liquid contents of HPAI-infected embryonating eggs.112 
The results from this paper are not consistent with other studies that indicate lower aerosol 
transmission between infected and susceptible chickens housed in adjacent cages, and are also 
not consistent with data published in Spekreijse et al. (2013).113 A possible explanation for the 
differences between this study and Spekreijse et al. (2013) is that the characteristics of 0.5- to 2-
µm contaminated aerosols generated by nebulizing embryonating egg contents differ from 
naturally contaminated aerosols emanating from a chamber with infectious chickens. In addition, 
Spekreijse et al. (2013) allow that the viral titer determined by RT-qPCR includes inactivated 
virus, such that the titer of viable virus in the air sample was actually lower.113 
8.7.3 Route of Entry and 50% Infectious Dose Estimate Used in this Assessment 
In poultry, the choanal cleft (palatine fissure)—located on the roof of the mouth—is a papillae-
lined, narrow slit that connects the oral and nasal cavities. During mastication or drinking, 
contents of the oral cavity may pass through this slit and contact the mucosal surfaces lining the 
nasal cavity.  
Because of the variability in the susceptibility of different tissues to infection with HPAI virus 
(intranasal vs. intragastric) observed in laboratory inoculation and experimental feeding trials, 
there is considerable uncertainty as to the infectious dose that is appropriate for natural exposure 
via feeding of contaminated materials. The route of entry impacts the dose-response parameters 
in the exposure assessment.  
We had obtained expert opinion regarding the appropriate route of entry and associated 
infectious dose (intranasal or intragastric) that best represents oral exposure in chickens, given 
the limited data on this aspect.115 Experts stated that it is reasonable to assume that transmission 
may occur if contaminated food or water were to pass through the choanal cleft into the nasal 
cavity. Therefore, due to the limited studies on exposure via natural feeding of contaminated 
materials and the associated uncertainty, we conservatively assumed that transmission of HPAI 
viruses through consumption of contaminated materials might occur with exposure to doses 
infectious for the intranasal route, in turkeys as well as in chickens. 
8.8 Latently Infected and Infectious Periods  
In individual birds, the incubation period is dependent on the dose, route of exposure, and 
individual host susceptibility. At the flock level, detection is highly dependent on the level of 
clinical signs and the ability of the grower to detect them.116 For trade purposes, the OIE defines 
the flock incubation period as 21 days.  
8.8.1 Latently Infected and Infectious Periods in Turkeys 
The latently infected and infectious periods may vary considerably with HPAI strain and turkey 
breed. Saenz et al. (2012) estimated the mean infectious period for HPAI H7N1 
(A/ostrich/Italy/984/00) in turkeys to be 1.47 days (95% CI [confidence interval], 1.3 to 1.7) 
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from experimental transmission studies.27,117 The data from this study also suggested that the 
latent period for HPAI H7N1 in turkeys is likely less than 16 hours.117 
Aldous (2010) evaluated the virus shedding patterns and mortality in turkeys inoculated with 
various doses of HPAI H5N1 (A/turkey/Turkey/1/05) virus.102 Analysis of these data indicated a 
mean latent period of 1.27 days (SD, 0.40 days) and a mean infectious period of 1.28 days (SD, 
1.17 days).102,118 Further details on the estimation of these parameters are provided in Appendix 
2 of the Turkey Hatching Eggs Risk Assessment.119 
8.8.2 Latently Infected and Infectious Periods in Chickens 
Latent and infectious periods have been documented for multiple HPAI virus strains, and periods 
may vary depending on virus strain and chicken type used in experimental conditions. Using 6-
week-old SPF white Leghorn chickens, Van der Goot et al (2005) determined an infectious 
period of 6.3 days (95% CI 3.9-8.7 days) when birds were inoculated with HPAI H7N7 
(A/Chicken/Netherlands/621557/03).120 In another experiment also using 6-week-old SPF white 
Leghorn chickens, this time inoculated with HPAI H5N2 (A/Chicken/Pennsylvania/1370/83), the 
mean infectious period was 6.8 days (95% CI 4.91-8.69 days) and a modeled latent period was 1-
2 days.121 
Mean time to death (which includes both latent and infectious periods) was observed in 2- to 4- 
week-old SPF white Leghorn chickens using multiple strains of HPAI H5N1. Death was 
observed in 100% of birds in less than 36 hours when inoculated with one of the four following 
strains: DK/Vietnam/201/05, DK/Vietnam/206/05, DK/Vietnam/207/05, Muscovy 
DK/Vietnam/213/05. Mean time to death was estimated at less than 48 hours for 
DK/Vietnam/218/05 and at 48 hours for DK/Vietnam/203/05.122 
In a study using 4-week-old SPF chickens of a layer breed inoculated with HPAI H5N1 
(A/Chicken/Legok/2003), researchers reported a mean latent period of 0.24 days (95% CI 0.099-
0.48 days) and a mean infectious period of 1.6 days (95% CI 0.90-2.5 days).123 
In 5- and 8-week-old broiler chickens inoculated with 2015 EA/AM HPAI H5N2 (Tk/MN/2015), 
mean times to death of 4.8 and 3.2 days were observed, respectively.124 
8.9 Clinical Signs 
The presence and severity of clinical signs of HPAI infection depend on the virus strain and bird 
species affected.44 Infected wild and domestic ducks may be asymptomatic, whereas clinical 
signs in gallinaceous poultry are usually severe, resulting in high mortality.125 In chickens and 
turkeys, the clinical signs associated with HPAI infection include marked lethargy with ruffled 
feathers, lack of appetite, excessive thirst, neurological signs (e.g., tremors, torticollis, 
opisthotonos, etc.), decreased egg production, soft-shelled or misshapen eggs, respiratory signs 
(coughing and sneezing), watery diarrhea, or sudden, unexpected death.91,125 Mature chickens 
frequently have swollen, cyanotic combs and wattles, and edema surrounding the eyes.125 In 
turkeys, a cessation in flock vocalization ("cathedral syndrome") often accompanies infection.92 
Progressive somnolence, reduction of normal vocalization, swollen sinuses, oculonasal 
discharge, edema of the face, and hemorrhages on the shanks are other clinical signs observed in 
turkeys.116,118,126  
The mortality rate in an infected flock can reach 100%.127 In mature birds, gross lesions on 
necropsy may consist of subcutaneous edema of the head and neck; fluid in the nares, oral cavity, 
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and trachea; congested conjunctivae and kidneys; and petechial hemorrhages which cover the 
abdominal fat, serosal surfaces, peritoneum, and surface under the keel.91,125 In layers, the ovary 
may be hemorrhagic or degenerated and necrotic.128 Ruptured ova have been reported in layers 
and broiler and turkey breeders; the peritoneal cavity may be filled with yolk from ruptured ova, 
causing severe peritonitis in birds that survive long enough.125 In addition, most HPAI viruses 
can cause necrosis of the pancreas91; all species of birds affected in the 1999-2001 H7N1 HPAI 
outbreak in Italy had lesions at necropsy of pancreatitis, but this was most pronounced in turkeys 
and chickens.129 
8.10 Diagnosis 
HPAI is a differential diagnosis to be considered in any flock in which marked lethargy, 
inappetence, or a drastic decline in egg production are followed by sudden deaths. While a 
confirmed diagnosis depends on the isolation and identification of the virus, it is typically 
advantageous (for rapid control and eradication) to respond to a presumptive positive H5 or H7 
result by PCR in accordance with any case definition.130 In the United States, confirmation of an 
HPAI outbreak is made by the National Veterinary Services Laboratories in Ames, Iowa 
(NVSL). After positive confirmation of HPAI, subsequent samples from premises inside the 
established Control Area may be sent to approved laboratories that are part of the National 
Animal Health Laboratory Network (NAHLN).130 
The reference standard for diagnosis of viable AI virus is virus isolation—an accurate method of 
confirming the presence of a virus that could infect other birds.131 In the laboratory, 9- to 11-day-
old embryonated chicken eggs are inoculated with swab or tissue specimens. Additional tests on 
fluids from the egg are required to confirm the p esence of AI virus and determine its HA and 
NA subtype.23 
Molecular methods for detection of viral nucleic acid and genetic sequencing for viral genes 
have become important tools in recent years. The rRT-PCR has advantages for outbreak 
surveillance such as speed, scalability for high through-put, high sensitivity, and high 
specificity.23 
Antigen detection immunoassay kits have also been used in prior outbreaks and have advantages 
of speed (15-20 minutes), simplicity, and good specificity. While the low analytical sensitivity 
(detection limit greater than 104 EID50) is a limiting factor, birds with clinical signs of AI, or that 
died of AI infection, generally shed adequate virus antigen for detection with these kits. In 
contrast, the assays are not recommended for screening of apparently healthy poultry, due to the 
lower level of shedding before the disease is clinical.23 
8.11 Differential Diagnosis 
HPAI can resemble several other avian diseases, including velogenic viscerotropic Newcastle 
disease, infectious bronchitis, infectious laryngotracheitis, mycoplasmosis, infectious coryza, 
fowl cholera, aspergillosis, and Escherichia coli infection. It also must be differentiated from 
heat exhaustion, toxicities, and severe water deprivation. 
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9 Risk Evaluation  
9.1 Pathways for a Pullet Flock Becoming Infected with HPAI via Local 
Area Spread Components other than those Involving Movements of 
People, Vehicles, and Equipment 
9.1.1 Role of Local Spread Components in Previous AI Outbreaks 
Local area spread refers to mechanisms whereby the transmission likelihood increases with 
proximity to infected farms. The implementation of a Control Area (e.g., minimum 3-km 
infected zone plus 7-km buffer zone) is based on potential for local spread. A review of past 
outbreak experiences indicates that the majority of local area spread of AI virus between farms 
can be attributed to the movement of people and equipment. We evaluated the likelihood of local 
spread occurring via insects, aerosols, wild birds, and fomites from poultry live-haul roads (i.e., 
proximity of pullet premises to poultry live-haul roads). 
 
Figure 9. Relationship between the daily likelihood of exposure and distance from infected 
premises estimated from past HPAI outbreak data (also called a “transmission kernel”). Note that 
all these transmission kernels are not “mechanism-specific” and, hence, include movement of 
people, vehicles, and equipment between farms as possible transmission mechanisms.132-134 
Several HPAI outbreak studies have evaluated proximity as a risk factor in general without 
differentiating between component mechanisms. Spatial and risk-factor analysis from HPAI 
outbreaks in the Netherlands and Italy indicates a considerable decrease in the chances of 
infection with distance from infected premises. For example, in Busani et al. (2009), farms 
within 1.5 km of an infected premises had a 4 to 5 times greater chance of infection relative to 
farms located more than 4.5 km away.135  
Figure 9 above shows the relationship between the daily likelihood of infection and distance 
from infected premises based on transmission equations estimated from different HPAI 
outbreaks. The predicted likelihood of exposure steadily decreases with distance in all curves. 
The specific mechanisms by which the transmission likelihood increases with proximity is 
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ambiguous based on these studies (see Appendix 3: Literature Review on the Role of Local Area 
Spread in Previous Outbreaks for a summary of past outbreak studies on proximity). 
Nevertheless, the transmission likelihood estimates from these studies can be considered as a 
conservative (an upper bound or maximum) estimate of the spread that occurs due to 
mechanisms not associated with movement of people, vehicles, and equipment. 
Apart from the above spatial analyses, most other AI outbreak observations indicate limited 
spread of AI among poultry premises by local spread mechanisms such as via insects, aerosols, 
and wildlife. For example, in a 2008 HPAI outbreak in the United Kingdom, there was no spread 
to 78 other farms within 3 km of an infected farm.136 There are several instances where spread 
did not occur to other houses even on the same premises. (See Appendix 3: Literature Review on 
the Role of Local Area Spread in Previous Outbreaks for a summary of past outbreak studies on 
proximity).  
9.1.2 Role of Insects in the Transmission of HPAI Virus  
Insect or fly transmission of AI virus has been suspected in previous HPAI outbreaks based on 
anecdotal reports.137,138 However, there are no quantitative epidemiological studies establishing 
transmission via flies. Houseflies (Muscidae) and blowflies (Calliphoridae) are reservoirs and 
vectors of a wide variety of pathogenic organisms affecting poultry.139 The housefly is usually 
the most abundant and pestiferous fly species in poultry houses.139 Most blowflies result from 
improper disposal of dead birds in a poultry operation, with very few associated with manure.139 
Some biosecurity plans and guidelines for AI control recommend fly control to minimize the 
spread of AI because of the existing uncertainty about fly transmission of HPAI.140,141 A majority 
of pullet growers specify some sort of fly control program within their biosecurity plans (SES 
WG, personal communication, June 2017). 
Below is a summary of the literature from previous outbreaks implicating insects in transmission 
of HPAI, survivability of AI viruses in flies, dispersion likelihood, and transmission of HPAI to a 
poultry flock in the two weeks prior to marketing.  
9.1.2.1 Literature Review 
• Blowflies were considered as a potential transmission route in the 2004 HPAI H5N1 
outbreak in Japan.142,143 In this outbreak, the prevalence of H5 virus genes was highest in 
blowflies collected 600 to 700 meters from the infected farm (20 to 30 percent), and 
HPAI virus gene-positive flies (10 percent) could be detected up to two kilometers from 
the infected premises. The authors estimated that prevalence of viable virus at 5 percent 
in flies around the epidemic area.143 
• Experimental studies indicate that flies can ingest AI virus and that there is a steady 
decrease in the viable virus titer over time.144-146 Sawabe et al. (2009)146 evaluated the 
survivability of H5N1 virus in blowflies after experimental exposure. Viable virus was 
recovered in the crop and intestine up to 24 hours post-exposure. However, there was a 
steady decrease in viral titers from the gut contents over time. Most of the flies had viral 
titers below the level of detection for the assay (0.50 log TCID50/0.05 ml of fly 
homogenate) at 24 hours. All of the flies had viral titers below the level of detection at 48 
hours post-exposure. 
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• Wanaratana et al. (2013)147 evaluated the potential of the housefly to serve as a 
mechanical vector of the H5N1 virus. H5N1 virus could survive within the body of the 
housefly and remain infective for up to 72 hours post-exposure. The viral titers in 
housefly homogenate varied between 105.43 EID50/ml at 6 hours post-exposure to 102 
EID50/ml at 72 hours post-exposure. In this study, the potential for virus transmission via 
virus on the fly body was also investigated. At 24 hours post-exposure, the virus 
concentration was 1.90 log ELD50/ml (the concentration at time 0 was 4.70 log 
ELD50/ml), whereas virus could not be recovered by 48 hours post-exposure. 
• Wanaratana et al. (2013), demonstrated transmission to chickens fed fly homogenate via 
oral drop with a pipette one day after exposure to 108.5 ELD50.147 Based on the timing of 
virus shedding,a between 1 and 3 chickens out of 10 appeared to have been directly 
exposed from the fly homogenate in this study.147 
• Tsuda et al. (2009)148 proposed a mechanism of transmission whereby poultry directly 
feed on HPAI-infected blowflies. It has been shown that a chicken can eat 31 blow flies 
placed in its cage in just 7 minutes.146 However, feeding dead flies (C. nigribarbis) 
contaminated with H5N1 virus did not result in transmission (unpublished data).149 The 
frozen dead flies were not attractive to chickens, and only small numbers of flies were 
consumed by the chickens in this experiment.149 
• Fly dispersal behavior varies by species and environmental conditions. Houseflies tend to 
remain close to their breeding site as long as they find suitable food, breeding sites, and 
shelter. Also of note, the dispersal rate of flies decreases at temperatures below 53°F and 
increases during premises cleanout or spreading of litter.150 A summary of dispersal rates 
appears in Table 2. 
Table 2. Reported dispersal rates for types of flies implicated in the mechanical 
transmission of H5N1 HPAI. 
Common 
name Reported dispersal rates Reference 
Housefly 1-3 km/day James & 
Harwood 151 
Housefly Generally range less than 2 miles (3.2 km); range in a radius 
of 328-1,640 feet (0.1-0.5 km) from breeding site if suitable 
food available; only 8-30% disperse beyond a poultry 
facility   
Stafford 150 
Blowfly Estimated 1,250-1,789 meters/day (1.3- 1.8 km) on average Tsuda et al.148 
Blowfly 2-3 km in 24 hours Sawabe et al.142  
 
• Beetles have also been implicated as a possible vector for transmitting AI viruses in a few 
studies.152-154 However, there are minimal data on the experimental transmission of AI via 
                                                 
a Only 3 birds out of 10 were shedding by day 2 postinoculation. In experimental studies in the literature, most HPAI 
strains had a mean latent infection period of less than 1.5 days.  
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beetles. In the 1983 HPAI H5N2 outbreak in Pennsylvania, testing of 144 pools of beetles 
(Coleoptera) yielded only two positive pools. One of the positive pools consisted of 
darkling beetles, and the second of hide beetles.138  
○ Given that 10 to 60 insects were pooled together in each sample, Bayesian analysis 
indicates that the actual prevalence among beetles would be between 0.01 and 0.15 
percent, which is quite small (see Appendix 4: Estimating an Approximate Posterior 
Distribution for the Prevalence Among Insects). 
9.1.2.2 Expert Opinion 
We obtained expert opinion on insects as a risk factor for the transmission of HPAI virus via two 
separate online polls (one in 2013-2014 prior to the 2014-2015 HPAI outbreak and a second in 
2018). Experts, many of whom are poultry veterinarians with field experience managing AI 
outbreaks, were asked to provide their opinion of perceived risk for given scenarios (see 
Appendix 5: Expert Polling on Insect Transmission Routes, for details of the two surveys). 
Overall, experts rated perceived risk on a categorical scale ranging from negligible to extremely 
high. A majority of experts in both surveys rated the likelihood of insect transmission from 
known infected premises (where there would be a higher predicted prevalence of infectious birds 
and circulating HPAI virus) as negligible to low at 1.5 km or farther (Figures 10 and 11). The 
ratings for the likelihood of insect transmission from infected but undetected premises (which 
would have lower predicted prevalence of circulating HPAI virus) were similar. 
 
 
Figure 10. Expert responses (2013-2014 poll; n=8) to the question of likelihood of AI 
transmission from a known infected flock to an uninfected turkey flock via insects at specified 
distances 
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Figure 11. Expert responses (2018 poll; n=15) to the question of likelihood of AI transmission 
via insects from a known infected poultry flock (high prevalence of circulating HPAI virus) to an 
uninfected pullet flock located at specified distances 
9.1.2.3 Qualitative Analysis  
We considered the following factors in evaluating this pathway: 
• Insects must be addressed year-round on pullet farms (SES WG, personal 
communication, June 2017). In the period leading up to load-out, the inside of a pullet 
house may contain a large amount of manure and/or other environmental conditions that 
may attract flies. Barn type and proximity to other animal agriculture premises, or other 
barns on multi-age premises, may impact the prevalence of insects.  
• Winpisinger et al. found the number of house flies was significantly higher near (within 
3.2 km) large (>2 million) caged layer operations, compared with background fly levels 
in rural areas.155 However, dispersal may depend on outdoor environmental and other 
factors. The number of flies caught at a distance of 0.8 km (3 to 22 percent of the mean 
value at layer farm) and 1.6 km (2 to 8 percent of the mean value at layer farm) was much 
lower than the number of flies trapped at the layer facilities.  
• While fly transmission has been proposed as a possible mechanism for spread of HPAI, 
there has not been any epidemiological analysis evaluating flies as a risk factor for 
spread. Furthermore, local area spread components (other than mechanisms involving 
movement of people, vehicles, and equipment) have historically played a minimal role in 
most AI outbreaks. (See section 9.1.1, Role of Local Spread Components in Previous AI 
Outbreaks, for more detail.) 
• Chickens have been shown to ingest live and actively flying houseflies,146 but there has 
been no experimental evidence of chickens or turkeys becoming infected with AI virus 
through feeding on contaminated whole flies in previous outbreaks. Infection was 
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achieved experimentally in chickens using fly homogenate administered via pipette, 
which likely approximates the oral or possibly nasal/choanal route of infection.147 We 
hypothesized that HPAI transmission via feeding of whole flies as opposed to 
homogenate would have a low likelihood for the following reasons: 
○ For HPAI virus encapsulated in the fly body (i.e., virus ingested by a fly), the most 
likely inoculation route to the chicken is intragastric. As chickens do not grind or 
masticate their food within the oral cavity, the likelihood that fly gut contents would 
contact the choanal cleft during ingestion is decreased. Intragastric infectious dose 
(CID50) estimates are quite high at 105.2 EID50 to 106.2 EID50 based on two 
studies.112,156 
○  Wanaratana et al. (2013) have found a considerable decrease in the external HPAI 
virus concentration on an exposed fly within 24 hours.147 While HPAI virus is 
inactivated at a slower rate in fly gut content, the likelihood of poultry infection (via 
fly ingestion) due to the virus encapsulated in the fly gut would be reduced because of 
the higher infectious dose needed for the intragastric route in poultry. 
• Contamination of fly perching surfaces with virus from the fly body, vomit, or feces is a 
possibility. However, available experimental studies indicated that there would be a 
considerable reduction in the virus concentration in fly body, vomit, or feces by 6 to 24 
hours post-exposure of the fly to virus. (See section 9.1.2.1, Literature Review on insect 
transmission.) The relatively rapid inactivation of virus present in and on flies would 
result in reduced likelihood of transmission at greater distances. 
○ In addition, the oral infectious dose f r HPAI virus in chickens is also relatively high 
compared with intranasal (or choanal) exposure (estimates range from 103.9 to 106.7 
for HPAI H5N1 and 108 for LPAI H9N2).112,156,157 
• The proportion of flies around an infected premise that could contain viable virus is likely 
low. Literature estimates report between 2 and 5 percent of flies may contain virus. 
Dispersal behavior may vary depending on environmental conditions and fly species, and 
dispersal is hypothesized to increase during outbreak activities such as premises 
depopulation. 
9.1.2.4 Conclusion 
We rated the likelihood of a pullet premises becoming infected with HPAI virus via insect 
transmission to vary with distance as described in Table 3. Of note, at premises located closer 
than 1.5 km to an infected flock, there are too many variables to accurately assess the risk of 
becoming infected with HPAI via insect transmission. 
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Table 3. Likelihood of a pullet premises becoming infected with HPAI virus via insect 
transmission based on qualitative analysis and expert opinion. 
Source premises type 
Composite likelihood rating 
Distance from source (km) 
1.5 2 >3 
Known infected premises Negligible to 
moderate 
Negligible to low Negligible 
Infected but undetected premises Negligible to low Negligible to low Negligible 
9.1.3 Role of Aerosol Transmission of HPAI Virus  
Aerosol spread of AI virus between premises has been implicated in some outbreaks, although 
most considered it to have played a limited role.158,159 Aerosol transmission of AI is an active 
research area with considerable data gaps. We used a combination of approaches including 
literature review of past outbreak experiences and experimental studies, exploratory dispersion 
models, and expert opinion to evaluate the role of aerosol transmission. 
9.1.3.1 Aerosol Transmission of AI Virus in Past Outbreaks 
• The limited role of local area spread through all mechanisms not involving movements of 
people and equipment in most previous AI outbreaks indicates a limited role for aerosol 
spread as well. Aerosol spread has been implicated in very few HPAI outbreaks. 
○ In several AI outbreaks, such as the LPAI H7N2 outbreak in Virginia, the geographic 
distribution of affected farms did not show a specific pattern, suggesting that aerosols 
were not a primary mode of transmission.72 In an HPAI H5N1 outbreak in the United 
Kingdom, there was no transmission to 78 other farms within 3 km of an infected 
turkey farm. The authors concluded that there was no evidence of local area spread 
beyond 1 km.136 Appendix 3: Literature Review on the Role of Local Area Spread in 
Previous Outbreaks summarizes the literature on the role of local spread in previous 
outbreaks.  
○ Ypma et al. (2012) estimated the contribution of a possible wind-mediated 
mechanism to the total amount of spread during the 2003 HPAI H7N7 outbreak in the 
Netherlands to be around 18 percent.82 This estimate was based on the observed 
correlation between the wind direction and the direction of the spread of disease, 
estimated through phylogenetic and epidemiological data. The possibility of the 
direction of spread coinciding with the wind direction by chance was also accounted 
for in their statistical analysis. We note that this outbreak occurred in a region of very 
high poultry density (~4 farms per km2), which may increase the likelihood of spread 
over short distances. 
○ Aerosol transmission between poultry barns that were in close proximity was 
suspected as a possible means of spread in the 2004 HPAI H7N7 outbreak in British 
Columbia. In this outbreak, there were anecdotal reports of some of the infected 
farms being in close proximity and downwind of other infected flocks. Some of these 
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anecdotal reports were associated with depopulation methods used early in the 
outbreak, such as grinding carcasses outside the barn or bringing birds outside the 
barn to depopulate. Although it was suspected, there is no conclusive evidence that 
aerosol transmission played a major role in this outbreak.160 
○ In a case-control study of infected layer facilities in Iowa and Nebraska in the 2014-
2015 HPAI outbreak, the authors were not able to determine if aerosol transmission 
was responsible for infection at a facility.161 
○ A plume analysis model of infected farms in the 2014-2015 HPAI outbreak in 
Minnesota found that farms located 7 to15 km from an infected farm were at low to 
moderate risk of infection via aerosol transmission; however, wind speed and 
direction may impact the distance at which transmission can occur. Farms located 
within 5 km of an infected premises were at increased risk regardless of wind 
conditions.161 
• Activities that can generate AI virus-contaminated dust or aerosols very close to 
susceptible poultry have been implicated as a transmission mechanism. 
○ Live haul trucking of birds actively infected with AI virus within 200 meters of a 
susceptible flock can pose a risk for aerosol transmission (D. Halvorson, personal 
communication, July 2016).137  
○ Depopulation activities up to 400 yards (366 meters) upwind from a susceptible flock 
can present a risk for aerosol transmission.162 In an LPAI H7N2 outbreak in 
Pennsylvania, aerosols generated by stirring up organic materials during depopulation 
were considered a potential mechanism of spread to farms within 1 to 1.25 miles.163 
Depopulation methods used early in the 2004 HPAI outbreak in Canada, such as 
grinding carcasses outside the barn or bringing birds outside the barn to depopulate, 
were implicated in spread of HPAI.160 
○ Spreading of non-composted contaminated litter on adjacent fields was suspected as a 
transmission mechanism during the 1983 HPAI H5N2 AI outbreak (D. Halvorson, 
personal communication, March 2016)137. Spread of non-composted manure from 
infected farms approximately 1.25 miles from susceptible poultry was suspected to 
have resulted in transmission in one instance during an LPAI H7N2 outbreak in 
Pennsylvania.163 
○ A 2015 survey of HPAI-infected turkey farms in the Midwest highlighted anecdotal 
evidence of aerosol spread related to recent nearby bird transport, blowing sawdust, 
and depopulation of nearby farms.161 
• Only a couple of studies have reported air-sampling results from or around HPAI-
infected houses during previous outbreaks. These studies demonstrate the effect of 
dilution on aerosol concentration with increasing distance from the generating source. 
○ High-volume air sampling was conducted in and near an infected layer flock that had  
high mortality during the HPAI H7N7 outbreak in Canada.164 Inside the barn, a viral 
titer of 292 TCID50/m3 was detected in air samples.b Air sampling at a command post 
outside the barn showed a much lower viral load of 12.5 TCID50/m3 based on 
                                                 
bTCID50 refers to the 50% tissue culture infectious dose. The MDCK cell line was used for the tissue culture.   
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quantitative PCR. However, no viable virus was recovered. Low concentration and 
inactivation of virus by sunlight was hypothesized as a possible explanation for the 
apparent absence of viable virus in these samples.  
○ In the 1983 H5N2 HPAI outbreak in Pennsylvania, 5 of 6 samples taken 3 to 6 meters 
downwind of affected flocks on six farms were positive by virus isolation, whereas 
only 1 of 12 samples taken 45 to 85 meters downwind of affected flocks on 8 farms 
was virus-positive; the positive sample was taken 45 meters downwind.137 
○ The 2015 USDA epidemiology investigation report describes the results of air and 
environmental sampling of three turkey flocks in Minnesota and three layer flocks in 
Iowa and Nebraska. Air samples were collected inside and immediately outside (5 
meters) of affected barns, and at extended distances ranging from approximately 70 to 
1,000 meters downwind from the barns. Five of the six flocks had at least one air 
sample test positive.165  
9.1.3.2 Experimental Studies of Aerosol Transmission of AI Virus 
Several experimental studies indicate that airborne transmission of HPAI infection between 
turkeys and chickens in adjacent pens or cages is possible but inefficient. These studies also 
suggest that aerosols may not be a primary route of transmission within a flock.  
• In several studies, aerosol transmission of AI was not observed between groups of 
inoculated and susceptible chickens housed in adjacent cages or chambers with direct 
airflow.24,57,166,167 
• A few studies have shown inefficient transmission or low transmission of AI between 
groups of inoculated and susceptible chickens housed in adjacent cages or chambers with 
direct airflow. 
○ LPAI (Turkey/Wis/66) virus was transmitted via aerosols between groups of 400 
turkeys in different compartments of a building. In this experiment, AI virus was 
transmitted to one out of three exposed groups of turkeys in different compartments. 
Infection was detected based on serology and hemagglutination inhibition (HI) titer, 
and no virus was recovered from tracheal swabs.168 
○ Two out of six strains of LPAI H9N2 were transmitted via aerosol from a cage with 
four infected chickens to chickens in an adjacent cage 100 cm away.169 
○ For chickens housed in cages 10 cm apart, airborne transmission of HPAI H5N1 
occurred inefficiently when 1 to 2 chickens were infected, but efficiently when 4 to 8 
chickens were infected.170 With likely similar distances, Yee et al. (2009) found the 
aerosol route to be an important mode of AI virus transmission among chickens in a 
simulated live bird market setting (i.e., stacked cages) using LPAI H6N2 
(A/chicken/California/1772/02).114 
○ For H5N1 (A/turkey/Turkey/1/2005), Spekreijse et al.113,171 estimated a transmission 
rate of 0.10 new infections per infectious bird per day for chickens housed 1 meter 
away. 
• Experimental studies indicate that variability between influenza virus strains can impact 
transmissibility via aerosols. For example, Zhong et al. (2014) found different strains of 
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LPAI H9N2 to have markedly different aerosol transmissibility between chickens.172 The 
study proposed that the influenza virus genes HA and PA are important in determining 
aerosol transmissibility. 
• Several studies have indicated efficient transmission of HPAI H5N1 and LPAI H9N2 
virus to chickens by aerosols that were mechanically generated by nebulizing virus 
containing stock fluid to very small particle sizes (2-5 μm).112,157  
• Several studies have found that influenza A viruses show decreased survivability in 
aerosols at higher temperature and higher relative humidity.173,174 
AERMOD plume models (see Appendix 6: Live Pullet Movement Aerosol Modeling for model 
parameters and scenarios) were utilized in the context of this risk assessment. The measure of 
interest was HPAI virus concentration:  
• These models were used to predict the risk of transmission to a house of 100,000 pullets.  
• In a scenario in which a house of 25,000 broilers was infected, aerosol concentration was 
predicted to be highest downwind from the infected flock; concentration of virus is 
predicted to fall sharply as distance increases. In this model, infectious dose was 
estimated at 105.44 EID50/m3, meteorological parameters and particle size were accounted 
for, and the predicted concentration of aerosolized virus farther than 2.5 km from the 
infected premise was considered to be low (Scenario A, see Appendix 6: Live Pullet 
Movement Aerosol Modeling). 
○ When the infectious dose was lowered to 104 EID50/m3, the AERMOD model 
predicted that transmission likelihoods are much higher at longer distances (Scenario 
C, see Appendix 6: Live Pullet Movement Aerosol Modeling). 
• In an alternate scenario involving multiple different variables (the source of infection was 
a somewhat smaller turkey flock and weather conditions were from a different 
geographic area), the predicted HPAI virus concentration at a given distance from the 
infected source was greater than when broilers were the source flock, and transmission 
likelihoods increased somewhat as well (Scenario B, see Appendix 6: Live Pullet 
Movement Aerosol Modeling). 
9.1.3.3 Expert Opinion 
• We obtained expert opinion on the risk of aerosol transmission of HPAI virus via two 
separate online polls (one in 2013-2014 prior to the 2014-2015 HPAI outbreak and a 
second in 2018). Experts, many of whom are poultry veterinarians with field experience 
managing AI outbreaks, were asked to provide their opinion of perceived risk for given 
scenarios (see Appendix 7 for details of the two surveys). Experts rated perceived risk on 
a categorical scale ranging from negligible to extremely high. In general, perceived risk 
was higher for all scenarios in the 2018 poll. For scenarios in which depopulation 
activities were not taking place, the median expert rating for the likelihood of aerosol 
transmission from infected premises was negligible to moderate if the pullet premises 
was within 3km from the infected premises. For scenarios in which depopulation 
activities were taking place, the median expert rating for the likelihood of aerosol 
transmission from infected premises ranged from negligible to extremely high when the 
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pullet premises was within 3km from the infected premises (see Figures 1-10, Appendix 
7: Expert Polling on Aerosol Transmission Route). 
9.1.3.4 Qualitative assessment  
We considered the following factors in evaluating this pathway: 
• The housing and ventilation systems utilized in commercial pullet growing operations 
likely represent at least a partial barrier to local area spread when compared with 
alternative housing systems (e.g., pasture-raised), which are not within the scope of this 
assessment. 
• Transmission via the aerosol pathway involves many constantly changing variables. 
○ Virus viability may change with temperature, humidity, and UV exposure, as 
increased temperature, humidity, and UV exposure may or may not cause virus 
inactivation.173-175 
○ Weather conditions (temperature, humidity, wind speed and direction) vary widely by 
season and geography. Dispersion of particulate matter and virus from an infected 
premises may not be consistent over time. 
• To date, all exploratory models have assumed the source to be a static premises (i.e., 
infected poultry house). Other sources of infection, such as proximity to trucking routes 
or road traffic, have not been investigated. 
9.1.3.5 Risk Rating and Conclusion 
The risk of HPAI spread to a pullet flock in a Control Area via aerosol transmission from an 
HPAI-infected poultry flock likely ranges from negligible to extremely high, depending on the 
distance from, and prevalence of virus in, the source flock. Other variables can also affect virus 
spread, such as disposal activities at the source flock, weather conditions (including prevailing 
wind speed), and virus characteristics such as necessary infectious dose. The risk is highest for 
flocks located within 3 km of an infected poultry farm. 
Given the uncertainties in modeling parameters, epidemiologic data from previous outbreaks and 
expert opinion was more strongly considered than modeling risk calculations when determining 
the risk associated with this pathway. In scenarios with known infected flocks (thus high 
predicted prevalence of infectious birds and circulating HPAI virus), both expert opinion ratings 
and exploratory dispersion modeling results indicated higher potential risk of transmission 
compared to spread from an infected but undetected flock (assumed lower prevalence of 
circulating HPAI virus), in some scenarios even beyond 2 km.  
Literature review and most previous outbreak reports indicated that local area spread—including 
aerosol transmission—were not an important factor at distances greater than 1.5 km from an 
infected flock. However, there is some historical evidence of aerosol transmission over shorter 
distances. Considering the above factors, we provide the following ratings for the likelihood of 
pullets becoming infected with HPAI via aerosols from an infected poultry premises: 
• Low to Extremely high if the pullet flock is located < 3 km from an infected poultry farm. 
• Negligible to Low if the pullet flock is located > 3 km from an infected poultry farm. 
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The presence of additional risk factors will influence where the true risk lies within the given 
ranges (e.g., outdoor disposal activities occurring at an infected premises with high winds present 
will push the risk closer to the Extremely high rating for pullet farms within 3 km from that 
infected premises).  
9.1.4 Role of HPAI Spread to a Pullet Flock in a Control Area via Wild Aquatic 
Birds in the Farm Vicinity 
Wild aquatic birds are the main reservoir of influenza A viruses in nature. They harbor all 16 
(H1-H16) HA and all 9 (N1-N9) NA subtypes of AI in their population. Most of the isolates 
from aquatic birds have been LPAI, which generally does not cause disease in the wild 
population. It is understood that the virus circulates continuously in the wild population, but 
often at low levels.176 
Various species of wild aquatic birds are implicated in the maintenance of AI viruses:  
• Wild waterfowl are considered to be the primary source of new H5 or H7 LPAI outbreaks 
in poultry, particularly in poultry reared in semi-intensive or extensive (free-range) 
conditions.177 Wild ducks have been found to carry a higher prevalence of virus during 
their southern migration in the fall (22.2 percent) than during their spring northerly 
migration (0.3 percent). This difference may be due to the increased number of 
susceptible young birds during the fall migration.176 
• Anecdotally, during the 2014-2015 HPAI outbreak in the Midwest, snow geese were 
observed in the proximity of poultry houses that later became infected with H5N2. 
• Shorebirds have also been found to carry influenza viruses in a higher percentage than 
that in ducks during the spring migration.176  
• Gulls are susceptible to HPAI viruses178 and are a known reservoir of AIVs.179 Gulls are 
suspected to have been the source of a 2002 outbreak in the Chilean poultry industry. In 
this instance, the HPAI virus likely mutated from an LPAI strain.180 The role of gulls in 
the transmission of AI is likely twofold because of their susceptibility to infection and 
their opportunistic nature when they scavenge for food. Gulls are susceptible to AI and 
thus can contract the virus but transmission from gulls to other species is less clear.178 
Because they are opportunists, gulls are likely to be present near poultry barns and may 
come into contact with dead birds. In this case, gulls may act as fomites in the dispersal 
of AIVs (more in-depth analysis of the role of scavengers can be found in section 9.2.4.2 
Likelihood of Pullet Flock Becoming Infected with HPAI via On-farm Dead Bird 
Disposal and Scavengers during PMIP). 
Influenza viruses have been shown to affect all types of domestic birds, and the primary infection 
depends on the degree of contact with wild birds. As mentioned in section 9.1.1., Role of Local 
Spread Components in Previous AI Outbreaks , secondary spread usually results from human 
activities that transfer infective feces to susceptible birds.181 Potential pathways of HPAI virus 
transmission through wild aquatic birds in the farm vicinity are illustrated below. 
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Figure 12. Pathway of HPAI virus transmission through wild aquatic birds 
9.1.4.1 Literature Review   
Historically, HPAI viruses rarely have been isolated from wild birds. Where HPAI viruses were 
identified, they were usually from isolates obtained from dead wild birds found in the vicinity of 
HPAI-infected poultry farms 182 or from aquatic bird population surveillance sampling.176  
Studies have shown that HPAI viruses, in particular Eurasian H5N1 and H5N8, are present in 
populations of different wild aquatic bird species covering wide geographical areas globally. 
• In a survey conducted in China from 2004 to 2007, 14,472 wild bird samples (cloacal 
swabs, organ tissues, or fresh excrement) were collected from 10 bird orders. The 
samples from Anseriformes had the highest prevalence of H5N1 virus. The positive 
samples were collected from nine species of ducks, geese, and swans.183 
• HPAI outbreaks in migratory water birds from 2005 to 2011 in Mongolia, a country with 
very few domestic poultry (fewer than 100,000 birds), provided strong evidence that wild 
birds can carry HPAI virus over at least moderate distances, but may not be competent as 
indefinite reservoirs.184  
• A large-scale surveillance program detected HPAI H5N2 in healthy birds of two wild 
waterfowl species sampled in Nigeria and genetically-related LPAI H5N2 in Eurasian 
domestic poultry.30 
• HPAI H5N8 was identified in poultry in South Korea in January 2014, and closely 
related strains subsequently appeared in Japan, China, and Europe. Several reassortant H5 
HPAI viruses isolated in North America show 99 percent similarity to the Korean H5 
strains.185,186  
• Wild bird sampling activities in the Netherlands between November 2014 and February 
2015, following H5N8 virus outbreaks in poultry, detected HPAI H5N8 virus in two 
samples (out of 4,018 birds sampled) from ducks of the Eurasian wigeon species.187 
Infected 
poultry farm 
Previously infected 
aquatic birds 
Potential contamination or 
infection of wild aquatic  
birds in the vicinity of the  
infected farm 
 
Subsequent transfer 
into uninfected house 
via farm personnel 
 
Potential contamination of 
environment surrounding 
uninfected house 
 
Workin g Draft 
Pullets Out of the Barn Risk Assessment 
Page 65 of 296 
• Between December 2014 and June 2015, Eurasian/North American reassortant HPAI 
H5N1 and H5N2, and Eurasian HPAI H5N8 were found in several species of wild 
aquatic birds as well as wild raptors, in the states of California, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, 
Michigan, Missouri, Nevada, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming.188 Table 4 
shows the aquatic bird cases of confirmed H5N2 in the U.S. between December 2014 and 
June 2015.  
Table 4. H5N2 cases in U.S. aquatic birds, December 2014 to June 2015 161,188 
Bird Species Number State Cause of death 
Canada goose 
Branta canadensis 
1 
5 
1 
1 
Kansas 
Michigan 
Washington 
Wyoming 
Morbidity/mortality 
Lesser snow goose 
Anser caerulescens caerulescens 
1 
2 
Kentucky 
Missouri 
Morbidity/mortality 
Ring-necked duck 
Aythya collaris 
1 Kentucky Morbidity/mortality 
American green-winged teal 
Anas crecca 
1 
1 
Idaho 
Oregon 
Hunter harvest 
Mallard 
Anas platyhrynchos 
2 
4 
4 
Idaho 
Oregon 
Washington 
Hunter harvest 
 
Hunter harvest (2) and 
Morbidity/mortality (2) 
Northern pintail 
Anas acuta 
2 
2 
Oregon 
Washington 
Hunter harvest 
Hunter harvest (1) and 
Morbidity/mortality (1) 
Northern shoveler 
Anas clypeata 
3 Oregon Hunter harvest 
Wood duck 
Aix sponsa 
3 Oregon Hunter harvest 
During the 2014-2015 H5N2 outbreak in the midwestern U.S., sampling of wildlife took place 
on five infected and five uninfected farms. Out of 419 individual birds sampled, killdeers were 
the only aquatic birds collected, and none tested positive for HPAI. It should be noted, however, 
that the samples were collected 2 to 4 weeks after clinical signs of HPAI were observed in the 
poultry flocks, and while depopulation was complete at some infected farms, it was ongoing at 
others.161  The role of wild aquatic birds in perpetuating HPAI viruses remains unresolved. AI 
researchers have examined current and historical aquatic bird influenza A virus surveillance and 
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outbreaks of highly pathogenic H5 viruses in poultry in the U.S. and Canada dating back 43 
years prior to the 2014-2015 outbreak.189 This analysis failed to detect HPAI viruses in wild 
aquatic birds before or after the resolution of that outbreak, suggesting that there are yet 
undetermined mechanisms preventing wild aquatic birds from perpetuating HPAI viruses.189  
Experimental studies suggest that while most aquatic bird species show minor or no clinical 
signs after being infected with HPAI viruses, some can efficiently transmit the viruses to their 
contacts. Table 5 summarizes the results of several studies on HPAI virus in wild and 
domesticated aquatic birds.
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Table 5. Summary of experimental studies of HPAI virus in wild and domesticated aquatic birds. 
HPAI virus  Bird type Inoculation Findings Reference 
H7N3 (A/chicken/Chile/184240-1/02) Chiloe 
wigeon and 
cinnamon teal 
106 EID50 (intranasal) No ducks developed disease or 
died. 
Oral and/or cloacal shedding in all 
virus-inoculated cinnamon teals 
and oral shedding in 2/8 chiloe 
wigeons at day 2 post-inoculation 
Virus efficiently transmitted to 
cinnamon teal contacts, not to 
chiloe wigeon contacts 
Sá e Silva et 
al., 2011 190 
H5N1 (A/chicken/Scotland/59) 
H5N2 
(A/chicken/Pennsylvania/1370/83)  
H5N2 (A/chicken/Pennsylvania/1/83)  
H5N9 (A/turkey/Ontario/7732/66) 
Khaki-
Campbell 
duck 
0.1 ml of diluted 
infectious allantoic 
fluid (intr muscular 
and intranasal routes, 
and contact with 
inoculated ducks) 
No infection and no shedding 
established.  
Alexander et 
al., 1986 191 
H5N8 (A/turkey/Ireland/83)  
H5N8 (A/duck/Ireland/113/84) 
Khaki-
Campbell 
duck 
0.1 ml of diluted 
infectious allantoic 
fluid (intramuscular 
and intranasal routes 
and contact with 
inoculated ducks) 
Virus shedding in cloaca and 
trachea and transmission to in-
contact ducks 
No clinical signs or deaths 
Alexander et 
al., 1986 191 
H7N7 
(A/Chicken/Netherlands/621557/03) 
Ringed teal 0.2 ml of tenfold 
diluted allantoic fluid 
(intravenous)  
All unvaccinated ringed teals 
became infected and rapidly 
transmitted to all contact teals. 
 
van der 
Goot, 2005 
120 
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Table 5. Summary of experimental studies of HPAI virus in wild and domesticated aquatic birds, cont. 
HPAI virus, cont. Bird type Inoculation Findings Reference 
   Shedding through cloaca and 
trachea in all animals 
2/10 developed conjunctivitis; no 
clinical signs in others. 
 
H5N2 
(A/chicken/Pennsylvania/1/83) 
Ring-billed 
gull 
108 EID50 
(intranasal/intraocula
r) 
Virus detected in the intestine, 
lung, and spleen  
No transmission to in-contact 
birds 
Wood et al., 
1985 192 
H5N1  
(A/Whooper Swan/ Mongolia/244/05) 
H5N1 
(A/Duck Meat/ Anyang/01) 
Mallard, 
northern 
pintail, blue-
winged teal, 
redhead, 
wood duck, 
and nestling 
laughing 
gulls. 
0.1 ml of diluted 
allantoic fluid from 
inoculated eggs 
diluted in brain-heart 
infusion (intranasal) 
Wood ducks were the only species 
of duck to exhibit illness or death 
after inoculation with either of the 
HPAI viruses. Severe clinical 
signs appeared in all of the 
inoculated gulls. In both species 
virus was isolated from internal 
organs. Viral titers were higher in 
oropharyngeal swabs than in 
cloacal swabs.  
Brown et al., 
2006 178 
H5N8 
(A/Gyrfalcon/Washington/41088/201
4)  
H5N2 
(A/Northern 
Pintail/Washington/40964/2014) 
(1) White 
Chinese 
Goose 
(2) Pekin 
duck  
(3) Mallards 
106 EID50 Geese: few clinical signs, some 
mortality 
Pekin duck: no mortality 
Mallards: no mortality or clinical 
signs, but lower body weight and 
elevated body temperature 
Mary Pantin-
Jackwood, 
personal 
communica-
tion, August 
2016 
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A study of several H5 and H7 HPAI virus strains in mallard ducks further illustrates the 
variability in shedding and transmission to contacts, depending on the virus strain.193 Findings 
from this study are summarized in Table 6. 
Table 6. Shedding and transmission results of experimental infection of mallard ducks with H5 
and H7 HPAI virus at106 EID50 intranasally.193 
Virus Strain Shedding 
(days) 
OP vs. 
CL 
Trans. to 
contacts 
> Chicken 
BID50  
H7N3 A/chicken/Chile/184240-1/2002 14 CL 3/3 na 
H7N3 A/chicken/Canada/314514-2/2005 14 CL 3/3 na 
H7N3 A/chicken/Jalisco/CPA1/2012 14 CL 3/3 na 
H7N7 A/chicken/Victoria/1985 11 CL 3/3 >2.9 
H7N7 A/chicken/North Korea/7916/2005 11 CL 3/3 na 
H7N7 A/chicken/Netherlands/1/2003 11 = 3/3 na 
H7N1 A/turkey/Italy/4580/1999 11 = 3/3 >2 
H5N2 A/chicken/Pennsylvania/1370/1983 14 = 3/3 >3 
H5N2 A/chicken/Queretaro/14588/1995 4 OP 1/3 >3 
H5N8 A/turkey/Ireland/1378/1983 11 OP 2/3 <4.7 
H5N3 A/tern/South Africa/1961 14 = 1/3 >3.4 
OP: primarily oropharyngeal shedding; CL: primarily cloacal shedding; =: equal OP and CL shedding. 
BID50: 50 percent bird infectious dose. One BID50 unit is the amount of virus that will infect 50 percent of inoculated birds. 
 
The evidence that connects wild birds to infected farms is divergent. In a case-control study of 
layer and pullet premises in Iowa and Nebraska in the 2015 HPAI outbreak, no consistent 
association was observed between infected or control farm status and wild bird sighting.194 In 
other cases, evidence has been found linking wild birds to infected premises. 
• Observations of wild bird activity in two provinces in Canada showed seven species of 
wild aquatic birds—Canada goose, mallard, ring-billed gull, glaucous-winged gull, mew 
gull, killdeer, and trumpeter swan—were seen in the immediate barn area at least 
twice.195 They were most frequently observed near feed silos. No wild aquatic birds were 
observed entering the poultry houses. 
Some events have provided additional evidence for outbreaks resulting from possible 
introduction of HPAI virus into domestic birds from wild aquatic birds. 
• A North American outbreak of HPAI with H5 of Eurasian lineage began on December 1, 
2014, and H5N2 was detected in 11 commercial broiler breeder, table egg layer, and 
turkey farms in British Columbia by December 17, 2014.196 In addition, the Canadian 
Food Inspection Agency confirmed HPAI H5N1 on a noncommercial poultry farm on 
February 7, 2015.196 Influenza viruses had been previously isolated from wild and 
domestic ducks in British Columbia.197 
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• Eurasian H5N8 was confirmed in a backyard mixed poultry flock in Oregon on 
December 19, 2014, followed by Eurasian/North American reassortant H5N2 outbreaks 
in backyard flocks in Washington, Oregon, and Idaho in January and February 
2015.198,199 Various positive aquatic birds were found during the 2014-2015 outbreak, as 
shown in Table 7, cementing the possibility of introduction from wild aquatic birds. 
Table 7. Hunter-harvested wild bird surveillance for HPAI virus H5 intercontinental A 
(icA) results for AI matrix gene, Pacific Flyway, December 2014 through February 1, 
2015, as reported in Bevins et al.199 
Species n HPAI virus icA positive 
Mallard, Anas platyrhynchos 1,410 15 
Northern shoveler, Anas clypeata 555 3 
Green-winged teal, Anas crecca 724 4 
American wigeon, Anas americana 777 31 
Northern pintail, Anas acuta 460 5 
Cinnamon teal, Anas cyanoptera 67 0 
Wood duck, Aix sponsa 27 3 
Gadwall, Anas strepera 185 1 
Canvasback, Aythya valisineria 68 0 
Ruddy duck, Oxyura jamaicensis 46 0 
Bufflehead, Bucephala albeola 35 0 
Canada goose, Branta canadensis 148 1 
Cackling goose, Branta hutchinsii 33 0 
Lesser scaup, Aythya affinis 14 0 
Ring-necked duck, Aythya collaris 65 0 
Common goldeneye, Bucephala clangula 39 0 
All other species sampled 76 0 
 
• Commercial turkey flocks in Stanislaus County, California, were infected with a novel 
Eurasian HPAI H5N8 in January 2015, and the outbreak is considered related to the 
HPAI events in wild birds. This novel AI virus of Eurasian origin (EA-H5N8 clade 
2.3.4.4) spread rapidly along wild bird migratory pathways during 2014.200 On February 
12, 2015, Eurasian H5N8 was also confirmed in a commercial chicken flock in Kings 
County, California.198 
• Between March and June of 2015, an outbreak of H5N2 was observed in the Midwest; 
turkey barns were the most impacted in Minnesota and chickens were more involved in 
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Iowa.161 Although 3,139 waterfowl fecal samples were tested during this outbreak, HPAI 
virus was not isolated from any aquatic bird fecal sample.201 
9.1.4.2 Qualitative Analysis 
We considered the following factors in evaluating this pathway:  
• Generally, total confinement and biosecurity measures practiced on commercial poultry 
operations effectively prevent wild aquatic birds and other pests from entering pullet 
barns.  
○ The spread of the viruses via migratory waterfowl routes is far less likely to occur in 
poultry farms with bird-proof confinement.202 
○ Feed bins are maintained so that wild birds do not frequent or access pullet premises, 
and spilled feed should be promptly cleaned up to avoid attracting wild birds.203-205 
• Experimental studies suggest that the possibility of HPAI infection in wild aquatic birds 
varies considerably, and their ability to transmit viruses depends on the combination of 
virus strain and host. 
○ A study in 1986 by Alexander et al. challenged ducks with eight different HPAI and 
LPAI viruses via three different routes (intranasal, intramuscular, and contact with 
inoculated ducks).181 Ducks became infected with only four strains of viruses, and the 
infection rate for each strain varied with the route of infection. In addition, tracheal 
and cloacal viral shedding were inconsistent. 
○ As illustrated in Table 7, mallard ducks experimentally infected intranasally with 
four strains of H5 HPAI viruses at106 EID50 responded differently from those infected 
with strains of H7 HPAI viruses at the same EID50.193  
• Despite the possibility of wild aquatic birds introducing HPAI to susceptible farmed 
poultry, there is no known evidence of secondary spread from total confinement farms 
within control zones via wild birds. Anecdotally, there have been reports of suspected 
movement of LPAI virus between flocks of free-range turkeys (Mahesh Kumar, personal 
communication, November 1995), but these free-range flocks fall outside the scope of 
this assessment. Once the viruses move from wild birds to poultry, it is assumed that 
human activities—especially movement of personnel and equipment from farm to farm—
are responsible for transferring infective materials from infected to susceptible birds.202 
Secondary spread caused by wild birds between poultry premises should be considered 
possible in rare instances. 
○ Wood et al. (1985) demonstrated little to no fecal shedding of HPAI H5N2 in wild 
ring-billed gulls (and domestic Pekin ducks), suggesting these birds were unlikely to 
transmit virus from farm to farm in the 1983 Pennsylvania outbreak.192  
○ None of the HPAI-infected wild ducks (H5N2, H5N1, and H5N8) found in the 2014-
2015 U.S. outbreak have been implicated in transferring the virus from one poultry 
farm to another.161,185,186,206  
○ In the above-mentioned HPAI H5N8 outbreak in commercial California turkeys, 
other houses on the premises remained negative, and spread of the disease within the 
Control Area did not occur.200 
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9.1.4.3 Likelihood Rating and Conclusion 
While wild aquatic birds are natural reservoirs for influenza A viruses (including several strains 
of HPAI virus) and could potentially cause a spillover of disease to domestic poultry, primary 
infection in layer pullets or other domestic poultry depends upon the degree of contact with wild 
birds. In addition, there is no historical evidence of secondary spread from total confinement 
barns within Control Areas via wild aquatic birds. Modern poultry management systems, in 
combination with stringent biosecurity measures, make the contact between wild and domestic 
birds—and resulting secondary spread of HPAI virus among domestic poultry via wild aquatic 
birds—unlikely within the Control Area. Therefore, we conclude that the likelihood of HPAI 
infection in poultry via wild aquatic birds in the farm vicinity is low.  
9.1.5 Role of HPAI Virus Spread to a Pullet Flock via Wild Non-Aquatic Birds in 
Farm Vicinity 
An AI virus was first identified in wild birds in 1961 when HPAI H5N3 was isolated from 
common terns (Sterna hirundo) in South Africa.207 A compilation of more recent surveys of wild 
birds describes an overall AI virus prevalence of 15.2 percent in Anseriformes (waterfowl), 2.9 
percent in Passeriformes (perching birds), and 2.2 percent in Charadriiformes (waders, gulls, and 
auks).202 Influenza viruses are primarily spread from wild birds to domestic poultry through the 
mechanical transfer of infective feces, usually via human activity.202 For a thorough review of 
pathways associated specifically with aquatic bird species, please see section 9.1.4, Role of 
HPAI Spread to a Pullet Flock in a Control Area via Wild Aquatic Birds in the Farm Vicinity. 
9.1.5.1 Likelihood of Infection via Passerine or Columbiforme Birds in Farm Vicinity 
Since its appearance, HPAI H5N1 has demonstrated the unique ability among HPAI viruses to 
infect a wide variety of species, including wild birds. Small perching birds of the order 
Passeriformes (passerines) commonly frequent poultry farm areas and thus have the potential to 
serve as biological or mechanical vectors of H5N1, or as so-called bridge species in its 
transmission.208 This group includes commonly encountered species such as sparrows, swallows, 
and starlings. Other potential bridge species include the Columbiforme birds, which include 
pigeons and doves.209 The potential pathways for HPAI transmission via passerine or 
Columbiforme birds include infection or contamination of the wild bird on an infected poultry 
farm or other area contaminated with infected bird feces, with subsequent primary or secondary 
transmission upon encountering an uninfected pullet house. The flying distances that some wild 
bird species travel depend on food supply and weather. For example, starlings and blackbirds 
disperse as far as 15 to 25 miles on average, with some individuals traveling up to 50 miles daily 
from their roost to their feeding grounds.210 Any of these movements provide an individual bird 
the opportunity to contact and disseminate AI viruses. 
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Figure 13. Pathway for exposure of a pullet growing farm via wild passerine or columbiforme 
birds 
9.1.5.1.1 Literature Review 
Small species of wild birds have been observed entering poultry barns. 
• European starlings and house sparrows a e frequently located near poultry houses.211 
During a field survey to estimate the incidence of bacterial pathogens in passerines near 
broiler houses, starlings were seen trying to gain entrance to all chicken houses on one 
farm, and a nest with young starlings was seen in the eaves of one house.211 Numerous 
droppings on the sides of the houses on another farm indicated that sparrows and starlings 
were attracted to the house and possibly trying to gain entrance. 
• In a survey of table-egg layer operations in California regarding pest management 
practices, producers ranked wild birds (passerines) as being somewhat more pestiferous 
on southern ranches212 than on northern ones208 when asked to rank pests in order of 
perceived importance.213 
• Craven et al. note that starlings have the ability to peck through plastic wire mesh on the 
sides of chicken houses.211 Burns et al. counted wild birds in the vicinity of poultry farms 
in Ontario and British Columbia195 and found: 
○ Barn swallows (Hirundo rustica), rock doves (Columba livia), and European starlings 
(Sturnus vulgaris) were all observed entering poultry barns, which included broiler, 
broiler breeder, layer, and turkey production. 
○ Rock doves were observed entering barns the most frequently. 
• In a survey of infected turkey farms during the 2014-2015 outbreak in Iowa, Minnesota, 
North Dakota, South Dakota, and Wisconsin (n=81), 33.7 percent of farms reported 
seeing wild birds (unspecified species) in poultry barns daily to occasionally; most 
reported that small perching birds are present on farm year-round.161,214 
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contamination  
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house 
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• Some species or populations of passerines could be termed synanthropic, as they occupy 
a distinct ecological niche in and around human agricultural activities. The behavioral 
characteristics of passerines that may contribute to their ability to play a role in the 
transmission of AI to domestic poultry are summarized in Table 8. 
Table 8. Behavioral characteristics of several members of the order Passeriformes that impact the 
potential role of transmission of HPAI virus in environments on the farm around poultry houses. 
Common name  
(species) Migration Habitat Nesting behavior Food 
Common Grackle 
(Quiscalus quiscula) 
Resident or 
short-distance 
migrant 
Agricultural fields, 
feedlots, 
woodland, forest 
edges, marshes 
Nearly always in 
scattered trees, 
rarely in barns 
Omnivorous; seeds 
(agricultural grains)  
House Sparrow 
(Passer domesticus) 
Resident Closely associated 
with people and 
their buildings  
Prefers structures; 
eaves or walls of 
buildings 
Grains and seeds 
(livestock feed) 
European Starling 
(Sturnus vulgaris) 
Resident or 
short-distance 
migrant 
Countryside near 
human 
settlements; feed 
in fields 
Trees, buildings, 
structures 
Focus on insects and 
invertebrates; also 
fruits, berries, grains 
(livestock feed) 
House Finch 
(Haemorhous 
mexicanus) 
Resident or 
short-distance 
migrant 
Farms, parks, 
urban centers, 
backyards 
In or near 
buildings; trees 
Plant materials 
almost exclusively; 
millet, milo, etc. 
Table from USDA-APHIS Poultry Feed Risk Assessment.215 
 
Wild birds may also be attracted to poultry feed. For more information on specific risks of feed 
contamination if passerines breach biosecurity at feed mills or on farms, see USDA-APHIS 
Poultry Feed Risk Assessment.215 
While passerine birds have not been directly implicated in the spread of HPAI in previous 
outbreaks, such birds have tested positive for AI in the vicinity of poultry outbreaks. 
• In a 1985 H7N7 HPAI outbreak in chickens in Australia, an antigenically closely related 
strain was isolated from starlings on the affected farm, and serologic evidence of H7N7 
infection was found in sparrows as well.216 
• In a 1995 survey to establish disease freedom for poultry operations during an outbreak 
of HPAI H5N2 virus in Mexico, serologic evidence of infection of three passerine birds 
(species not specified) to an H5N2 serotype was reported.217 However, an LPAI H5N2 
virus had been circulating in poultry in 11 Mexican states prior to the outbreak; it is 
ambiguous as to which virus resulted in the exposure. 
• In Pakistan in 2007, four wild crows were found to be H5N1-positive following 
outbreaks in backyard poultry and zoo birds.218  
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• In Hong Kong in 2009, among 22 birds found dead, including chickens, one large-billed 
crow (Corvus macrorhynchus) was infected with H5N1.218 
• In Jalisco, Mexico, in 2012, 81,000 general surveillance samples in an H7N3 outbreak 
region yielded one positive common grackle (Quiscalus quiscula) and one positive barn 
swallow.219  
• A chickadee recovered in metropolitan Ramsey County, Minnesota, and delivered on 
June 10, 2015, to a wildlife rehabilitation center later tested positive for AI by 
immunohistochemical stains of fixed brain (Minnesota Department of Natural Resources 
2015).220 No virus was isolated, but the chickadee tissues were positive by the H5 inter-
continental A (icA) molecular assay, which targets the Eurasian H5 clade 2.3.4.4 viruses. 
However, hemagglutinin gene sequencing attempts were negative. Where the bird may 
have become exposed to icA H5 is unknown since complete information about 
submission circumstances was unavailable.  
• As part of a case-control study of layer flocks in northwest Iowa in 2015, wild birds and 
mammals around the flocks were sampled.161 
○ Of over 1,600 wild bird samples collected—caught using a mist-net around a nest 
built in a walkway between two poultry barns on an infected premises—a single 
sample from lung tissue of a juvenile European starling was positive for Eurasian H5 
(icA).  
○ Additional serologic evidence of positives for icA H5 were found in a sparrow 
(Passer domesticus), another European starling (Sternus vulgaris), and two American 
robins (Turdus migratorious) sampled around the same positive farm. 
With one exception, surveillance of passerines for AI virus has demonstrated a zero to low 
prevalence in the wild population. 
• In a summary of three studies from 1979 to 1980, in which a total of 11 passerine species 
were tested, AI virus isolation was reported from 17 out of 586 birds.161,221  
• No influenza virus was isolated from 83 cloacal swabs collected from four adult and 79 
juvenile reed warblers (Acrocephalus scirpaceus) in 1993, despite proximity to aquatic 
habitats of known AI reservoir species.177 
• In a survey of passerine birds in the state of Georgia from 1999 to 2009, zero of 234 birds 
of 25 different species tested positive for AI antibodies.222  
• On Helgoland Island in the North Sea in 2001, 543 migrating passerine birds of different 
species all tested negative for AI virus subtypes H5 and H7.223  
• In China, from 2004 to 2007, RT-PCR on 7,320 cloacal, tissue, or fecal samples from 33 
Passeriforme species identified 0.36 percent to be H5N1-positive; 1.09 percent of tree 
sparrows were positive.183 
• During active surveillance of Passeriformes for HPAI H5N1 in Mongolia from 2005 to 
2011, zero of 80 live-bird, fecal, and sick-bird samples were positive.184  
○ No passerine birds were sampled during five H5N1 wild bird outbreak investigations. 
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• In 2006, out of 8,961 Passeriformes sampled via RT-PCR in Europe, one (0.01 percent) 
was H5N1 positive and eight (0.09 percent) were LPAI positive.208 
• From a total of 670 cloacal swabs from 37 different species of migratory passerine birds 
in Slovenia from 2004 to 2006, there was one positive rRT-PCR in the only common 
starling (Sturnus vulgaris) tested, but virus isolation was unsuccessful.224  
• In a 2007 study in Slovakia, 30 percent of 155 passerine birds of 12 species were AI virus 
positive via RT-PCR on cloacal and/or oropharyngeal samples, including three of six 
swallows (Hirundo rustica).225 The authors speculate that the higher than typically 
reported prevalence may be due to the increased sensitivity of nested RT-PCR used in 
this study. 
• Rectal samples from 1,300 tree sparrows (Passer montanus) in China in 2011 yielded no 
AI virus, while 94 of 800 were serologically positive for H5N1, and zero of 800 were 
seropositive for H7.226 
Experimental susceptibility of passerine birds to HPAI H5N1 depends on the species of bird and 
strain of virus. 
• In sparrows inoculated with four different H5N1strains, mortality was 66 to 100 percent, 
oropharyngeal and cloacal titers were as high as 4.7 and 4.1 log10 EID50/ml, respectively, 
at 4 days post-inoculation (DPI), and there was no same-species contact transmission.227 
Mortality was 0 percent in European starlings, maximum cloacal titer was 3.8 log10 
EID50/ml at 2 DPI, and there was only one unduplicated instance of contact transmission. 
Oropharyngeal and cloacal titers were very low in pigeons (Columba spp.), and their 
mortality was 0 percent. 
○ The authors deduce that sparrows may act as intermediate hosts for transmission to 
both poultry and mammals, but the lack of contact transmission and high mortality 
preclude them from serving as a reservoir species for H5N1. 
○ While starlings may also act as intermediate hosts, the authors conclude the low 
contact transmission rate likely indicates they could not serve as an H5N1 reservoir. 
○ Pigeons were determined to be likely to play a minor role in the ecology of H5N1. 
• Brown et al. (2009) found similar mortality rates (60-100 percent at 102 to 106 EID50 
inoculum/bird) and maximum oropharyngeal titers (4.2 log10 TCID50/ml) in house 
sparrows (Passer domesticus) inoculated with A/whooper swan/Mongolia/244/05 HPAI 
H5N1, but maximum cloacal titers were significantly (P=0.002) lower than 
oropharyngeal. While 40 percent of pigeons (Columba livia) inoculated with the highest 
dose of H5N1 died, they and the survivors shed virus only briefly and at low titers. All 
pigeons in the low- and medium-dose groups survived and remained AI virus-free.228 
○ These authors conclude that sparrows could play a role in AI virus transmission in an 
outbreak, though more likely via contamination of the environment and feed, due to 
their predominantly oropharyngeal shedding, or via chickens scavenging infected 
sparrow carcasses. 
• Two studies with the HPAI H5N1 strain A/chicken/Hong Kong/220/97 resulted in no 
mortality and infrequent histopathology lesions in house sparrows and European 
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starlings.229,230 While mortality among house finches (Carpodacus mexicanus) averaged 
44 percent, histopathology lesions were absent to mild and viral antigen rare in the nasal 
cavity and gastrointestinal tract. The authors were not able to draw any definitive 
conclusions regarding the role of these species as biological vectors. 
• In another study, house sparrows experimentally infected with A/duck/Laos/25/06 H5N1- 
shed virus for several days and rapidly contaminated their drinking water.231 On the other 
hand, inoculated chickens shed undetectable levels of virus into their water troughs, 
despite high oropharyngeal and cloacal shedding; the authors surmise that this was due to 
rapid disease progression in the chickens. 
○ These authors concluded that sparrows may be unlikely to become infected by 
chickens under normal field conditions in an H5N1 outbreak. 
○ They also inferred that the behavior of infected sparrows may be a determining factor 
in their potential as intermediate H5N1 hosts via viral shedding. 
• In tree sparrows inoculated with A/chicken/Miyazaki/K11/2007 and 
A/chicken/Shimane/1/2010 H5N1, mortality was 100 percent within 11 days (mean >6 
days), with oral swabs positive from 1 to 8 DPI and maximum titers of 106.5 to 107.3 
EID50/ml.232 While there was no intraspecies transmission among sparrows, 10 of 16 
(62.5 percent) contact chickens died when housed with infected sparrows. 
○ Due to the prolonged viral shedding observed here, the authors concluded that tree 
sparrows have the potential to serve as biological vectors of H5N1. 
• Nestorowicz et al. infected house sparrows and starlings with 105 log EID50 of an isolate 
of an HPAI H7N7 virus from chickens (A/Chicken/Victoria/1/85) via the oral/tracheal 
and nasal cleft route.216 Uninfected birds were placed in contact with infected birds of the 
same species. Transmission to starlings was observed. More details from the experiment 
are provided in Table 9 below. 
Table 9. Summary of the experimental transmission of H7N7 HPAI virus in house 
sparrows and starlings by Nestorowicz et al. (1987)216 
Common 
name Mortality Virus isolation Transmission 
Starlings 100%; All 
inoculated birds 
died within 48 hr. 
post-inoculation 
Not reported Contact birds died 
within 4 days of 
being placed with 
infected birds 
Sparrows 30% mortality rate  Isolated from all tissues 
from birds that died within 
2 days post-inoculation 
Not transmitted to 
uninfected contact 
birds 
 
• 23 of 23 stonechats (Saxicola torquata) inoculated with A/Cygnus 
cygnus/Germany/R65/2006 H5N1 died within three to seven days, most with no clinical 
signs.212 Oropharyngeal shedding peaked at 103 to 104 TCID50/ml on 3 to 6 DPI. 
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9.1.5.1.2 Qualitative Analysis 
We considered the following qualitative factors for evaluating this pathway: 
• A majority of the studies cited above examine strains of HPAI H5N1. 
○ To date, HPAI H5N1 has proven to be unique in its ability to infect a variety of 
species, and more ubiquitous in its prevalence than any other HPAI virus. 
• The risk of AI transmission is much lower from a single infected bird than from a 
population of birds in which infection is established. 
○ As noted in the literature review, surveys of passerine birds have demonstrated a low 
prevalence of AI virus, including the more pervasive H5N1. 
○ Several experimental studies have resulted in no intraspecies transmission in 
passerine species.212,227,232  
• Given the preponderance of passerine birds, more disease spread out of Control Areas in 
previous outbreaks would be expected to have occurred if these birds played an important 
role in the transmission of HPAI. 
○ As discussed in section 9.1.1, Role of Local Spread Components in Previous AI 
Outbreaks, most studies indicate limited spread of AI between poultry premises via 
mechanisms that do not involve the movement of people, vehicles, or equipment.  
• The CID50 for HPAI H5N1 infection via aerosol was estimated to be 105 to 106 EID50, 
with higher doses deemed necessary for infection via the oral route (see section 8.7.2, 
Dose Response in Chickens). 
○ The studies cited above demonstrate variability in oropharyngeal and cloacal HPAI 
virus titers in passerines, depending on the bird species and the H5N1 strain, but 
when shed titers were measured, most studies indicate they would be adequate to 
infect chickens via the aerosol route. 
• Biosecurity guidelines dictate measures to prevent wild bird access to pullet barns and 
maintenance of feed bins such that wild birds are neither frequenting nor accessing pullet 
premises (section 7.4.3.5, Animal, Pest, Insect Control).203,205  
○ While it is industry standard to discourage wild birds from accessing poultry barns as 
part of a company biosecurity plan, assuring that no birds are entering all pullet barns 
is not considered feasible (SES WG, personal communication, June 2017). 
o Even with proactive industry management, wild birds are known to enter poultry 
barns. Burns et al. observed wild birds frequenting and entering poultry barns on 
premises where the producers were “highly involved in poultry industry 
management” and, the authors note, may have thus been practicing more stringent 
biosecurity than other producers.195 
○ For more information on potential for contamination of finished feed products by 
passerine birds, see USDA-APHIS Poultry Feed Risk Assessment.215 
• Secondary transmission of HPAI from a passerine bird outside the pullet house is 
unlikely. 
Workin g Draft 
Pullets Out of the Barn Risk Assessment 
Page 79 of 296 
○ As potential biological vectors, passerine birds shed lower cloacal viral titers, and 
their fecal volume is small. 
○ There also is the possibility of mechanical transmission of HPAI virus if plumage or 
feet were to become contaminated. Preliminary results from a survey of 419 passerine 
birdsc on five farms infected with HPAI H5N2 virus and five uninfected farms in 
Iowa indicates that mechanical transmission through contamination of the external 
surface of passerine birds is a possibility, although the likelihood is very low (only 
one external surface swab was positive by matrix gene rRT-PCR and submitted for 
further testing).161 As potential mechanical vectors, Passeriformes, due to their small 
size, can transfer a very small volume of contaminated feces from an infected poultry 
premises. 
9.1.5.1.3 Likelihood Rating and Conclusion 
While passerine and columbiforme birds have proven unlikely to play an important role in the 
transmission of HPAI virus in poultry outbreaks, uncertainty remains as to their potential as 
vectors, and they have demonstrated the ability to enter some secure pullet houses. Thus, the 
likelihood of HPAI infection via passerine birds in the farm vicinity is low to moderate. 
9.1.5.2 Likelihood of Infection via Other Non-Aquatic Bird Species in Farm Vicinity 
Other non-aquatic avian species such as birds of prey or scavenger species vary greatly in 
number and behavior around poultry farms. Unlike passerines or columbiforme species, these 
birds are unlikely to be able to enter poultry barns, resulting in only secondary transmission 
pathways. Several studies have clearly shown that flying birds transport viruses such as HPAI 
H5N1.45 These birds might have contact with manure stored outside the poultry house or manure 
that is land-applied. Although the quantity of manure wild birds can carry is unknown, as well as 
the host adaptability of other HPAI virus strains to different wild bird species, it was 
conservatively (and hypothetically) assumed that wild birds will carry HPAI-contaminated 
manure if they have contact with it. Additionally, a predatory bird or scavenger may become 
contaminated with feathers or body fluids of an infected prey item, or potentially pick up and 
move that prey item to a location closer to a pullet premises. 
Common predator and scavenging wild birds undertake a variety of short- and long-distance trips 
to search for food and cover. These include daily movements to and from hunting/feeding and 
roosting areas, post-fledging dispersal, and seasonal movements.45 Scavenger species may be 
attracted to premises with improperly secured daily mortality carcasses. Species known to 
scavenge avian carcasses in the U.S. considered in this assessment include vultures, some hawks 
and eagles, crows, ravens, and magpies. Some gull species known to scavenge are covered 
separately in section 9.1.4, Role of HPAI Spread to Pullet Flock in a Control Area via Wild 
Aquatic Birds in the Farm Vicinity. 
Finally, wild galliformes also may be attracted to poultry operations. 
                                                 
c 220 individual birds across 18 species on infected farms, 199 individual birds across 16 species on uninfected 
farms 
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• In a survey of infected turkey farms during the 2014-2015 outbreak in Iowa, Minnesota, 
North Dakota, South Dakota, and Wisconsin (n=81), 26 percent reported seeing wild 
turkeys, pheasants, and quail around their poultry barns.161 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14. Pathway for exposure of a pullet farm via scavenging birds or raptor species. A 
similar process could be demonstrated for wild gallinaceous birds 
 
9.1.5.2.1 Literature Review 
Non-passerine non-aquatic birds have not been directly implicated in the spread of HPAI in 
previous outbreaks, and few such birds have tested positive for AI in the vicinity of outbreaks in 
poultry or wild waterfowl. 
• Turkey vultures (Cathartes aura) may visit poultry farms to feed on dead birds. Turkey 
and black vultures (Coragyps atratus) both belong to the order Accipitriformes, family 
Cathartidae. 
○ During the 1983-1984 HPAI H5N2 outbreak in Pennsylvania, Virginia, and 
Maryland, eight turkey vultures and 22 black vultures from the quarantine zones were 
tested for H5N2 and none were positive.233  
• Experimentally infected wild pheasants (order Galliformes) shed the virus in their feces 
for up to 15 days, demonstrating the potential to transmit HPAI H5N2 
(A/Chicken/Penn./1370/83). However, surveillance of wild pheasants in the quarantine 
area did not support this.192 
• Raptors found dead during an H5N1 outbreak in wild water birds in Germany in 2006 
revealed evidence of H5N1 infection in common buzzards and peregrine falcons.234 The 
authors hypothesize that in this H5N1 outbreak in wild water birds, raptor exposure and 
mortality likely occurred more often in species that hunted or scavenged sick or dead 
medium-sized prey birds. 
○ The highest concentration of H5N1 was found in brain tissue and air sacs, with 
marked encephalitis as a common finding on histopathology. 
Infected 
poultry farm 
 Fomite contamination or infection of raptor 
or scavenger birds around house or preying 
on infected wild aquatic birds 
 
Subsequent transfer into uninfected 
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○ The suspected main cause of death in H5N1-positive raptors is encephalitis. 
○ No infection was found in other species tested (Eurasian sparrow hawk, common 
kestrel, white-tailed sea eagle, undetermined species buzzard, undetermined species 
raptor, red kite, rough-legged buzzard, western marsh-harrier, and goshawk). 
• Other birds of prey in the order Accipitriformes, such as the common buzzard (Buteo 
buteo), have become infected in previous HPAI H5N1 outbreaks. 
○ 10.5 percent of wild birds testing positive during the 2006 HPAI H5N1 outbreak in 
Germany were birds of prey, including common buzzards, peregrine falcons, kestrels, 
and European eagle owls.235 
 The buzzards reportedly displayed severe central nervous system infection 
without systemic virus distribution (unpublished data). 
○ An HPAI H5N1-positive common buzzard carcass found in Bulgaria in 2010 
contained no gross pathological lesions, suggesting the bird died shortly after 
infection and would not have served as a reservoir of infection.236 
• The U.S. Interagency Steering Committee on Avian Influenza in Wild Birds has 
compiled all U.S. wild bird cases of HPAI H5 from December 2014 to June 2015.188 Out 
of 100 positive birds, only seven were from non-passerine non-aquatic species (Table 
10). 
Table 10: HPAI H5-positive samples from non-passerine non-aquatic species 
collected from December 2014 to June 2015 in the U.S.188 
Date Species Lineage Sampling type (location) 
 4/14/15  Cooper’s hawk ) EA/AM H5N2  Mortality (MN) 
 4/13/15  Snowy owl  EA/AM H5N2  Mortality (WI) 
1/20/15 Bald eagle EA H5N8 Mortality (ID) 
1/9/15 Red-tailed hawk EA/AM H5N2 Mortality (WA) 
12/31/14 Red-tailed hawk EA/AM H5N2 Mortality (WA) 
12/29/14 Cooper’s hawk EA/AM H5N2 Mortality (WA) 
12/29/14 Peregrine falcon EA H5N8 Mortality (WA) 
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• There also were cases of HPAI confirmed in captive wild birds (Table 11).237  
Table 11.  HPAI-positive samples from captive wild birds in the U.S.237 
Date Species Lineage Sample location 
3/27/15 Captive gyrfalcon EA/AM H5N2 MT 
3/27/15 Captive falcon (hybrid) EA/AM H5N2 MO 
1/29/15 Captive gyrfalcon (2) EA H5N8 ID 
1/16/15 Captive falcons, great horned owl EA/AM H5N2 ID 
12/14/14  Captive gyrfalcon EA H5N8 WA 
 
• Similarly, cases of HPAI in captive falconry birds in Dubai suggests that these raptors 
were likely infected through consumption of infected farmed or wild prey items.238 
• An outbreak of H5N1 clade 2.3.2.1c in captive falconry birds in Dubai and avian prey 
species at a breeding facility included mortality in gyrfalcons and hybrid gyr/peregrine 
falcons.238 
Surveillance of non-passerine non-aquatic birds for AI virus has demonstrated zero to low 
prevalence in the wild. 
• A 2010 survey of antibodies to AI in wild birds revealed zero positives out of 184 black 
vultures sampled in Mississippi.102 The authors note that nearly all species of terrestrial 
birds tested were negative for AI antibodies. 
• A survey of antibodies to influenza A in 616 raptors admitted to two U.S. wildlife 
rehabilitation centers, and 472 peregrine falcons caught at a migratory banding station, 
found relatively low prevalence of antibodies (subtype not described) in a variety of 
species. Results of the survey are summarized in the table below (Table 12).239 
○ Antibodies to influenza A (subtyping not possible due to low HI ratio in sera) were 
found in bald eagles, peregrine falcons, great horned owls, and Cooper’s hawks. 
○ No influenza A was found in turkey vultures or black vultures. 
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Table 12.  Serologic evidence of influenza A in raptors admitted to two U.S. wildlife 
rehabilitation centers239 
Species Number tested Number positive Percent positive 
Bald eagle 406 22 5.1 
Peregrine falcon 472 1 0.2 
Great horned owl 81 1 1.2 
Cooper’s hawk 100 1 1.0 
Turkey vulture 21 0 0 
Black vulture 8 0 0 
 
• Gunnarson et al. (2010) sampled nestling white-tailed sea eagles (n=181) and peregrine 
falcons (n=168) in Sweden for influenza A infection.240 
○ No evidence of infection or antibodies was detected in any samples. 
○ Authors acknowledge that maternal antibodies last less than three weeks in nestlings, 
and sampling older nestlings that haven’t fledged may be a less sensitive screening 
population than adult birds. 
• Peterson et al. (2002) found a 0 percent prevalence of AI virus in wild turkeys 
(Melleagris gallopavo) in a survey of 70 turkeys in Texas.241 
• Another study of wild captured or hunter-harvested wild bobwhite quail (Colinus 
virginianus) in Texas found prevalence of 1.4 percent using rRT-PCR; however, no virus 
could be isolated from culture.242 
Experimental susceptibility of non-passerine birds to HPAI is relatively unstudied. 
• Experimentally infected American kestrels (Falco sparverius) with H5N1 
(A/whooperswan/Mongolia/244/05) demonstrated 100 percent mortality within seven 
days of inoculation.243 
○ The American kestrels demonstrated oral viral RNA shedding and infectious virus 
and, to a lesser extent, cloacal shedding. Infectious viral particles as detected by 
embryonated egg inoculation were not detected in cloacal samples. 
○ Seroconversion occurred by DPI 4 to 5. 
○ The most consistent histopathological lesions occurred in brain and pancreas; all 
infected birds had some evidence of meningitis and encephalitis. 
• In commercial Japanese quail, Chukar partridges, ring-necked pheasants, and Guinea 
fowl experimentally infected with H5N8 (A/GF/WA/14) and H5N2 (A/NP/WA/14), there 
was 100 percent mortality, with a mean time to death of 2.5 to 3 days (M. Pantin-
Jackwood, personal communication, Nov 2015). 
o Clinical signs included listlessness and ruffled feathers. 
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o Histopathological signs included necrotic pancreas, mottled spleen, petechial 
hemorrhages on the myocardium, and pulmonary hemorrhage. 
o Conspecific birds (i.e., birds belonging to the same species) placed in contact with 
infected partridges or pheasants also showed high mortality from both H5N8 and 
H5N2 infections. 
9.1.5.2.2 Qualitative Analysis 
We considered the following qualitative factors in evaluating this pathway: 
• To date, HPAI H5N1 has proven to be unique in its ability to infect a variety of species, 
and more ubiquitous in its prevalence than any other HPAI virus. 
• The risk of AI transmission is much lower from a single infected bird than from a 
population of birds in which infection is established. Additionally, low circulating 
antibodies, solitary living patterns, and apparent rapid mortality in raptors make risk of 
spread within these predatory species less likely. 
○ As noted in the literature review, surveys of birds of prey and scavenging birds have 
demonstrated a low prevalence of AI virus, including the more pervasive H5N1. 
• Given that some scavenger and other non-passerine species may have relatively large 
home ranges,244-246 spread beyond the Control Areas in previous outbreaks would have 
been expected if these birds played an important role in the transmission of HPAI. 
○ Further discussion of avian scavenger species, home ranges, and factors for likelihood 
of transmission can be found in the de d bird disposal section (see section 9.2.4, 
Likelihood of a Pullet Flock Becoming Infected with HPAI Virus via Dead Bird 
Disposal). 
○ As discussed in section 9.1.1 (Role of Local Spread Components in Previous AI 
Outbreaks), most studies indicate limited spread of AI between poultry premises via 
mechanisms that do not involve the movement of people, vehicles, or equipment. 
• Biosecurity guidelines dictate measures to prevent wild bird access to poultry barns, 
manage dead bird disposal, and maintain feed bins such that wild birds are neither 
frequenting nor accessing pullet premises (section 7.4.3.5, Animal, Pest, Insect 
Control).203-205  
○ Given proper disposal of dead birds on pullet premises and the fact that non-passerine 
and non-columbiforme species have not been observed inside pullet houses, direct 
contact with poultry is extremely unlikely with standard biosecurity measures in place 
in the pullet industry (SES WG, personal communication, June 2017). 
9.1.5.2.3 Likelihood Rating and Conclusion 
Other (not passerine or columbiforme) non-aquatic bird species have the potential to contract 
HPAI virus and have home ranges of adequate size to contain adjacent poultry farms where they 
potentially may access contaminated carcasses, manure, or other material at an infected 
premises. However, they are unlikely to have direct contact with poultry flocks if standard 
biosecurity measures are in place, and their ability to shed virus has not been studied in many 
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Virus transfer to pullet 
premises via vehicle 
species. For the above reasons, the likelihood of HPAI infection via non-passerine non-aquatic 
birds in the farm vicinity was rated as low.  
9.1.6 Role of HPAI Virus Spread to Pullet-Growing Premises near Poultry Live-
Haul Routes via Feathers, Feces, and Other Fomites 
The evaluation of the risk of HPAI virus transmission to pullet-growing premises in a Control 
Area near poultry live-haul routes assumes the release of potentially HPAI-contaminated 
material from live-haul trailers along roadways and transportation routes in close proximity to a 
pullet premises. The birds in transit may originate from premises inside or outside the Control 
Area. This evaluation is written specifically for pullet-growing premises. However, since 
multiple poultry commodity operations involve live-bird movements, including broilers to 
market, turkeys to market, spent layer hens to market, layer pullets to egg production, turkeys 
from brood to grow-out, and breeder movements, the concepts here can be translated across these 
other live-bird movements.  
As a requirement of the Secure Poultry Supply Plans, the Pre-Movement Isolation Period (PMIP) 
decreases the likelihood of permitted movement of infected but undetected flocks within a 
Control Area. Additionally, pullet-growing premises in a Control Area that wish to request 
permitted movement must adhere to the greatly intensified biosecurity of the PMIP, which 
minimizes the likelihood of exposure to virus in the days leading up to movement (see Appendix 
8: Cross-Commodity Pre-Movement Isolation Period).  
9.1.6.1 Risk of HPAI Virus Transmission to Pullet Premises near Poultry Live-Haul 
Routes  
The transport of an infected but undetected flock near a pullet-growing facility represents a 
potential pathway for local area spread. HPAI virus transfer to premises near the live-haul route 
could occur via HPAI-contaminated feathers, feces, and other fomites, which may contaminate a 
pullet premises close to the route and may subsequently be tracked into barns. The two specific 
pathways identified are: (1) HPAI-contaminated fomites from a live-haul truck blow into or are 
tracked onto a pullet premises and introduce virus to the pullet flock, and (2) a contaminated 
live-haul road results in a vehicle bringing virus onto pullet premises and subsequent virus 
transfer into a barn. Figure 15 diagrams the exposure pathway.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 15. Pathway for exposure of a pullet-growing premises via fomites originating from 
nearby live-haul route. 
Infected and 
undetected flock 
 
HPAI-contaminated feathers, feces, 
or other fomites fall from live-haul 
trailer during transit 
 
Subsequent virus 
transfer into barn 
Contaminated fomites blow 
from road to nearby pullet 
farm or into barn 
Cross-
contamination 
to vehicle on 
live-haul road 
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9.1.6.2 Literature Review 
• If infected poultry are transported to processing, the extent of virus contamination 
available to infect a flock near the live-haul route is affected by virus shedding, virus 
persistence, and quantity of virus transferred between transfer steps.  
○ Estimates of HPAI virus concentrations in feathers, feces, and blood from HPAI-
infected poultry generally range between 103 and 107 EID50 per gram or per milliliter 
of tested substrate, although higher concentrations have been observed in some cases. 
Various units of measure are used. 
 Immature feathers: In chicken feathers, the median viral titers for three HPAI 
H5N1 virus strains (A/duck/Sleman/BBVW-1003-34368/2007, 
A/duck/Sleman/BBVW-598-32226/2007, and A/Muscovy 
duck/Vietnam/453/2004) tested were ~105, ~106, and ~105.7 TCID50/0.1mL for 
immature pectorosternal feathers, immature flight feathers, and immature tail 
feathers, respectively, in inoculated broilers after feather samples were ground 
with a mortar and pestle.247 From chicks inoculated with an HPAI H7N1 strain 
(A/Chicken/Italy/5093/99) at 15 days old, viral RNA load was higher in feather 
pulp than in oropharyngeal and cloacal swabs for most days tested post-
inoculation.248 Feather pulp was obtained by squeezing the calamus (i.e., the 
feather quill).248 In detached feather quills from ducks, HPAI viral titers were 
105.5 EID50/mL and 106.3 EID50/mL at day 10 at 4°C (39.2°F) for the two H5N1 
virus strains (A/chicken/Miyazaki/ K11/2007 and A/whooper swan/Akita/1/2008) 
tested, respectively, when 4-week-old ducks were inoculated with 107 EID50.249 
 Mature feathers: In chickens, viral antigen was detected in feather stromal cells 
and feather epidermal cells in inoculated (Ck/Miya/K 11/07, Ws/Akita/1/08) 7- 
and 8-week-old chickens.250 In ducks, 3.8% of mature pectorosternal feather 
samples were positive post-challenge and, of the virus-positive feathers, viral 
titers ranged from ~100.6 to ~104.5 TCID50/0.1 mL.247 From inoculated 
(A/duck/Nigeria/1071-23/2007) 24-week-old Pekin ducks, 31.25% of breast and 
tail feather calami and 37.5% of wing feather calami were positive by rRT-PCR at 
3 days post-inoculation.251 
 Feces: In chicken feces, HPAI viral titers were greater than 109 ELD50/g when 
chickens were inoculated with 1983 Pennsylvania H5N2 (SEPRL-PA isolate).78 
In turkey feces, viral titers were estimated to be between 103 and 105 EID50/mL 
with 2015 HPAI H5N2 viruses (A/turkey/MN/12528/2015 and 
A/chicken/IA/13388/2015) on the basis of cloacal swab data (E. Spackman, 
personal communication, May 2016).252 
 Blood: In turkey blood, HPAI viral titers ranged from 101 to 105.8 EID50/0.1 mL at 
1-3 days post-inoculation when inoculated with 106 EID50 of an H7N1 virus strain 
(A/chicken/Italy/1067/1999).62 
○ Once virus is shed, it remains viable for a varying amount of time depending on viral 
strain and environmental conditions, such as humidity and temperature. Virus 
persistence is generally longer at cooler temperatures and in more humid conditions. 
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 For virus persistence data in a range of conditions and on substrates relevant to 
this pathway, such as feathers, feces, and water, see Appendix 2: AI Virus 
Survival at Various Humidity Levels, at Various Temperatures, and on Various 
Substrates. 
○ This transmission pathway is likely multi-step. The available literature suggests virus 
concentration decreases when transferred between surfaces. In an experimental 
setting, mechanical transmission of an enveloped virus after multiple contact steps 
have occurred.253 
 Virus transfer between surfaces for non-AI viruses ranges from undetectable to 
46% transferred.254 
 Mechanical transmission via a multiple-step pathway was documented using 
porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome virus (PRRSV) in 1 of 10 
replicates by virus isolation and in 8 of 10 replicates by RT-PCR at less than 0°C 
(32°F) in a swine industry-like setting.253 
• Similar to HPAI virus, PRRSV is an enveloped virus shed in feces, urine, 
semen, aerosolized respiratory secretions, and other bodily fluids.  
• Experimental design simulated a four-step transmission pathway: PRRSV-
inoculated (field strain MN 30-100) carrier attached to undercarriage of 
vehicle and driven 50 km→ Contact between PRRSV-inoculated carrier and 
driver’s boots→ Driver re-entered vehicle and drove 50 km→ Driver’s boots 
entered farm anteroom→ Contact between farm anteroom floor and 
containers of four kinds (cardboard, Styrofoam, metal, and plastic). 
• PRRSV RNA was detected by PCR in 8 of 10 replicates on three container 
surfaces (Styrofoam, metal, and plastic) and 7 of 10 replicates on a cardboard 
container after the final transmission step at less than 0°C (32°F).253 
• At 10-16°C (50-60.8°F), infectious PRRSV RNA was detected by PCR in 2 of 
10 replicates on the farm anteroom floor.255 
• Findings from previous disease outbreaks suggest virus transmission to a poultry 
premises near a live-haul route is possible.  
○ In a review of infectious laryngotracheitis (ILT) outbreaks on U.S. broiler operations, 
some experts have implicated live-haul trucks transporting infectious birds as a 
probable means of indirect spread to nearby susceptible flocks along the route.256,257 
○ In the 2002-2003 outbreak of ILT on Mississippi broiler farms, the mean distance of 
the nearest live-haul road to case farms was 0.40 miles, while the distance of the 
nearest live-haul road to control farms was 1 mile (distance to nearest live-haul road 
[miles]: Odds Ratio=0.54; P-value=0.0392; univariate analysis).258 
○ In the 1995 outbreak of LPAI H9N2 in Minnesota, spatial observations suggested 
exposure to the live-haul route used to transport a known infected turkey flock to 
slaughter was a risk for premises infection (eight of nine premises within 250 meters 
of the live-haul route became infected) (D. Halvorson, personal communication, June 
2016). 
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○ Close proximity to an infected premises has been associated with an increased risk of 
infection.133,135,259 As a function of distance, the pathway of infection is not clear. For 
a detailed examination of the literature on local area spread in AI outbreaks, see 
Appendix 3: Literature Review on the Role of Local Area Spread in Previous 
Outbreaks. 
• If virus is transferred into a barn, the likelihood of infection is dependent on infectious 
dose. Mean infectious dose varies with poultry species and virus strain.105  
○ In chickens, the infectious doses post-challenge with 11 HPAI-viruses of chicken and 
turkey origin ranged from 101.2 to 104.7 BID50.105 In this study, the infectious doses for 
most strains tested were between 102 and 103 BID50 and were lower for isolates of 
chicken origin.105 With four 2015 H5N2 poultry isolates (A/turkey/ 
Minnesota/12582/2015, A/ turkey/South Dakota/12511/2015, A/chicken/Iowa/13388/ 
2015, A/turkey/Arkansas/7791/2015), infectious dose in chickens ranged from 103.2 
to 105.1 BID50.40  
9.1.6.3 Qualitative Analysis 
We considered the following factors in evaluating this pathway:  
• While this risk assessment is limited to evaluating risk of HPAI infection on premises 
located within the Control Area, poultry transport on routes passing through the Control 
Area may include flocks originating inside or outside the Control Area, which have 
different movement requirements.  
○ Permitted terminal and transfer movements of live poultry originating from within a 
Control Area likely will require movement from a Monitored Premises, adherence to 
a PMIP, and rRT-PCR testing in the days preceding movement. The duration of 
PMIP may vary by sector and type of movement but is determined in part to provide a 
95% probability or greater of detection in flocks exposed to HPAI virus before the 
PMIP begins, given a 100% effective PMIP [see Appendix 8: Cross-Commodity Pre-
Movement Isolation Period). As an example of movement originating from inside the 
Control Area, Table 13 shows simulation results of the detection probability for 
pullets with SPS pre-movement testing and PMIP. This modeling assumed a 100% 
effective PMIP, which prevents flock exposure to virus during the PMIP. For 
modeling with a PMIP that is not 100% effective, see Appendix 9: Supplementary 
Modeling Results. 
○ Premises located outside a Control Area may not be subject to permitted movement. 
There may be variation in pre-movement testing as states or Incident Command may 
require testing for poultry movements from premises in the Free Area,130 but if not, 
these premises may not be subject to pre-movement testing requirements beyond 
routine NPIP surveillance for LPAI. There is also likely variation of biosecurity 
practices in the Free Area. Biosecurity measures may be heightened in an outbreak 
scenario, but implementation may differ markedly between premises. For this 
analysis, the pre-movement surveillance modeled as the method to detect infection 
prior to movement from outside the Control Area consists of rRT-PCR testing of all 
dead birds in pools of 11 swabs (up to a maximum of 4 pools) beginning 8 days 
before movement and a mortality trigger of greater than 1 bird per 1000. Simulation 
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results for pullets are shown in Table 13 and 14. When detection by a mortality 
trigger is obtained depends on transmission parameters and virus characteristics.260 In 
the models for movement originating outside a Control Area, the flock could be 
exposed 1 to 14 days prior to movement since a PMIP is not implemented. 
Introduction close to movement is more likely to go undetected, and, if infection is 
not detected, there may be fewer infected undetected birds at movement.  
 During the 2014-2015 HPAI outbreak in the United States, approximately one 
third (36/103) of the positive commercial premises in Minnesota were located 
outside a Control Area at the time of detection (P. Bonney, personal 
communication, September 2016).  
Table 13. Detection probabilities for pullets using three biosecurity and surveillance 
protocol scenarios, with baseline fast contact rate and 1983 Pennsylvania HPAI 
H5N2 strain characteristics* 
Biosecurity and Surveillance Protocol Detection Probability 
Scenario A  
○ Daily rRT-PCR testing of all dead birds in 11-
swab pools each day (up to a maximum of 4 
pooled samples) during an 8-day PMIP. PMIP 
was considered to be 100% effective.  
0.999 
Scenario B  
○ Daily rRT-PCR testing of all dead birds in 11-
swab pools each day (up to a maximum of 4 
pooled samples) beginning 8 days prior to start 
of load-out. No PMIP implemented 
0.81 
Scenario C                                          
○ Detection under mortality trigger of 1 bird per 
1,000 only. No PMIP implemented. 
0.43 
*Probabilities estimated from 10,000 simulation iterations using Pennsylvania HPAI H5N2 strain characteristics, 
fast contact rate, and considering virus exposure within 14 days of movement. 
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Table 14 Detection probabilities for pullets using three biosecurity and surveillance 
protocol scenarios, with baseline slow contact rate and 1983 Pennsylvania HPAI 
H5N2 strain characteristics* 
Biosecurity and Surveillance Protocol Detection Probability 
Scenario A  
○ Daily rRT-PCR testing of all dead birds in 11-
swab pools each day (up to a maximum of 4 
pooled samples) during an 8 day PMIP. PMIP 
was considered to be 100% effective.  
0.99 
Scenario B  
○ Daily rRT-PCR of testing all dead birds in 11-
swab pools each day (up to a maximum of 4 
pooled samples) beginning 8 days prior to start 
of load-out. No PMIP implemented 
0.66 
Scenario C                                          
○ Detection under mortality trigger of 1 birds per 
1,000 only. No PMIP implemented. 
0.03 
* Probabilities estimated from 10,000 simulation iterations using Pennsylvania HPAI H5N2 strain characteristics, 
slow contact rate, and considering virus exposure within 14 days of movement 
 
• If infected poultry are transported to processing, the initial contamination for this 
pathway depends on HPAI-contaminated material falling from the live-haul trailer. 
Feathers, feces, and other potential fomites fall from live-haul trailers because they are 
not enclosed, as shown in Figures 16-18 (D. Halvorson, personal communication, July 
2016). Day-old chicks and poults are transferred in different vehicles and are totally 
enclosed.  
○ Netting systems to contain feathers in the live-haul trailers typically are not used 
because they are ineffective and create an additional biosecurity problem as nets are 
difficult to clean. Thus, nets were not used on live-haul trucks during the 2014-2015 
or 2016 U.S. HPAI outbreaks (Turkey Working Group [TWG], personal 
communication, July 2016). 
○ Figures 16-18 show the openings in crates used for live-haul in the broiler and turkey 
industries. 
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• The likelihood of this contamination 
reaching the premises and infecting the 
flock may depend on the distance of the 
premises from the live-haul road, 
weather conditions, natural 
barriers/landscape, and virus transfer 
steps. 
○ Close proximity to a road seems  
quite likely for the majority of poultry premises, regardless of species.  
 In a survey of operators of broiler and breeder-layer premises in Georgia, 68% of 
growers were within 440 yards (0.25 miles) of a public road.261 
 Among turkey premises, a case-control study following the 2016 H7N8 outbreak 
in Indiana reported similar distances between a majority of farms and the nearest 
public gravel or dirt road (55% of case farms were within 499 yards of a public 
road; 60% of control farms were within 499 yards of a public road).262 
○ During disease outbreaks, the distance between the live-haul road and poultry 
premises may be efficiently maximized by routing, when possible or based on 
company requests. Poultry live-haul routes are determined by individual companies 
based on transit time and welfare of the birds on the truck, often in addition to 
consideration of any poultry premises in the area (BWG, personal communication, 
July 2016; TWG, personal communication, August 2016; SES WG personal 
communication, January 2018).  
 Poultry companies near outbreaks have communicated frequently and shared 
locations of premises, although knowledge of the locations of other poultry 
premises by a particular company or veterinarian varies (BWG, personal 
communication, July 2016; TWG, personal communication, August 2016). 
Figure 16. Crates filled with broilers to be 
loaded onto a live-haul truck (Photo courtesy  
of GNP Company). 
 
Figure 18. Live-haul trailer of turkeys (Photo 
courtesy of Jill Nezworski.) 
 
Figure 17. Live-haul trailer of turkeys after 
load-out (Photo: Anonymous) 
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• In geographic areas with many poultry production premises, routing may take 
on increased importance due to the density of susceptible birds near a route.  
 During the 2014-2015 HPAI outbreaks in the U.S., live-haul routing requirements 
were not needed for approval of permitted movement in Minnesota (Minnesota 
Board of Animal Health, personal communication, October 2016) and were not 
mandated by Incident Command in 2016 in Indiana (TWG, personal 
communication, July 2016). 
• However, for permitted movement from premises in an HPAI Control Area, 
both the Secure Broiler Supply (SBS) Plan and Secure Turkey Supply (STS) 
Plan recommend live-haul route approval from the Incident Command team or 
routes selected in consultation with a poultry veterinarian or production 
manager.263,264 
 In the management of ILT outbreaks, geographic information system (GIS)-
assisted live-haul route planning has been used to minimize the number of farms 
within a specified distance along the route to processing from a broiler premises 
in a Biosecurity Zone.257  
○ The transmission steps of this pathway could be affected by weather conditions, 
natural barriers/landscape, and C&D. 
 Since feathers are lightweight, transmission to the premises via feathers over short 
distances might be a possibility. Weather conditions such as wind and 
precipitation as well as natural barriers/landscape between the live-haul route and 
pullet premises may affect whether virus arrives on-farm. As most pullet barns are 
fully enclosed, feathers are not likely to blow directly into a poultry house. 
○ Virus transmission from a live-haul trailer to a premises close to the road represents a 
multi-step transmission pathway. With each virus transfer step, virus concentration is 
likely to decrease. Among the potential pathways identified, blowing of HPAI-
contaminated fomites from a live-haul trailer to a pullet premises directly into the 
barn, involves fewer transfer steps compared to fomites blowing onto a premises (not 
into the barn) or a vehicle bringing virus to a pullet premises from a contaminated 
live-haul road, followed by subsequent transfer into the barn. 
• The minimum biosecurity guidelines for poultry premises participating in the NPIP and 
the greatly intensified biosecurity of the PMIP for premises in a Control Area that wish to 
request movement during an outbreak are designed to reduce the likelihood that 
contamination which reaches the premises would subsequently infect the flock.  
○ Standardized biosecurity in the poultry industry, such as rules about entering the 
perimeter buffer area, crossing the line of separation, and managing vehicle access, 
are intended to prevent flock exposure to diseases.2 
○ For pullet-growing premises in a Control Area that wish to request permission to 
move live birds, the enhanced biosecurity of the PMIP minimizes the chances of a 
flock being exposed to HPAI for the 8-day period prior to movement to the driveway. 
The PMIP reduces the likelihood of a vehicle contaminated from a live-haul road 
bringing virus to a pullet operation, as all vehicles will be cleaned and disinfected 
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before entering the premises. A requirement to use line of separation (LOS)-specific 
clothing and footwear to enter the poultry house during the PMIP minimizes 
introduction of virus via tracking into the barn on the clothes or boots of personnel. 
The pertinent biosecurity guidelines of the PMIP are (see Appendix 8: Cross-
Commodity Pre-Movement Isolation Period): 
 Limiting visits to the premises to feed delivery and emergency operational visits 
(e.g., emergency fuel delivery and emergency repair or replacement of critical 
mechanical equipment; and service visits to address changes in bird health) 
 Requiring specific biosecurity for those emergency visits  
 Replacing all non-emergency operational and routine visits with telephone 
communication or scheduling such visits outside the PMIP  
○ Vehicles and equipment arriving on a pullet premises may be difficult to disinfect 
thoroughly, especially during harsh winter conditions. Thus, virus may remain on 
vehicles contaminated from the live-haul route, despite C&D steps. 
• Previously, ten experienced poultry veterinarians evaluated the risk of infecting 
susceptible poultry flocks via the microbial load from two truckloads of turkeys shedding 
a generic pathogen at varying distances (results shown in Table 15).265  
Table 15. Perceived qualitative risk posed by two truckloads of turkeys at varying 
distances from susceptible poultry based on expert opinion, as reported in Halvorson 
and Hueston 2006265  
Distance to susceptible 
poultry 10 m 100 m 1,000 m 10,000 m 
Risk rating* Intolerable Intolerable Low Negligible 
      *Risk rating scale of negligible, low, moderate, high, and intolerable.  
 The results of the veterinarian survey were strongly correlated (P<0.01) with the 
values calculated with an exposure risk index, which took into account mass of 
contaminant, percentage available for transmission, initial titer of the pathogen, 
age of contaminant/half-life of virus, and distance to susceptible poultry.265 
9.1.6.4 Risk Rating and Conclusion 
9.1.6.4.1 Risk of HPAI Transmission to Pullet Premises in a Control Area near Route of Live-
Haul Trailer 
Literature review and expert opinion indicate a potential for increased risk when a poultry 
premises is located close to live-haul routes for transporting infectious birds. The requirements 
for permitted movement of live birds in the Secure Poultry Supply (SPS) Plan, specifically 
implementing an effective PMIP, increase the likelihood of detection prior to scheduled 
movements that originate in a Control Area. Vehicles transporting live poultry from a Monitored 
Premises that have met the requirements of the SPS Plan (PMIP, PCR testing) are less likely to 
represent an infected but undetected movement than if the PMIP and testing were not in place. 
As presented in Appendix 9: Supplementary Modeling Results, it is also unlikely that flocks 
moved after a PMIP and testing would contain large numbers of clinically infected birds. 
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During the 2014-2015 HPAI outbreak in the U.S., infected premises were identified both inside 
and outside Control Areas at the time of detection. It is expected that biosecurity may be 
heightened during an outbreak scenario; however, biosecurity and pre-movement testing 
practices in Free Areas may differ from those in Control Areas. With the use of a mortality 
trigger alone or pre-movement testing without implementing a PMIP, the likelihood of detecting 
HPAI virus in a flock before movement is estimated to be substantially lower than the detection 
probability with a PMIP in place.  
9.1.6.4.2 Conclusion 
The risk of HPAI virus spread to pullet growing premises near poultry live-haul routes via 
feathers, feces, and other fomites depends on both distance and source flock. Considering the 
above factors, assuming that the preventive measures specified in the SPS Plan are strictly 
followed when moving live poultry, and given that live-haul vehicles passing a premises within 
the Control Area may originate from within or outside the Control Area, the following risk 
ratings are provided: 
Likelihood rating at given distance 
 (between live-haul road and poultry premises) 
Characteristics of live-haul vehicle 
<100 
meters 
100-1000 
meters 
>1000 
meters 
Truck hauling birds that had no PMIP and no tests High Moderate Low 
Truck hauling birds that had less than optimum 
PMIP and tests (e.g., 80% effective PMIP; delayed testing; 
or load-out >24 hours) 
Low Very Low Negligible 
Truck hauling birds that had a PMIP & rRT-PCR 
negative birds (i.e., 100% effective PMIP; two tests within 
24 hours of move and load-out completion within 24 hours) 
Very 
Low 
Negligible Negligible 
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9.2 Pathways for a Pullet Flock Becoming Infected with HPAI via 
Movements of People, Vehicles, or Equipment 
9.2.1 Likelihood of a Pullet Flock Becoming Infected with HPAI via Feed and 
Emergency Operational Visits during PMIP 
Routine operational visits to a farm include feed delivery, fuel delivery, veterinarians, repairmen, 
service personnel, managers, vaccination crews, clean-out services, and other visitors. The SPS 
Plan requires most of the operational visits to be scheduled outside of the PMIP before moving 
live birds. However, some operational visits, such as feed delivery or emergency repair services, 
would need to continue during the PMIP. A survey of pullet producers (convenience sample) 
indicated that the frequency of feed delivery varied widely, however over half reported feed 
delivery 2-3 times a week (SES WG, personal communication, Spring 2017). The frequency of 
maintenance type visits also varied widely, from daily to 30% of respondents stating less than 
monthly in the same survey.  
9.2.1.1 Likelihood of Infection via Feeds 
During the 2015 HPAI outbreak in Minnesota and Iowa, risk managers were concerned about 
biosecurity practices related to storage of feed ingredients and finished feed. Specifically, the 
observation of corn piles stored on the ground and contaminated with wild bird feces raised 
concerns about the possibility that contaminated corn might be a pathway for HPAI virus 
introduction and spread. Additional concerns include the chance that finished feed could become 
contaminated by wild birds through breaches in biosecurity at the feed mill or feed storage bins 
on a farm.215 Feedback from the Secure Egg Supply Working Group (SES WG) revealed that 
feed spilled on the farm (outside the barn) would not be fed to pullets and would be disposed of 
in compost or garbage (SES WG, personal communication, Feb 2018). 
On most pullet operations, birds receive a mash feed tailored to meet their requirements as they 
develop; this mash feed may or may not be formaldehyde-treated (SES WG, personal 
communication, Feb 2018). During the first six weeks pullets are fed a starter feed and then are 
transitioned to a grower formulation until about 12 weeks of age. During the final weeks in the 
pullet house the birds are fed a finishing or developer feed. The Feed Risk Assessment assessed 
the risk of HPAI transmission to poultry fed contaminated feed in a variety of scenarios listed in 
Table 16. Further information can be found in the Feed Risk Assessment.215 
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Table 16. Risk ratings for various types of poultry feed products215 
Pathway Risk 
Potential that corn stored on ground is contaminated with feces 
from wild migratory birds 
Low to very low* 
Potential that pelleted feed made with contaminated corn 
transmits HPAI to poultry flock 
Negligible 
Potential that untreated mash feed made with contaminated corn 
transmits HPAI to poultry flock 
Low to very low 
Potential that formaldehyde-treated mash feed made with 
contaminated corn transmits HPAI to poultry flock 
Negligible 
Potential that finished feed contaminated by perching birds at 
feed mill or storage bins on farm transmits HPAI to poultry flock 
Low to very low 
*Under fall and spring seasonal conditions  
9.2.1.2 Likelihood of Infection via Feed Delivery or Emergency Operational Visits 
Under normal operations, feed vehicles may deliver to multiple farms the same day (a range of 0 
to 5 deliveries per day was considered a reasonable estimate by the SES WG, which is similar to 
other poultry industries) (SES WG, personal communication, Feb 2018).266 The possible 
pathways for transmission via feed delivery involve contamination of the vehicle or driver at an 
infected but undetected farm, and subsequent cross-contamination of a virus-free pullet premises. 
During the PMIP, only the following operational visits to the premises are allowed (SES WG, 
personal communication, Sept 2017):  
• Feed delivery should use a dedicated truck and deliver directly from a stand-alone feed 
mill (no poultry on-site at feed mill). Trucks delivering feed or individual feed 
ingredients that are produced or stored on poultry premises will require a permit. 
Permitting of feed delivery from premises with poultry on-site will require PCR 
surveillance of poultry on premises sufficient to satisfy Incident Command. 
• Emergency fuel delivery and emergency repair or replacement of critical mechanical 
equipment 
• Service visits to address changes in bird health  
It has been suggested that company feed delivery should involve dedicated trucks for use in the 
quarantine zone. Additionally, trucks within the Control Area should be limited to a single 
premises delivery per load rather than delivering feed to several farms on a route,12 which is 
already common practice in the pullet industry (SES WG, personal communication, Feb 2018). 
In addition to feed delivery, emergency operations visits (emergency maintenance, service visits, 
etc.) are assumed to offer a similar potential pathway to that of feed trucks. Figure 19 diagrams 
the transmission pathway. 
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Figure 19. Pathway for exposure of a pullet farm via a feed delivery or critical visitor vehicle 
9.2.1.2.1 Literature Review 
• Feed truck deliveries were the most commonly reported visits at 84 percent of Georgia 
poultry farms surveyed.261 
• In a survey of contract broiler growers in the U.S., feed delivery averaged once every two 
days (range one to five days). In this analysis, feed delivery accounted for 74 percent of 
total point estimates of risk for farms using the same integrator as index farm.267 Of note, 
this model considered all vehicle/visitor traffic to a farm, even activities that would not 
be allowed under PMIP, and did not account for differences in magnitude of virus 
contamination in different types of visitor contacts.  
• Similarly, a stochastic model by Dorea et al (2010) predicted that off-farm spread of 
HPAI from a commercial broiler farm by visitors is most frequently associated with feed 
trucks and company personnel.266 
○ Of the reviewed HPAI and LPAI outbreaks in the U.S., feed delivery or contaminated 
feed was implicated in only the 1983-1984 Pennsylvania outbreak (mixed 
LPAI/HPAI).268 
• In a model of risk for ILT infection in broilers during an outbreak, farms with more visits 
per month by feed trucks were associated with higher risk for ILT (OR=1.18; 
P=0.0099).258 
9.2.1.2.2 Qualitative Analysis 
We considered the following factors in evaluating this pathway:  
• Feed truck visits and feed delivery are likely to occur on most, if not all, pullet operations 
during the PMIP. 
• While feed truck visits will be the most frequent type of contact during PMIP, all 
emergency operational visits that may occur during the PMIP require enhanced 
Cross-contamination of the ground or feed bin 
exterior from the vehicle or driver and subsequent 
transfer into the house via farm personnel, or 
direct transfer if critical visitor enters house  
Potential contamination of 
tires from organic matter or 
feathers on the farm road or 
feed mill driveway 
Potential contamination of vehicle 
exterior, cab interior, driver  
Infected and undetected 
poultry farm 
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biosecurity measures in addition to standard biosecurity protocols (see Appendix 8: 
Cross-Commodity Pre-Movement Isolation Period for a full list of PMIP biosecurity).  
○ All vehicles and equipment entering the premises shall be cleaned and disinfected 
using a protocol acceptable to regulatory personnel prior to entering the premises.  
○ All vehicle drivers must mitigate the risks of moving insects on and off the farm and 
the risks of contaminating themselves and their vehicle interior due to exiting and re-
entering the vehicle. 
○ Feed delivery should use a dedicated truck and deliver directly from a stand-alone 
feed mill (no poultry on-site) or will require a permit. 
○ Any person who is going to cross a line of separation (LOS) should shower and 
change clothes prior to or at the time of entering the premises and must wear 
necessary protective clothing and footwear dedicated to that LOS. It is noted that not 
all pullet premises have shower facilities on-site, thus showers may be used at homes 
or hotels (SES WG, personal communication, May 2018).  
• Emergency visitors other than those associated with feed delivery may be required to 
enter a poultry house to complete their necessary tasks. Visitors who enter poultry houses 
during PMIP may contact birds directly, thus decreasing the number of steps in the 
potential pathway to infection diagrammed above. 
○ Relative to feed deliveries, however, emergency operations visits likely happen less 
frequently, and visitors may or may not have visited other poultry farms recently. 
9.2.1.2.3 Likelihood Rating and Conclusion 
Operational visits will be limited during PMIP; however, delivery of feed during this period is 
likely and the potential for emergency maintenance visits also exists. Assuming all requirements 
for biosecurity during PMIP are followed, the likelihood of introducing HPAI virus to a pullet 
flock by feed, feed delivery, and emergency operations visits during PMIP is as follows: 
Pathway Likelihood 
Contaminated feed Negligible to low 
Feed delivery (driver and/or vehicle) Low  
Other emergency operations visitors (personnel and/or vehicle) Low to Moderate 
 
9.2.2 Likelihood of a Pullet Flock Becoming Infected with HPAI Virus via People 
and Their Vehicles Entering the Premises 
Movement of people represents a potential pathway for virus transmission to poultry premises. In 
previous outbreaks, off-site movements of poultry growers, their families, and their employees 
have been implicated as risk factors for disease transmission.83,258 The risk posed by people who 
work exclusively on one poultry premises and have no contact with other commercial or non-
commercial flocks is likely lower than for people who may work on or have contact with other 
poultry premises. During a PMIP, only emergency visitors (including feed delivery) are allowed 
on the premises. All non-emergency and non-feed delivery visitors are prohibited from entering 
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pullet premises and all people who work on pullet farms will be prohibited from visiting other 
poultry premises (i.e., during a PMIP people working on that premises should have contact with 
only their assigned flock[s] on that single premises) (see Appendix 8: Cross-Commodity Pre-
Movement Isolation Period). Thus, in the 8 days leading up to load-out, visitor and vehicle traffic 
is likely to include only growers, employees, and emergency operational visitors (to include feed 
delivery).2 However, these people may still have off-site social contacts with other people who 
may contact birds (e.g., people who work on other poultry farms) and they could still have 
contact with waterfowl species known to harbor HPAI virus (e.g., through hunting). 
Additionally, outside of a PMIP, workers may be employed and continue to work on multiple 
poultry premises (e.g., vaccination crews)  
For a discussion on emergency operational visitors (including feed delivery) and their vehicles, 
see section 9.2.1, Likelihood of a Pullet Flock Becoming Infected with HPAI Virus via 
Emergency Operational Visits During PMIP. For a discussion of any critical tools or equipment 
brought onto poultry premises during these visits, please see section 9.2.3, Likelihood of a Pullet 
Flock Becoming Infected with HPAI virus via Machinery or Equipment Shared between 
Multiple Premises. 
9.2.2.1   Likelihood of Infection via Movement of People  
Social contact data reported among poultry growers from other sectors of the poultry industry 
conservatively indicate the potential for cross-contamination via off-site movement of people in 
the pullet industry.259, 264,379 Variation in frequency of off-site contact among people is expected 
regionally.  
The possible pathways for transmission via movement of people involve contamination of the 
person’s clothes, shoes, hands, or vehicle at a meeting place with another person who came from 
an infected but undetected farm/backyard flock or from contact with infected or contaminated 
waterfowl, and subsequent cross-contamination of a virus-free poultry premises. These pathways 
are shown below in Figure 20. 
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Figure 20.  Pathway for exposure of a poultry premises due to virus introduction by people. 
9.2.2.1.1 Literature Review 
• Movement of people, including growers, temporary staff, shared personnel, company 
supervisors, and part-time employees, has been implicated in the spread of poultry 
viruses in previous outbreaks. Indeed, an overview of the epidemiology of avian 
influenza states that the dominant route of secondary spread in domestic poultry has been 
via people and that farm owners and caretaker staff have been implicated in the spread of 
AI.46 
○ In the epidemiological questionnaires and interviews conducted during the 2015 
HPAI H5N2 outbreak on pullet and layer premises in Iowa and Nebraska, nine 
producers demonstrated virus spread via the movement of service personnel or 
visitors not changing clothes.192  
○ In their study of risk factors in the spread of LPAI H7N2 in the 2002 Virginia 
outbreak, McQuiston et al. (2005) found the likelihood of infection to be significantly 
higher among farms using nonfamily caretakers to work in the poultry houses, with 
an odds ratio of 2.1 in the multivariate analysis (case farms: 45.7%; control farms: 
30.4%).83 
○ In the 1999-2000 H7N1 outbreaks in Italy, which included LPAI and HPAI outbreaks 
in turkeys, broilers, layers, and other poultry types, it has been suggested that 
temporary staff on larger farms may have contributed to the identification of larger 
farm sizes as a risk factor for infection.135 
○ In the 1979 LPAI H7N3 outbreaks in four Texas turkey flocks, Glass et al. reported 
potential transmission from the index premises to another case farm by shared 
personnel (i.e., an insemination crew).269  
Potential contamination of 
person’s shoes, hands, or 
vehicle tires 
Person socializes/shares 
environment with person 
from infected and 
undetected farm, backyard 
flock, or waterfowl contact 
Infected and 
undetected poultry 
farm, backyard 
flock, or hunted 
infected waterfowl 
Uninfected poultry 
farm 
Virus is tracked into poultry house 
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○ In the 2002-2003 infectious laryngotracheitis (ILT) outbreak in Mississippi, farms 
whose workers visited other chicken farms daily were significantly more likely to be 
infected with ILT virus than those with less frequent visits (OR = 13.75; multivariate 
analysis).255 
• Social contacts between people have been evaluated as a risk for disease transmission in 
the poultry industry. Analytical studies specific to the pullet industry, including on the 
frequency of such contacts, are lacking. 
○ In a study combining a national survey of broiler poultry growers and stochastic 
disease modeling, Leibler et al. (2010) determined that broiler grower social contacts 
contribute less than 1% to the AI disease transmission risk attributable to contacts 
between farms, based on an estimated average frequency of social contacts of once 
monthly.267  
 The range in frequency of social visits among broiler growers reported by Leibler 
et al. was 10 times a month to no visits.267  
 However, a similar survey of broiler and breeder-layer growers in Georgia 
reported a higher frequency of personal interactions among growers, which 
demonstrates the likely variability of this parameter. In the two Georgia counties 
surveyed by Vieira et al., 49% (25/51) of broiler respondents reported personal 
interactions with another grower in the previous week, and 9.8% (5/51) reported 5 
or more personal interactions with another grower in the previous week.261  
 Thus, the risk estimate by Leibler et al. may be too low. Nonetheless, the social 
contacts in Leibler et al. (2010) were “at a given visitor-receiving farm,”267 and 
the PMIP measures prohibit such on-farm visits.  
○ In addition to other factors, Dunn et al. (2003) noted that there were significant social 
ties between growers in the H7N2 LPAI in the 2001-2002 Pennsylvania outbreak in 
broiler chickens. Five infected flocks had growers who all belonged to the same 
church group, two flocks were managed by brothers, and two others were managed 
by people with close social and business ties.270 
• HPAI virus has the potential to be transmitted via feces-caked shoes or vehicle tires, 
depending on ambient temperature, humidity, and elapsed time. As detailed in Appendix 
2: AI Virus Survival at Various Humidity Levels, at Various Temperatures, and on 
Various Substrates, HPAI virus has the potential to survive for prolonged periods in cool, 
moist conditions.  
○ At low ambient temperatures of 4.0-6.7°C (39-44°F) and low to moderate relative 
humidity (15.2 to 46.3%), HPAI H5N1 (A/Vietnam/1203/2004) in chicken feces 
remained viable until day 13.271 
 However, at temperatures closer to summer conditions in the United States (72.3-
74.6°F and 89.1-91.2% relative humidity), the same HPAI H5N1 virus strain in 
chicken feces was inactivated at day 4.271 
○ On two rubber surfaces (gumboot and tire) at an unspecified room temperature, LPAI 
H13N7 was below the detectable limit at day 6.272  
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• Previous modeling results indicate potential variation of virus spread in the poultry 
industry via people, depending on factors such as farm density and virus characteristics. 
○ Glanville et al. (2010) used modeling to predict the average probability of HPAI 
H5N1 virus transmission via contaminated shoes from a house in which an infection 
is beginning into the house on another farm (without cleaning and disinfecting shoes) 
to be P= 0.039 to 0.15 per transfer event.273 
 The model was based on a small-scale broiler farm in Indonesia, and model 
parameters were estimated from survey data, literature review, and expert 
opinion.  
 Variables affecting the risk estimation included viral concentration on shoes after 
arriving at the second broiler farm, as well as the proportion of fecal matter (and 
virus) transferred from the shoes. 
• In the same study, imposing a mandatory 24-hour downtime between farms 
decreased the predicted probability of transmission to P=0.0016 in this 
exploratory model.   
○ In a stochastic disease model of HPAI spread among Georgia broiler farms, Dorea et 
al. (2010) estimated that hired help contributed between ~22% (low farm density) and 
~37% (high farm density) to the overall spread of HPAI virus via visitors from one 
infected farm in 1 day.265 
○ Stochastic disease modeling combined with national survey data on broiler poultry 
growers estimated that the relative ris  of exposure to avian influenza for broiler 
farms employing day laborers ranges from 3.8 (2-day viral survival on a vehicle, 
within the same integrator as index farm) to 25.8 (7-day vehicle viral survival, across 
different integrator group than index farm).264 
• Respiratory viruses can be transmitted via human hands, though studies with HPAI virus 
are lacking. 
○ As detailed in Appendix 5 of the Risk Assessment of the Movement of Broiler 
Hatching Eggs During an HPAI Outbreak, several studies have determined the 
transfer rate for various non-AI viruses between different surfaces, including from 
fingerpad to fingerpad.254 Depending on the virus, percentage transferred via 
fingerpads ranged from undetectable to 23%. 
○ Ansari et al. (1991) demonstrated that 20 minutes after deposition on donor fingertips, 
0.7% of human rhinovirus transferred to recipient fingertips.274 On the other hand, 
transfer of human parainfluenza virus was undetectable at 20 minutes post-deposition. 
Both parainfluenza and rhinovirus are single-stranded RNA viruses similar to 
influenza. 
○ Assuming a virus transmission efficiency of 0-20%, and based on data extrapolation 
from other viruses (including the above study), modeling by Glanville et al. (2010) 
demonstrated an average 5% chance of a bird being infected with HPAI H5N1 virus 
via hand contact with someone who had directly handled an infected bird at another 
farm.273 This estimate applies only to the first bird handled and incorporates the effect 
of estimated travel time—specific to the study locale in Indonesia—on virus decay. 
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9.2.2.1.2 Qualitative Analysis 
We considered the following qualitative factors for evaluating this pathway: 
• PMIP measures aim to reduce poultry employee contact with potentially contaminated or 
infectious sources, such as other birds and equipment (see Appendix 8: Cross-
Commodity Pre-Movement Isolation Period). 
○ People who work on pullet premises are not be allowed to enter the pullet premises 
during the PMIP if they work on another commercial operation with live poultry or 
have contact with a noncommercial flock (e.g., vaccination crews will not be allowed 
on-site during a PMIP). 
○ All people who are going to cross a line of separation (LOS) on a pullet premises 
should shower and change clothes prior to or at the time of entering the premises and 
must wear necessary protective clothing and footwear dedicated to that LOS which 
may decrease the amount of contamination on clothing, boots, or shoes worn into the 
poultry house. 
• There is the potential for pullet growers, farm employees, or members of their households 
to have regular social or other contacts with other people who work on poultry farms, 
especially in poultry-dense regions. During the PMIP, it is likely that these off premises 
contacts will continue to occur.263 
○ The potential level of contamination on the people when they are interacting may 
vary and depends in part on the level of on-farm biosecurity at their respective 
premises. 
○ People from pullet, layer, broiler, and turkey premises operating under heightened 
PMIP biosecurity may represent a lower contact risk since, during PMIP, most 
activities with a risk for lateral transmission of HPAI virus are prohibited, and 
enhanced biosecurity for people must be in place (see Appendix 8: Cross-Commodity 
Pre-Movement Isolation Period). 
○ There are fewer C&D stipulations for people working in the poultry industry during 
an outbreak when a PMIP is not being implemented. While it is reasonable to assume 
that biosecurity may be heightened in the face of an HPAI outbreak, the practices 
utilized on individual commercial or noncommercial poultry premises will likely 
vary. 
• HPAI virus could contaminate the exterior of a vehicle that has been used close to a 
poultry barn.   
○ During a PMIP, all vehicles entering a pullet premises (including personal vehicles) 
shall be cleaned and disinfected using a protocol acceptable to regulatory personnel 
prior to entering premises. Drivers must mitigate the risks of contaminating 
themselves and their vehicles interior due to exiting and re-entering the vehicle (see 
Appendix 8: Cross-Commodity Pre-Movement Isolation Period). 
○ Outside of a PMIP there may be biosecurity measures in place to mitigate potential 
contamination to people’s vehicles, such as vehicle access and traffic pattern 
guidelines; however, there are no standard mitigations across the pullet industry (SES 
WG, personal communication, March 2018).  
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○ Outside of a PMIP, a grower with contaminated boots, hands, or clothing may drive 
on his or her premises (for example, from working in a poultry barn to residence on 
the same premises) without any C&D step. This contamination may remain in the cab 
of a vehicle, thus re-contaminating an individual who uses that vehicle to drive off-
site to meet with another grower. 
• According to industry representatives, most company biosecurity plans discourage 
employees from having contact with wild waterfowl (e.g., hunting); while some 
companies do, many do not explicitly “prohibit” waterfowl hunting. Instead, open 
communication is encouraged and employees who have had recent contact with wild 
waterfowl are prohibited from entering pullet barns (these employees may be directed to 
work elsewhere for the company, away from birds, during downtime) (SES WG, personal 
communication, May 2018). 
○ A detailed assessment of the risks of HPAI contamination or infection due to wild 
birds can be found in section 9.1.4, Role of HPAI Spread to Pullet Flock in a Control 
Area via Wild Aquatic Birds in the Farm Vicinity, and section 9.1.5, Role of HPAI 
Virus Spread to Pullet Flock via Wild Non-aquatic Birds in Farm Vicinity. 
○ Contamination of an employee or a vehicle via exposure to infected or contaminated 
wild bird carcasses may represent one type of potential contact with infectious 
material in which the employee is not expressly prohibited from entering a poultry 
barn during PMIP.  
• As outlined in the literature review, virus may survive days to weeks, depending on 
weather conditions and type of contaminated surface.  
• This potential pathway involves multiple virus transfer steps between contact surfaces. In 
general, the chances of the pathway resulting in virus transmission decrease with the 
number of contact steps that need to occur. Furthermore, even if the transfer steps occur, 
there would likely be a substantial reduction in the virus concentration transferred with 
each contact step. This is because only a fraction of the virus (6 to 27%) on a donor 
surface is transferred to the recipient surface in each direct contact event.275 
○ As an example, viral contamination on the exterior of a vehicle on an infected and 
undetected farm, already reduced by dilution outside the house, would undergo 
multiple transfer steps (e.g., vehicle tires→ travel to social meeting place→ ground→ 
tires of vehicle from uninfected farm→ travel to uninfected farm→ ground→ 
person’s boots→ uninfected barn) and subsequent viral load reduction. 
○ If, however, a social contact or waterfowl contact resulted in direct contamination of 
a person and the newly contaminated person later entered the pullet house, fewer 
contact steps would be needed. 
 In such a scenario, contamination in the interior of a vehicle may serve as a point 
of contamination/re-contamination even if a person were to change clothes and 
boots before working with poultry (again with multiple transfer steps). 
○ Additionally, in the period before the PMIP begins, growers and employees may visit 
other poultry premises (e.g., vaccination crews), thus potentially decreasing the 
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number of transfer steps needed to bring virus onto the pullet premises, where it may 
be tracked into the barn during PMIP. 
• Biosecurity measures for people, such as PPE (dedicated work clothing, LOS-dedicated 
clothing and footwear), showering, and hand hygiene, have been effective in reducing the 
likelihood of virus transmission in a previous infectious disease outbreak and 
experimental studies.255,377,378 In an outbreak situation, it is expected that biosecurity 
measures may be heightened on many premises in addition to those undergoing the PMIP 
(SES WG, personal communication, May 2018) 
○ Appendix 6 of the Broiler Hatching Eggs Risk Assessment details the effectiveness of 
PPE, showering, changing clothes, and hand hygiene in mitigating the transmission of 
various infectious diseases.275 
9.2.2.2 Likelihood Rating and Conclusion 
Although some contact may be unavoidable, it is recommended that people who work on pullet 
premises minimize unnecessary contact with other people who work in the poultry industry 
during the PMIP and limit travel to other poultry premises during the entire pullet-rearing period. 
Still, social and other non-business contacts have been documented between poultry growers, 
employees, and members of their families. Similarly, while task-specific crews (such as 
vaccination or insemination workers) and day-laborers who may work on multiple poultry 
premises are known to be used in the poultry industry, many companies suggest that employees 
should limit contact with other commercial or noncommercial poultry flocks outside their job 
duties even during non-outbreak times. During an outbreak, people who work on pullet premises 
are not be allowed to enter the pullet premises during the PMIP if they work on another 
commercial operation with live poultry or have contact with a noncommercial flock (e.g., 
vaccination crews will not be allowed on-site during a PMIP). During the PMIP, vehicle and 
visitor traffic to a poultry premises is to be decreased to include only growers, employees, and 
emergency or feed delivery visitors. The prevention of HPAI virus transmission by people during 
the PMIP is dependent on close adherence to the biosecurity measures outlined in the PMIP.  
Provided the PMIP measures for people are strictly followed, the likelihood of HPAI 
transmission to a pullet flock during the PMIP via people and their vehicles is as follows: 
Person type Likelihood Rating 
Emergency operational visitors and vehicles 
(includes feed delivery driver and/or vehicle) 
See section 9.2.1 Likelihood of a Pullet 
Flock Becoming Infected with HPAI via 
Feed and Emergency Operational Visits 
during PMIP  
Growers/employees and their vehicles Low 
 
9.2.3 Likelihood of a Pullet Flock Becoming Infected with HPAI Virus via 
Machinery or Equipment Shared between Multiple Premises 
Many types of equipment are used to maintain a pullet flock and premises, including specialized 
types of equipment that may be shared between premises for activities such as beak trimming, 
house maintenance, and preparing an empty house for the next flock of chicks. Shared equipment 
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may be owned and managed by an integrator, a grower, or a visitor who utilizes an item on 
multiple poultry operations. For an assessment of equipment utilized for load-out, see section 9.3 
Likelihood of Pullet Flock Becoming Infected with HPAI Virus via Load-Out Operations. 
During PMIP, no equipment may be brought onto the premises, except in the case of tools or 
items required to complete an emergency operational visit. Such equipment must be cleaned and 
disinfected before entering a pullet premises during PMIP (see Appendix 8: Cross-Commodity 
Pre-Movement Isolation Period). There are, however, no industry-wide stipulations about the 
types and disinfection of equipment which may be brought onto the premises in the days leading 
up to PMIP. 
9.2.3.1 Likelihood of Infection via Shared Machinery or Equipment 
Equipment shared between premises may be returned to its owner (if grower-owned) or staged 
on a pullet premises (if owned by an integrator or a third party) at any point in the days leading 
up to PMIP. While birds may not directly contact this equipment, if it arrives contaminated with 
HPAI virus, and if it is not cleaned and disinfected effectively, there is potential for cross-
contamination of the ground around a barn and/or personnel who may then track virus into a 
pullet barn. Additionally, some shared equipment may enter a pullet barn in the final days before 
pullet movement during routine tasks, disease investigation, or building maintenance. Figure 21 
illustrates the transmission pathway.   
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Figure 21. Pathway for exposure of a pullet flock via shared machinery or equipment. 
9.2.3.2 Literature Review 
• Movement of contaminated equipment and, more specifically, shared equipment has been 
implicated as a potential transmission pathway in previous AI outbreaks in the U.S. 
poultry industry. 
○ In the 2015 U.S. HPAI outbreak on turkey premises in the Upper Midwest (IA, MN, 
ND, SD, and WI), a descriptive analysis of epidemiologic findings based on narrative 
responses from infected turkey farms identified highly likely transmission routes for 
some of them. Of those routes, two involved sharing equipment, with the onset of 
clinical signs occurring 10 to 11 days after potential exposure to the shared 
equipment.161 
○ On layer premises in the 2014-2015 HPAI outbreak, preliminary univariate analysis 
of a case-control study considered sharing of egg racks or pallets and egg flats as 
potential infection risk factors for entry into the farm-level multivariate model (egg 
racks or pallets shared in previous 14 days: 29% of case farms, 11% of control farms, 
P=0.08; egg flats shared in previous 14 days: 30% of case farms, 14% of control 
farms, P=0.17). Because of model instability due to sparse data, equipment sharing 
was not included in the multivariate model, but the authors concluded that this could 
be a risk factor for infection.194 
○ In the 2002 LPAI H7N2 outbreak in Virginia the pattern of virus spread indicated 
likely movement by fomites, people, and equipment contaminated with virus.72 
However, in a case-control study of infected premises during the same outbreak, there 
was no statistically significant difference in the occurrence of equipment sharing on 
infected premises versus non-infected premises (farm equipment borrowed or loaned: 
case farms, 17.3%, control farms, 16.7%; P=0.88).83 
○ In the 1996-1998 LPAI H7N2 outbreak in Pennsylvania, the source of virus exposure 
for 1 of 25 positive premises was suspected to be equipment contact.163 
 
Virus tracked into uninfected pullet house 
Contaminated equipment from an 
infected, but undetected premises 
Equipment is shared between premises; 
arrives on premises 9 days prior to movement 
(conservative estimate) or for an emergency 
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house 
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○ Virus spread was attributed in part to equipment in the 1983-1984 HPAI H5N2 
outbreak in Pennsylvania and in the 2000-2002 LPAI H6N2 outbreak in California.268 
 During the 1983-1984 HPAI H5N2 outbreak in Pennsylvania, Utterback 
identified movement of products, materials, equipment, tools, and supplies that 
may contact birds as a potential mode of AI transmission between flocks. In the 
analysis, the potential high-risk equipment included egg flats; equipment used for 
manure, dead bird disposal, and feed; and equipment moved from farm to farm.276 
○ Sharing of equipment has been associated with disease spread in outbreaks of other 
viral pathogens of poultry.  
 In a multivariate model with matched controls, removing litter using shared 
equipment increased the odds of infectious laryngotracheitis (ILT) infection on 
Mississippi broiler farms in a 2002-2003 outbreak (caked and/or total litter 
removed from house and/or farm using shared equipment: OR=5.39; 
P=0.0378).258 
 Analysis of the Newcastle disease epidemic mainly on layer and pullet premises 
in southern California from 1971-1973 showed evidence of mechanical spread of 
the disease from infected premises by fomites, such as egg flats.277 
• Based on the data in the literature, equipment sharing occurs in the poultry industry 
during both outbreak and non-outbreak situations. The types and frequency of equipment 
sharing vary between operations, sectors, and regions. 
○ The extent of equipment sharing duri g normal operations in the pullet industry has 
not been published, to our knowledge.  
○ Regional biosecurity surveys of Georgia broiler and breeder-layer growers reported 
that 8 to 25.8% of respondents share equipment.261,278 Findings by Dorea et al. 
indicate that shared equipment is most commonly used by one other grower, but this 
ranged from 1 to 20 growers.278 
• During outbreaks (LPAI H7N2 in Virginia in 2002 and HPAI/LPAI H7N8 in Indiana in 
2016), equipment was shared at 17.3% (26/150) and 11% (1/9) of surveyed case 
premises, respectively.83,262 Among case premises in Indiana in 2016, the only equipment 
reported to be shared was a live-haul loader.42 
○ Data on sharing of specific types of equipment, as published in a case-control study 
of infected Iowa layer flocks and a case series of infected turkey flocks in the upper 
Midwest during the 2015 HPAI outbreak, are shown in Table 17. 
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Table 17. Percentage of layer and turkey premises reporting equipment sharing (i.e., not farm-
specific equipment) during the 2015 HPAI outbreak161,165 
 Layer premises, 2015 HPAI 
outbreak 
Turkey premises 2015 
HPAI outbreaka 
 Case farms 
(n=26) 
Control farms 
(n=33) 
Case farms  
(n=67-80)b 
Equipment Percent sharing equipment  
Gates/panels --c -- 9% 
Lawn mowers 20% 28% 37% 
Pressure 
sprayer/washer 
8% 9% 43% 
Skid-steer loader 12% 0% 39% 
Tillers -- -- 13% 
Manure handling 12% 3% -- 
aInvestigation questionnaire to turkey premises in 2015 case series asked if equipment used on the premises was farm-specific. In 
this analysis, non-farm-specific equipment was interpreted to be equivalent to shared equipment. 
bThe number of respondents varied for each equipment type listed in the survey. 
cDashes indicate data on that specific type of equipment was not reported. 
 
• Historically, disinfecting shared equipment is a described mitigation measure in the event 
of an infectious disease outbreak in poultry. Little is documented, however, on the 
specific procedures for C&D during an outbreak. 
○ All layer case and control premises (n=59) surveyed in a case-control study in the 
2015 HPAI outbreak reported that shared pressure sprayers/washers, skid-steer 
loaders, and manure-handling equipment were disinfected. Other shared equipment 
was disinfected at variable rates (lawn mowers, egg flats, racks, or pallets). Shared 
lawn mowers were disinfected by 65% of surveyed farms.165 
○ For case turkey premises in the Upper Midwest 2015 HPAI outbreak, the majority of 
farms responded that pre-loaders were cleaned and disinfected by first power washing 
(to remove organic material, manure, and feathers) and then applying disinfectant.161 
○ During an outbreak of ILT in northern Georgia, the most frequently reported cleaning 
procedures for equipment were power washing (64.4%), water washing only (33.8%), 
disinfectant use (20.0%), and disassembly and cleaning of parts (3.8%); 3.5% of 
equipment was not cleaned.  
 In southern Georgia, where there was no ongoing ILT outbreak, the methods used 
to clean equipment were not statistically different; however, relatively fewer 
farms utilized a disinfectant in this region (9.4% versus 20% of farms, P= 
0.056).278 
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9.2.3.3 Qualitative Analysis 
We considered the following qualitative factors in evaluating this pathway: 
• Sharing equipment between poultry operations represents a known risk to biosecurity and 
an opportunity for disease introduction. Although poultry industry biosecurity guidelines 
recommend not sharing equipment when possible,2,15 this may not be economically or 
logistically feasible for all types of equipment and scenarios.161 
○ Equipment sharing between poultry premises is documented in the literature, and 
pullet industry representatives report that likely 100% of pullet premises use some 
sort of shared equipment at some point during the production process (though the 
type of equipment and timing may vary) (SES WG, personal communication, May 
2018).  
 Most pullet farms receive day-old chicks in plastic boxes on chick dollies that are 
delivered to pullet premises in hatchery trucks; the equipment involved with chick 
delivery may be company-owned or contracted.  
 Specific equipment types reported to be shared in the pullet industry include beak 
trimming equipment (though most farms now have beak treatment conducted at 
the hatchery), vaccination equipment, lawnmowers, skid loaders, tractors, septic 
tank service equipment, high-pressure scrubbers, honey wagon/vacuum truck (for 
waste water removal), formaldehyde (fumigation equipment), and other C&D 
equipment (SES WG, personal communication, May 2018).  
 Feedback from industry is that the shared large equipment frequently is delivered 
just in time and not stored on a poultry premises before use; for single-age pullet 
farms, some shared equipment (e.g., high pressure scrubber, honey wagon and 
tractor, lawn mower) may not come on-site until after the pullets are off-premises 
(SES WG, personal communication, May 2018).  
 During an HPAI outbreak, pullet premises may reduce non-essential activities 
requiring equipment (e.g., activities related to grounds maintenance such as lawn-
mowing or gravel road repair) to minimize equipment sharing. 
○ During a PMIP, sharing of equipment and all non-emergency visitors (e.g., 
vaccination crews) are prohibited. The exception is for equipment needed to complete 
emergency operational visits, such as emergency repair of critical mechanical 
equipment or service visits to address changes in bird health (see Appendix 8: Cross-
Commodity Pre-Movement Isolation Period).  
○ However, any equipment brought to the premises during the final days prior to 
implementation of a PMIP may continue to be used by premises personnel during 
PMIP.  
 HPAI outbreak experience suggests this scenario may still present a risk of 
infection, as there were epidemiological links during the 2015 HPAI outbreak for 
turkey premises that used shared equipment 10 to 11 days prior to the onset of 
clinical signs.161 
 Arrival of contaminated shared equipment well in advance of bird movement 
could provide more opportunities for personnel or equipment to track virus into 
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the barn, especially under certain environmental conditions (e.g., cool 
temperatures and high humidity) in which viable virus could persist for days to 
months (see Appendix 2: AI Virus Survival at Various Humidity Levels, at 
Various Temperatures, and on Various Substrates). 
• On shared equipment, the potential level of virus contamination depends on the infectious 
material, the contaminated substrate, and the survival characteristics of the virus. 
○ Machinery or equipment that enters a poultry barn, has poultry contact, or comes in 
contact with poultry feces is at high risk for contamination at an infected but 
undetected premises. Such equipment (excluding load-out equipment) may include, 
vaccination equipment, de-caking or tilling equipment, skid steers/front loaders, hand 
tools, and poultry monitoring equipment. 
○ Estimates of HPAI virus concentrations in poultry carcasses, feces, and feathers from 
infected poultry generally range between 103 and 107 EID50 per gram or milliliter of 
tested substrate, although higher concentrations have been observed in some cases. 
 For a detailed summary of the literature on virus titers in feces, feathers, blood, 
and poultry carcasses from infected poultry, see section 9.2.4, Likelihood of 
Pullet Flock Becoming Infected with HPAI via Dead Bird Disposal, and on virus 
titers in immature and mature feathers from infected poultry and ducks, see 
section 9.1.6, Role of HPAI Virus Spread to Pullet Premises Near Poultry Live-
Haul Routes via Feathers, Feces, and Other Fomites. 
○ Virus survival is generally longer in cooler temperatures and moist conditions. In 
chicken feces, virus can remain infectious between 2 and 7 weeks at cooler 
temperatures (39 to 46°F; 4 to 8°C), similar to winter conditions in many regions of 
the United States.271,279,280 Virus survival in chicken feces is reduced to less than 5 
days in warmer temperatures (71 to 77°F; 22 to 25°C).271,279  
 For virus survival data on feathers, feces, and equipment surfaces, see Appendix 
2: AI Virus Survival at Various Humidity Levels, at Various Temperatures, and 
on Various Substrates. 
• In a non-outbreak setting, premises participating in the NPIP will follow the site-specific 
biosecurity guidelines outlined in 9 CFR,2 which include C&D procedures for equipment 
when applicable. 
○ As described in the literature above, disinfecting shared equipment is the best practice 
in non-outbreak situations, and regional pullet industry representatives reported this 
likely occurs for a high proportion of equipment types (SES WG, personal 
communication, May 2018). During an HPAI outbreak, attention to disinfecting most 
equipment is even more likely. 
 While C&D protocols should be described in most company biosecurity plans, 
strict compliance with plans cannot be assumed, especially when growers or third-
party contractors are not directly observed.  
 C&D procedures for some equipment types may vary depending on if a flock is 
present on premises or if equipment is used during downtime between flocks 
(SES WG, personal communication, June 2018). 
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○ There may be limitations to C&D of some equipment because of environmental 
concerns (e.g., excessive waste water from cleaning large equipment), the physical 
structure of the equipment, or concerns about damaging the functionality of 
mechanical or electrical equipment that cannot be heated or wet (i.e., laptops, cell 
phones, or other monitoring devices). Weather conditions, such as harsh winter 
weather, may make thorough C&D of equipment more difficult.  
• For shared equipment that is not used inside barns during the final pullet rearing period, 
the pathway to infect a pullet flock that is to be moved requires multiple steps to 
introduce HPAI virus into a barn. 
○ A potential pathway in this scenario involves 4 contact steps: shared contaminated 
equipment→ ground area on uninfected pullet premises→ farm personnel’s boots or 
clothing→ pullet house. However, if personnel handle the equipment directly and 
then enter a pullet barn (e.g., to move equipment to a new location on the premises 
before working with the flock that is to be moved), fewer steps are needed in this 
pathway: shared contaminated equipment→ farm personnel’s boots, clothing, or 
hands→ pullet house. 
○ With each transfer step, there would likely be a reduction in the virus concentration 
transferred to the recipient surface. This is because only a fraction of the virus (6 to 
27 percent) on the donor surface is transferred to the recipient surface in each direct 
contact.275 However, depending on the initial viral load and infectious dose in pullets 
for that strain, the potential level of virus concentration tracked into the barn may still 
be adequate for infection. 
○ If the equipment remains outside the PBA, there is a decreased likelihood of cross-
contamination to the ground near the poultry house. 
 NPIP stipulations state that all biosecurity plans for poultry premises utilize a 
PBA.2 
○ During a PMIP, individuals who will cross a LOS (i.e., may have direct contact with 
poultry) must wear protective clothing and footwear dedicated to that LOS (see 
Appendix 8: Cross-Commodity Pre-Movement Isolation Period).  
 For more information on risks and mitigation measures related to farm personnel 
introducing virus into a barn, see section 9.2.2, Likelihood of a Pullet Flock 
Becoming Infected with HPAI via People and their Vehicles Entering the 
Premises. 
○ Ssematimba et al. assessed the risk of people and/or equipment that access only the 
poultry premises or storage rooms on the premises on broiler and layer farms in the 
Netherlands. They proposed the exposure risk classification for a majority of these 
contacts to be medium (with risk classifications of negligible, low, medium, high, or 
very high). In the analysis, the risks identified for such contacts are the potential of 
serving as fomites, expanding the farm network, and lack of or non-adherence to 
biosecurity protocols, such as non-thorough C&D.86 
• Equipment that enters the poultry house may be a greater risk due to closer proximity to 
or potential direct contact with poultry.  
Workin g Draft 
Pullets Out of the Barn Risk Assessment 
Page 113 of 296 
○ For equipment utilized inside the poultry house, site-specific biosecurity plans should 
have provisions regarding crossing the LOS, as required by the NPIP standardized 
biosecurity principles.  
 According to industry representatives of the SES Working Group, most pullet 
companies likely require C&D of shared equipment that will be used inside barns, 
although some do not require such protocols between houses on the same 
premises. (SES WG, personal communication, May 2016) 
○ During the PMIP, equipment used in the house may include shared equipment that 
arrived before the onset of the PMIP and equipment used for an emergency 
operational visit during a PMIP.  
 Any equipment brought on farms for emergency operational visits during a PMIP 
must be cleaned and disinfected, using a protocol acceptable to regulatory 
personnel, prior to entering the premises (see Appendix 8: Cross-Commodity Pre-
Movement Isolation Period).  
○ Emergency visits during the PMIP, such as emergency repair or replacement of 
critical mechanical equipment or service visits to address changes in bird health, are 
assumed to occur at a situation-specific frequency. Repair and service persons may be 
company-employed or contractors, with varying levels of biosecurity training. The 
available information from studies conducted in non-outbreak scenarios suggests a 
maintenance visit may be required during an 8-day PMIP. 
 A survey of poultry growers in Georgia found that the total number of high-risk 
visits (classified as people who enter the poultry houses), during a 7-day period, 
did not differ significantly between low and high poultry density regions. 
However, one type of high risk visit (repair personnel entering the poultry house) 
was significantly more likely among broiler farms in the low-density poultry 
region (approximately 18%) compared with farms in the high-density (0%) during 
a 7-day period.261  
 Among eight premises observed for 4 days in Ontario, Canada, there was one 
maintenance visit to service barn ventilation equipment, and this contact had 
visited three other premises over a 3-day period.281 
○ During a PMIP, it is plausible that required repair or service persons performing 
emergency maintenance or evaluating changes in bird health may use equipment that 
has been used on multiple poultry premises. 
 For further information on the risks associated with the person or vehicle making 
an emergency operational visit during PMIP, see section 9.2.1, Likelihood of a 
Pullet Flock Becoming Infected with HPAI Virus via Feed and Emergency 
Operational Visits During PMIP. 
○ In an evaluation of broiler and layer premises in the Netherlands, the exposure-risk 
classification was proposed to be high for people and/or equipment that access the 
poultry house largely because of the frequency of the human contacts. Such contacts 
(e.g., veterinarians) may visit up to 100 farms per year, and their equipment may not 
always be thoroughly cleaned and disinfected between farm visits.86 The same 
evaluation proposed an overall exposure-risk classification of medium for people and 
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equipment that did not access the poultry house.86 Similar to this risk assessment, the 
risk classifications of the Netherlands study included negligible, low, medium, high, 
or very high; however, the rating scale used in this risk assessment includes an 
additional ‘very low’ classification. 
9.2.3.4 Likelihood Rating and Conclusion 
Previous poultry disease outbreaks demonstrate a known risk for virus spread as a result of 
movement of contaminated shared equipment. Contaminated equipment that is brought onto a 
poultry premises may contaminate the ground or personnel who work with poultry, or if 
contaminated equipment is used inside a barn, live poultry may directly contact it. In the U.S., 
C&D of shared equipment should be addressed in the biosecurity protocols for all NPIP-
approved poultry premises. However, adherence to C&D protocols may be limited by feasibility, 
consistency, and logistics.  
As a mitigation for this known risk, during a PMIP, in addition to standard biosecurity measures, 
no equipment may be brought onto the premises, except in the case of tools or items required to 
complete emergency operational visits, such as emergency repair or replacement of critical 
mechanical systems, feed delivery, or service visits to address changes in bird health. Equipment 
for these emergency operational visits must be cleaned and disinfected using a protocol 
acceptable to regulatory personnel, prior to entering the premises. Provided the SPS Plans, 
including the greatly intensified biosecurity of the PMIP, are strictly followed, we rate the 
likelihood of a pullet flock becoming infected with HPAI virus via shared machinery or 
equipment as low.  
9.2.4 Likelihood of a Pullet Flock Becoming Infected with HPAI Virus via Dead 
Bird Disposal 
The process of dead bird disposal in the Control Area addressed in this risk evaluation relates to 
normal mortality on pullet premises, as opposed to mortality from known infected premises, 
including depopulation. Processes described are recommended industry best practices or 
contained within the cross-commodity PMIP working document (see Appendix 8: Cross-
Commodity Pre-Movement Isolation Period). 
Dead pullets should be collected daily, removed from the housing systems, and placed in a 
biosecure on-site location. Ideally, containers (e.g., trash cans, dumpsters) for dead birds should 
never leave the farm. It is not advised for multiple poultry farms to share initial dead bird 
collection containers or disposal sites located on poultry premises. In normal operations, pullet 
premises may employ a variety of methods to dispose of daily mortality, both on- and off-site. 
But when following the SPS Plan, guidelines restrict off-site transportation of carcasses in the 
days leading up to movement of pullets out of the barn, i.e., for the duration of the PMIP. 
9.2.4.1 Dead Bird Disposal during PMIP 
Due to the potential spread of HPAI via carcass disposal, the pre-movement isolation measures 
restrict off-site carcass transportation for disposal during the PMIP. Dead bird disposal is limited 
to secure on-site storage or disposal during the PMIP, as outlined in the SPS Plan guidance. 
Secure on-site storage or disposal options include refrigerator/freezer storage, composting, pit 
burial, incineration, individual burial, and carcass fermentation. As individual burial and carcass 
fermentation are not widely practiced, this risk evaluation will focus on the more common on-
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site practices of pit burial, composting, incineration, and refrigerator/freezer storage. 
 
Pit Burial 
In large poultry operations, pit burial is the most common means of carcass disposal, although it 
is restricted in certain states, such as Virginia.282 Environmental (specifically groundwater) 
contamination and carcass scavenging by wildlife are concerns that can lead to restrictions on pit 
burial sites. Areas with nonporous soil and a deep water table are the most amenable to pit burial, 
while sandy soil requires reinforcement of the sides of the pit. To prevent access by animal and 
insect pests, the top of the pit must be solid and have a tight-fitting lid. Due to groundwater 
concerns, the placement of burial pits is usually closely regulated by State Departments of 
Agriculture.283 
Composting 
In states that have banned burial pits, composting (controlled decomposition under thermophilic 
and aerobic conditions) is a widely used method of carcass disposal.1 Under conditions of routine 
mortality, carcasses are composted together in piles or bins to which a supplemental carbon 
source, such as litter or sawdust, has been added (see Figure 22). Under good composting 
practices, the carcasses are positioned and layered within the carbon source in a manner optimal 
for complete and odor-free composting. The resulting product is humus-like, with only feathers 
and small fragments (e.g., bone, beak) remaining, and the process is generally able to deactivate 
many pathogens due to the high temperatures (130-150oF) achieved. Composted chicken 
carcasses may be used as fertilizer, soil amendment, or as a source of organic material for 
composting additional material.284  
Poultry composters are typically 
constructed on a concrete slab to 
prevent nutrient leaching and vermin 
entrance (Figure 22). They typically 
are three-sided and have an overhead 
roof.1 If mass depopulation is needed, 
depending on the type of poultry 
house, in-house composting may be 
used. Multiple peridomestic species 
have been shown to access poultry 
carcass compost piles (Figure 23), 
including, but not necessaril raccoon 
(Procyon lotor), opossum (Didelphis 
virginiana), striped skunk (Mephitis 
mephitis), and domestic cats (Felis 
catus).285                                           
  
Figure 22. Mortality composter profile1 
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Figure 23. Wild mammals accessing poultry mortality compost piles. Photos courtesy of USGS 
 
Incineration 
Incineration is a commonly used method for poultry carcass disposal and one of the most 
biosecure methods. Complete carcass combustion occurs within the incinerator unit and the 
resultant residue does not attract animal or insect pests.286 
Refrigeration/Freezer storage 
Carcasses may be stored in a vermin-proof refrigerator/freezer until off-site carcass movement 
for rendering or another disposal method is permitted.286  In large pullet growing operations, 
daily mortality can require the use of a high-capacity unit. The freezer typically contains leak-
proof carcass storage boxes, which are also used to transport the carcasses to the rendering 
plant287 or other destination.  
Use of freezers in daily operation on pullet farms may vary based on geography and company.  
In some states, freezer carcasses may be picked up from pullet farms for rendering. They are kept 
in an on-farm freezer if picked up less frequently than daily. In Alabama, for example, this is 
regulated by the State Department of Agriculture, such that carcass freezers must be placed a 
minimum of 150 feet from the nearest poultry house, the pick-up truck must not pass between 
any poultry houses or within 150 feet of any poultry house to reach the freezer, the driver must 
disinfect the truck tires before entering the road to the poultry farm and again as the truck leaves 
the farm, and the grower must minimize contact around the freezer area and with carcasses.288 
In areas where refrigeration/freezing is not commonly practiced during normal operations, short-
term on-site refrigeration/freezing of carcasses may provide a viable choice for dead bird 
management during PMIP (e.g., using refrigerated trucks or “reefers”) until other on-site or off-
site disposal can be coordinated or permitted. 
9.2.4.2 Likelihood of a Pullet Flock Becoming Infected via On-farm Dead Bird Disposal 
and Scavengers during PMIP 
Carcass disposal on the farm presents an opportunity for vermin and scavengers to access 
infected wildlife or poultry carcasses and transmit the HPAI virus to a neighboring uninfected 
poultry house or mortality disposal site, either mechanically or via virus shedding. The virus 
could subsequently be transmitted into the pullet house via farm personnel or other mechanisms.  
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Figure 24. Pathway for exposure of a pullet farm via dead bird disposal on-site 
9.2.4.2.1 Literature Review 
• Several studies have evaluated the impact of composting on HPAI virus:  
○ Using a small-scale duplicate of a typical on-farm compost bin (depicted above, 
Figure 22), Senne et al. (1994) composted HPAI H5N2-infected chicken carcasses 
for 20 days at 22oC (72oF) ambient temperature, with compost turning at day 10.284  
 Peak composting temperatures were 57.3 and 58.3oC (135 and 137oF) during the 
first and second phases of composting, respectively, for the upper layer of 
carcasses, and 41.5 and 42.8oC (107 and 109oF), respectively, for the lower layer. 
 Despite the lower temperatures at the lower carcass layer, no HPAI virus was 
detected from any of the carcasses at 10 and 20 days, including from carcasses 
placed at the periphery of the bin, within 15 to 20 cm (6 to 8 inches) of the walls.  
○ Elving et al. (2012) composted HPAI H7N1, a strain with known prolonged survival 
in manure at 5 to 22oC.289 In laboratory-scale reactors at 35, 45 and 55oC (95, 113 and 
131oF), they found a 12-log viral load reduction within 6.4, 1.7 and 0.5 hours, 
respectively, in a manure/straw mixture, and within 7.6, 9.8 and 0.5 hours, 
respectively, in a manure/straw/embryonated egg mixture. 
 They recommend: 
• No turning of compost pile during the first phase of composting, to avoid 
aerosolization of HPAI virus 
• An insulating top layer on the compost to maintain adequate temperature 
• Monitoring of the surface temperature as a parameter for HPAI virus 
inactivation 
○ Ahmed et al. could no longer isolate an H5N1 virus strain by day 15 from a closed 
composter used to dispose of infected birds and their wastes, with temperatures 
reaching 60oC (140oF).290  
 
Cross-contamination of ground surrounding uninfected 
pullet house or mortality disposal site and subsequent 
transfer into house  
 
Infected avian 
carcass attracts 
scavenger species 
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○ Using a static pile passive aeration composting system, Guan et al. (2009) 
demonstrated inactivation of H6N2 virus in chicken tissue samples and embryonated 
eggs by day 10 at 61.5oC (143oF) at the top and 50.3oC (123oF) at the bottom of the 
bin.291 While still detectable at day 10, viral RNA was degraded in all samples by day 
21. 
○ In the 2004 LPAI H7N2 outbreak on the Delmarva Peninsula in Delaware, in-house 
windrow composting was the method of carcass disposal.292 AI virus was 
undetectable in all samples from the compost and house environment upon compost 
turning at days 14 to 19 and again upon compost removal at four to five weeks. 
 In this case, as an additional measure, the houses were heated to 37.8oC (100oF) 
for three consecutive days after windrow formation and again after compost 
turning. 
 The outbreak was contained to three farms in a dense poultry production area, 
which the authors attribute largely to on-site composting, as opposed to off-site 
disposal, for carcass disposition. 
• The observation of scavengers near poultry houses has been identified as a risk factor for 
AI transmission. 
○ In the 2002 LPAI H7N2 outbreak in Virginia, multivariate analysis determined that 
the presence of foxes, raccoons, and opossums posed an approximately two-fold 
increase in risk of infection.83  
• Multiple studies have demonstrated the susceptibility of mammals, including scavenger 
species, to HPAI. 
○ Ferrets and foxes fed HPAI H5N1-infected chicken meat developed respiratory 
and/or digestive infections, demonstrating mammalian potential to shed HPAI virus 
after consuming HPAI virus-tainted meat.293,294 Lipatov et al. (2009) measured 
presence of viral antigen in ferret tissue, not actual viral shedding. Reperant (2008), 
however, demonstrated pharyngeal shedding in foxes for three to seven days, peaking 
at 103.5 to 105.2 TCID50/ml following intratracheal inoculation. Pharyngeal shedding 
peaked at 104.2 to 104.5 TCID50/ml and lasted for three to five days after feeding 
infected carcasses. Rectal shedding was detected in one of three foxes inoculated 
intratracheally at approximately 102 TCID50/ml, only at two days post-
inoculation(DPI), and in one of three foxes fed infected meat, at approximately 101 
TCID50/ml, on 1 DPI only. All foxes were euthanized at 7 DPI, and virus isolation 
was negative from all organs sampled from foxes fed infected carcasses. 
○ Following experimental gastrointestinal HPAI H5N1 infection, cats became 
systemically infected and viral shedding was detected (via RT-PCR) in pharyngeal 
and rectal swabs.295 Pharyngeal shedding occurred in both cats with gastrointestinal 
exposure, beginning 2 DPI. Rectal shedding was observed in only one of these cats, 
and only 2 DPI. 
○ Songserm et al. (2006) describe a fatal HPAI H5N1 infection in a dog following 
ingestion of infected duck carcasses.296 
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○ When they were experimentally fed carcasses of LPAI H4N6-inoculated mallards or 
H4N6-spiked and coated chicken eggs, raccoons failed to subsequently shed AI virus 
RNA. While this study does not support scavengers as a source of LPAI biological 
transmission, the authors propose that HPAI virus may be more likely to be shed by 
scavengers because of its ability to cause more disseminated infection.297 
 More recently, experimentally infected striped skunks (as well as cottontail 
rabbits) have been shown capable of transmitting LPAI H4N6 to birds (mallards) 
through contact with shared resources (i.e., through contaminating the 
environment).53 
○ Both striped skunks and raccoons have been shown to shed LPAI H4N8 and H4N6, 
respectively, following experimental nasal inoculation with those strains.51,298 For 
most of the skunks, nasal shedding of H4N8 peaked at 8 DPI at an average 105.65 PCR 
EID50d equivalents/ml, and oral shedding at 7 DPI at an average 104.82 PCR EID50 
equivalents/ml. Nasal shedding of H4N6 in the raccoons varied from 1 to 6 days of 
shedding and between 100.02 and 101.1 EID50 equivalents/ml. Both species (plus 
cottontail rabbits) also have been shown to shed novel avian-origin H7N9 
(A/Anhui/1/2013) influenza virus at more than 105 PFU/ml nasal flush.299 
• Turkey vultures (Cathartes aura) may visit poultry farms to feed on dead birds. Turkey 
and black vultures (Coragyps atratus) both belong to the order Accipitriformes, family 
Cathartidae. While a review of the literature revealed a paucity of studies of AI in turkey 
vultures and other Cathartidae, other birds of prey in the order Accipitriformes, such as 
the common buzzard (Buteo buteo), have become infected in previous HPAI H5N1 
outbreaks.236 
○ For a detailed assessment of susceptibility and pathogenicity in avian scavenger 
species, please see section 9.1.5, Role of HPAI Virus Spread to Pullet Flock via Wild 
Non-aquatic Birds in Farm Vicinity. 
9.2.4.2.2 Qualitative Analysis 
We considered the following qualitative factors for evaluating this pathway: 
• The pathway may involve one or more virus transfer steps between contact surfaces. For 
example, if a wild animal is acting as a mechanical vector, the pathway infected 
undetected carcass→scavenger→ground area on uninfected premises→farm personnel’s 
boots→pullet house involves four contact steps. In general, the chances of the pathway 
resulting in virus transmission decreases with the number of contact steps that need to 
occur. Furthermore, even if the transfer steps occur, the virus concentration transferred 
would likely decrease substantially with each contact step. This is because only a fraction 
of the virus (6 to 27 percent) on a donor surface is transferred to the recipient surface in 
each direct contact.275 The ground traveled by the scavenger between the carcass and the 
uninfected pullet growing premises would further lessen the amount of virus present on 
the scavenger for transmission once at the premises. 
                                                 
d PCR EID50 equivalent is a measure based on comparing the viral load in the experimental samples with the viral 
load in samples with known virus titers, as measured by rRT-PCR 
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○ If a wild animal were contaminated by an infected carcass, we would expect virus 
may be transferred via feces, bodily fluids, or feathers of that carcass. One gram of 
organic matter from a poultry carcass may contain 106 EID50/g.254 
○ For perspective, using a mid-range viral transfer concentration, if 15 percent of virus 
is transferred at each contact step described above, enough virus particles still remain 
after four steps to infect five birds (assuming an infectious dose of 102 EID50) if only 
a single gram of feathers, fluid, or feces is present at the first step of the pathway. 
• If, however, the scavenger becomes infected with and subsequently sheds HPAI virus on 
the grounds outside the uninfected pullet house, there are only two contact steps: from the 
contaminated grounds to the personnel’s boots, and from the boots to the poultry house 
floor. The likelihood of a scavenger actively shedding HPAI virus following ingestion of 
an infected carcass is, thus, a critical consideration.  
○ The studies cited above demonstrate that mammalian and avian scavengers can 
become infected with HPAI virus following ingestion of infected chicken, both 
naturally and experimentally. 
 In the studies in which rectal shedding following consumption of HPAI-infected 
meat was studied, it was short-lived and occurred inconsistently.294,295 
○ Additionally, HPAI H5N1 strains that replicate mostly in the lower respiratory tract 
may not be readily excreted via the upper respiratory system of mammals.300 The role 
of other excretory systems, such as the gastrointestinal and urinary tracts, as portals of 
viral exit is unknown at this time. 
• Other plausible pathways where fewer contact steps are involved include those where the 
grower or other poultry farm personnel directly contact an infected or contaminated 
scavenger species: 
○ An infected or contaminated scavenger species is trapped and killed on an uninfected 
farm. The grower or employee disposes of the scavenger and then enters a pullet 
house, introducing virus to the flock. 
○ A domesticated scavenger (e.g., dog or cat) is infected or contaminated on an infected 
neighboring farm (see Figure 25). The grower or employee touches the animal and 
then enters a pullet house, introducing virus into the flock. 
 In a study of commercial poultry farms in Virginia, over half of all farms had cats 
on the premises, and over two-thirds of farms had dogs on premises.83 
 The number was slightly lower in a case-control study of turkey flocks affected 
by the 2016 HPAI outbreak in Indiana; between 30 and 44% of flocks had dogs 
and/or cats on the premises.262 
 In December 2016 a highly pathogenic strain of AI (H5N6) was discovered in two 
dead cats in South Korea, 2 km from a chicken farm where HPAI H5N6 was first 
reported in November 2016 (CIDRAP News 2017).  
 Among HPAI-positive turkey farms in the 2015 outbreak in the northern 
Midwest, 25 to 30% had dogs and/or cats.161 
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Figure 25. Domestic dog consuming poultry carcass next to poultry barn (with an avian 
scavenger nearby). Photos courtesy of Fabio Vannucci 
• The distance between poultry farms (i.e., the distance a scavenger must travel between a 
carcass and an uninfected farm), also impacts the likelihood of HPAI transmission by the 
scavenger. The infected carcass and the uninfected farm must be within the likely range 
of the scavenger for transmission to potentially occur and, based on knowledge of 
scavenger ranges, this is very likely. 
○ The home range of red foxes (Vulpes vulpes) is generally up to 8 km (5 miles) in 
diameter, being largest in the winter.301  
○ Raccoons (Procyon lotor) normally have a home range diameter of 1.8 to 3 km (1.1 
to 1.95 miles).302 
○ The diameter of the opossum's (Didelphis virginianis) home range is between 1.3 and 
2 km (0.8 to 1.2 miles).303 
○ The striped skunk (Mephitis mephitis) has a home range 2.2 to 2.5 km (1.4 to 1.6 
miles) in diameter.304 
○ Turkey vultures can travel up to 225 km (140 miles) per day.305 
• The enhanced biosecurity required during the PMIP applies only to farms located in a 
Control Area that wish to move birds off the premises. While it is assumed that 
biosecurity practices may be elevated in an outbreak situation, other farms in the Control 
Area are not subject to any particular stipulations on dead bird disposal or other 
movements on and off the farm. It is assumed that there may be marked variation in the 
practices on farms within the Control Area that are not currently adhering to a PMIP. 
Additionally, even for farms that are adhering to a PMIP, changing to a different disposal 
method than a premises is accustomed to requires adequate preparation and training to do 
correctly (e.g., composting is not always straightforward without such preparation and 
could end up attracting more scavengers/flies to the area). 
• In a case-control study of commercial poultry farms in Virginia in 2002, a 1.9-fold 
increased risk of LPAI H7N2 infection was associated with the sighting of wildlife near 
poultry houses.83 Scavengers must, however, gain access to the infected carcass at the 
source farm in order to contact and transmit HPAI virus. 
○ As described above, it may be unlikely for scavengers to access carcasses in burial 
pits, incinerators, or storage freezers, as all are designed to prevent animal entrance. 
 However, we assume some industry variation in frequency of mortality collection 
and type of storage container used to gather carcasses from the time they are 
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removed from the poultry house to the point when they are placed in the pit, 
incinerator, or storage freezer. 
 These intermediate transport or storage containers should also prevent access by 
scavengers on premises observing PMIP (SES WG, personal communication, Feb 
2018).264, 306 
○ While most often constructed on a concrete slab, in part to prevent vermin access, 
compost bins typically are not completely enclosed. The top layer of litter or sawdust, 
however, is of a depth (10 to 12 inches) designed to prevent odor production that 
would attract scavengers.1 
 When the carcass is surrounded by a sufficient carbon source and the proper 
moisture level is maintained, odorous gases enter an aerobic zone and are 
degraded to CO2 and water.307 
 Reports vary on the prevalence of vermin and scavengers with a properly 
managed composter.1,285 
 In their univariate analysis, McQuiston et al. (2005) found that uninfected farms 
were significantly more likely to dispose of dead birds via composting than 
infected farms (77.9% versus 63.9%, P=0.008).83  
9.2.4.2.3 Likelihood Rating and Conclusion 
The risks for HPAI introduction associated with off-site dead bird disposal methods such as 
rendering (i.e., pick-up and transport processes for rendering) are well-documented in the 
literature (see section 9.2.4.1, Dead Bird Disposal during PMIP, below), and off-site disposal of 
mortality must be discontinued during PMIP. Best practices for on-site carcass disposal and SPS 
Plan biosecurity measures (i.e., PMIP) should decrease the likelihood of attracting scavenger 
species to poultry mortality on a pullet farm in the days leading up to movement. Other poultry 
farms in the Control Area including an infected farm, however, may not be subject to the 
intensified biosecurity practices required by PMIP. Mammalian and avian scavengers have the 
potential to biologically or mechanically carry HPAI virus. Given that many scavenger species 
have home ranges of adequate size to contain adjacent poultry farms, the likelihood of HPAI 
introduction to a pullet farm during the PMIP via scavengers within the Control Area is low to 
moderate.  
9.2.4.3 Likelihood of a Pullet Flock Becoming Infected with HPAI via Dead Bird Disposal 
that Takes Place before PMIP 
Pullet grower operations are free to utilize their preferred disposal method for daily mortality in 
the days leading up to PMIP. For facilities that exclusively use an on-farm disposal method listed 
above (whether or not the premises is under a PMIP), refer to protocols and procedures listed in 
section 9.2.4.2., Likelihood of Pullet Flock Becoming Infected with HPAI via Dead Bird 
Disposal during PMIP, for an evaluation of risk.  
Off-site disposal methods include rendering, landfill (garbage), or sourcing animal byproduct as 
feed for other farmed carnivorous species (such as fox and mink for fur production). When dead 
birds are moved off a farm, trucks should be covered (to prevent dissemination of potentially 
contaminated feathers) and should follow a designated approved route. Trucks that carry dead 
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birds must be C&D, using an appropriate protocol, after delivery of the carcasses and before 
returning to the pullet farm.12 
Rendering 
The typical mortality collection process for rendering was described during in communications 
(SES WG, personal communication, Dec 2017-Feb 2018). During non-outbreak operations, dead 
birds are hand collected inside each house throughout the day and deposited in one or more 
designated areas (e.g., bins) on one or both ends of the house, either inside or outside. Once or 
twice per day, an employee collects the carcasses or the bin(s) containing the carcasses from 
each house and loads them into a pickup truck, utility vehicle, or small front-loader (such as a 
skid-steer or mini-track loader). The carcasses are transported to a common collection bin at 
some distance from the houses. The distance between the houses and the collection bin varies 
from farm to farm. The bins typically are dumpster-type containers and may or may not be 
covered. On large farms, roll-off containers may be used.  
Several times per week a company-owned or contracted rendering truck collects the contents of 
the collection bins: lift arms on the truck engage the dumpster and raise it over the bed of the 
truck, dumping the carcasses into the truck. While the truck bed is sealed against leakage, it may 
or may not be covered. Depending on the company ownership, the rendering truck may or may 
not visit other premises on the same day for carcass pick-up.  
Ideally, provisions should be in place to limit contact with dead birds from other farms. These 
may include prohibiting growers or farm employees from using company or personal vehicles to 
transport carcasses to a rendering site, utilizing a neutral off-site area for pickup by the rendering 
company, and ensuring all containers used in tra sporting mortality from the poultry house to the 
final destination are secure against wildlife, leaks, and spills.308 
The transfer of dead birds via onsite equipment to collection bins from which carcasses are then 
collected by a rendering truck presents an opportunity for truck and ground contamination with 
HPAI virus and subsequent virus transfer to other premises and other houses on the same 
premises. The rendering truck may directly enter other premises, and/or transfer virus to other 
premises along the route if the truck is uncovered. The virus could subsequently be transmitted 
inside other poultry houses via farm personnel. For further analysis of infection of premises near 
the route, please see section 9.1.6, Role of HPAI Virus Spread to Pullet Growing Premises near 
Poultry Live-Haul Routes via Feathers, Feces, and other Fomites. 
 
Contamination along route  
from uncovered or leaking truck, with 
subsequent transfer of HPAI virus onto 
other premises  
Cross-contamination (from truck) of collection bin and 
surrounding ground at premises on pick-up route. Cross-
contamination of uninfected farm from shoes, hands, or 
tires with subsequent transfer into uninfected house 
Truck is contaminated by 
infected mortality at 
infected/un-detected farm or 
at rendering plant 
Subsequent 
transfer of HPAI 
virus into house. 
Potential infection 
or contamination 
of scavenger with 
HPAI virus  
Figure 26. Pathway for exposure of a pullet farm via rendering. Other      
off-site disposal methods are assumed to share a similar pathway. 
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Other off-site dead bird disposal 
• Landfill – Pullet farm mortality may be transported to a landfill with other garbage 
products from the operation. A survey of layer industry veterinarians revealed that three 
out of thirty-nine respondents knew of growers who would “maybe” or “definitely” 
dispose of poultry carcasses in their trash in the event of an HPAI outbreak, questions did 
not differentiate pullet-growing premises specifically (see Appendix 11: Poultry Industry 
Survey on Garbage Management Practices). Further information about this pathway can 
be found in section 9.2.5, Role of HPAI Virus Spread to a Pullet Flock due to Garbage 
Management. 
• Transportation for use as feed for other carnivore-raising operations – Use of poultry 
carcasses and byproducts from the poultry industry has been described domestically and 
internationally in the feeding practices for fur-bearing animals (such as mink and 
fox),300,309,310 other exotic species (e.g., alligator farms,311 captive wildlife and zoos312) 
and anecdotally in some commercial dog breeding operations. Carcasses may be 
transported directly to local feeding operations (J. Nezworski, personal communication, 
July 2016),310 or may be consolidated at regional collection centers for distribution.313 
9.2.4.3.1 Literature Review 
• Rendering has been implicated in the spread of AI virus in previous outbreaks. 
○ Following the 2015 HPAI H5N2 outbreak in Minnesota, a case control study of 43 
case and 40 control turkey farms found that the use of rendering to dispose of dead 
birds was a risk factor for H5N2 infection, with an odds ratio of 9.8 (i.e., farms that 
had mortality picked up for disposal via rendering were 9.8 times more likely to be 
infected than farms that did not use rendering).314 
○ Also in the 2015 HPAI H5N2 outbreak, a case-control study of Iowa layer farms and 
barns found that 39 percent of case farms versus 13 percent of control farms reported 
that the renderer came onto the farm. Rendering trucks came near the barns in 29 
percent of case farms, compared with 3 percent of control farms. 
 The adjusted odds ratio (OR) for rendering trucks coming near the barns was 22.3 
(P < 0.001).194 
○ In a case series of 81 infected turkey farms in Iowa, Minnesota, North Dakota, South 
Dakota, and Wisconsin in the 2015 HPAI H5N2 outbreak, 47 percent of case farms 
used off-site carcass disposal (renderer, landfill, other) in the 14 days prior to disease 
detection.161 
○ Data from the 2003 HPAI H7N7 outbreak in the Netherlands were used to estimate 
H7N7 transmission probabilities to susceptible farms by individual contact types 
(e.g., feed delivery, egg transport, etc).159 
 The analysis determined that, per-contact, rendering visits posed a 25 percent 
chance of transmission.  
○ A case-control study of the 2002 LPAI H7N2 outbreak in Virginia found dead bird 
disposal by rendering to be the most significant risk factor for AI infection on turkey 
and chicken farms. 
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 The odds ratio was 7.3 (P< 0.001) in a multivariate analysis.83 
○ Rendering pick-ups of dead birds likely played a part in the spread of AI virus in the 
California LPAI H6N2 outbreak from 2000 to 2002.141,315 
• Among carnivorous species that may be fed poultry carcasses or byproducts from the 
poultry industry, HPAI infection has been documented in a variety of species that may be 
used in the commercial or exotic pet trade, in zoos, or in the fur industry. 
○ In reviews of HPAI H5N1 infection in carnivorous species, tigers, leopards, other 
exotic felids, domestic cats, domestic dogs, civets, and ferrets were identified as 
potential host species. Within-population transmission was documented in various cat 
species and in ferrets.300,316 
 It was hypothesized in all cases, except that of infection in a colony of civets, that 
carnivores were infected by consuming or scavenging infected bird carcasses.300 
○ In captive large felids, onset of clinical signs has been correlated with feeding poultry 
carcasses in areas with ongoing HPAI outbreaks.312 
• In captive mink, clinical signs when inoculated with H9N2 (A/Chicken/Hebei/4/2008) 
were relatively mild, including lethargy and dry nose. No mortality was observed, but 
pulmonary edema and inflammatory infiltrates were noted on histopathology of lung 
tissue. Upper respiratory shedding of virus was evident up to 15 days post-inoculation.309  
• In non-mammalian carnivores, there is limited evidence for AI virus infection. One study 
noted antibodies against an unknown subtype of AI virus in captive crocodilians of three 
species in Florida, and PCR testing revealed over 99 percent identity with the NS1 gene 
of duck AI virus isolates in four crocodilian species tested.317 
9.2.4.3.2 Qualitative Analysis 
The following qualitative factors were considered for evaluating off-site dead bird disposal: 
• Collection dumpsters may not be consistently or securely covered, allowing potential 
access to scavengers. 
○ As discussed in other sections of this risk assessment (concerning visitors/people, 
wild non-aquatic birds, and on-farm disposal during PMIP), inconsistently covering 
collection dumpsters presents the opportunity for mechanical or biological transfer of 
HPAI virus via scavengers from infected and undetected carcasses onto the 
surrounding grounds. This practice could potentially result in cross-contamination of 
the rendering truck or other mortality transport truck tires and personnel boots, with 
subsequent contamination of other premises and pullet houses.  
• The transfer of infected and undetected poultry carcasses from the collection dumpster 
into the rendering truck or mortality transport truck bed can result in feathers and bodily 
fluids contaminating the truck’s lift arms, the outside of the truck bed, and the ground 
surrounding the truck. When the same truck collects a load on another premises, the lift 
arms could contaminate the dumpster there, and the truck tires could contaminate the 
ground near the dumpster.  
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○ Many studies have demonstrated high titers and the persistence of HPAI virus in 
various poultry tissues and fluids: 
 When turkeys were experimentally infected oro-nasally with 100 µl of 106 EID50 
of HPAI H7N1, virus persisted for >1 day at >104EID50/g of muscle tissue at  
4oC (39oF).59 
 Toffan et al. (2008) experimentally infected turkeys with A/turkey/Italy HPAI 
H7N1 and measured titers up to 106.8 EID50/ml in their blood.62 
 In experimental infections of chickens with EA/AM HPAI H5N2, viral titers were 
107 to 108 EID50/g in spleen and lung samples.124  
 Chicken thigh meat contained up to 107.5 EID50 /g of HPAI H5N1 virus at 24 
hours after experimental infection.63 
 EA/AM HPAI H5N2 viral titers of 103 to 105 EID50/mL of turkey feces were 
interpolated from cloacal swab data (E. Spackman, personal communication, May 
2016).252 
 Experimental infections with the 1983 Pennsylvania HPAI H5N2 strain resulted 
in ~109 ELD50/g of chicken feces.90 
 Turkey feather tip pools from experimentally infected birds contained 104.168 to 
105.79 EID50/ml of HPAI H5N1 virus. (M. Slomka, personal communication, 
January 2014) 
 Indiana HPAI H7N8 viral titers were105.9 EID50/ml in feather root samples. (M. 
Pantin-Jackwood and E. Spackman, personal communication, May 2016) 
○ A conservative compilation of these results indicates that 1.0 g of tissue or 1.0 ml of 
feather pulp could contain a minimum 104 EID50 of HPAI virus. 
 Assuming a relatively low infectious dose of 102 viral particles, based on findings 
discussed in section 8.7.2, only 1.5 ounces (~44 ml) of carcass fluid contains 
enough viral particles to infect approximately 4,400 birds. 
 In a study of 1-week-old chicks that had been infected intratracheally with 2.5 × 
104 TCID50 of HPAI virus (H5N1), homogenates of liver, lung, kidney, and brain 
from those infected chicks contained 106.3 to >109.3 TCID50/g tissue. On the basis 
of the relative weight of the lungs, liver, kidneys, and brain of 1-week-old chicks 
weighing 50 to 55 g, the volume of two chick carcasses represents a minimum of 
1010 TCID50.294 
• If the rendering truck or other mortality transport truck bed is not covered, feathers and 
other material may escape and result in contamination along the truck’s route, with the 
potential for subsequent transfer into other poultry houses along the route. 
○ Mortality transport trucks may be owned by the poultry company or by a third-party 
contractor. Trucks operated by contractors may or may not be covered, and it may be 
difficult to require use of covered trucks in these situations (SES WG, personal 
communication, May 2018). Additionally, even if a truck were covered, feathers or 
other material may still escape at driving speeds. 
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○ In addition to the literature cited above, another study found that feathers harvested 
from ducks experimentally infected with HPAI H5N1 maintained viral titers of 105.5 
EID50/ml for 3 to 6 days at 4oC (39 oF) and 104.0EID50/ml for 3 to 6 days at 20oC  
(68oF).249  
 The authors point out that while fecal material containing high viral loads may be 
quickly diluted in the environment, contaminated feathers may persist as solid 
materials in the field.  
○ In the 1983-1984 LPAI and HPAI H5N2 outbreak in Pennsylvania, contaminated 
transport trucks and coops, and movement of dead (and live) birds, were some of the 
factors implicated in spread of the virus.315  
• Some companies require rendering trucks to be C&D between farms. 
○ This is more likely to be effective at eliminating virus contamination in warmer and 
drier conditions than in colder and wetter conditions. 
 Appendices 4-6 in the Nest Run Shell Eggs risk assessment discuss the 
effectiveness of disinfectants and C&D under different environmental 
conditions.318 
○ If C&D is inadequate to remove viral contamination or not performed between farms, 
HPAI virus survival is not likely to be affected by the relatively short time period 
between farms, especially in the protected, moist environment provided by poultry 
carcasses.  
 Appendix 2: AI Virus Survival at Various Humidity Levels, at Various 
Temperatures, and on Various Substrates details HPAI virus survival on various 
substrates under different environmental conditions.  
• Similar to rendering, collection of mortality from pullet grower operations for use in the 
feeding of captive carnivores or fur-industry commercial mink and fox operations 
represents a risk of premises contamination. 
○ Growers may individually contract with a local mink operation or may source 
mortality to a centralized feeding operation that collects byproducts from many 
agricultural industries, including egg, dairy, swine, beef, fish, and slaughter 
facilities.313 
○ Protocols for truck and driver biosecurity of such operations, in addition to C&D of 
equipment used to store and transport mortality, are not known and are suspected to 
vary by premises. 
○ Feed for many mink and some farmed fox is prepared on-site and may include ground 
raw poultry carcasses combined with other agricultural products that the grower may 
source and store on-site. This practice occurs both in the U.S. and in other major fur-
producing countries such as Canada and China.309,319,320 
• Ranches and farms in the U.S. that raise fur-bearing animals are geographically limited; 
they are mostly located in states with cooler winter climates, and the number of registered 
premises is likely under 400.321  
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• Both mink and foxes have been shown experimentally to be susceptible to multiple HPAI 
and LPAI viruses,294,322 and mink have been shown to transmit avian H3N8, H11N4, 
H7N7, H5N3, and H9N2 by contact with other mink.309,322   
○ In a Chinese study of farmed mink, there was serological evidence of exposure to 
H5N1 strains (RE-5 and RE-7) and H9N2 strains (A/Chicken/Hebei/4/2008 and 
A/chicken/Shanghai/10/01) in both juvenile and breeding adult mink.309 Of note, 
researchers could not find a mink farm where poultry carcasses or byproducts were 
not fed to mink as part of their regular rations. 
○ This may represent a means of perpetuating virus and a potential source of 
contamination for pullet premises that contract with mink farms for mortality 
disposal. 
• Biosecurity measures such as using footwear and clothing that are specific to each line of 
separation (LOS) have been proposed as a means to minimize introduction of virus into 
the poultry house on the boots/clothes of personnel. 
○ During PMIP, growers and employees must wear LOS-specific clothing and footwear 
before entering poultry houses (see Appendix 8: Cross-Commodity Pre-Movement 
Isolation Period). 
 If virus from off-site dead bird disposal contaminated the ground before the onset 
of PMIP, premises-specific clothing and footwear could still become 
contaminated before entering the poultry house. 
9.2.4.3.3 Likelihood Rating and Conclusion 
While off-site disposal methods are prohibited during the PMIP leading up to load-out because 
of the associated high risk of virus transmission, there remains the potential for contamination of 
the ground around a poultry house (prior to PMIP) that could lead to virus being tracked into the 
house on personnel clothing or equipment (during PMIP). The PMIP is designed to increase the 
probability of detection if virus were introduced nine or more days before load-out (since PMIP 
duration for moving pullets out of the barn is 8 days), but virus could be tracked into the barn 
any time during PMIP, potentially allowing an infected but undetected flock to move. Given that 
off-site dead bird disposal occurs in the Control Area before a PMIP, the likelihood of a pullet 
flock becoming infected as a result of HPAI virus introduction to the flock (before or during the 
PMIP) via off-site dead bird disposal that takes place prior to the PMIP is moderate, provided 
that best on-site carcass disposal practices and the cross-commodity PMIP measures are 
followed. 
9.2.5 Likelihood of a Pullet Flock Becoming Infected with HPAI Virus due to 
Garbage Management 
Garbage is typically removed from poultry premises by contracted garbage management services 
(see Appendix 11: Poultry Industry Survey on Garbage Management Practices). Garbage trucks 
coming near the barns were a significant risk factor in a case-control study of egg layer flocks in 
the 2015 U.S. HPAI outbreak.194 This evaluation considers the possible ways a pullet flock could 
become infected with HPAI-virus by garbage management before movement to an off-site lay 
facility. 
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9.2.5.1 Likelihood of HPAI-Virus Infection via Garbage Management 
Garbage management represents a potential pathway for HPAI-virus infection of a pullet flock, 
as multiple poultry premises may share a common disposal site (e.g., landfill), trash collection 
provider, or trash collection site (i.e., shared dumpster for multiple premises). HPAI-virus may 
enter a pullet growing premises via contaminated garbage trucks or drivers. Figure 27 diagrams 
the transmission pathway.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 27. Pathway of HPAI virus infection of pullet flock via garbage management. 
9.2.5.2 Literature Review 
• In the 2014-2015 HPAI outbreak, garbage management was identified as a previously 
unconsidered risk factor for disease spread.194 
○ In the 2014-2015 outbreak of HPAI H5N2 in the U.S., a case-control study with 
multivariable analysis of infected egg layer flocks in Nebraska and Iowa identified 
garbage trucks coming near the barns as a risk for infection at the farm level 
(OR=14.7; P <.001). This practice occurred at 61 percent of case farms and 23 
percent of control farms.194 
 The univariate analyses (of factors considered for the farm-level multivariable 
model) showed that 39 percent of control farms had garbage trucks come to the 
perimeter of the premises; this did not occur at case farms (P=0.003). The 
frequency of garbage trucks entering the farm but not nearing barns was reported 
to be comparable among case and control farms (case farms, 21%; control farms, 
26%).194 
○ The frequency with which garbage trucks visited the farms in this study is not known. 
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• Prior to 2015, epidemiologic trace-back questionnaires in AI outbreaks did not 
specifically identify garbage management services as a risk factor. However, previous 
studies have assessed the risk related to non-company visitors that, similar to garbage 
collectors, do not typically need to access the poultry house and may visit or contract 
with multiple poultry premises in an area.  
○ In the 2002-2003 outbreak of ILT virus on Mississippi broiler farms, each gas 
supplier visit to the farm per month increased the likelihood of infection (gas 
suppliers per month: OR=6.89; P=0.0132; multivariate model, matched controls).258 
 The authors suggest gas suppliers may have contributed to viral spread by 
transporting contaminated material between farms. 
○ Based on a stochastic model predicting the spread of HPAI virus between Georgia 
broiler farms in low- and high-poultry-density regions, gas delivery and utility 
management visitors contributed minimally (approximately 2 to 4 percent) to off-
farm transmission.266 
 The models estimated the percent contribution to off-farm transmission. Visitor 
activities in the high-poultry-density region (1.45 farms/5 miles2) and low-
poultry-density region (0.49 farms/5 miles2) were calculated separately.  
• In many areas, noncommercial poultry operations (i.e., live poultry markets and backyard 
flocks) may utilize the same garbage management contractors as commercial poultry 
farms. On noncommercial poultry operations, disposal of mortality in garbage has been 
identified as a risk factor for AI. 
○ In an evaluation of risk factors for live bird markets in New York, New Jersey, 
Pennsylvania, and New England, markets that disposed of dead birds and offal in the 
trash were 2.4 times more likely to have a repeated presence of LPAI H5 and H7 
viruses (OR, 2.4; 95% CI, 1.8-3.4).323 
○ In an analysis of risk factors associated with H5N1 in backyard poultry in Egypt from 
2010-2012, disposing of mortality and poultry feces in garbage piles outside was 
significantly correlated in the regression model (F=15.7; P<0.0001).324 
• Landfills may serve as a potential site for cross-contamination as garbage management 
services for poultry premises may transport garbage to the same landfill. This risk likely 
increases if landfills are used as an off-site disposal method for positive depopulated 
flocks, which has been reported in previous LPAI outbreaks.72,270 
○ In the 2002 LPAI H7N2 outbreak in Virginia, disposal of depopulated flocks mainly 
occurred at “mega-landfills” by sealed, leak-proof trucks that were cleaned and 
disinfected on-farm and at the landfill.72 
○ During the 2001-2002 Pennsylvania H7N2 LPAI outbreak, some euthanized case 
flocks were disposed of at landfills after being transported in closed containers.270 
9.2.5.3 Qualitative Analysis  
We considered the following qualitative factors in evaluating this pathway: 
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• The types of potentially infectious or contaminated material disposed of in garbage vary 
by sector of the poultry industry. However, many potentially contaminated or infectious 
materials have been reported to be routinely disposed of in the trash, according to survey 
responses from representatives of the broiler, turkey, and layer sectors (see Table 18). 
○ The survey results referenced throughout this qualitative analysis were obtained from 
a small convenience sample of individuals with knowledge of garbage industry 
practices in various poultry sectors and with a low response rate. Statistical analyses 
were not conducted for these data. Absence of an affirmative response cannot be 
assumed to indicate a high-risk activity is not occurring, and this has been taken into 
account in the assessment. Despite these limitations, the data are informative for the 
purpose of the risk assessment. For a summary of the survey results, see Appendix 
11: Poultry Industry Survey on Garbage Management Practices. 
Table 18. Survey results concerning material disposed of in garbage on premises in the broiler, 
turkey, and layer industries.a 
Item Broiler sector 
(n=8 
respondents) 
Turkey sector 
(n=15 
respondents) 
Layer sector 
(n=39 
respondents) 
Dead wildlife/wild birds Yes (1/8) Yes (5/15) Yes (1/39) 
Rodents Yes (3/8) Yes (5/15) Yes (10/39) 
Mortality or poultry carcasses No (0/8) Yes (1/15) Yes (9/39) 
Eggs or egg productsb Yes (1/8) Yes (1/15) Yes (8/39) 
Manure No (0/8) No (0/15) Yes (1/39) 
Spilled feed Yes (2/8) Yes (8/15) Yes (7/39) 
Disposable chick transport boxesb Yes (4/8) Yes (4/15) Yes (24/39) 
Used needles/syringes/diagnostic supplies 
that have contacted birdsb 
Yes (1/8) Yes (5/15) Yes (14/39) 
PPE (boot covers, gloves, coveralls, etc.) Yes (8/8) Yes (14/15) Yes (36/39) 
Feathers No (0/8) Yes (2/15) Yes (4/39) 
Offal No (0/8) No (0/15) No (0/39) 
Equipment or supplies from inside barnsc Yes Yes Yes (22/39) 
Household garbage from farm manager or 
any other residence 3 
-- Yes Yes (20/39) 
Trash associated with waterfowl huntingc -- -- No (0/39) 
Garbage from processing operationc -- -- Yes (23/39) 
Lunch room and restroom garbagec -- -- Yes (37/39) 
aYes indicates materials disposed of in the garbage by one or more survey respondents within each industry. In parenthesis, 
numerator indicates number of survey respondents reporting disposal of item and denominator indicates total number of 
respondents. 
bLanguage of selection choice modified in survey distributed to representatives of layer industry. 
cItem explicitly asked only in survey distributed to representatives of layer industry. Yes in the broiler and turkey industries for 
these items indicates at least one respondent manually reported disposing of that item in the garbage.                                                                                                                  
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○ Additional items reported to be disposed of in the garbage on broiler premises were 
boxes, buckets, jugs from disinfectants, litter treatments, and disposable chick feeder 
lids. On turkey premises, additional items included empty medication containers, 
poult box papers, and supply containers. 
• Of potential HPAI-contaminated or infectious material reported to be disposed of in the 
garbage on poultry premises (i.e. dead wildlife, poultry carcasses, egg shells, and 
potentially contaminated materials that have contacted poultry), the hypothetical expected 
virus concentration on each type of item varies.  
○ HPAI virus has been recovered in many tissues of poultry carcasses, such as muscle, 
liver, kidney, brain, spleen, and blood. For detailed information on virus 
concentration in various tissues, feces, and feathers, see section 9.2.4, Likelihood of a 
Pullet Flock Becoming Infected with HPAI Virus via Dead Bird Disposal. 
 If garbage is contaminated with infectious poultry carcasses, the risk of infection 
via garbage management is likely similar to the risk via off-site dead bird 
disposal. Off-site dead bird disposal has been implicated in previous AI 
outbreaks. For a detailed literature review, see section 9.2.4.2.1, Literature 
Review. 
○ There are reports of disposing of dead wildlife in trash on commercial poultry 
premises.  
 Evidence of AI virus infection of multiple mammalian species, such as ferrets, 
foxes, cats, dogs, skunks, raccoons, and mink, has been demonstrated by virus 
isolation, antigen detection, and PCR. For a detailed description on mammalian 
susceptibility, see section 9.2.4, Likelihood of a Pullet Flock Becoming Infected 
with HPAI Virus via Dead Bird Disposal. 
 Wild and domesticated bird species can be infected with HPAI virus. For a 
detailed description of experimental studies in wild and domesticated aquatic 
birds, see section 9.1.4, Role of HPAI Spread to Pullet Flock in a Control Area 
via Wild Aquatic Birds in the Farm Vicinity. For a detailed review of HPAI 
detections, prevalence, and susceptibility of passerine birds and non-passerine 
non-aquatic birds, see section 9.1.5, Role of HPAI Virus Spread to Pullet Flock 
via Wild Non-Aquatic Birds in Farm Vicinity. 
○ Eggs from infected hens have tested positive for HPAI virus, including shells, 
albumen, and yolk. Measured concentrations have varied. See the Secure Egg Supply 
Egg Shell Risk Assessment for more details.115 
• Influenza virus survival varies depending on strain and environmental conditions, such as 
humidity and temperature. Virus persistence is generally longer at lower temperatures 
and in more humid conditions. For virus persistence data on materials that may be 
disposed of in the garbage, such as poultry carcasses, feathers, egg shells, egg trays, 
wood, steel, glass, and PPE, see Appendix 2: AI Virus Survival at Various Humidity 
Levels, at Various Temperatures, and on Various Substrates. 
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• In a survey sent to representatives of the broiler, turkey, and layer sectors, it was reported 
that garbage is likely to be transported to a landfill by a contracted service provider for 
the majority of commercial poultry operations.  
○ Transport trucks may become contaminated at municipal landfills; it has been noted 
that upon arrival at landfills, garbage management vehicles may drive over previously 
deposited garbage (D. Halvorson, personal communication, June 2016). 
 The CFR provides standards for design and operation at landfills.325 For 
municipal solid waste landfills, these include 6 inches of covering on disposed 
solid waste each day or as necessary, disease vector control, and access 
requirements.325  
○ Garbage management contractors used by some commercial poultry premises have 
been reported to visit multiple poultry premises on one route before depositing a load 
at the landfill; thus, HPAI-virus-contaminated garbage from an undetected premises 
may be present on the truck when it arrives at a pullet farm. 
 The types of potentially contaminated trash from other types of poultry operations 
(e.g., backyard poultry, processing facilities, live bird markets, etc.) are not 
known, but are assumed to include materials similar to those reported in garbage 
from commercial poultry operations.  
• In the Netherlands, poor management practices pertaining to liquid waste 
(e.g., waste water) and solid waste have been identified as potentially 
increasing the risk of AI transmission in the neighborhood of infected farms 
(A. Ssematimba, personal communication, August 2016).86 
• A shared dumpster or common trash collection point for multiple poultry 
premises, while not commonly used in the poultry industry, represents an 
additional site of potential cross-contamination between commercial poultry 
operations. 
• Garbage trucks and drivers typically do not contact live poultry while completing 
contracted duties on a poultry premises. Biosecurity recommendations and site-specific 
biosecurity plans may not stipulate specific measures for garbage management drivers, 
but it is recommended that visitors follow procedures to cross the PBA and LOS.2  
○ In a qualitative evaluation of potential AI transmission pathways on broiler and layer 
premises in the Netherlands, Ssematimba et al. proposed an exposure risk 
classification of "medium" for the majority of contacts assessed that access only the 
premises and have no contact with live poultry.86 The analysis considered contact 
frequency, biosecurity practices, and risk category. 
• Virus introduction into poultry houses via garbage management may involve one or more 
virus transfer steps. Although there would likely be reduction in the virus concentration 
(6 to 27 percent) between a donor surface and recipient surface in each direct contact,275 
the virus concentration potentially tracked into the barn may still be above the infectious 
dose. This depends on the initial viral load and infectious dose of that virus strain in 
pullets.  
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○ It is assumed that the ground traveled by the vehicle between the time of contact with 
infected garbage and the uninfected pullet growing premises may lessen the amount 
of virus present for transmission once at the premises. However, mechanical 
transmission of a similar type virus (PRRSV) has been demonstrated experimentally 
in a swine industry-like setting.253  
○ Alternatively, if an infected load of garbage is in the truck at the time of arrival on an 
uninfected pullet premise, fewer transfer steps are required. 
○ The enhanced biosecurity required during a PMIP applies only to farms located in a 
Control Area that wish to move birds off the premises. It is assumed that there may be 
marked variation in the biosecurity and garbage practices on farms within the Control 
Area that are not currently adhering to a PMIP, despite a likely elevation of 
biosecurity during an outbreak.  
○ If garbage management activities and visits occur outside of the PBA, there is a 
decreased likelihood of cross-contamination between contaminated garbage 
management and personnel, equipment, or other potential fomites that may access the 
poultry house. 
 Per personal communication with the SES WG, some pullet premises have the 
dumpster or trash collection point located outside of the PBA but others may have 
dumpsters located right next to pullet barns (SES WG, personal communication, 
Feb 2018).  
○ As is true with other third-party contractors, poultry growers or integrators may find it 
difficult to control or influence certain practices by contract garbage haulers, 
including C&D of garbage trucks, pickup routing, and landfill practices.  
○  On pullet premises, the frequency of garbage pickup is highly variable from weekly 
to monthly to as needed depending on the size of the operation (SES WG, personal 
communication, Feb 2018).  
9.2.5.4 Likelihood Rating and Conclusion 
9.2.5.4.1 Likelihood of a Pullet Flock Becoming Infected with HPAI-Virus due to Garbage 
Management  
Garbage management was identified as a previously unconsidered risk factor for HPAI virus 
introduction in the 2014-2015 outbreak in the U.S. Epidemiological studies of past outbreaks 
have not specifically investigated garbage as a potential route for HPAI virus entry onto a 
poultry premises, but a recent survey identified a number of items disposed of in trash across 
poultry industry sectors that could be potentially infectious or contaminated by HPAI virus. 
Given that there is potential for HPAI virus associated with garbage management to be tracked 
into the poultry house, the likelihood of a pullet flock becoming infected with HPAI virus due to 
garbage management without a PMIP (i.e., when off-site garbage management takes place) is 
moderate to high.   
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9.2.5.4.2 Likelihood of a Pullet Flock Becoming Infected with HPAI Virus due to Garbage 
Management when a PMIP is Implemented 
During the PMIP, garbage will not be removed from the premises, given the risk it presents, and 
the producer is responsible for managing the risks associated with any on-site garbage movement 
that must occur. The greatly intensified biosecurity measures of the PMIP, such as using 
footwear and clothing specific to each LOS, should decrease the likelihood that virus is tracked 
into barns during the final days before load-out (see Appendix 8: Cross-Commodity Pre-
Movement Isolation Period). Provided the on-farm biosecurity measures are strictly followed 
during a PMIP, the likelihood of a pullet flock becoming infected with HPAI-virus due to 
garbage management during PMIP is low. 
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9.3 Pathways for a Pullet Flock Becoming Infected with HPAI Virus via 
Load-Out Operations 
It is important to note that movements of load-out equipment and crews have been implicated in 
AI virus transmission in several previous outbreaks.268,326 In this chapter we are assessing the 
likelihood that a pullet flock will become infected during the load-out process resulting in 
movement of infected but undetected birds out of the barn.e Pathways considered include 
contaminated load-out equipment, vehicles, and/or crews (e.g., coming from a previously loaded 
out infected and undetected farm) introducing HPAI virus into the pullet flock.f In addition, since 
more than 50% of commercial pullet grower premises are multi-age farms where younger birds 
remain on the premises for multiple weeks (depending upon their life stage) after older birds are 
loaded out, the potential for these younger flocks to become infected has also been considered. 
Figure 28 diagrams potential exposure pathways. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 28. Potential pathways for exposure of a pullet premises via load-out operations. 
                                                 
e The likelihood of virus spread to other birds at the pullet destination (e.g., a layer farm) will be addressed in a 
separate risk assessment. 
f Premises contamination with HPAI virus by load-out crews or processes may also represent a pathway by which 
day-old chicks could become infected upon placement of the next flock in the same poultry house if virus were not 
inactivated during downtime. These pathways leading to infection of the next flock are outside the scope of this 
risk assessment.  
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9.3.1 Likelihood of a Pullet Flock Becoming Infected with HPAI via Load-Out 
Operations with PMIP Measures for Moving Pullets Off the Farm in Place 
For premises within a Control Area that wish to move pullets off the farm, a Pre-Movement 
Isolation Period (PMIP) is defined that limits non-emergency visits and personnel on the farm, 
while biosecurity and flock disease surveillance are increased (see Appendix 8: Cross-
Commodity Pre-Movement Isolation Period and Appendix 12: Load-out Mitigation Measures for 
Pullets Off the Farm). Adherence to enhanced biosecurity principles during this isolation period 
prior to scheduled movement minimizes the likelihood that the flock will become exposed to 
HPAI virus via contact with people, vehicles, or equipment that may be contaminated with HPAI 
virus in the final days before load-out. Similarly, decreasing the likelihood of late introduction of 
virus to a flock increases confidence that the flock is not infected based on surveillance sampling 
performed during the PMIP. For further information on the likelihood of detecting infection 
close to movement, see section 9.4, Likelihood of Detecting HPAI in an Infected Pullet House 
Using Modeling Simulations. 
9.3.1.1 Load-out Mitigation Measures for Permitted Movement of Poultry from a Control 
Area 
Load-out begins as the first load-out crew, vehicle, or equipment arrives on the premises and 
ends when the last load of birds (to be moved) departs the premises. As noted, on multi-age 
premises there still may be pullets on the premises after a load-out is completed. According to 
cross-commodity PMIP guidelines, pre-staging of equipment during PMIP is prohibited (see 
Appendix 8: Cross-Commodity Pre-Movement Isolation Period). If contaminated load-out 
equipment or crews enter the pullet-growing premises, the virus may be tracked into the 
occupied poultry house(s). If the pullets to be moved out are infected, they have the potential to 
shed virus both during transit (e.g., on the way to a layer facility) or after arrival at the 
destination. On multi-age premises, the virus could be introduced into the houses with younger-
age pullets, causing these flocks to become infected.  
To minimize virus introduction and spread between poultry flocks during pullet load-out, 
emphasis is placed on decreasing the likelihood of HPAI-contaminated load-out equipment, 
vehicles, and crews being used for permitted pullet movement within the Control Area, and on 
diligent biosecurity between barns on the pullet farm. Specifically, PMIP measures are continued 
throughout pullet load-out (except for load-out associated crew, equipment, and activities); daily 
bird sampling and daily PCR test submission (every 24 hours) continues throughout load-out for 
all flocks on the premises greater than 28 days of age; load-out trucks and equipment are C&D 
prior to the first arrival at the pullet premises (C&D to be verified/inspected by someone not 
affiliated with the crew). Further detail on load-out mitigations recommended for pullet premises 
are included in Appendix 12: Load-out Mitigations. Results of modeling simulations to support 
the increased biosecurity and sampling requirements, especially for premises with long load-out 
times, can be found in Section 9.4 Likelihood of Detecting HPAI in an Infected Pullet House 
Prior to Movement Using Modeling Simulations and Appendix 9: Supplementary Modeling 
Results. 
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9.3.2 Literature Review 
In past LPAI outbreaks in the U.S. poultry industry, load-out equipment and crews have been 
implicated as a means of virus spread between farms, specifically involving partial flock removal 
and movement of load-out crews between premises.  
• In the 1995-1996 LPAI H9N2 outbreak in Minnesota, likely transmission pathways 
between commercial turkey premises included exposure from contaminated processing 
trucks during partial flock load-outs and contaminated load-out personnel and equipment 
from an infected flock.326 
• In a 1978 outbreak of LPAI (H6N1, H4N8, H6N2) in Minnesota turkey flocks, the 
management practice of marketing turkey hens while leaving growing toms on the farm 
allowed potentially contaminated load-out equipment and crews to contact birds (toms) 
that would remain on the farm.268 
• In an overview of the Minnesota Cooperative Control Program, Poss et al. identified 
orderly marketing as a procedure to prevent AI virus spread, as there is potential for 
heavy contamination to personnel and equipment involved in the transport of an infected 
flock. Previously, load-out crews, which may load out more than one flock within 12 
hours, have been associated with the spread of AI.327 
• The use of clean load-out vehicles and equipment has been protective in a past AI 
outbreak. During the 1986 LPAI H5N2 outbreak in Pennsylvania, which likely spread in 
part through movement of contaminated crates, transmission was interrupted when 
premises access was restricted to sanitary crates and clean trucks.328 
During previous poultry disease outbreaks (LPAI, HPAI, and ILT), movement of contaminated 
transport vehicles, transport equipment, and infected poultry likely contributed to virus spread 
between farms. 
• Shared equipment likely played a role in the 2014-2015 HPAI outbreak in the U.S. Load-
out equipment was among the most commonly shared equipment found in a case series of 
81 infected turkey farms in Iowa, Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, and 
Wisconsin (including 63 meat production farms). The case series showed that 85% of 
farms shared pre-loaders; 92% of farms shared live-haul loaders; and 69% of farms 
shared poultry trailers.38 For more information on other shared equipment, see section 
9.2.3, Likelihood of a Pullet Flock Becoming Infected with HPAI virus via Machinery or 
Equipment Shared between Multiple Premises. 
• A 2001-2002 outbreak of LPAI H6N2 in Northern California is suspected to have spread 
from flock to flock in part through moving live birds to slaughter.141,315 
• In the 1983-1984 H5N2 LPAI and HPAI Pennsylvania outbreak, contaminated transport 
trucks and coops and movement of birds were among the factors that contributed to 
spread of infection.268 
• Findings from previous disease outbreaks suggest that virus transmission to poultry 
premises near live-haul routes is possible. For a review of literature on infection of 
premises near the route in past outbreaks, see section 9.1.6, Role of HPAI Virus Spread 
to Pullet-Growing Premises near Poultry Live-Haul Routes Via Feathers, Feces, and 
Other Fomites. 
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The load-out process inherently places crews, vehicles, and equipment in close contact with live 
poultry, poultry feces, and poultry feathers. 
• Estimates of HPAI virus concentrations in chicken secretions, feces, feathers, and other 
tissues generally range between 103 and107 EID50 per gram or per milliliter, although 
higher concentrations have been observed in some cases.57,63,64 
• While pullet load-out equipment should be C&D between farms in a Control Area, not all 
items are easy to disinfect, especially if all organic matter is not removed in the cleaning 
step (typically power-washing); power-washing practices may vary in thoroughness and 
effectiveness in practice.38 
• For further information on viral load on substrates related to live-bird movement, see 
section 9.1.6, Role of HPAI Virus Spread to Pullet-Growing Premises near Poultry Live-
Haul Routes via Feathers, Feces, and Other Fomites, and section 9.2.4, Likelihood of a 
Pullet Flock Becoming Infected with HPAI Virus via Dead Bird Disposal. 
Viral persistence depends on substrate, temperature, and humidity, among other factors. Virus 
may persist for days to weeks or longer in a climate like that of the continental U.S.. 
• Kurmi et al., Beard et al., and Wood et al. reported that HPAI virus strains were 
inactivated in chicken feces in less than 5 days in warm temperatures (71 to 77°F) and 
nearly 2 to 8 weeks in cooler temperatures (39.2 to 46.04°F).90,271,280 In these 
experimental studies, when temperature was constant, time to virus inactivation in feces 
usually increased as moisture level increased.90,271 On substrates that may be found on 
vehicles or pullet transport dollies, an LPAI virus strain (A/Herring gull/Delaware 471/86 
[H13N7]) was below detectable limit at day 6 on tires, steel, and plastic, and at hour 72 
on wood.272 In cool temperatures (39.2-46.0°F), an HPAI H5N1 strain 
(A/Vietnam/1203/2004 [H5N1 clade 1]) on glass and galvanized metal persisted longer 
in low relative humidity than in high humidity, whereas the opposite was true for the 
same virus in feces. (On glass and metal, virus was recovered at day 13 in low relative 
humidity and at 4-9 days in high relative humidity; in feces, virus was recovered at day 8 
in low relative humidity and at day 13 in high relative humidity in feces.)271 
• For further data on viral persistence on different substrates and in varying environments, 
see Appendix 2: AI Virus Survival at Various Humidity Levels, at Various Temperatures, 
and on Various Substrates. 
9.3.3 Qualitative Analysis 
We considered the following qualitative factors for evaluating this pathway: 
• The time required to load out a pullet premises depends on the size and type of operation, 
crew and equipment logistics, and distance to the destination premises. 
○ Industry representatives report that some pullet premises can complete load-out in 2 
days; but load-out may take up to 10 days for larger premises (SES WG, personal 
communication, 2017-2018; see also Appendix 1 Poultry Industry Survey on Pullet 
Growing Management Practices). 
○ The probability of HPAI transmission to a pullet premises during load-out depends on 
the number of person-days a load-out crew works on the pullet premises. That is, the 
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probability of disease transmission increases both as the size (i.e., number of people ) 
of a load-out crew increases and as the duration (i.e., number of days required for 
load-out crew work) increases. To decrease the number of people in a load-out crew, 
the load-out duration would likely need to increase. The reverse is also true: to 
decrease the number of days needed to complete a load-out move, more load-out 
crewmembers could be used. It is unclear whether a shorter load-out duration with 
more people or a longer load-out with fewer people is riskier. While there could be 
slightly more infectious and undetected birds moved during a long load-out, the 
probability of detection would also be higher with a long load-out (both assuming 
birds are exposed to virus early in the load-out process).     
○ Transportation distance from the pullet premises to destination layer facilities ranges 
from less than 10 miles to more than 120 miles and may be interstate (SES WG, 
personal communication, April 2018). Industry representatives from the SES WG 
have indicated that load-out crew and schedules may be adjusted slightly during an 
outbreak situation, if possible (e.g., depending upon crew availability), in an attempt 
to expedite the load-out process but likely cannot be shortened significantly (SES 
WG, personal communication, May 2018). 
 In situations where expedited load-out is desired, equipment and crew capacity 
may require recruitment of crews, vehicles, and equipment from additional 
contract hauling companies working simultaneously. (SES WG, personal 
communication, June 2018). While this may expedite the load-out process, 
introducing crews, vehicles, and equipment from multiple sources may increase 
the risk of virus exposure/contamination. 
• As discussed in section 9.4, Likelihood of Detecting HPAI in an Infected Pullet House 
Using Modeling Simulations, the likelihood of a pullet house becoming infected with 
HPAI in the days leading up to movement (and undetected prior to the start of load-out) 
is lower when PMIP enhanced biosecurity measures are implemented and when the 
premises is located farther away from an infected premises. Increased biosecurity and 
greater distance help reduce the chances of moving birds that are infectious because of 
exposure to HPAI virus during PMIP.  
• For the pullet industry following the Secure Poultry Supply Plan, the enhanced 
biosecurity measures in place during PMIP and daily PCR testing will continue into the 
load-out period (see Appendix 8: Cross-Commodity Pre-Movement Isolation Period and 
Appendix 12: Load-out Mitigation Measures); however, it remains possible that 
contaminated load-out equipment or contaminated crews brought to the premises for 
load-out could lead to cross-contamination of houses undergoing load-out or houses that 
have yet to be loaded out. 
• As pre-staging of load-out crews or equipment is not allowed during a PMIP according to 
cross-commodity guidelines, potential viral introduction via contaminated load-out crews 
or load-out equipment would thus occur as or after the load-out process begins. The 
pullet industry has opted to continue daily flock sampling for HPAI throughout the load-
out process (SES WG, personal communication, August 2017). 
○ The latent period for an individual bird varies with virus strain and infectious 
dose.123,329 Short load-out durations (e.g., 1-2 days) would result in decreased 
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likelihood, while greater distance between pullet-growing operation and destination 
could increase the chance, that a large numbers of pullets will be actively shedding 
virus during transport. 
 Variation in infectious period and mean time to death has been reported. All 
chickens inoculated with one of six 2005 HPAI H5N1 Vietnam strains died in 48 
hours or less,122 while inoculation with 2015 EA/AM HPAI H5N2 (Tk/MN/2015) 
resulted in a mean time to death of 4.8 and 3.2 days in 5- and 8-week-old broiler 
chickens, respectively.124 
 For a more detailed review of experimental studies of latency period, infectious 
period, and mean time to death from AI infections in chickens, see section 8, 
Hazard Identification: HPAI Overview. 
• In the event of infection being introduced via load-out activities, the likelihood of 
detection increases as the number of days since exposure increases. Similarly, the 
likelihood of detection increases as the number of initially infected birds increases, since 
more infectious birds results in faster spread of the infection within the house.  
○ Modeling results suggest that the infection in a house exposed early in a four-, five-, 
or six-day load-out would likely be detected independent of the level of 
contamination. When the initial number of infected birds is 5, the 95% threshold is 
estimated to be exceeded by four days post-exposure under either a slow or fast 
contact rateβ scenario (see Tables 19A and 19B below). 
Table 19A. The likelihood of detecting HPAI in a house prior to the transportation of pullets 
for varying numbers of days post-exposure and varying numbers of initially infected birds.a 
Slow contact rate parameters were used in simulations.b 
 Days post-exposure 
Initial no. of birds 
infected 
2 3 4 5 6 
Predicted detection probabilitya 
1 0.09 0.27 0.55 0.76 0.89 
5 0.43 0.85 0.98 1.00 1.00 
   aThe initial number of birds infected represents the level of contamination present on the load-out crew and equipment.  
   bPercent probabilities are estimated from 10,000 simulations based on the Pennsylvania HPAI H5N2 strain and an active 
surveillance protocol of testing all dead birds (up to a maximum of 4 pools) daily via rRT PCR during load out. 
  
                                                 
β An adequate contact rate is defined as the mean number of birds each bird comes in contact with per unit time such 
that the contact is adequate to transmit infection. A low adequate contact rate represents slow or inefficient within 
flock spread. Higher adequate contact rates result in a higher likelihood of infection. For further information see 
section 9.4 Likelihood of Detecting HPAI in an Infected Pullet House Using Modeling Simulations. 
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Table 19B. The likelihood of detecting HPAI in a house prior to the transportation of pullets 
for varying numbers of days post-exposure and varying numbers of initially infected birds. a  
Fast contact rate parameters were used in simulations.b 
 Days post-exposure 
Initial no. of birds 
infected 
2 3 4 5 6 
Predicted detection probabilitya 
1 0.14 0.47 0.8 0.95 0.99 
5 0.49 0.93 1.00 1.00 1.00 
aThe initial number of birds infected represents the level of contamination present on the load-out crew and equipment.  
bPercent probabilities are estimated from 10,000 simulations based on the Pennsylvania HPAI H5N2 strain and an active 
surveillance protocol of testing all dead birds (up to a maximum of 4 pools) daily via rRT PCR during load-out. 
 
• It is standard practice in the pullet industry, and a United Egg Producers (UEP) 
certification requirement, for load-out carts to be C&D at least after each time a flock is 
moved (i.e., at the completion of a whole flock move/before next flock is moved). 
However, transport vehicles often make multiple trips during the load-out process, and 
equipment and vehicles are not routinely C&D between loads transported from the same 
pullet farm to a single destination site (SES WG, personal communication, May 2018). 
• Whether C&D occurs before (i.e., at an off-site C&D station) or upon arrival on the pullet 
farm, there is potential for feces, feathers, and other contaminants to remain on surfaces 
that will contact the pullet flock. 
○ Vehicles and equipment which are sanitized off-site may collect debris from the wash 
station or during travel to the pullet premises. These contaminants may contact the 
pullets during collection for and during transport. 
○ Conversely, C&D which occurs at the pullet premises risks bringing feces, feathers, 
and other contaminants onto the pullet premises. This contamination could be tracked 
into poultry houses as previously described (see section 9.2, Pathways for a Pullet 
Flock Becoming Infected with HPAI via Movements of People, Vehicles, or 
Equipment). 
• More stringent load-out biosecurity for pullet premises during an outbreak should 
decrease the likelihood of heavily contaminated people, equipment, or vehicles bringing 
HPAI virus to a premises during the load-out process. In addition to standard “at the 
gate” vehicle sanitation (i.e., C&D of wheels and undercarriage), the SES WG has agreed 
to further recommended mitigation measures for pullet load-out following an outbreak of 
HPAI: 
• Load-out trucks and equipment are C&D prior to first arrival at the pullet premises 
with C&D verified by a person not with the load-out crew. 
• Pullet loading crews are prohibited from entering other poultry houses on the same 
farm, and load-out crews must shower and change to clean clothes and clean footwear 
(prior to or at the time of arrival at a pullet premises) on a daily basis. It is noted that 
not all pullet premises have shower facilities on-site, thus showers may be used at 
homes or hotels (SES WG, personal communication, May 2018). 
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• On multi-age premises, it is expected that growers and other employees may still need 
to enter multiple other barns on the premises in the course of caring for birds. This 
may include both load-out aged flocks and barns containing younger flocks, which 
will remain on the pullet-growing site. 
 On both single- and multi-age premises, growers or employees also may need to 
enter emptied barns to prepare them for downtime protocols (C&D, shutting off 
water, heat, etc.). 
o Barn-to-barn biosecurity measures should be implemented to limit likelihood of 
contaminating barns still occupied by poultry during the load-out, such as utilizing 
LOS-specific footwear and clothing, and handwashing/hand sanitizing. 
o For additional details on mitigation measures, see Appendix 12: Load-out Mitigation 
Measures for Pullets Off the Farm. 
• On multi-age premises, younger birds remaining on the farm after load-out are at risk of 
coming into contact with HPAI virus that was brought to the premises via contaminated 
load-out equipment, crews, or vehicles. 
○ Once load-out is complete, heightened biosecurity and surveillance measures 
stipulated for PMIP and load-out are no longer required. If the practice of using LOS-
specific footwear is not continued, the potential to track HPAI virus contamination 
into occupied barns remains. 
• Load-out equipment and crews may come from premises outside the Control Area and/or 
may have been used to move spent hens.  
○ Premises outside the Control Area may not be subject to surveillance and pre-
movement testing requirements beyond routine NPIP surveillance for LPAI. 
○ Load-out vehicles and crews outside the Control Area may have less stringent 
biosecurity or traceability requirements. 
○ While it may be possible to test the pullets most recently moved by a crew or specific 
equipment (if deemed appropriate), this is not possible if crews/equipment recently 
moved spent hens. Moving spent hens represents a terminal move; ensuring that those 
birds were negative for HPAI at the time of movement may not be possible.  
○ Industry representatives have said that in some cases they can track the use of load-
out equipment and crews (e.g., company crews, company-owned equipment), and in 
some cases could ensure “lower risk” crews and equipment are used; however, in 
some cases traceback may not be easily accomplished (whether company or 
contracted crews and equipment are used). 
 There are also geographic differences in the availability of crews and equipment. 
In some areas of the country, it may not be possible to locate/obtain labor or 
equipment which have only had lower risk exposures (SES WG, personal 
communication, Sept-Oct 2017). 
• Load-out crews have the potential to carry virus off the premises on clothing, boots, and 
vehicles, and may pose additional risks in transit to and from job sites, by living in homes 
with backyard poultry or shared with individuals who work on other poultry operations. 
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○ While some contractors and crew supervisors make attempts to keep family members 
together in a single crew, it is not possible to guarantee that other persons in a 
household are not employed in the poultry industry (SES WG, personal 
communication, June 2018). 
○ Additional mitigations for load-out agreed upon by the SES WG include that load-out 
crews must shower and change clothes prior to or at the time of arrival at the pullet 
premises. It is noted that not all pullet premises have shower facilities on-site, thus 
showers may be used at homes or hotels (SES WG, personal communication, May 
2018).  
○ Interaction between load-out crews and other people with poultry contact (e.g., other 
poultry industry employees) is addressed in section 9.2, Pathways for a Pullet Flock 
Becoming Infected with HPAI via Movements of People, Vehicles, or Equipment. 
• Flocks that are infected via load-out activities may not be detected by clinical signs, 
mortality, or testing. If a pullet flock is infected with HPAI during load-out, there is a 
high chance of missing detection. Therefore, it is most important that load-out equipment, 
vehicles, and crew are very clean. 
• Daily PCR testing of all flocks, greater than 28-days of age, throughout load-out on a 
pullet premises should help increase the probability of detecting infections that 
occurred because of the load-out process, especially as the duration of load-out 
increases. 
• For further information on load-out testing and surveillance protocols and sensitivity 
analysis of such protocols, see Sectio  9.4 Likelihood of Detecting HPAI in an 
Infected Pullet House Using Modeling Simulations and Appendix 9: Supplementary 
Modeling Results. 
9.3.4 Risk Rating and Conclusion 
Previous outbreaks have implicated contaminated load-out crews and equipment (to include 
load-out vehicles) in the spread of AI. It is standard practice in the U.S. commercial pullet/layer 
industry to clean and sanitize pullet moving equipment prior to initial use (i.e., between flocks); 
however, vehicles and equipment often make multiple trips between the pullet and layer facilities 
to transfer a flock. Complete C&D of vehicles and equipment is certified only before beginning 
the first transfer load and complete load-out of a pullet flock may take multiple days, depending 
on size of operation, crew and equipment logistics, and distance between the pullet and 
destination facility. In addition, a large proportion of pullets are grown on multi-age premises, 
thus making complete depopulation of a pullet premises unfeasible in many cases. If a flock were 
infected via contaminated load-out crews or equipment this infection could remain undetected 
until after arrival at the destination facility. Therefore, effective C&D of load-out equipment and 
farm/load-out crew biosecurity are the main mitigation measures to decrease the risk of moving 
infected but undetected pullets.  
The risk of HPAI virus spread to pullet growing premises via load-out activities depends on a 
number of variables that may exist in each pullet move scenario and is likely to be high unless 
significant mitigation measures are in place. Assuming that PMIP enhanced biosecurity and 
Secure Poultry Supply Plan testing measures are utilized, and that additional load-out mitigation 
measures are in place premises-wide for the duration of the load-out process, we estimate the 
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likelihood of a pullet flock becoming infected with HPAI virus via load-out operations to range 
between low and high. While the likelihood of moving a large number of infectious pullets 
(>80) is likely to be low. 
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9.4 Likelihood of Detecting HPAI in an Infected Pullet House Using 
Modeling Simulations  
9.4.1 HPAI Surveillance Measures 
9.4.1.1 Current Measures 
For pullet flocks participating in the U.S. H5/H7 Avian Influenza Monitored program of the 
NPIP, current routine influenza surveillance measures involve testing a minimum of 11 pullets in 
the grow house per flock within 21 days of the move to lay (see 9 CFR part 146.23 for further 
information).  
9.4.1.2 Outbreak Measures 
Active Surveillance by rRT-PCR Testing 
The active surveillance protocol option outlined by the SES WG includes daily testing—at 
National Animal Health Laboratory Network (NAHLN) labs—of all dead birds, in flocks greater 
than 28 days of age, in 11-swab pools (up to a maximum of 4 pools) beginning 8 days prior to 
the start of the load-out and continuing throughout the load-out. Current USDA:APHIS HPAI 
emergency response plans assume same-day turnaround for submitted rRT-PCR samples. For 
example, the results of samples collected and submitted to NAHLN labs for rRT-PCR testing in 
the morning are assumed to be available to the Incident Command at the end of the same 
business day. However, this may not always be feasible, in which case earlier sample collection 
times for rRT-PCR tests may be needed on a case-by-case basis.  
9.4.2 Quantitative Methods for the Estimated Likelihood of Detection prior to the 
Start of Load-out on a Premises 
The likelihood of detecting HPAI in a pullet house prior to the start of load-out is estimated via 
simulation. The approach consists of a stochastic disease transmission model, which simulates 
the spread of HPAI within a house, and an active surveillance model, which uses the output from 
the disease transmission model to simulate the probability of detection under a given active 
surveillance protocol. A technical description of the simulation model algorithms can be found in 
Weaver et al.330 These simulation models from Weaver et al. have been reparametrized for 
pullets for use in the current analysis.330 A summary of the input parameters is given in Table 
20, and details on their estimation are given in Appendix 13: Modeling Technical Details. A 
brief overview of the disease transmission and active surveillance models is given below. 
9.4.2.1 Overview of Disease Transmission and Active Surveillance Models   
The likelihood of detecting HPAI depends on the following factors: 
• The HPAI spread dynamics in a house, which impact the rate of mortality and morbidity, 
rise over time. The HPAI spread dynamics depend on parameters such as the length of 
latently infected and infectious periods in individual birds and the “contact rate” between 
infectious and susceptible chickens. 
• The variability in the steps of the detection process, given an active surveillance protocol 
option. Factors such as the normal mortality (mortality not related to HPAI) and HPAI 
mortality rates impact the chances of including a virus-positive swab in the test sample. 
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The chances of detecting a virus-positive sample depend on the diagnostic sensitivity of 
the test. 
The HPAI spread dynamics in a house are simulated by the disease transmission model. Disease 
states included in the model are susceptible (S), latently infected (L), infectious (I), and removed 
(R). The number of pullets in each disease state is updated at 0.1-day intervals. Transitions from 
the latent to the infectious state and the infectious to removed state are determined by latent and 
infectious period distributions estimated for various HPAI strains based on data from 
experimental studies. Once a bird is in the removed state, it is considered to be deceased and 
remains in that state for the remainder of the simulation. The transition from the susceptible to 
the latently infected state is determined by the adequate contact rate and number of infectious 
birds in the current time period. The adequate contact rate (β) is defined as the mean number of 
birds each bird comes in contact with per unit time such that the contact is adequate to transmit 
infection. Higher adequate contact rates result in a higher likelihood of infection. Similarly, as 
the number of infectious birds increases, the likelihood of infection increases.  
The variability in the detection process is simulated by the active surveillance model. Detection 
of HPAI in the surveillance model occurs through either diagnostic testing or heightened 
mortality. Samples for diagnostic tests are randomly selected from the normal and disease 
mortality available on the test day. The normal mortality is simulated based on industry-provided 
daily and weekly mortality, while the disease mortality is drawn from the transmission model 
output. Provided at least one infected bird is present in the test sample, detection occurs 
according to a Bernoulli trial with probability equal to the test sensitivity. Detection via 
heightened mortality occurs if the total mortality exceeds the trigger level on one of the days 
prior to the start of load-out. 
9.4.2.2 Model Scenarios 
The likelihood of detecting HPAI in a pullet house prior to movement is evaluated under four 
scenarios: 
• Pennsylvania HPAI H5N2 with a mean time to death of 3.75 days and fast contact rate 
• Pennsylvania HPAI H5N2 with a mean time to death of 3.75 days and slow contact rate 
• EA/AM HPAI H5N2 with a mean time to death of 4.8 days and fast contact rate 
• EA/AM HPAI H5N2 with a mean time to death of 4.8 days and slow contact rate 
The length of latent and infectious period distributions can impact the time to detection: for 
example, HPAI strains with a long mean time to death—the combined length of the latent and 
infectious periods—will generally take longer to detect via active surveillance due to the slower 
rise in mortality. As the latent and infectious periods are strain-specific and can vary 
considerably, evaluating results based on multiple strains is critical for developing robust risk 
management strategies. In the current analysis, the likelihood of detection is estimated for latent 
and infectious period distributions based on Pennsylvania HPAI H5N2 (based on layer chicken 
data) and EA/AM HPAI H5N2 (based on inoculation studies in 5-week-old broilers, D. Swayne, 
personal communication, Oct 2016). 
We evaluated two scenarios for the contact rate, given high uncertainty in the parameter 
estimates identified in a review of the available literature. The baseline contact rate distribution 
was determined in light of this literature review. However, in the 2015 HPAI H5N2 outbreak in 
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Minnesota, mortality and diagnostic test result patterns indicative of slow or inefficient within 
house spread were observed in several pullet flocks (J. Erickson, P. Stonger-Lonsdale, S. 
Malladi; personal communication, March 2018). In these flocks, there was no observable 
increase in mortality for up to 9 days after initial detection. A few of these flocks also presented 
a pattern of intermittent positive and negative rRT-PCR test results for several days following 
initial detection. These mortality and test result patterns can be simulated by a low adequate 
contact rate representing slow or inefficient within flock spread. For the slow contact rate 
scenarios, we used the lower contact rate values for HPAI spread in caged birds from published 
literature. The contact rate affects how quickly the infection moves within the house, with lower 
contact rates resulting in slower spread. As slow spread generally increases the time for high 
levels of mortality to accumulate, leading to longer detection times, the slow-contact-rate 
scenario represents a more conservative approach.  
Table 20. Parameter estimates for the HPAI transmission model for pullet houses. 
Parameter 
name 
Parameter 
description Distribution/Value 
Contact rate 
(transmission 
parameter) 
The number of 
direct or indirect 
contacts a bird 
has that are 
sufficient to 
transmit infection 
per unit time 
Baseline: Uniform distribution of contacts per day 
(minimum 1, maximum 2) 
Slow: Uniform distribution of contacts per day (minimum 
0.30, maximum 0.52) 
Latent period 
distribution  
Length of the 
latent period 
Pennsylvania HPAI H5N2: Gamma distributed (shape= 
0.8248, scale=0.4446; mean 0.37 days) 
EA/AM HPAI HPAI H5N2  (MTDa 3.2 & 4.8 days): 
Gamma distributed (shape=0.8926, scale=0.7145; mean 
0.64 days) 
Infectious 
period 
distribution  
Length of the 
infectious period 
Pennsylvania HPAI H5N2: Gamma distributed 
(shape=5.1503697, scale=0.6562668,mean 3.38 days) 
EA/AM HPAI H5N2 (MTD of 4.8 days): Weibull 
distributed (shape=1.9651, scale=4.70; mean 4.17 days) 
Number of 
chickens/ 
house 
Distribution of 
the number of 
hens per house 
Uniform 37,000 and 308,000. Estimated from industry 
data. 
aMean Time to Death, the combined lengths of the latent and infectious periods. 
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9.4.2.3 Estimated Likelihood of Detection under a Pre Movement Isolation Period (PMIP)  
As discussed previously, a PMIP involves the implementation of heightened biosecurity to 
minimize the chances of a house becoming exposed to HPAI close to the start of load-out. Table 
21 gives the detection probabilities for a house 1 to 14 days following exposure to HPAI under 
the active surveillance protocol of daily testing of all dead birds in pools of 11 (up to a maximum 
of 4 pools) starting 8 days before load-out begins on the premises.  
Under the PA HPAI H5N2 fast contact rate scenario, for example, if a house were exposed to 
HPAI three days prior to the start of load-out, the estimated probability of detection is 0.47. In 
this example, the probability of detection improves as the number of days post-exposure 
increases. This is due to the exponential growth in mortality that occurs as HPAI moves through 
the house, which increases the likelihood of including at least one bird dead from HPAI in the 
pooled sample taken for diagnostic testing. Thus, by reducing the chances of exposure to HPAI 
close to the start of load-out, the PMIP decreases the risk of releasing infected but undetected 
birds by allowing sufficient time for the infection to spread within the house. 
Table 21 can be used to inform the length of the PMIP under an assumption that the PMIP is 
100% effective in preventing exposure to the pathogen. In these scenarios, it is conservatively 
assumed that the house is infected immediately prior to implementation of the heightened 
biosecurity of PMIP. For example, under a four-day PMIP, a house is assumed to have been 
infected four days before the start of load-out, just prior to the start of the PMIP. The detection 
probability in this case, considering the PA HPAI H5N2 fast contact rate scenario, is estimated to 
be 80%. Similarly, in the slow contact rate scenario an eight-day PMIP is predicted to result in a 
98% likelihood of detection. The length of the PMIP decided on by the SES Workgroup is 8 
days, which generally achieves high probabilities of detection. However, under the EA/AM 
HPAI H5N2 slow contact rate scenario, detection probabilities as low as 92% were predicted, 
which suggests an eight-day PMIP is not entirely robust for all potential strains and contact rates.  
Table 21. Simulation model results showing the predicted probability of HPAI detection for a 
pullet house infected a given number of days prior to the start of load-out.a 
Number of days 
prior to movement 
when exposure  
to HPAI occurs 
PA HPAI H5N2 
MTD 3.75 
EA/AM HPAI H5N2: 
 MTD 4.8 
Fast contact 
rate 
Slow contact 
rate 
Fast contact 
rate 
Slow contact 
rate 
1 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 
2 0.14 0.09 0.14 0.07 
3 0.47 0.27 0.35 0.17 
4 0.80 0.55 0.64 0.34 
5 0.95 0.76 0.85 0.54 
6 0.99 0.89 0.95 0.72 
7 1.00 0.95 0.98 0.84 
8 1.00 0.98 1.00 0.92 
9 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.96 
10 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.98 
Workin g Draft 
Pullets Out of the Barn Risk Assessment 
Page 150 of 296 
Number of days 
prior to movement 
when exposure  
to HPAI occurs 
PA HPAI H5N2 
MTD 3.75 
EA/AM HPAI H5N2: 
 MTD 4.8 
Fast contact 
rate 
Slow contact 
rate 
Fast contact 
rate 
Slow contact 
rate 
11 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 
12 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 
13 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
14 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
a The detection probabilities are estimated from 10,000 simulation iterations for four different scenarios varying by the strain or 
contact rate. The active surveillance protocol consists of Daily rRT-PCR testing beginning 8 days prior to start of load-out with 
a protocol of testing all dead birds in 11-swab pools each day (up to a maximum of 4 pooled samples). 
 
Table 22 compares the probability of detection under three different active surveillance and 
PMIP strategies. Under the scenarios with no PMIP, exposure is assumed to occur sometime 
between one and fourteen days prior to the start of load-out. Under the scenario with an eight-
day, 100% effective PMIP, meaning the PMIP guarantees the house is not infected during its 
implementation, exposure is assumed to occur sometime between eight and fourteen days prior 
to the start of load-out. Exposures occurring earlier than fourteen days prior to load-out are not 
considered since the infection is almost certain to be detected via diagnostic testing and 
monitoring of mortality, so the risk of moving infected but undetected pullets would be minimal 
in such cases.  
The results in Table 22 indicate that performing ctive surveillance using only a mortality trigger 
without implementing a PMIP is insufficient for detecting HPAI in a pullet house. In particular 
the detection probability in the slow contact rate scenarios with the mortality trigger alone was 
only 0.03. Including diagnostic testing consisting of testing all dead birds in 11-swab pooled 
samples (up to a maximum of 4 pools) for rRT-PCR testing beginning 8 days prior to the start of 
load-out substantially improves the likelihood of detecting HPAI in the house prior to movement. 
However, when a PMIP is not implemented, exposures occurring within eight days of load-out 
still fail to generate high levels of detection. The results in Table 22 suggest that HPAI could go 
undetected in roughly one third to one fifth of these cases. When exposure close to the time of 
movement is prevented through an eight-day PMIP, on the other hand, HPAI is generally 
detected in the house with a high degree of confidence, although under the EA/AM HPAI H5N2 
(MTD=4.8 days) slow-contact rate-scenario there is an estimated 2% chance of not detecting the 
infection.  
Also included in Table 22 is the mean number of infectious birds at the start of load-out in the 
houses that go undetected, along with the 5th and 95th percentile. The mortality-trigger-only 
active surveillance protocol with no PMIP is estimated to result in large numbers of infectious 
birds present at the start of load-out in undetected houses. As it is likely that many infectious 
birds will go undetected, given the low detection probabilities, surveillance via a mortality 
trigger alone with no PMIP represents an extremely risky practice. The mean number of 
infectious birds at the start of load-out in houses that went undetected is higher under the 
scenario of diagnostic testing with an eight-day PMIP, because the infection is present in the 
house for at least eight days, which leads to more birds becoming infected. Diagnostic testing 
with no PMIP, on the other hand, allows for infections to occur within eight days of the start of 
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load-out, which provides less time for large numbers of infectious birds to accumulate. The 
amount of mortality due to HPAI will also be lower when infections occur within eight days of 
the start of load-out.  
Table 22. Likelihood of detecting HPAI in a pullet house prior to the start of load-out under 
three surveillance scenarios, followed by the mean number of infectious pullets in undetected 
houses at the time of movement.  
 Active surveillance and PMIP scenarioa 
Strain/contact rate 
scenario 
Mortality trigger 
only, no PMIP 
rRT-PCR testing 
and mortality 
trigger, no PMIPb 
rRT-PCR testing and 
mortality trigger, 100% 
effective 8-day PMIPc 
PA HPAI H5N2: Fast 
contact rate 
0.43 
359(0, 1920) 
0.81 
6.3 (0, 24) 
0.99 
0.005(0, 0) 
PA HPAI H5N2: 
Slow contact rate 
0.03 
5 (0, 23) 
0.66 
1.3 (0, 4) 
0.99 
0.06(0, 0) 
EA/AM HPAI H5N2: 
MTD 4.8 days; Fast 
contact rate 
0.33  
(273, 0-1537) 
0.78 
4.3 (1-17) 
0.99 
0.59(0-0) 
EA/AM HPAI H5N2: 
MTD 4.8 days; slow 
contact rate 
0.03 
5(0-23) 
0.61 
1.4(0,4) 
0.98 
0.40(0-3) 
aParentheses indicate the 5th and 95th percentiles estimated from 10,000 iterations for different active surveillance and PMIP 
scenarios.  
bHouses are assumed to be infected sometime within 1 to 14 days of the start of load-out with no PMIP.  
cFlocks are assumed to be infected sometime within 8 to 14 days of the start of load-out with PMIP.  
9.4.2.4 Overall Likelihood of not Detecting HPAI in a Pullet House prior to the Start of 
Load-out on the Premises 
The overall probability of not detecting HPAI in an infected pullet house by the start of load-out 
considers two events: the probability a susceptible house becomes infected provided it is some 
given distance from an infectious premises, and the probability that the infection is not detected 
in the house prior to the start of load-out. The probability that a susceptible premises located a 
given distance from an infectious premises also becomes infected is estimated via a spatial 
transmission kernel, which is discussed in section 9.4.2.4.1 below. The probability that infectious 
birds are not detected by the start of load-out, given that the house has been infected, is estimated 
using the transmission and active surveillance simulation models discussed in the previous 
sections. The two probabilities are combined into an overall likelihood using a method described 
in Weaver et al. that considers the ten days prior to the start of load-out.330 
9.4.2.4.1 Estimation of the Probability of Infection via a Spatial Transmission Kernel 
A spatial transmission kernel uses outbreak data to estimate the hazard rate, or infection risk, 
posed by an infectious premises a given distance away from a susceptible premises. The spatial 
transmission kernel theoretically averages the risk overall transmission pathways at the given 
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inter-premises distance, therefore providing a summary view of outbreak spread. The current 
analysis considers three different spatial transmission kernels: a transmission kernel estimated 
from the 2003 HPAI H7N7 outbreak in the Netherlands by Boender et al. (2007), a transmission 
kernel estimated from the 2015 HPAI H5N2 outbreak in Minnesota and a kernel estimated from 
the 2015 HPAI H5N2 outbreak in Iowa.133 The Minnesota transmission kernel was estimated 
using the maximum likelihood method from Boender et al. (2007) with an additional parameter 
added to the force of infection, which is the cumulative hazard rate faced by a susceptible 
premises on a given day.133 The force of infection on susceptible premises i on day t, 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡), is 
given in Boender et al. (2007) as 
𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) = �ℎ�𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�1{𝑗𝑗 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖}
𝑖𝑖≠𝑖𝑖
 
where ℎ(𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) represents the spatial transmission kernel as a function of the distance between 
susceptible premises i  and infectious premises j.133  
The force of infection as defined above assumes all spread to be lateral, dependent only on the 
number of infectious premises on day t. Due to phylogenetic evidence of primary introductions 
occurring concurrently with lateral spread in the Minnesota outbreak, an additional parameter, k, 
was added to the force of infection equation used to estimate the spatial transmission kernel for 
Minnesota, giving the following expression161:  
𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) = � ℎ�𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�1{𝑗𝑗 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖}
𝑖𝑖≠𝑖𝑖
� + 𝑘𝑘 
The additional parameter represents a constant, distance-independent hazard primarily 
expressing the infection risk posed by distance-independent environmental factors—note that k 
does not depend on the number of infectious premises—such as wild birds. For more details on 
the estimation of the spatial transmission kernel for the Minnesota HPAI H5N2 outbreak, see 
Appendix 12: Load-out Mitigation Measures for Pullets Off the Farm. 
The force of infection is used to estimate the probability that susceptible farm i is infected on day 
t, called 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡). The expression for 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) is defined below: 
𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) = 1 − 𝑖𝑖−𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) 
As the force of infection increases, the probability of infection increases. Figure 29 is a 
comparison of the Netherlands HPAI H7N7, Minnesota HPAI H5N2 and Iowa HPAI H5N2 
transmission kernels under the mean maximum likelihood estimates. The transmission kernels all 
indicate that infection risk was primarily distance-dependent during their respective outbreaks. 
As the mean hazard rate for the Minnesota outbreak is higher and persists over longer distances 
relative to the Netherlands outbreak, the probability of infection will also be higher and remain 
elevated at larger distances under the Minnesota transmission kernel. As the overall probability 
of not detecting HPAI in a house prior to the start of load-out is derived using the transmission-
kernel-based probability of infection, it is expected to exhibit similar behavior. 
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Figure 29. Spatial transmission kernels estimated from the 2003 HPAI H7N7 outbreak in the 
Netherlands by Boender et al. (2007)133 and the 2015 HPAI H5N2 outbreaks in Minnesota and 
Iowa. 
9.4.2.4.2 Estimated Overall Likelihood of not Detecting HPAI in a Pullet House Prior to the 
Start of Load-out 
Estimates for the overall likelihood of not detecting HPAI in a pullet house prior to the start of 
load-out are given for PA HPAI H5N2 under slow contact rate scenario are provided in Table 
23. The overall likelihood is the combined probability of a house first being exposed to HPAI 
and then HPAI going undetected in the house prior to load-out following exposure. The 
probability that a susceptible premises is infected with HPAI by an infectious premises located a 
specific distance away is estimated using the Minnesota HPAI H5N2 and Iowa HPAI H5N2 
spatial transmission kernels. The overall likelihood under the Iowa transmission kernel is given 
by Table 23 in parentheses. The probability the infection goes undetected in the house is 
estimated using the active surveillance simulation model under a diagnostic testing protocol of 
daily testing of all dead birds (up to a maximum of 4 pools) beginning 8 days prior to the start of 
load-out. The overall likelihood is estimated for the 14 days prior to the start of load-out under 
the PA HPAI H5N2 under slow contact rate scenario in order to obtain relatively conservative 
estimates. 
The overall likelihood is estimated under three scenarios varying by the effectiveness of the 
PMIP at preventing exposure during the eight days prior to the start of load-out. Premises did not 
institute a PMIP during the Minnesota or Iowa HPAI outbreaks. Since the heightened biosecurity 
during the PMIP should result in lower likelihoods of exposure, the spatial transmission kernels 
estimated from these outbreaks likely overestimate the infection risk during this time. The 
baseline scenario in Table 23 assumes the daily probability of exposure does not change during 
the PMIP, which would be expected if no additional biosecurity measures were implemented. 
The second scenario assumes the PMIP is 80% effective at preventing exposure, which means 
the daily probability of infection during the PMIP is reduced to one fifth of the probability prior 
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to the PMIP. The last scenario considers a 100% effective PMIP, which means the daily 
probability of exposure during PMIP is zero. 
The estimates given in Table 23 provide evidence that limiting exposure close to the time of 
movement through a PMIP reduces the overall likelihood of infection; even a partially effective 
PMIP leads to a considerable reduction. The overall likelihood decreases as distance from the 
infectious premises increases, due to the distance dependence exhibited by the spatial 
transmission kernels. In addition, the higher mean hazard rate estimated from the Minnesota 
HPAI H5N2 outbreak results in higher estimates for the overall likelihood. Biosecurity and 
distance from an infectious premises both play a critical role in preventing exposure to HPAI and 
thereby limiting the risk of not detecting the infection in a house prior to the start of load-out.  
This risk can be further reduced by implementing a sound active surveillance protocol. Table 23 
indicates that the heightened biosecurity during the PMIP combined with an active surveillance 
protocol of daily testing of all dead birds (up to a maximum of 4 pools) beginning 8 days prior to 
the start of load-out is a viable strategy for reducing the overall likelihood, yielding low 
likelihoods of moving infected and undetected birds even at relatively short distances from 
infectious premises and under the higher hazard rates of the Minnesota transmission kernel. 
Table 23. Predicted percent likelihood of a pullet house being: (1) exposed to HPAI from an 
infected premises at a specific distance and (2) undetected prior to the start of load-out 
following exposure under three PMIP scenarios varying by biosecurity effectiveness. PA 
HPAI H5N2 strain characteristics and slow contact rate parameters were used in simulations.a 
 Scenario for the daily likelihood of exposure during 8-day PMIP varying by status and effectivenessb 
Distance from an 
infected premises (km) 
Baseline: no PMIP 80% effective PMIP 100% effective PMIP 
Predicted likelihood 
1.5 2.05(2.9)% 0.44(0.63)% 0.02(0.03)% 
2 2.01(2.16)% 0.43(0.46)% 0.02(0.02)% 
3 1.89(1.4)% 0.4(0.3)% 0.02(0.01)% 
5 1.52(0.78)% 0.32(0.16)% 0.02(0.01)% 
a The first likelihood estimate in each cell is based on the 2015 Minnesota HPAI H5N2 outbreak transmission kernel, and the 
estimate in parenthesis is based on the 2015 Iowa outbreak kernel estimated by Thibaud Porpheye (personal, comm).132 
b In all scenarios, an active surveillance protocol of testing all dead birds daily for 8 days via rRT PCR prior to movement day 
was considered. Parameters for slow spread contact rate and Pennsylvania HPAI H5N2 strain were used to generate this table. 
 
9.4.3 Likelihood of Moving Infectious but Undetected Pullets Following Exposure 
During Load-out  
Contaminated load-out crews and equipment entering a poultry premises pose an infection risk 
that is especially relevant during extended (i.e., multiple-day) load-outs. As discussed in Section 
9.3.3 (Likelihood of a Pullet Flock Becoming Infected with HPAI via Load-Out Operations with 
PMIP Measures for Moving Pullets Off the Farm in Place, Qualitative Analysis), the number of 
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infectious birds can increase rapidly in houses infected early in the load-out process, which could 
pose significant consequences if these birds were to be transported from the premises. Additional 
diagnostic testing during the load-out period can decrease the likelihood of moving large 
numbers of infectious birds following exposure to HPAI during the load-out process. The 
estimated likelihood of detection for a single house two to six days following exposure to HPAI 
under an active surveillance protocol of daily testing of all dead birds (up to a maximum of 4 
pools) beginning 8 days prior to the start of load-out is given in Tables 24A and B.  
The protocol is evaluated under two scenarios varying by the number of birds assumed to be 
initially infected, which represents increasing levels of contamination on the load-out crews and 
equipment. This model uses the Pennsylvania HPAI H5N2 strain. The testing protocol decided 
upon by the SES Workgroup involves daily testing of all dead birds (up to a maximum of 4 
pools) beginning 8 days prior to the start of load-out and continuing during load out. On large 
operations, it is possible that multiple poultry houses will be awaiting load out at the 48-hour 
mark after premises-wide load-out has begun. Since more than one house could be tested, the 
premises-wide likelihood of detection would be at least as high as and generally higher than the 
estimates given in Tables 24A and B, which are for surveillance in a single house only. 
As expected, the likelihood of detection increases as the number of days since exposure 
increases. Similarly, the likelihood of detection increases as the number of initially infected birds 
increases, since more infectious birds results in faster growth of the infection within the house. 
The results suggest that the infection in a house exposed early in a four-, five-, or six-day load-
out would likely be detected independent of the level of contamination. When the initial number 
of infected birds is 5, the 95% threshold is estimated to be exceeded as soon as four days post-
exposure under the slow contact rate scenario.  
Table 24A. The likelihood of detecting HPAI in a house prior to the transportation of pullets to 
for different numbers of days post-exposure and different numbers of initially infected birds, 
meant to represent the contamination level of the load-out crew and equipment. PA HPAI 
H5N2: Slow contact rate parameters were used in simulations a,b 
 Days post-exposure 
Initial no. Of 
birds infected 
2 3 4 5 6 
Predicted detection probabilitya 
1 0.09 0.27 0.55 0.76 0.89 
5 0.43 0.85 0.98 1.00 1.00 
aThe initial number of birds infected represents the level of contamination present on the load-out crew and equipment.  
bPercent probabilities are estimated from 10,000 simulations based on the Pennsylvania HPAI H5N2 strain and an active 
surveillance protocol of testing all dead birds (up to a maximum of 4 pools) daily via rRT PCR  during load out. 
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Table 24B. The likelihood of detecting HPAI in a house prior to the transportation of pullets 
for different numbers of days post-exposure and different numbers of initially infected birds, 
meant to represent the contamination level of the load-out crew and equipment. PA HPAI 
H5N2: Fast contact rate parameters were used in simulations a,b 
 Days post-exposure 
Initial no. Of 
birds infected 
2 3 4 5 6 
Predicted detection probabilitya 
1 0.14 0.47 0.8 0.95 0.99 
5 0.49 0.93 1.00 1.00 1.00 
aThe initial number of birds infected represents the level of contamination present on the load-out crew and equipment.  
bPercent probabilities are estimated from 10,000 simulations based on the Pennsylvania HPAI H5N2 strain and an active 
surveillance protocol of testing all dead birds (up to a maximum of 4 pools) daily via rRT PCR during load-out. 
 
As infections occurring two to three days prior to the testing day have a low likelihood of 
detection, the exposure mitigation and biosecurity measures implemented during a multiple-day 
load-out are especially important in reducing the risk of transporting infectious but undetected 
birds. Despite these low probabilities of detection, the likelihood of moving large numbers of 
infectious but undetected pullets is expected to be quite low. Given in Table 25A is the predicted 
percent of a houses being undetected and having more than 20 infectious birds, given exposure 
occurred during load-out, some number of days prior to movement in the slow contact rate 
scenario. Table 25B provides the predicted percent of houses being undetected and having more 
than 80 infectious birds given exposure occurred during load-out, some number of days prior to 
movement in the fast contact rate scenario. Similar results were determined for numbers of 
infectious but undetected pullets exceeding 50, 100, and 200 birds at the time of movement and 
are given in Appendix 9: Supplementary Modeling Results.  
The results in Table 25 suggest the risk of moving infectious but undetected pullets off the farm 
in numbers of 80 or more is generally quite low. However, a 3.2% probability of moving at least 
80 infectious but undetected pullets where 5 birds were initially infected 2 days prior to 
movement (fast contact rate) is not trivial. The nontrivial likelihood of such an event underscores 
the importance of using relevant biosecurity to prevent heavy contamination from accumulating 
on load-out equipment and prevent contamination of other barns yet to be loaded out.   
Current recommended practices for pullet premises load-outs include cleaning and disinfecting 
the load-out equipment prior to initial use on the premises. This should prevent the equipment 
from being highly contaminated, making the scenario where only one bird is initially infected 
more likely than having many infected birds initially infected. In addition, heightened barn-to-
barn biosecurity, such as LOS-specific clothing and footwear, is recommended, which limits the 
likelihood of HPAI entering a populated barn before load-out begins in that barn. This may keep 
HPAI virus from infecting a house for multiple days. Considering these recommended exposure 
mitigation measures for multiple-day load-outs, the likelihood of moving at least 80 infectious 
but undetected pullets off the farm is expected to be low.  
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Table 25A. Predicted percent probability of at least 20 infectious but undetected pullets at 
the time of movement. PA HPAI H5N2: Slow contact rate parameters were used in simulations  
 Days post-exposure 
Initial number of birds infected 
2 3 4 5 6 
Predicted percent probability of at least 20 infectious 
but undetected pullets at the time of movementb 
1 0.000% 0.006% 0.014% 0.008% 0.017% 
5 0.14% 0.66% 0.24% 0.05% 0.01% 
aThe initial number of birds infected represents the level of contamination present on the load-out crew and equipment.  
bPercent probabilities are estimated from 10,000 simulations based on the Pennsylvania HPAI H5N2 strain and an active 
surveillance protocol of testing all dead birds (up to a maximum of 4 pools) daily via rRT PCR during load-out. 
Table 25B. Predicted percent probability of at least 80 infectious but undetected pullets at 
the time of movement. PA HPAI H5N2: Fast contact rate parameters were used in simulations  
 Days post-exposure 
Initial number of birds infecteda 
2 3 4 5 6 
Predicted percent probability of at least 80 infectious 
but undetected pullets at the time of movementb 
1 0.02% 1.05% 1.73% 0.74% 0.12% 
5 3.22% 3.43% 0.36% 0.03% 0.00% 
aThe initial number of birds infected represents the level of contamination present on the load-out crew and equipment.  
bPercent probabilities are estimated from 10,000 simulations based on the Pennsylvania HPAI H5N2 strain and an active 
surveillance protocol of testing all dead birds (up to a maximum of 4 pools) daily via rRT PCR  during load-out. 
 
9.4.4 Conclusions 
An effective PMIP increases the probability of detection by preventing exposure close to the 
time of load-out, which allows a longer time for HPAI to spread within the house. This leads to 
higher levels of disease mortality and increases the likelihood that the total mortality exceeds the 
trigger level or that a swab from an HPAI-infected dead bird is included in the diagnostic test 
sample. An eight-day PMIP generally yields high probabilities of detection, though it may not be 
entirely robust for all HPAI strains and within-house spread scenarios. Exposure of a pullet 
house to HPAI during a multiple-day load-out may be difficult to detect, since the infection 
occurs close to the time of movement. However, given the load-out biosecurity and active 
surveillance measures in place, if an infected but undetected movement were to take place, a 
movement containing large numbers of infectious birds would be unlikely.  
Assuming that an effective PMIP is implemented, and that active surveillance as outlined by the 
SES WG (rRT-PCR mortality testing of all dead birds) are utilized as described, and that load-
out biosecurity measures are implemented, the likelihood of HPAI in an infected pullet house 
going undetected is rated as follows: 
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• The overall likelihood of HPAI-infected but undetected pullets in a house at the 
conclusion of PMIP and prior to the start of load-out on the premises is estimated to 
be low at a distance of 1.5 km or more from an infected premises. 
• The likelihood of HPAI-infected but undetected pullets in a house at the conclusion 
of load-out, resulting in movement of large numbers of infectious birds (≥ 80) is 
estimated to be low. 
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10 Overall Conclusion  
The objective of this assessment was to estimate the risk that the movement of pullets out of a 
pullet barn (e.g., to the driveway of the pullet premises, not to a specific location), from a 
premises located within a Control Area during an HPAI outbreak in the poultry industry in the 
U.S., will result in the movement of infectious but undetected birds and the likely number of 
infectious birds at the time of movement.  
The assessment considered relevant current industry practices and current biosecurity measures 
as well as outbreak-specific measures from the SPS Plan, in particular the PMIP and additional 
load-out mitigation measures. The assessment focused on the risk pathways for HPAI infection 
of pullets on premises located within an HPAI Control Area via components of local area spread, 
people and vehicles, and load-out processes. Many of these pathways do not involve the 
movement of live birds, and rather relate to the likelihood of infection of live birds that will then 
move and the potential for missed detection prior to movement. Qualitatively compiling the 
assessed risks and likelihoods of the pathways analyzed yields the estimated risk of moving 
HPAI infected but undetected pullets out of the barn (Figure 30). 
 
Figure 30: Diagrammatic representation of the assessed risk with the relative amount of risk 
increasing as the width of the figure increases (the risk of component parts is not to scale). The 
risk assessment is based on consideration of the steps needed to move pullets off a farm and the 
pathways that could lead to infection of a flock, the subsequent likelihood of detection of the 
infected flock, and potential movement of an infected but undetected flock. 
 
The evaluation of the major risk pathways identified resulted in the following conclusions: 
Local Area Spread Pathways 
• Insects. The likelihood of a pullet premises becoming infected with HPAI virus via insect 
transmission varies with distance and with source premises infection status. The 
Workin g Draft 
Pullets Out of the Barn Risk Assessment 
Page 160 of 296 
estimated likelihood ratings range from negligible to moderate, with a higher likelihood 
of infection closer to a known infected premises. For premises located closer than 1.5 km 
to an infected flock, there are too many variables to accurately assess the risk of 
becoming infected with HPAI via insect transmission. 
• Aerosols. The likelihood of a pullet premises becoming infected with HPAI virus via 
bioaerosol transmission varies with distance and with viral load at the source premises. 
Literature review and most previous outbreak reports indicated that aerosol transmission 
was not an important factor at distances more than 1.5 km from an infected flock. 
However, there is some evidence of aerosol transmission over short distances and both 
expert opinion and exploratory dispersion modeling indicate possible risk of transmission 
beyond 2 km. Thus, the likelihood of a pullet premises becoming infected via bioaerosol 
transmission is rated as follows: 
○ Low to Extremely high if <3 km from an infected poultry premises 
○ Negligible to Low if >3 km from an infected poultry premises 
• Wild Birds. The likelihood of HPAI virus spread to a pullet premises via wild birds 
depends upon the type of wild birds and exposure to the wild birds. With an effective 
PMIP, the likelihood of HPAI infection via wild aquatic birds and via non-passerine non-
aquatic birds is low, as these birds and their waste are unlikely to access or be tracked 
into a pullet barn. Given that passerine birds may access the inside of pullet barns (even 
during a PMIP) and have been shown to be capable of shedding the virus, the likelihood 
of HPAI infection via passerine birds in the farm vicinity was assessed as low to 
moderate. 
People, Vehicles, and Equipment Pathways 
• Live-haul Routes. The risk of HPAI virus spread to pullet premises near poultry live-
haul routes via feathers, feces, and other fomites depends on both distance and source 
flock. For trucks hauling birds that had an effective PMIP and negative rRT-PCR test 
results, the risk is estimated to be negligible to low no matter the distance. In contrast, for 
trucks hauling birds that had no PMIP and no diagnostic tests (e.g., from premises outside 
the Control Area), the risk ranges from low to high, with premises within 100 meters of 
the live-haul route at highest risk.   
• Feed Delivery and Emergency Operational Visits. Operational visits will be limited 
during PMIP; however, delivery of feed during this period is likely, and the potential for 
emergency maintenance visits also exists. The likelihood of a pullet flock becoming 
infected with HPAI via feed delivery and emergency operational visits during PMIP was 
assessed as negligible to moderate, as follows: 
○ Negligible to low via contaminated feed 
○ Low via feed delivery (i.e., contaminated driver and/or vehicle) 
○ Low to moderate via other emergency operational visits (i.e., emergency personnel or 
their vehicle) 
• People and their Vehicles. Provided PMIP measures for people are strictly followed 
(e.g., people wear LOS-specific clothing and footwear, no vaccination crews are allowed 
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on-site during a PMIP) we rate the likelihood of a pullet flock becoming infected with 
HPAI via people and their vehicles entering the premises during the PMIP as low.  
• Shared Equipment (other than load-out equipment). Previous outbreaks have 
demonstrated that shared equipment poses a disease transmission risk; however, during 
the PMIP, no off-site equipment will be pre-staged and only feed delivery and emergency 
operational visits may continue. Thus, we rated the likelihood of a pullet flock becoming 
infected with HPAI virus via shared equipment as low. 
• Dead Bird Disposal. The risks of HPAI introduction associated with off-site dead bird 
disposal methods, such as rendering, are well documented, and off-site disposal of 
mortality must be discontinued during PMIP. However, the risky practice of off-site dead 
bird disposal may still occur outside of a PMIP.  
○ For on-farm dead bird disposal, given that many scavenger species can biologically or 
mechanically carry HPAI virus and have home ranges large enough to contain 
adjacent poultry farms, we assessed the likelihood of HPAI introduction to a pullet 
farm during the PMIP as low to moderate. 
○ Off-site dead bird disposal methods prior to a PMIP may possibly result in premises 
contamination. However, the implementation of a PMIP does reduce the likelihood 
that such contamination will be tracked inside a pullet barn during the PMIP. We thus 
assessed the likelihood of a pullet flock becoming infected as a result of HPAI virus 
introduction to the flock via off-site dead bird disposal that takes place prior to the 
PMIP as moderate. 
• Garbage Management. There is potential for HPAI virus associated with garbage 
management to be tracked into a poultry house, and thus we assessed the likelihood of a 
pullet flock becoming infected with HPAI virus due to garbage management without a 
PMIP to be moderate to high. During a PMIP, no off-site movement of garbage is 
allowed, and thus we assessed the likelihood of a pullet flock becoming infected with 
HPAI virus due to garbage management during a PMIP as low. 
Load-out Pathways 
• Load-out Operations. Assuming PMIP enhanced biosecurity and testing measures are 
strictly implemented, and that additional load-out mitigation measures are in place for the 
duration of the load-out process, the risk that a pullet flock will become infected with 
HPAI virus via load-out operations and that this will result in an infected but undetected 
movement off the premises is estimated to range between low and high.  
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Overall Risk 
It is concluded that the risk of moving infected but undetected pullets out of a pullet barn from 
within a Control Area during an HPAI outbreak ranges between low and extremely high, 
provided that all applicable preventive measures from the SPS Plan, in particular the PMIP and 
additional load-out mitigation measures, are strictly followed. The likelihood of moving a large 
number of infectious pullets (>80 birds) is rated to be low. 
In using the results of this risk assessment, it should be remembered that:  
• This assessment is based on current (January 2019) information and will need to be 
reviewed and revised as circumstances warrant.  
• The assessment does not replace the judgment of on-scene officials with first-hand 
knowledge of the outbreak situation and the premises in question.  
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Appendix 1: Poultry Industry Survey on Pullet Growing Management 
Practices 
The pullet rearing industry raises recently hatched chicks until point of lay (i.e., prior to moving 
the pullets into a lay house). A convenience sample of veterinarians and other managers in the 
US pullet growing industry that supplies pullets to egg laying farms was surveyed between April 
and June 2017.  Participants were asked about standard practices for rearing pullets on farms that 
they manage or supervise. Surveys were administered by the University of Minnesota HPAI 
Team using the online polling service Qualtrics.g  
A convenience sample of participants with considerable experience in the poultry industry was 
solicited; however, this survey was limited by small sample size (n=18). Additionally, some 
participants declined to answer all questions within the survey. The answers from one respondent 
who indicated that responses represented only pullets with access to the outdoors was excluded 
as this risk assessment only applies to pullets that do not have access to the outdoors. 
Respondents where some premises under their management (31%; n=5) include pullets that have 
access to the outdoors remain within the summary statistics below (the percentage of their 
premises with outdoor access ranged from 10 to 30%).  
Summary descriptive statistics were tabulated. While no additional analyses were performed, 
these results are informative for the risk assessment and serve to illustrate the variations in 
industry practice and potential differences between producers who may operate in the same or 
different geographic areas. As such, readers should note that absence of an affirmative response 
to a high-risk activity does not definitively indicate it is not occurring within the industry. The 
results of the survey are shown in Appendix 1 Figures 1-28. 
  
                                                 
g Qualtrics© 2015 Provo, UT, USA. http://www.qualtrics.com 
Workin g Draft 
Pullets Out of the Barn Risk Assessment 
Page 164 of 296 
Types of Pullet Rearing Premises. 
Appendix 1 Figures 1-3 show the types of pullet premises represented by the survey 
respondents.  
 
Appendix 1 Figure 1. Responses of industry representatives (n=18) to the statement “My 
answers in this survey respresent____.” Where respondents managed farms with both pullets and 
layers on the same premises (n=4), the percentage of their farms that have both pullets and layers 
on the same premises ranged from 10% to 30%. 
 
Appendix 1 Figure 2. Responses of industry representatives (n=18) to the question “Are pullets 
raised on a single-age farm (all-in all-out)?” indicating whether the pullets are all the same age or 
there are multiple flocks of different ages on the same farm. Where respondents managed both 
single- and multiple-aged flocks (n=8), the percentage of single-aged farms under their 
responsibility ranged from 15% to 90%. 
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Appendix 1 Figure 3. Responses of industry representatives (n=16) to the question “Do you 
move pullets between premises during the growth cycle (e.g., brood at one premises, then finish 
growing at another premises)?” 
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Feed Management Practices on Pullet Farms  
Some pullet premises have a feed mill on the pullet premises or obtain feed through contracts 
with stand-alone feed mills that are not under their management. Others may receive feed from 
stand-alone feed mills (not on a poultry premises) that are under company management. A third 
scenario is that pullet premises receive feed from another farm which has layer flocks or a 
combination of pullets and layers on the same site. Appendix 1 Figures 4-6 shows survey results 
related to such feed management practices. 
 
Appendix 1 Figure 4.  Responses of industry representatives (n=16) to the question “Is there a 
feed mill on the same premises as your pullet-growing operation(s)?” For respondents (n=4) with 
feed mills on some pullet premises that they manage, the percentage of their pullet farms with 
on-site feed mills ranged from 10% to 25% with these mills supplying the on-site pullet-growing 
premises or other poultry premises under the same company/management (no respondents said 
that these mills supplied other poultry premises under different management). One respondent 
offered that, for their situation, only farms with both pullet and lay flocks on the same premises 
had feed mills on-site. 
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Appendix 1 Figure 5. Responses of industry representatives (n=15) to the question “How often 
is feed delivered to your pullet farm(s)?” Respondents checked all answers that applied for the 
different locations they owned/managed.  
 
 
Appendix 1 Figure 6. Responses of industry representatives (n=15) to the question “In the event 
of an HPAI outbreak, how long could you suspend feed delivery to your farm?” Respondents 
choosing ‘8 days or more’ were asked to specify the length; one respondent stated feed delivery 
could be suspended for 10 days while two others indicated the length would depend upon the age 
of the pullets.  
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Management Strategies for Moving Pullets to Layer Farms 
Once pullets are near the point of lay, they are moved into an egg lay barn. These barns may be 
on the same premises, on another premises under the same management, or on another farm 
under different management. Appendix 1 Figures 7-9 illustrate survey responses to questions 
relating to management strategies for moving pullets to layer farms. 
 
Appendix 1 Figure 7. Responses of industry representatives (n=15) to the question 
“Approximately what percentage of grown pullets move to layer houses on the same premises?” 
One respondent reporting that all pullets were moved off-site indicated that the pullets were 
moved only 1/8 mile to the layer farm which has a different premises ID.  
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Appendix 1 Figure 8. Responses of industry representatives (n=15) to the question 
“Approximately what percentage of grown pullets move to lay facilities on another premises 
owned/managed by your company?”  
 
 
Appendix 1 Figure 9. Responses of industry representatives (n=15) to the question 
“Approximately what percentage of grown pullets move to lay facilities owned/managed by 
other egg producers?” 
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Transportation of Pullets to Lay Farm  
People (work crews), vehicles, and equipment are required to move pullets from a pullet barn 
into an egg lay barn. Appendix 1 Figures 10-12 illustrate survey responses to questions relating 
to management strategies for moving pullets to layer farms. 
 
Appendix 1 Figure 10. Responses of industry representatives (n=15) to the question “Annually, 
approximately what percent of moves do you use contracted pullet moving crews (e.g., hired 
crews)?” Two representatives using 100% contracted crews replied that those crew are dedicated 
to their farm/company only and work no other locations.  
 
Appendix 1 Figure 11. Responses of industry representatives (n=15) to the question 
“Approximately how often do you use contracted pullet-moving vehicles or equipment?” 
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Appendix 1 Figure 12. Responses of industry representatives (n=15) to the question “How 
many days does it take to move a pullet flock under your management to lay houses?” 
Considering all responses, the length of pullet moves ranges from 1 day to 14 days with the 
average duration ranging from 1 day to 8 days. 
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Crews and Other Visitors on Pullet Farms 
Appendix 1 Figures 13-16 illustrate survey responses to questions relating to management of 
work crews and visitors during the pullet growing cycle. 
 
Appendix 1 Figure 13. Responses of industry representatives (n=15) to the question “How often 
are chick placement, vaccination, beak trimming, or other crews used on your pullet farm(s) (on 
multi-age farms, consider all ages present)?” Respondents checked all answers that applied for 
the different locations they owned/managed. Most who selected ‘other’ indicated that they use 
company employed/managed crews. 
 
Appendix 1 Figure 14. Responses of industry representatives (n=15) to the question “In the 
event of an HPAI outbreak, how long could you suspend vaccination or other crews from visiting 
your farm (on multi-age farms, consider all ages present)?” Respondents choosing ‘8 days or 
more’ were asked to specify the length; responses ranged from 14 to 30 days with some noting 
the difficulty and that the length may depend on the age of the birds at the time of the outbreak.    
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Appendix 1 Figure 15. Responses of industry representatives (n=15) to the question “How often 
are other visitors on your pullet farm(s) (e.g., flock supervisors, extension agents, propane 
maintenance, neighbors, etc.)?” Respondents checked all answers that applied for the different 
locations they owned/managed. One respondent noted that they do not allow visitors to their 
pullet sites.  
 
Appendix 1 Figure 16. Responses of industry representatives (n=15) to the question “In the 
event of an HPAI outbreak, how long could you suspend other visitors (listed above) from 
entering your farm?” Respondents choosing ‘8 days or more’ were asked to specify the length; 
responses ranged from 2 weeks to indefinitely to not sure, depends upon service provided.  
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Shared Employees and Equipment on Pullet Farms 
Appendix 1 Figures 17-20 illustrate survey responses to questions relating to management 
strategies for employees or equipment that may be used on multiple farms. 
 
Appendix 1 Figure 17. Responses of industry representatives (n=15) to the question “How often 
do you have employees on your pullet farm(s) who also work on other farms (including adjacent 
premises)?” Respondents checked all answers that applied for the different locations they 
owned/managed.  
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Appendix 1 Figure 18. Responses of industry representatives (n=15) to the question “In the 
event of an HPAI outbreak, how long could you suspend employees on your pullet farm(s) who 
also work on other farms (including adjacent premises)?” Respondents choosing ‘8 days or 
more’ were asked to specify the duration that use of such employees could be suspended; 
responses ranged from to 2 weeks to indefinitely with some noting this was ‘not applicable’ as 
they never have employees who work on other farms.   
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Appendix 1 Figure 19. Responses of industry representatives (n=15) to the question “How often 
is shared equipment (i.e., equipment used on other poultry farms including adjacent premises) 
used on your pullet farm(s) (e.g., pullet/hen moving dollies, batteries or carts; skid steers, 
pressure sprayers, vaccination equipment, beak trimming equipment, lawn mowers, tools, barn 
cleaning equipment, dead bird disposal, garbage, propane)?” Respondents checked all answers 
that applied for the different locations they owned/managed. Those who selected ‘other’ 
indicated that they either only use dedicated equipment or only share pullet moving equipment.  
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Appendix 1 Figure 20. Responses of industry representatives (n=15) to the question “In the 
event of an HPAI outbreak, what is the maximum length of time that you could suspend bringing 
any shared equipment (i.e., equipment used on other poultry farms including adjacent premises) 
onto your pullet farm(s)?” Respondents choosing ‘8 days or more’ were asked to specify the 
length of time; responses ranged from several weeks to indefinitely with many noting that shared 
equipment is only used during pullet move outs. 
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Moving Live and Dead Birds On/Off Pullet Farms 
 Appendix 1 Figures 21-24 illustrate survey responses to questions relating to management 
practices for moving live poultry (e.g., chick placement or grown pullet movement) or dead 
poultry (e.g., mortality management) off pullet premises. 
 
Appendix 1 Figure 21. Responses of industry representatives (n=15) to the question “How often 
do live birds move on/off your farm?” Respondents checked all answers that applied for the 
different locations they owned/managed.  
 
Appendix 1 Figure 22. Responses of industry representatives (n=15) to the question “In the 
event of an HPAI outbreak, how long could you suspend all live bird movements on/off your 
farm?” Respondents choosing ‘8 days or more’ were asked to specify the length of time; 
responses ranged from 14 days to several months with the majority commenting that the length 
of time depends on the age of the birds and replacement schedules.   
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Appendix 1 Figure 23. Responses of industry representatives (n=15) to the question “How often 
are dead birds hauled away from your pullet farm(s)?” Respondents checked all answers that 
applied for the different locations they owned/managed.  
 
Appendix 1 Figure 24. Responses of industry representatives (n=15) to the question “In the 
event of an HPAI outbreak, what is the maximum length of time you could suspend off-site 
mortality disposal (dead birds) from your farm (i.e., how long could dead birds be stored on-
farm)?” Respondents choosing ‘8 days or more’ were asked to specify the length of time; 
responses ranged from several weeks to indefinitely with composting on-site.  
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Moving Manure Off Pullets Farms 
Appendix 1 Figures 25-26 illustrate survey responses to questions relating to management 
practices for moving manure off pullet premises. 
 
Appendix 1 Figure 25. Responses of industry representatives (n=15) to the question “How often 
is manure hauled away from your pullet farm(s)?” Respondents checked all answers that applied 
for the different locations they owned/managed. Additional comments indicated that high rise 
pullet barns are often cleaned out only after the complete grow cycle (e.g., manure is moved after 
18 weeks) while belted houses may move manure during the grow cycle if needed. 
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Appendix 1 Figure 26. Responses of industry representatives (n=15) to the question “In the 
event of an HPAI outbreak, what is the maximum time you could suspend manure hauling from 
your farm (i.e., how long could manure be stored on-farm)?” Respondents choosing ‘8 days or 
more’ were asked to specify the length of time; responses ranged from 30 days to one year, with 
a majority (n=9 of 14) indicating that manure could be stored for an entire growth cycle (i.e., 18 
weeks) or more. The timeframe may depend on how full manure pits and compost areas are at 
the time of the outbreak.    
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Moving Garbage Off Pullets Farms 
Appendix 1 Figures 27-28 illustrate survey responses to questions relating to management 
practices for moving garbage off pullet premises. 
 
Appendix 1 Figure 27. Responses of industry representatives (n=15) to the question “How often 
is garbage hauled away from your pullet farm(s)?” Respondents checked all answers that applied 
for the different locations they owned/managed.  
 
Appendix 1 Figure 28. Responses of industry representatives (n=15) to the question “In the 
event of an HPAI outbreak, what is the maximum length of time that you could suspend garbage 
hauling from your farm (i.e., how long could garbage be stored on-farm)?” Respondents 
choosing ‘8 days or more’ were asked to specify the length of time; responses ranged from 10 
days to 6 months with one respondent indicating that garbage hauling may be able to be 
eliminated completely (i.e., garbage disposal managed on-site).  
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Appendix 2: AI Virus Survival at Various Humidity Levels, at Various Temperatures, and on Various 
Substrates. 
Appendix 2 Tables 1-6 summarize the results of studies documenting survival and persistence of AI viruses at various humidity levels, at various 
temperatures, and on various substrates. The general trend in persistence and survival time in the environment for AI viruses appears to be decreased 
survival in conditions of lower moisture and higher temperature. Virus survival and persistence in the environment has also been reported to be 
longer near neutral pH, in lower salinity, and without UV exposure.79,271,331-333 
These tables are compiled to describe virus survival and persistence across a range of conditions. Of note, there are multiple methodologies to 
determine virus survival or persistence; readers should consult the studies listed to evaluate all parameters and methods utilized in experimental 
studies, as definitions of these terms are not uniformly applied. In compiling data from the literature for these tables, studies where HPAI virus was 
utilized were given preference over LPAI studies. Where information on AI virus was not available, data on other influenza viruses are included as 
indicated. Virus inactivation was prioritized as a time point in the summary tables below. In studies in which virus remained viable for all time points 
measured, the last reported time when virus was measured (and detected) is included in the tables for comparison. 
These summary tables focus on conditions that may be similar to those encountered on commercial poultry operations and climatic parameters 
similar to those of the continental United States. Further summaries of virus inactivation times in eggs and egg products can be found in the OIE 
Terrestrial Animal Health Code (Article 10.4.25),334 and inactivation times at high temperatures have been summarized by USDA documents on 
parameters to inactivate HPAI virus using heat treatment.335  
 
Appendix 2 Table 1. Summary of experimental studies on survival of AI viruses in feces and manure by increasing temperature.  
                                                 
h T90 value: time required for 90% loss of virus infectivity 
Substrate Temperature Humidity  
(as described by 
study authors) 
Sub-
type 
Strain Last time point 
detected (if viable 
for all contact 
times) 
Time to virus inactivation 
(experimental, estimated, 
or predicted based on 
regression analysis) 
Reference 
Duck feces 0°C  
(32°F) 
Moist germ carrier; 
feces in closed 50-
ml plastic tubes 
LPAI 
H5N1 
A/Teal/Wv632/ 
Germany/05 
- T90h value of 75 days Nazir et al., 
2011336 
Wet Chicken feces 4°C  
(39.2°F) 
Closed vial HPAI 
H5N2 
#1370 isolate Viable virus 
through 35 days 
(last time point 
tested) 
- Beard et 
al., 198478 
Workin g Draft 
Pullets Out of the Barn Risk Assessment 
Page 184 of 296 
Appendix 2 Table 1. Summary of experimental studies on survival of AI viruses in feces and manure by increasing temperature, cont. 
Substrate,  
cont. 
Temperature Humidity  
(as described by 
study authors)  
Sub-
type 
Strain Last time point 
detected (if viable 
for all contact 
times) 
Time to virus inactivation 
(experimental, estimated, 
or predicted based on 
regression analysis) 
Reference 
Commercial 
chicken manure 
(field house) 
4°C  
(39.2°F) 
Manure-virus 
mixture in a 50-ml 
sterile tube 
LPAI 
H7N2 
A/chicken/PA/3779-
2/ 97AIV 
Remained 
activated at 20 
days 
- Lu et al., 
2003337 
Wet chicken feces 4°C  
(39.2°F) 
Capped vials HPAI 
H5N1 
A\Ck\Sikkim\15146
6\2008 
- 0% infectivity at week 7 Kurmi et 
al., 2013280 
Dry chicken feces 4°C  
(39.2°F) 
Capped vials HPAI 
H5N1 
A\Ck\Sikkim\15146
6\2008 
- 0% infectivity at week 8 Kurmi et 
al., 2013280 
Chicken feces 4.0-6.7°C  
(39.2-44.06°F) 
15.2-46.3% relative 
humidity 
HPAI 
H5N1 
A/Vietnam/1203/ 
2004v 
- Virus not detected at day 13 Wood et 
al., 2010271 
Chicken feces 6.7-7.8°C 
(44.06-46.04°F) 
79.0-96.9% relative 
humidity 
HPAI 
H5N1 
A/Vietnam/1203/ 
2004 
Day 13 (last time 
point tested) 
- Wood et 
al., 2010271 
Duck feces 10°C  
(50°F) 
Moist germ carrier; 
feces in closed 50-
ml plastic tubes 
LPAI 
H6N8 
A/Mute 
Swan/Germany/R29
27/07 
- T90 value of 14 days Nazir et al., 
2011336 
Commercial 
chicken manure 
(field house) 
15-20°C  
(59-68°F) 
Manure-virus 
mixture in a 50-ml 
sterile tube 
LPAI 
H7N2 
A/chicken/PA/3779-
2/ 97AIV 
Remained 
activated at 2 days 
- Lu et al., 
2003337 
Duck feces 20°C  
(68°F) 
Moist germ carrier; 
feces in closed 50-
ml plastic tubes 
LPAI 
H4N6 
A/Mallard/Wv1732-
34/03 
- T90 value of 4 days Nazir et al., 
2011336 
Fecal material 22°C  
(71.6°F) 
Capped glass vials LPAI 
H3N6 
A/Duck/Memphis/ 
546/74 
- Infectious virus not detected 
at day 13 
Webster et 
al., 1978338 
Chicken feces 22.0-22.7°C 
(71.6-72.86°F) 
30-42% relative 
humidity 
HPAI 
H5N1 
A/Vietnam/1203/ 
2004 
- Virus not detected at day 2  Wood et 
al., 2010271 
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Appendix 2 Table 1. Summary of experimental studies on survival of AI viruses in feces and manure by increasing temperature, cont. 
Substrate,  
cont. 
Temperature Humidity  
(as described by 
study authors)  
Sub-
type 
Strain Last time point 
detected (if viable 
for all contact 
times) 
Time to virus inactivation 
(experimental, estimated, 
or predicted based on 
regression analysis) 
Reference 
Chicken feces 22.4-23.7°C 
(72.32-74.66°F) 
89.1-91.2% relative 
humidity 
HPAI 
H5N1 
A/Vietnam/1203/ 
2004 
- Virus not detected at day 4  Wood et 
al., 2010271 
Wet chicken feces 25°C  
(77°F) 
Closed vial HPAI 
H5N2 
#1370 isolate - No viable virus at day 3 Beard et 
al., 198478 
Field commercial 
chicken manure 
28-30°C 
(82.4-86°F)  
Manure-virus 
mixture in a 50-ml 
sterile tube 
LPAI 
H7N2 
A/chicken/PA/3779-
2/97AIV 
 Inactivated at hour 12 Lu et al., 
2003337 
Duck feces 30°C  
(86°F) 
Moist germ carrier; 
feces in closed 50-
ml plastic tubes 
LPAI 
H4N6 
A/Mallard/Wv1732-
34/03 
- T90 value of 2 days Nazir et al., 
2011336 
Dry chicken feces 37°C  
(98.6°F) 
Capped vials HPAI 
H5N1 
A\Ck\Sikkim\15146
6\2008 
- 0% infectivity at hour 30 Kurmi et 
al., 2013280 
Wet chicken feces 37°C  
(98.6°F) 
Capped vials HPAI 
H5N1 
A\Ck\Sikkim\15146
6\2008 
- 0% infectivity at hour 30 Kurmi et 
al., 2013280 
Field commercial 
chicken manure 
37°C  
(98.6°F) 
Manure-virus 
mixture in a 50-mL 
sterile tube 
LPAI 
H7N2 
A/chicken/PA/3779-
2/97AIV 
- Inactivated at hour 24 Lu et al., 
2003337 
Dry chicken feces 42°C  
(107.6°F) 
Capped vials HPAI 
H5N1 
A\Ck\Sikkim\15146
6\2008 
- 0% infectivity at hour 24 Kurmi et 
al., 2013280 
Wet chicken feces 42°C  
(107.6°F) 
Capped vials HPAI 
H5N1 
A\Ck\Sikkim\15146
6\2008 
- 0% infectivity at hour 24 Kurmi et 
al., 2013280 
Field commercial 
chicken manure 
56°C  
(132.8°F) 
Manure-virus 
mixture in a 50-mL 
sterile tube 
LPAI 
H7N2 
A/chicken/PA/3779-
2/97AIV 
- Inactivated at minute 15 Lu et al., 
2003337 
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Appendix 2 Table 2. Summary of experimental studies on survival of AI viruses in compost by increasing temperature. 
 
  
Substrate Temperature Humidity  
(as described by 
study authors)  
Subtype  Strain Last time point 
detected (if 
viable for all 
contact times) 
Time to virus inactivation 
(experimental, estimated, 
or predicted based on 
regression analysis) 
Reference 
Cage layer 
manure in middle 
of compost 
Peak recorded    
46 °C 
(114.8°F) 
Nylon mesh bag; 
65% moisture 
content of compost 
LPAI 
H6N2 
A/Tky/Mass/3740/
65 
- Virus below detectable 
limit at day 3 (1st time point 
tested) 
Guan et al., 
2009291 
Used litter in 
middle of 
compost 
Peak recorded    
46°C 
(114.8°F) 
Nylon mesh bag; 
65% moisture 
content of compost 
LPAI 
H6N2 
A/Tky/Mass/3740/
65 
- Virus below detectable 
limit at day 3 (1st time point 
tested) 
Guan et al., 
2009291 
Breast muscle in 
abdominal cavity 
of chicken 
carcass at bottom 
of compost 
Peak recorded 
50.3°C 
(122.54°F) 
Plastic netting; 
65% moisture 
content of compost 
LPAI 
H6N2 
A/Tky/Mass/3740/
65 
- Virus below detectable 
limit at day 10 
Guan et al., 
2009291 
Embryonated 
chicken eggs at 
bottom of 
compost 
Peak recorded 
50.3°C  
(122.54°F) 
Plastic mesh 
baskets; 65% 
moisture content of 
compost 
LPAI 
H6N2 
A/Tky/Mass/3740/
65 
- Virus below detectable 
limit at day 10 
Guan et al., 
2009291 
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Appendix 2 Table 3. Summary of experimental studies on survival of AI viruses in water by increasing temperature. 
Substrate Temperature Humidity  
(as described 
by study 
authors)  
Subtype  Strain Last time point 
detected (if viable 
for all contact 
times) 
Time to virus inactivation 
(experimental, estimated, 
or predicted based on 
regression analysis) 
Reference 
Surface water  
(Lake Constance) 
-10°C  
(14°F) 
- LPAI 
H6N8 
A/mute swan/ 
Germany/R2927/07 
- T90 value of 395 days Nazir et al., 
2010339 
Surface water  
(Lake Constance) 
0°C  
(32°F) 
- LPAI 
H5N1 
A/teal/Germany/Wv
632/05 
- T90 value of 208 days Nazir et al., 
2010339 
Contaminated fecal 
material in river water 
4°C  
(39.2°F) 
- LPAI 
H3N6 
A/Duck/Memphis/5
46/74 
Viable for all 
contact times (32 
days) 
 Webster et 
al., 1978338 
Sea water (Black Sea) 5-6°C  
(41-42.8°F) 
- LPAI 
H6N2 
Not specified - No infective virus detected 
at day 7 
Zarkov, 
2006340 
Sea water (Black Sea) 5-6°C 
(41-42.8°F) 
- LPAI 
H11N6 
A/duck/England/ 
56 
- No infective virus detected 
at day 9 
Zarkov, 
2006340 
Surface water 
(Koprinka dam) 
5-6°C 
(41-42.8°F) 
- LPAI 
H6N2 
Not specified - No infective virus detected 
at day 16 
Zarkov, 
2006340 
Surface water 
(Koprinka dam) 
5-6°C 
(41-42.8°F) 
- LPAI 
H11N6 
A/duck/England/ 
56 
- No infective virus detected 
at day 18 
Zarkov, 
2006340 
Surface water  
(Lake Constance) 
10°C  
(50°F) 
- LPAI 
H4N6 
A/mallard/Germany/
Wv1732-34/03 
- T90 value of 85 days Nazir et al., 
2010339 
Surface water 
(Ovcharitsa dam) 
10-12°C 
(50-53.6°F) 
- LPAI 
H6N2 
Not specified - No infective virus detected 
at day 1 
Zarkov, 
2006340 
Surface water 
(Ovcharitsa dam) 
10-12°C 
(50-53.6°F) 
- LPAI 
H11N6 
A/duck/England/ 
56 
- No infective virus detected 
at day 1 
Zarkov, 
2006340 
Distilled water 17°C  
(62.6°F) 
- HPAI 
H5N1 
A/WhooperSwan/M
ongolia/244/05 
- Predicted persistence of 
158 days 
Brown et 
al., 2007333 
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Appendix 2 Table 3. Summary of experimental studies on survival of AI viruses in water by increasing temperature, cont. 
Substrate, cont. Temperature Humidity  
(as described 
by study 
authors)  
Subtype  Strain Last time point 
detected (if viable 
for all contact 
times) 
Time to virus inactivation 
(experimental, estimated, 
or predicted based on 
regression analysis) 
Reference 
Surface water  
(Lake Constance) 
20°C  
(68°F) 
- LPAI 
H4N6 
A/mallard/Germany/
Wv1732-34/03 
- T90 value of 23 days Nazir et al., 
2010339 
Contaminated fecal 
material in river water 
22°C  
(71.6°F) 
- LPAI 
H3N6 
A/Duck/Memphis/5
46/74 
- Virus not detected at day 7 Webster et 
al., 1978338 
Distilled water 28°C  
(82.4°F) 
- HPAI 
H5N1 
A/DuckMeat/ 
Anyang/01 
- Predicted persistence of 30 
days 
Brown et 
al., 2007333 
Surface water  
(Lake Constance) 
30°C  
(86°F) 
- LPAI 
H4N6 
A/mallard/Germany/
Wv1732-34/03 
- T90 value of 14 days Nazir et al., 
2010339 
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Appendix 2 Table 4. Summary of experimental studies on survival of AI viruses in poultry carcass (meat, liver, muscle, feather) by increasing 
temperature. 
 
  
Substrate Temperature Humidity  
(as described by 
study authors)  
Sub- 
type  
Strain Last time point 
detected (if 
viable for all 
contact times) 
Time to virus inactivation 
(experimental, estimated, 
or predicted based on 
regression analysis) 
Reference 
Duck feathers 4°C  
(39.2°F) 
Placed in incubator HPAI 
H5N1 
A/chicken/Miyaza
ki/K11/2007 
A/WhooperSwan/
Akita/1/2008 
- Negative for virus isolation 
at day 200 
Yamamoto et 
al., 2010249 
Breast muscle in 
abdominal cavity of 
chicken carcass 
3.9-7.9°C 
(39-46.2°F) 
Plastic netting outside 
compost bin 
LPAI 
H6N2 
A/Tky/Mass/3740/
65 
Virus detected at 
all times tested 
(21 days) 
- Guan et al., 
2009291 
Liver in abdominal 
cavity of chicken 
carcass 
4.0-7.9°C 
(39.2-46.2°F) 
Plastic netting outside 
compost bin 
LPAI 
H6N2 
A/Tky/Mass/3740/
65 
- Virus not detected at day 7 Guan et al., 
2009291 
Duck feathers 20°C  
(68°F) 
Placed in incubator HPAI 
H5N1 
A/WhooperSwan/
Akita/1/2008 
- Negative for virus isolation 
at day 20  
Yamamoto et 
al., 2010249 
Chicken meat 57.8°C 
(136.04°F) 
PCR tubes in thermo- 
cycler heating block 
HPAI 
H5N1 
A/chicken/Korea/ 
ES/2003 
- Predicted 11-log EID50 
reduction at 39.6 minutes 
Thomas et 
al., 2007341 
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Appendix 2 Table 5. Summary of experimental studies on survival of AI viruses in allantoic fluid and embryonated chicken eggs by increasing 
temperature. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Substrate Temperature Humidity  
(as described by 
study authors)  
Subtype  Strain Last time point 
detected (if 
viable for all 
contact times) 
Time to virus inactivation 
(experimental, estimated, 
or predicted based on 
regression analysis) 
Reference 
Embryonated 
chicken eggs 
3.9-7.9°C 
(39-46.2°F) 
Plastic mesh 
baskets outside 
compost bin 
LPAI 
H6N2 
A/Tky/Mass/3740/65 Virus detected at 
all times tested 
(21 days) 
- Guan et al., 
2009291 
Allantoic fluid 55°C  
(131°F) 
Capped centrifuge 
tubes 
HPAI 
H5N1 
A/chicken/Chonburi/ 
Thailand/CU-7/04, 
A/chicken/Nakorn 
Patom/Thailand/CU-
K2/2004, 
A/chicken/Ratchaburi/
Thailand/CU-68/04 
Infective at all 
contact times (60 
minutes) 
- Wanaratana 
et al., 
2010342 
Allantoic fluid 56°C  
(132.8°F) 
Thermocycler tubes 
in heating block 
LPAI 
H7N9 
A/Anhui/1/2013, 
A/Shanghai/1/2013 
- Virus not infective at 
minute 30 
Zou et al., 
2013343 
Allantoic fluid 60°C  
(140°F) 
Capped centrifuge 
tubes 
HPAI 
H5N1 
A/chicken/Chonburi/ 
Thailand/CU-7/04, 
A/chicken/Nakorn 
Patom/Thailand/CU-
K2/2004, 
A/chicken/Ratchaburi/
Thailand/CU-68/04 
- Virus not infective at 
minute 60 
Wanaratana 
et al., 
2010342 
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Appendix 2 Table 6. Summary of experimental studies on survival of influenza viruses on additional substrates by increasing temperature. 
Substrate Temperature Humidity  
(as described by 
study authors)  
Subtype Strain Last time point 
detected 
Time to virus inactivation 
(experimental, estimated, 
or predicted based on 
regression analysis) 
Reference 
Galvanized metal, 
glass, soil 
4.0-6.7°C  
(39.2-44.06°F) 
15.2-46.3% relative 
humidity 
HPAI 
H5N1 
A/Vietnam/1203/ 
2004 
Virus detected at 
all times tested 
(13 days) 
- Wood et al., 
2010271  
Galvanized metal 6.7-7.8°C  
(44.06-46.04°F) 
89.5-96.9% relative 
humidity 
HPAI 
H5N1 
A/Vietnam/1203/ 
2004 
- Virus below detectable 
limit at day 9 
Wood et al., 
2010271 
Glass, soil 6.7-7.8°C  
(44.06-46.04°F) 
79.0-96.9% relative 
humidity 
HPAI 
H5N1 
A/Vietnam/1203/ 
2004 
- Virus below detectable 
limit at day 13 
Wood et al., 
2010271 
Window glass, 
unvarnished oak 
17-21°C 
(62.6-69.8°F) 
23-24% humidity H1N1 A/PuertoRico/8/34 
(PR8) 
- Virus not detected at hour 4 Greatorex et 
al., 2011344 
Stainless steel, 
plastic control 
17-21°C 
(62.6-69.8°F) 
23-24% humidity H1N1 A/PuertoRico/8/34 
(PR8) 
- Virus not detected at hour 
24 
Greatorex et 
al., 2011344 
Steel, tile, gumboot, 
tire, egg shell, 
plastic 
Unspecified 
room 
temperature 
In 14-ml round-
bottom tubes and 
stored in a drawer 
LPAI 
H13N7 
A/Herringgull/ 
Delaware 471/86 
- Virus below detectable 
limit at day 6 
Tiwari et al., 
2006272 
Latex, feather Unspecified 
room 
temperature 
In 14-ml round-
bottom tubes and 
stored in a drawer 
LPAI 
H13N7 
A/Herringgull/ 
Delaware 471/86 
Virus detected at 
day 6 (last time 
point tested) 
- Tiwari et al., 
2006272 
Wood Unspecified 
room 
temperature 
In 14-ml round-
bottom tubes and 
stored in a drawer 
LPAI 
H13N7 
A/Herringgull/ 
Delaware 471/86 
- Virus below detectable 
limit at hour 72 
Tiwari et al., 
2006272 
Egg tray, polyester 
fabric 
Unspecified 
room 
temperature 
In 14-ml round-
bottom tubes and 
stored in a drawer 
LPAI 
H13N7 
A/Herringgull/ 
Delaware 471/86 
- Virus below detectable 
limit at hour 24 
Tiwari et al., 
2006272 
Cotton fabric Unspecified 
room 
temperature 
In 14-ml round-
bottom tubes and 
stored in a drawer 
LPAI 
H13N7 
A/Herringgull/ 
Delaware 471/86 
- Virus below detectable 
limit at hour 48 
Tiwari et al., 
2006272 
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Appendix 2 Table 6. Summary of experimental studies on survival of influenza viruses on additional substrates by increasing temperature, cont. 
Substrate,  
cont. 
Temperature Humidity  
(as described by 
study authors)  
Subtype Strain Last time point 
detected 
Time to virus inactivation 
(experimental, estimated, 
or predicted based on 
regression analysis) 
Reference 
Stainless steel 22°C  
(71.6°F) 
50-60% relative 
humidity 
H1N1 A/PR/8/34 Viable virus at 
hour 24 (last time 
examined) 
- Noyce et al., 
2007345 
Galvanized metal, 
glass 
22.7-23.4°C 
(72.86-74.12°F) 
32-38% relative 
humidity 
HPAI 
H5N1 
A/Vietnam/1203/ 
2004 
- Virus below detectable 
limit at day 1 
Wood et al., 
2010271 
Soil 22.0-23.4°C 
(71.6-74.12°F) 
30-42% relative 
humidity 
HPAI 
H5N1 
A/Vietnam/1203/ 
2004 
- Virus below detectable 
limit at day 2 
Wood et al., 
2010271 
Galvanized metal, 
glass 
22.4°C  
(72.32°F) 
89.1% relative 
humidity 
HPAI 
H5N1 
A/Vietnam/1203/ 
2004 
- Virus below detectable 
limit at day 1 
Wood et al., 
2010271 
Soil 22.4-23.4°C 
(72.32-74.12°F) 
89.1-90.4% relative 
humidity 
HPAI 
H5N1 
A/Vietnam/1203/ 
2004 
- Virus below detectable 
limit at day 2 
Wood et al., 
2010271 
Rubber glove, N95 
particulate 
respirator, surgical 
mask (non-woven 
fabric), gown 
(Dupont Tyvek), 
coated wooden 
desk, stainless steel 
25.2°C  
(77.36°F) 
55% relative 
humidity 
H1N1 A/PR/8/34 Virus detected at 
hour 24 (last time 
point tested) 
- Sakaguchi 
et al., 
2010346 
Plastic 27.8-28.3°C 
(82.0-82.9°F) 
35-40% relative 
humidity 
H1N1 A/Brazil/11/78-like Virus detected at 
~101TCID50/0.1 
ml at hour 48 
(last time point 
tested) 
- Bean et al., 
198256 
Stainless steel 27.8- 28.3°C 
(82.0- 82.9°F) 
35-40% relative 
humidity 
H1N1 A/Brazil/11/78-like - Virus below detectable 
limit at hour 72 
Bean et al., 
198256 
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Appendix 2 Table 6. Summary of experimental studies on survival of influenza viruses on additional substrates by increasing temperature, cont. 
Substrate,  
cont. 
Temperature Humidity  
(as described by 
study authors)  
Subtype Strain Last time point 
detected 
Time to virus inactivation 
(experimental, estimated, 
or predicted based on 
regression analysis) 
Reference 
Stainless steel 55°C  
(131°F) 
50% relative 
humidity 
H1N1 A/PR/8/34 Minute 60 (last 
time point tested) 
- McDevitt et 
al., 2010347 
Stainless steel 60°C  
(140°F) 
50% relative 
humidity 
H1N1 A/PR/8/34 - Virus below detectable 
limit at minute 30 
McDevitt et 
al., 2010347 
Stainless steel 65°C  
(149°F) 
50% relative 
humidity 
H1N1 A/PR/8/34 - Virus below detectable 
limit at minute 15 (1st time 
point tested) 
McDevitt et 
al., 2010347 
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Appendix 3: Literature Review on the Role of Local Area Spread in 
Previous Outbreaks 
Appendix 3 Table 1 below summarizes the results from studies (to include modeling) on the influence 
of local area spread in AI transmission during previous outbreaks. 
 
Appendix 3 Table 1. Previous AI outbreak investigations and results associated with local area spread. 
AI strain 
(Location) 
Year of 
outbreak 
(species 
involved) Study approach Key findings Source 
HPAI/LPAI 
H7N8 
(Indiana) 
2016 
(turkeys) 
Geospatial analysis; 
case-control (9 
cases, 30 controls) 
The geospatial analysis showed a likely 
association between infected premises 
and a common driving route. The case-
control study identified risk factors 
more common on case farms and in 
case barns than on control farms and in 
control barns as: shorter distance to 
dead bird disposal and litter compost 
area, presence of wild mammals, and 
visitors entering barns. 
USDA 
Epi 
Report 
Indiana, 
March 18, 
2016262 
HPAI H5N2 
(Iowa) 
2015  
(layer 
chickens) 
Case-control (28 
cases, 31 control) 
with multivariate 
logistic regression
  
Fa m-level analysis indicated that 
location in an existing control zone (10 
km perimeter beyond the closest 
infected premises) was highly 
associated with infection status. 
Garber et 
al., 
2016194 
LPAI H5N2 
(Japan) 
2005  
(layer 
chickens) 
Case-control (37 
cases, 36 controls) 
with multivariate 
logistic regression. 
Biosecurity factors 
controlled for.  
Distance up to 1.5 km from infected 
premises identified as a risk factor for 
egg layer farms in Japan. Equipment 
sharing and visitor biosecurity were 
also identified as risk factors. 
Nishi-
guchi et 
al., 
2007259 
HPAI H5N2  
(Texas) 
2004  
(broiler 
chickens) 
Outbreak 
observation  
No area spread. Samples were 
collected from 368 premises (39 in the 
8-km affected zone, 167 in the 
surveillance zone [16 km], and 162 in 
the buffer zone [50 km]). 
Pelzel et 
al., 
2006348 
  
  
HPAI H7N7 
(Netherlands) 
2003 
(multiple 
poultry 
species) 
Spatial transmission 
model with distance 
and infectious 
period at premises 
level as factors 
Exposure increased with proximity to 
infectious farm. Farms <1 km from an 
infected premises were are at least 8 
times more likely to become infected 
than farms >5 km. 
Boender 
et al., 
2007133 
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Appendix 3 Table 1. Previous AI outbreak investigations and results associated with local area 
spread, cont. 
AI strain 
(Location) 
Year of 
outbreak 
(species 
involved) Study approach Key findings Source 
LPAI H7N2 
(Virginia, 
West Virginia, 
North 
Carolina) 
2002 
(chickens 
and turkeys)  
Outbreak 
observation 
Spread mainly by people and fomites, 
including equipment; rendering 
especially high risk. Very little 
evidence for airborne spread. 
Senne et 
al., 
2005349 
LPAI H7N2 
(Pennsyl-
vania) 
2001-2002 
(broiler 
breeders and 
broiler 
chickens) 
Outbreak 
observation 
Local spread within 1 mile. Likely 
mechanisms were family ties, business 
connection, social contact, etc.  
 
Dunn et 
al., 
2003270 
HPAI H7N1 
(Italy) 
1999-2000 
(turkeys 
[meat and 
breeder], 
chickens 
[breeders, 
layers, and 
broilers], 
geese, quail, 
ostriches, 
guinea fowl, 
pheasants) 
Multivariable Cox 
regression; people 
and equipment flow 
not controlled for in 
model. 
Flocks ≤1.5 km from an infected 
premises were estimated to have a 
Hazard ratio of 7.9. 
Poultry species and farm size also were 
identified as risk factors. 
Mannelli 
et al., 
2006350 
Multivariable Cox 
regression; people 
and equipment flow 
not controlled for in 
model. 
Flocks ≥4.5 km from infected premises 
had lower risk. Flocks ≤1.5 km from 
infected premises had highest risk 
(hazard ratio 4.6 in comparison to 
flocks >4.5 km from an infected 
premises).  
Poultry species, type of production, 
and farm size also were identified as 
risk factors. 
Busani et 
al., 
2009135 
Spatial transmission 
model with distance 
and infectious 
period at premises 
level as factors 
Proximity to infectious farms increased 
the risk of infection, e.g., probability of 
infection estimated to be 2.5 times 
higher for susceptible farms 1 km from 
an infectious farm than for farms 3 km 
away.  
Control measures such as culling of 
infected farms and ban on restocking 
were identified through simulation to 
reduce infection spread. 
Dorigatti 
et al, 
2010132 
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Appendix 3 Table 1. Previous AI outbreak investigations and results associated with local area 
spread, cont. 
AI strain 
(Location) 
Year of 
outbreak 
(species 
involved) Study approach Key findings Source 
HPAI H5N1 
(England) 
2007 
(turkeys) 
Outbreak 
observation, spatial 
simulation model 
Spread to 3 houses on the same 
premises. No transmission to 78 other 
farms within a 3-km protection zone or 
70 farms within a 10-km surveillance 
zone.  
Simulation showed no evidence of 
local transmission above 1 km. 
Sharkey et 
al., 
2008136; 
Irvine et 
al., 
2007126 
LPAI H5N3 
(California) 
1984 
(turkeys) 
Outbreak 
observation 
Spread associated with insemination at 
5 breeder premises across 110 miles, 
linked to one company and 
insemination crew. No spread to 193 
other turkey premises or >800 chicken 
premises in the state. 
McCapes 
et al., 
198692 
LPAI H6N1 
(Minnesota) 
1978 
(layer 
chickens) 
Outbreak 
observation 
No spread to 1 of 4 houses on the same 
layer premises; the unaffected house 
was across a road from the 3 affected 
and interconnected houses. No spread 
to epidemiologically linked layer farms 
or neighboring premises. 
Halvorson 
et al., 
1980351 
LPAI   
A/T/Minn./67 
(Minnesota) 
1967 
(turkeys) 
Outbreak 
observation 
Spread between houses on same 
premises and between premises. 
Spread between premises appeared 
associated with insemination; some 
houses on severely infected premises 
were not infected. 
Kleven et 
al., 197095 
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Appendix 4: Estimating an Approximate Posterior Distribution for the 
Prevalence among Insects 
A Bayesian approach with Monte Carlo simulation was used to estimate the posterior distribution of 
the prevalence among insects given the observed data from testing pools of insects.138 In the observed 
data, the pool size varied between 10 and 60 insects, and 2 of the 144 pools tested were positive for AI. 
The steps in the simulation iteration were as follows. 
For each of the 144 pooled samples, the pool size Nj was simulated as an integer Uniform (10, 60) 
distribution. The prevalence among individual insects Pr was simulated using a uniform (0,1) prior 
(uninformed). The probability of a pooled sample being positive Ppool (j) was calculated according to 
the equation below, 
 𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑗𝑗) = 1 − (1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟)𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡 
An indicator variable for whether the pooled sample j is positive, X(j) was simulated as a Bernoulli 
trial with the probability equal to Ppool (j). 
The prevalence Pr in an iteration was accepted if the sum ∑ 𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗 = 2𝑖𝑖 , as only 2 out of 144 pools were 
positive in the data. The simulation was run for 2,000,000 iterations to estimate the approximate 
posterior distribution of Pr. An approximate two-sided 95% credibility interval was (0.01%, 0.15%) 
based on 391 values.  
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Appendix 5: Expert Polling on Insect Transmission Routes 
Expert opinion on risk of HPAI transmission via insects and other mechanisms of local area spread 
was obtained via two separate online polls. A poll was conducted via Qualtrics®i between May and 
June 2018. Participants were recruited who had expertise and/or experience with influenza spread. This 
included poultry industry representatives, international experts, and some who work with other species 
(e.g., swine). A previous poll was conducted via SurveyMonkeyj between November 2013 and January 
2014 and was administered to industry and regulatory veterinarians in the turkey and broiler industries 
with field experience managing AI. In both polls, experts were asked to provide their opinion, based on 
previous experience, of perceived risk for given scenarios, however the 2018 survey also asked 
participants to draw on knowledge of disease outbreak spread (rather than experience alone).  
Compared to the 2013-14 survey, the 2018 survey targeted spread specifically to pullet premises. In 
both surveys, experts rated perceived risk on a categorical scale ranging from negligible to extremely 
high; qualitative risk rating definitions were provided and match those used in this risk assessment 
(with the exception that the 2013-2014 survey did not include a “very low risk” option and the 2018 
survey also included an “unsure” option) (see section 5, Overview of Data Analysis Approaches, for 
risk rating definitions). 
Below is the subset of questions from both polls that pertain to spread by insects with associated expert 
responses shown in Appendix 5 Tables 1-4 and Appendix 5 Figures 1-4. 
2018 Survey Questions 
Qa1. Please qualitatively rate the likelihood of AI t ansmission via insects from a known infected 
poultry flock (high prevalence of circulating HPAI virus) to an uninfected pullet flock located at 
distances specified in the table. Please select a risk rating for each distance listed. 
Qa2. Please qualitatively rate the likelihood of AI transmission via insects from an infected but 
undetected poultry flock (low prevalence of circulating HPAI virus) to an uninfected pullet flock located 
at distances specified in the table. Please select a risk rating for each distance listed. 
2013-2014 Survey Questions 
Qb1. Please qualitatively rate the likelihood of AI transmission from a known infected flock to an 
uninfected turkey flock via insects located at distances specified in the table. Please complete the 
following table, selecting a risk rating for each scenario as negligible, low, moderate, high, or extremely 
high, based on your expert opinion. 
Qb2. Please qualitatively rate the likelihood of AI transmission from an infected but undetected flock 
(lower prevalence) to an uninfected turkey flock via insects located at distances specified in the table. 
Please complete the following table, selecting a risk rating for each scenario as negligible, low, 
moderate, high, or extremely high, based on your expert opinion. 
  
                                                 
i Qualtrics© 2015 Provo, UT, USA. http://www.qualtrics.com 
j SurveyMonkey, Inc., Palo Alto, CA, www.surveymonkey.com 
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Appendix 5 Table 1. Expert responses (n=15) to the question of likelihood of AI transmission via 
insects from a known infected poultry flock (high prevalence of circulating HPAI virus) to an 
uninfected pullet flock located at distances specified in the table (Qa1). 
Distance 
from source 
flock 
 Likelihood rating  
Negligible Very 
low 
Low Moderate High Extremely 
high 
Unsure 
1 km 1 0 6 3 2 0 3 
1.5 km 1 2 6 2 1 0 3 
2 km 3 3 4 2 0 0 3 
3 km 4 4 3 1 0 0 3 
 
 
Appendix 5 Figure 1. Expert responses (n=15) to the question of likelihood of AI transmission via 
insects from a known infected poultry flock (high prevalence of circulating HPAI virus) to an 
uninfected pullet flock located at specified distances (Qa1). 
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Appendix 5 Table 2. Expert responses (n=15) to the question of likelihood of AI transmission via 
insects from an infected but undetected poultry flock (low prevalence of circulating HPAI virus) 
to an uninfected pullet flock located at distances specified in the table (Qa2). 
Distance 
from source 
flock 
 Likelihood rating  
Negligible Very 
Low 
Low Moderate High Extremely 
high 
Unsure 
1 km 1 5 3 3 0 0 3 
1.5 km 2 5 3 2 0 0 3 
2 km 5 5 1 1 0 0 3 
3 km 6 4 2 0 0 0 3 
 
 
Appendix 5 Figure 2. Expert responses (n=15) to the question of likelihood of AI transmission via 
insects from an infected but undetected poultry flock (low prevalence of circulating HPAI virus) to an 
uninfected pullet flock located at specified distances (Qa1). 
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Appendix 5 Table 3. Expert responses (n=8) to the question of likelihood of AI transmission 
from a known infected flock to an uninfected turkey flock via insects at specified distances 
(Qb1). 
Distance from 
source flock 
Likelihood rating 
Negligible Low Moderate High Extremely high 
1 km 1 3 2 2 0 
1.5 km 3 3 1 1 0 
2 km 6 1 1 0 0 
3 km 7 1 0 0 0 
 
 
Appendix 5 Figure 3. Expert responses (n=8) to the question of likelihood of AI transmission from a 
known infected flock to an uninfected turkey flock via insects at specified distances (Qb1). 
 
Appendix 5 Table 4. Expert responses (n=8) to the question of likelihood of AI transmission 
from an infected but undetected (lower prevalence) flock to an uninfected turkey flock via 
insects at specified distances (Qb2). 
Distance from 
source flock 
Likelihood rating 
Negligible Low Moderate High Extremely high 
1 km 2 1 3 2 0 
1.5 km 3 2 2 1 0 
2 km 5 2 1 0 0 
3 km 6 2 0 0 0 
 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
1 Km 1.5 km 2 km 3km
Nu
m
be
r  
 o
f r
es
po
ns
es
 (o
ut
 o
f 8
)
Distance from source premises
extremely high
high
moderate
low
negligible
Workin g Draft 
Pullets Out of the Barn Risk Assessment 
Page 202 of 296 
 
Appendix 5 Figure 4. Expert responses (n=8) to the question of likelihood of AI transmission from an 
infected but undetected (lower prevalence) flock to an uninfected turkey flock via insects at specified 
distances (Qb4). 
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Appendix 6: Live Pullet Movement Aerosol Modeling 
Introduction 
AERMOD352,353 is a regulatory model used by, among others, the U.S. EPA for air quality assessment. 
The model inputs include information on source location and parameters, receptor locations, and 
meteorological variables (such as wind speed, wind direction, and turbulence parameters), and outputs 
include concentrations at various receptor locations over selected time periods. The model can output 
printed summaries of, for example, high values by receptor, overall maximum values for each 
averaging period, and tables of concurrent values summarized by receptor. These values can then be 
used to generate outputs such as contour plots that depict the concentrations at the various receptor 
locations. The model can also generate a file of all occurrences when a concentration value equals or 
exceeds a user-specified threshold. 
Scenario A:  
Source and Receiving Flock Size 
The source infected premises (IP) in this scenario is a 25,000-bird HPAI-infected broiler house, and 
the receiving flock is a 100,000-bird pullet house. The weight of receiving pullets was assumed to be 
1.250 kg in this scenario (17 week old pullets) where the air intake per bird would be 0.49m3/day using 
equations presented in Lasiewski and Calder (1971).354,355 
Meteorological Parameters 
Meteorological data such as wind speed, relative humidity, temperature, etc. were obtained from 
Tupelo, Mississippi, for the year 2011.  
Aerosol Source Emission Rate 
The emission rate was directly estimated from the total suspended particle emission rate for a broiler 
house in the literature. Burns et al. (2008) estimated a mean particle emission rate of 2.78 ± 1.87 
kg/day-house for a broiler house with average placement of 25,000 chickens.356 Assuming that 50 
percent of the suspended particles were contaminated at an HPAI virus concentration of 105 EID50/g 
and a particle emission rate of 4.65 (2.78+1.87) kg/day-house, the aerosol source emission rate would 
be 103.43 EID50 per second (s) = 50%*4.65*1,000 g/day/(24*3,600 s/day)*105EID50/g. 
Particle Size Distribution 
Particle pollution, also known as particulate matter or PM, is a mixture of very small particles and 
liquid droplets in the air. Generally, the smaller the particle, the more likely it could be inhaled and 
cause health problems. The EPA is most concerned with particles less than 10 micrometers in 
diameter, as these are generally considered small enough to pass through the nose and throat and 
potentially enter the lungs.357 We considered that 41 percent of particles are PM10 and 27 percent of 
PM10 particles are PM2.5. The particle size fraction in this scenario was chosen using a conservative 
approach from the data points in Appendix 6 Table 1 to have a greater proportion of small particles. 
For particles greater than 10 µm in size, a diameter of 25 µm was used based on the mean mass 
diameter estimate from Redwine et al. (2002).358 
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HPAI 50 Percent Infectious Dose 
As mentioned in the literature review, we used an exponential dose-response model parameterized 
from data presented in Spekreijse et al. (2012). The specific data points from Spekreijse et al. (2012) 
that we included in our analysis are shown in Appendix 6 Table 2. In our analysis, we excluded data 
points where the concentration of HPAI virus was zero. We used a chicken air intake rate of 1.2 
m3/day/bird359 in order to convert the concentration into dose per chicken per day. 
The parameter for exponential distribution r was estimated to be 2.517*10-6/EID50. There is 
considerable uncertainty regarding the parameters as well as the shape of the dose-response model for 
the aerosol route, given the limited data (Appendix 6 Table 2). In particular, as aerosol may represent 
a very low-concentration exposure for a large number of birds, the risk estimate would be considerably 
lower if there existed a threshold dose below which the probability of an exposed bird becoming 
infected were zero. The exponential dose-response model is a “single hit” model without a threshold 
dose. 
Appendix 6 Table 1. Fraction of particles from poultry operations with size less than or equal to 
10µm (PM10) and 2.5µm (PM2.5). 
Study 
PM10 fraction of total 
suspended particles (%) 
PM2.5 fraction of 
PM 10 (%) 
Burns et al. (2008)356  
(background PM controlled) 41  
Roumeliotis (2010)360  
(background PM controlled)  15.6 
Wathes et al. (1997)361 10  
Li et al. (2008),362 turkey toms  11 
Redwine (2002)358  
(background PM not controlled) 5.9 (2.7-8.4)  
Takai et al. (1998),363 inhalable vs. respirable 
dust (background PM not controlled ) 13  
Li et al. (2009),364 layers 
(background PM not controlled)  10.5 
Roumeliotis (2007)365  
(background PM not controlled) 77 27 
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Appendix 6 Table 2. Data points  from Spekreijse et al. (2012) used to parameterize an 
exponential dose-response model through maximum likelihood methods.359 
Trial 
Concentration 
EID50/m3 Dose (EID50) 
Number infected  
out of 14 birds 
Trial 2 day 4 2.3 2.38 0 
Trial 2 day 5 2 2.08 0 
Trial 2 day 6 1.5 1.58 1 
Trial 2 day 9 2.2 2.28 0 
Trial 2 day 10 2.8 2.88 0 
Trial 4 day 2 2.5 2.58 0 
Trial 4 day 3 2.9 2.98 0 
Trial 4 day 4 3.5 3.58 0 
Trial 4 day 5 3.2 3.28 0 
Trial 4 day 6 4.1 4.18 0 
Trial 4 day 7 3.9 3.98 0 
Trial 4 day 8 3.5 3.58 0 
Trial 4 day 9 4 4.08 0 
Trial 4 day 10 3.7 3.78 0 
Trial 4 day 13 3.5 3.58 2 
Trial 4 day 14 3.7 3.78 0 
Trial 1 day 2 2.1 2.18 0 
Trial 1 day 3 2.9 2.98 0 
Trial 1 day 4 3.1 3.18 0 
Trial 1 day 5 2.6 2.68 0 
Trial 1 day 6 2.8 2.88 0 
Trial 1 day 7 2.9 2.98 0 
Trial 1 day 8 2.7 2.78 0 
Trial 3 day 2 2.4 2.48 0 
Trial 3 day 4 3.05 3.12 0 
Trial 3 day 5 2.7 2.78 0 
Trial 3 day 6 3.1 3.18 0 
Trial 3 day 8 3.51 3.59 0 
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Appendix 6 Table 2 cont. Data points  from Spekreijse et al. (2012) used to 
parameterize an exponential dose-response model through maximum likelihood 
methods.359 
Trial, cont. 
Concentration 
EID50/m3 Dose (EID50) 
Number infected  
out of 14 birds 
Trial 3 day 9 2.75 2.83 0 
Trial 3 day 10 3.28 3.36 0 
Trial 3 day 13 2.91 2.99 0 
Trial 3 day 14 3.50 3.58 0 
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Scenario A results:  
Scenario A results are shown in Appendix 6 Figures 1-2 and Appendix 6 Table 3. We can see from 
Appendix 6 Figure 1 that the predicted aerosol concentration is highest in the downwind direction and 
decreases sharply with distance. The predicted concentration is low farther than 2.5 km from the 
source infected broiler premises.  
 
Appendix 6 Figure 1 AERMOD model-predicted HPAI virus concentrations at various points 
downwind of a source infected broiler premises (Scenario A) 
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Appendix 6 Table 3. AERMOD model-predicted HPAI virus concentrations and daily exposure 
probability at various points downwind of a source infected broiler premises (Scenario A). 
                                                                           Distance from source (infected broiler premises) 
Outcome Variable 0.5 km 1 km 1.5 km 3 km 5 km 
Predicted HPAI concentration (EID50/m3) 0.55 0.19 0.1 0.04 0.02 
Predicted probability of exposure in a day 0.0633 0.0255 0.0122 0.004 0.002 
 
 
 
Appendix 6 Figure 2. AERMOD model-predicted daily probability of infection for a susceptible 
pullet flock located at various points downwind of a source infected broiler premises (Scenario A). 
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Scenario B:  
Source and Receiving Flock Size 
The source farm in this scenario is a 14,000-bird HPAI-infected turkey flock, and the receiving flock is 
a 100,000-bird pullet house. In this scenario, the receiving pullets were assumed to be 17-week-old and 
weighing 1.250 kg.366 The calculated daily air intake per bird was estimated  to be  0.49 m3  using the 
equations presented in Lasiewski and Calder (1971).354  
Meteorological Parameters 
Meteorological data such as wind speed, relative humidity, and cloud cover, etc. were obtained from 
Olivia, Minnesota, for the year 2011.  
Aerosol Source Emission Rate 
In this scenario, the aerosol source emission rate was approximated using air sampling data from the 
2015 HPAI outbreak. In these data, the CT values of 3 air samples from a liquid cyclone collector 
taken in a high HPAI prevalence turkey barn were 35.9, 34.2, and 33.9 for the EA/AM HPAI H5N2 
strain. We used a standard curve for EA/AM HPAI H5N2 from the Southeast Poultry Research 
Laboratory (SEPRL) (SEPRL, personal communication, Jan 2016) to approximate the HPAI 
concentration in an infected turkey house. We note that the standard curve may vary depending on the 
virus strain and lab processes and therefore the use of this standard curve is an approximation to 
inform qualitative ratings. Specifically based on the standard curve, the concentration in log EID50/ml 
was calculated as CT *(-0.30+13.43). Using this approach, estimated virus concentration per m3 of air 
was 2.67 log EID50. We used a ventilation rate of 3 cubic feet per minute (CFM)/turkey362 and 
estimated an overall emission rate of 103.96 EID50/s for a 14,000 bird turkey barn. 
Distribution of HPAI Virus on Different Particle Sizes 
The distribution of HPAI virus on different particle sizes was estimated using data on the number of 
RNA copies/m3 in different particle size stages presented in Torremorell et al.367 The first 3 columns of 
Table 4 below are directly based on data from Torremorell et al.367 (Table 4 results from Andersen 
Cascade Sampler). The fractions in the last column of Appendix 6 Table 4 were calculated by 
dividing the estimated RNA copies per m3 in a particle size stage by the sum of the RNA copies per m3 
across all the stages. The estimated distribution of airborne virus suggests that most of the virus is 
carried by large sized particles that tend to settle faster. 
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Appendix 6 Table 4 The concentration of virus on the different particle size stages and the 
proportion of virus RNA in a size fraction based on Torremorell et al. results.367 
Particle size stage 
lower limit (µm) 
Particle size stage 
upper limit (µm) 
Log RNA copies/m3 Fraction of particles 
in this stage 
0.01 0.4 2.939519253 0.00038 
0.4 0.7 2.568201724 0.00016 
0.7 1.1 2.62324929 0.00018 
1.1 2.1 4.342422681 0.00951 
2.1 3.3 5.041392685 0.04754 
3.3 4.7 5.342422681 0.09509 
4.7 5.8 5.653212514 0.19450 
5.8 9 5.322219295 0.09077 
9 - 6.113943352 0.56188 
 
HPAI 50 percent chicken Infectious Dose 
The infectious dose for this scenario (Scenario B) is the same as in Scenario A. 
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Appendix 6 Figure 3 AERMOD model-predicted daily probability of infection for a susceptible pullet 
flock located at various points downwind of a source infected turkey premises (Scenario B). 
 
Appendix 6 Table 5 AERMOD model-predicted HPAI virus concentrations and daily exposure 
probability at various points downwind of a source infected turkey premises (Scenario B) 
 Distance from source (infected turkey premises) 
Outcome variable 0.5 km 1 km 1.5 km 3 km 5 km 
Predicted HPAI concentration (EID50/m3) 0.76 0.27 0.15 0.05 0.02 
Predicted probability of exposure in a day 0.089 0.032 0.018 0.007 0.003 
 
Scenario C:  
This scenario is aimed at showing the impact of the uncertainty in the aerosol infectious dose. In this 
scenario, the 50 percent HPAI virus infectious dose of 104 EID50 was used instead of the 105.44 used in 
Scenario A. The rest of the inputs were not changed from Scenario A.  
Scenario C results:  
Scenario C results are shown in Appendix 6 Figure 4 and Appendix 6 Table 6. We can see that the 
AERMOD model-predicted transmission likelihoods are much higher and at longer distances when 
using a lower infectious dose. 
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Appendix 6 Figure 4. AEROMOD model-predicted daily probability of infection for a susceptible 
pullet flock located at various points downwind of a source infected broiler premises (Scenario C) 
Appendix 6 Table 6.  AERMOD model-predicted HPAI virus concentrations and daily exposure 
probability at various points downwind of a source infected broiler premises (Scenario C). 
 Distance from source  (known infected broiler premises) 
Outcome variable 0.5 km 1 km 1.5 km 3 km 5 km 
Predicted HPAI concentration (EID50/m3) 0.55 0.19 0.1 0.04 0.02 
Predicted probability of exposure in a day 0.83 0.46 0.28 0.11 0.05 
 
Scenario D:  
Source and Receiving Flock Size 
The source farm in this scenario is a 200,000-bird HPAI-infected layer flock, and the receiving flock is 
a 160,000-bird pullet house. In this scenario, the receiving pullets were assumed to be 17-week-old and 
weighing 1.250 kg366. The calculated daily air intake per bird was estimated  to be  0.49 m3  using the 
equations presented in Lasiewski and Calder (1971).354  
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Meteorological Parameters 
Meteorological data such as wind speed, relative humidity, and cloud cover, etc. were obtained from 
Olivia, Minnesota, for the year 2011.  
Aerosol Source Emission Rate 
High volume air sampling was conducted in and near an infected layer flock where birds experienced a 
high mortality during the HPAI H7N7 outbreak in Canada.85 Inside the barn, a viral titer of 292 
TCID50/m. was detected in air samples.  For HPAI H7N7 virus, 1 TCID50 is approximately equal to 10 
EID50 (D. Swayne, personal communication). We used an estimate of 103.46 EID50/m3 in Scenario C for 
the aerosol concentration in a severely infected layer house. A ventilation rate of 1 CFM/bird Liang et 
al 2005 was used to estimate the source emission rate. The resulting HPAI virus emission rate was 
calculated to be 105.43EID50/s = 1 CFM/bird* 200,000 birds*0.000472 (m3/s/cfm)*103.46 EID50/m3. 
Distribution of HPAI Virus on Different Particle Sizes 
The distribution of  HPAI  virus on different  particle sizes was estimated using data on the number of 
RNA copies/m3 in different particle size stages presented in Torremorell et al.367 The first 3 columns of 
Table 7 below are directly based on data from Torremorell et al.367 (Table 4 results from Andersen 
Cascade Sampler). The fractions in the last column of Appendix 6 Table 7 were calculated by 
dividing the estimated RNA copies per m3 in a particle size stage by the sum of the RNA copies per m3 
across all the stages. The estimated distribution of airborne virus suggests that most of the virus is 
carried by large sized particles that tend to settle faster. 
 
Scenario D results:  
Scenario D results are shown in Appendix 6 Figure 5 and Appendix 6 Table 8. We can see that the 
model-predicted transmission likelihoods are much higher and at longer distances when using a larger 
source population in this scenario. The predicted concentration is not low until farther than 12km from 
the source infected layer premises.  
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Appendix 6 Table 7 The concentration of virus on the different particle size stages inside 
an infected layer house and the proportion of virus RNA in a size fraction based on 
Torremorell et al. results.367 
Particle size stage 
lower limit (µm) 
Particle size stage 
upper limit (µm) 
Log RNA copies/m3 Fraction of virus in  
this particle stage 
0.01 0.4 4.61 0.01461 
0.4 0.7 3.08 0.00043 
0.7 1.1 4.30 0.00712 
1.1 2.1 4.28 0.00677 
2.1 3.3 4.98 0.03420 
3.3 4.7 5.40 0.08906 
4.7 5.8 5.63 0.15318 
5.8 9 5.74 0.19592 
9 - 6.15 0.49872 
 
Appendix 6 Figure 5. AERMOD model-predicted daily probability of infection for a susceptible 
pullet flock located at various points downwind of a source infected layer premises (Scenario D). 
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Appendix 6 Table 8 AERMOD model-predicted HPAI virus concentrations and daily exposure 
probability at various points downwind of a source infected layer premises (Scenario D) 
 Distance from source (200,000 bird layer flock) 
Outcome variable 0.5 km 1 km 1.5 km 3 km 5 km 
Predicted HPAI concentration (EID50/m3) 24 8.8 4.8 1.7 0.8 
Predicted probability of exposure in a day 0.99 0.82 0.6 0.28 0.14 
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Appendix 7: Expert Polling on Aerosol Transmission Route 
Expert opinion on risk of HPAI transmission via aerosol and other mechanisms of local area spread 
was obtained via two separate online polls. A poll was conducted via Qualtrics®k between May and 
June 2018. Participants were recruited who had expertise and/or experience with influenza disease 
spread. This included poultry industry representatives, international experts, and some who work with 
other species (e.g., swine). A previous poll was conducted via SurveyMonkeyl between November 
2013 and January 2014 and was administered to industry and regulatory veterinarians in the U.S. 
turkey and broiler industries with field experience managing AI. In both polls, experts were asked to 
provide their opinion, based on previous experience, of perceived risk for given scenarios, however the 
2018 survey also asked participants to draw on knowledge of disease outbreak spread (rather than 
experience alone). 
Compared to the 2013-14 survey, the 2018 survey included more detailed scenarios targeting spread 
specifically to pullet premises. In both surveys, experts rated perceived risk on a categorical scale 
ranging from negligible to extremely high; qualitative risk rating definitions were provided and match 
those used in this risk assessment (with the exception that the 2013-2014 survey did not include a 
“very low risk” option and the 2018 survey also included an “unsure” option) (see section 5, Overview 
of Data Analysis Approaches, for risk rating definitions). 
Table 1 displays the subset of local area spread questions that pertain to spread by aerosol transmission 
under two overarching scenarios: with and without depopulation activities happening at a source farm. 
Associated expert responses to these questions are shown in Appendix 7 Figures 1-10. 
Table 1.  Questions pertinent to aerosol spread from two online expert opinion surveys administered in 
2018 and 2013-2014. 
Q1 Please qualitatively rate the likelihood of AI transmission via aerosol to an uninfected pullet 
flock from a known infected 150,000-bird layer flock. In this scenario: 
• there are no depopulation or disposal activities happening at the source layer flock 
(i.e., assume only required minimal daily activities on the farm), and 
• winds are moderate. 
The uninfected pullet flock is located downwind from the infected flock at varying distances 
as specified in the table; please select a risk rating for each distance listed. 
Q2 Please qualitatively rate the likelihood of AI transmission via aerosol to an uninfected pullet 
flock from a known infected 150,000-bird pullet flock. In this scenario: 
• there are no depopulation or disposal activities happening at the source pullet flock 
(i.e., assume only required minimal daily activities on the farm), and 
• winds are moderate. 
The uninfected pullet flock is located downwind from the infected flock at varying distances 
as specified in the table; please select a risk rating for each distance listed.    
Q3 Please qualitatively rate the likelihood of AI transmission via aerosol to an uninfected pullet 
flock from a known infected 14,000-bird commercial turkey flock. In this scenario: 
                                                 
k Qualtrics© 2015 Provo, UT, USA. http://www.qualtrics.com 
l SurveyMonkey, Inc., Palo Alto, CA, www.surveymonkey.com 
2018 Survey 
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Q3 cont • there are no depopulation or disposal activities happening at the source turkey flock 
(i.e., assume only required minimal daily activities on the farm), and 
• winds are moderate. 
The uninfected pullet flock is located downwind from the infected flock at varying distances 
as specified in the table; please select a risk rating for each distance listed 
Q4 Please qualitatively rate the likelihood of AI transmission via aerosol to an uninfected pullet 
flock from a known infected layer farm (1 million birds, 5 houses) that is undergoing 
depopulation and disposal activities: 
• shortly after detection in the source layers (i.e., no clinical signs in birds; low 
prevalence of circulating HPAI virus; HPAI detected via active surveillance), with 
• outside disposal (carcasses placed into windrows for composting outdoors), and 
• high winds. 
The uninfected pullet flock is located downwind from the infected flock at varying distances 
as specified in the table; please select a risk rating for each distance listed. 
Q5  Please qualitatively rate the likelihood of AI transmission via aerosol to an uninfected 
pullet flock from a known infected layer farm (1 million birds, 5 houses) that is undergoing 
depopulation and disposal activities: 
• shortly after detection in the source layers (i.e., no clinical signs in birds; low 
prevalence of circulating HPAI virus; HPAI detected via active surveillance), with 
• strictly inside disposal activities (e.g., birds composted in the manure pits), and 
• light winds. 
The uninfected pullet flock is located downwind from the infected flock at varying distances 
as specified in the table; please select a risk rating for each distance listed 
Q6 Please qualitatively rate the likelihood of AI transmission via aerosol to an uninfected pullet 
flock from a known infected layer farm (1 million birds, 5 houses) that is undergoing 
depopulation and disposal activities: 
• after 3 houses are showing clinical signs (i.e., high prevalence of circulating HPAI 
virus), with 
• strictly inside disposal activities (e.g., birds composted in the manure pits), and 
• high winds. 
The uninfected pullet flock is located downwind from the infected flock at varying distances 
as specified in the table; please select a risk rating for each distance listed. 
Q7 Please qualitatively rate the likelihood of AI transmission via aerosol to an uninfected pullet 
flock from a known infected layer farm (1 million birds, 5 houses) that is undergoing 
depopulation and disposal activities: 
• after 3 houses are showing clinical signs (i.e., high prevalence of circulating HPAI 
virus), with 
• outside disposal (carcasses placed into windrows for composting outdoors), and 
• light winds. 
The uninfected pullet flock is located downwind from the infected flock at varying distances 
as specified in the table; please select a risk rating for each distance listed. 
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Q8 Please qualitatively rate the likelihood of AI transmission via aerosol to an uninfected pullet 
flock from a known infected layer farm (1 million birds, 5 houses) that is undergoing 
depopulation and disposal activities: 
• after 3 houses are showing clinical signs (i.e., high prevalence of circulating HPAI 
virus), with 
• outside disposal (carcasses placed into windrows for composting outdoors), and 
• high winds. 
The uninfected pullet flock is located downwind from the infected flock at varying distances 
as specified in the table; please select a risk rating for each distance listed. 
2013-2014 Survey 
Q1.1 Please qualitatively rate the likelihood of AI transmission from a known infected flock to an 
uninfected turkey flock located at distances specified in the table. In this scenario, there are 
no depopulation activities happening at source flock. Please complete the following table, 
selecting a risk rating for each scenario as negligible, low, moderate, high, or extremely 
high, based on your expert opinion.     
Q2.1 Please qualitatively rate the likelihood of AI transmission from a known infected flock to an 
uninfected turkey flock located at distances specified in the table. In this scenario, there are 
depopulation activities happening at source flock. Please complete the following table, 
selecting a risk rating for each scenario as negligible, low, moderate, high, or extremely 
high, based on your expert opinion.     
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Appendix 7 Figure 1.  2018 expert survey estimations (n=16) of the likelihood of AI transmission 
via aerosol to an uninfected pullet flock located at given distances downwind from a known infected 
150,000-bird layer flock. In this scenario, it was assumed that there are no depopulation or disposal 
activities happening at the source layer flock (i.e., assume only required minimal daily activities on 
the farm), and that winds are moderate.  Of note, no respondent selected the answer choice ‘unsure.’ 
(Q1) 
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Appendix 7 Figure 2.  2018 expert survey estimations (n=16) of the likelihood of AI transmission via 
aerosol to an uninfected pullet flock located at given distances downwind from a known infected 
150,000-bird pullet flock. In this scenario, it was assumed that there are no depopulation or disposal 
activities happening at the source pullet flock (i.e., assume only required minimal daily activities on 
the farm), and that winds are moderate.  Of note, no respondent selected the answer choice ‘unsure.’ 
(Q2) 
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Appendix 7 Figure 3.  2018 expert survey estimations (n=16) of the likelihood of AI transmission via 
aerosol to an uninfected pullet flock located at given distances downwind from a known infected 
14,000-bird commercial turkey flock. In this scenar o, it was assumed that there are no depopulation or 
disposal activities happening at the source turkey flock (i.e., assume only required minimal daily 
activities on the farm), and that winds are moderate.  Of note, no respondent selected the answer choice 
‘unsure.’ (Q3) 
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Appendix 7 Figure 4.  2018 expert survey estimati ns (n=15) of the likelihood of AI transmission via 
aerosol to an uninfected pullet flock located at given distances downwind from a known infected one 
million-bird commercial layer flock (5 houses) currently undergoing depopulation and disposal 
activities. In this scenario, it was assumed that time is shortly after detection in the source layers (i.e., 
no clinical signs in birds; low prevalence of circulating HPAI virus; HPAI detected via active 
surveillance), source farm is using outside disposal (carcasses placed into windrows for composting 
outdoors), and that winds are high.  Of note, no respondent selected the answer choice ‘unsure.’ (Q4) 
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Appendix 7 Figure 5.  2018 expert survey estimations (n=15) of the likelihood of AI transmission via 
aerosol to an uninfected pullet flock located at given distances downwind from a known infected one 
million-bird commercial layer flock (5 houses) currently undergoing depopulation and disposal 
activities. In this scenario, it was assumed that time is shortly after detection in the source layers (i.e., 
no clinical signs in birds; low prevalence of circulating HPAI virus; HPAI detected via active 
surveillance), source farm is using only inside disposal (e.g., carcasses composted in manure pits), and 
that winds are light.  Of note, no respondent selected the answer choice ‘unsure.’ (Q5) 
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Appendix 7 Figure 6.  2018 expert survey estimations (n=15) of the likelihood of AI transmission via 
aerosol to an uninfected pullet flock located at given distances downwind from a known infected one 
million-bird commercial layer flock (5 houses) currently undergoing depopulation and disposal 
activities. In this scenario, it was assumed that clinical signs were noted in 3 of 5 houses of source 
layers (i.e., high prevalence of circulating HPAI virus), source farm is using only inside disposal (e.g., 
carcasses composted in manure pits), and that winds are high.  Of note, no respondent selected the 
answer choice ‘unsure.’ (Q6) 
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Appendix 7 Figure 7.  2018 expert survey estimations (n=15) of the likelihood of AI transmission via 
aerosol to an uninfected pullet flock located at give distances downwind from a known infected one 
million-bird commercial layer flock (5 houses) currently undergoing depopulation and disposal 
activities. In this scenario, it was assumed that clinical signs were noted in 3 of 5 houses of source 
layers (i.e., high prevalence of circulating HPAI virus), source farm is using outdoor disposal (e.g., 
carcasses placed into windrows for composting outdoors), and that winds are light.  Of note, no 
respondent selected the answer choice ‘unsure.’ (Q7) 
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Appendix 7 Figure 8.  2018 expert survey estimations (n=15) of the likelihood of AI transmission via 
aerosol to an uninfected pullet flock located at given distances downwind from a known infected one 
million-bird commercial layer flock (5 houses) currently undergoing depopulation and disposal 
activities. In this scenario, it was assumed that clinical signs were noted in 3 of 5 houses of source 
layers (i.e., high prevalence of circulating HPAI virus), source farm is using outdoor disposal (e.g., 
carcasses placed into windrows for composting outdoors), and that winds are high.  Of note, no 
respondent selected the answer choice ‘unsure.’ (Q8) 
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Appendix 7 Figure 9.  2013-2014 expert survey estimations (n=8) of the likelihood of AI transmission 
to an uninfected turkey flock located at given distances from a known infected flock (size/type not 
specified) where there are no depopulation or disposal activities happening at the source flock.  Of 
note, the answer choices ‘unsure’ or ‘very low’ were not used in this survey version. (Q1.1) 
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Appendix 7 Figure 10.  2013-2014 expert survey estimations (n=8) of the likelihood of AI 
transmission to an uninfected turkey flock located at given distances from a known infected flock 
(size/type not specified) where there are depopulation or disposal activities (type not specified) 
happening at the source flock.  Of note, the answer choices ‘unsure’ or ‘very low’ were not used in this 
survey version. (Q2.1) 
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Appendix 8: Cross-Commodity Pre-Movement Isolation Period (PMIP) 
Prohibited activities during the PMIP: 
The following activities have a risk for lateral transmission of HPAI virus and are prohibited during the 
PMIP: 
• Off-farm disposal of mortality is prohibited. Producers must manage risks associated with dead 
birds on-site.  
• Off-farm removal of manure or litter is prohibited. Producers must manage risks associated 
with manure or litter Permitting of feed delivery from premises with poultry on-site will require 
PCR surveillance of poultry on premises sufficient to satisfy Incident Command.” movement 
on-site. 
• Off-farm garbage disposal is prohibited. Producers must manage risks associated with garbage 
storage on-site. 
• Visiting other poultry farms is prohibited for people who work on poultry farms. People should 
only have contact with their assigned flock(s) on a single premises. 
• All non-emergency visitors are prohibited from entering farms. All routine, or operational visits 
(excluding feed delivery) must be replaced by electronic communication, take place at a non-
poultry site outside the control area, or must be scheduled prior to or following the PMIP.  
• Entering a poultry house is prohibited unless the person is wearing footwear and clothing 
dedicated to the line of separation (LOS). 
• Pre-staging of shared critical equipment is prohibited. 
• Movement of non-critical equipment from off-site, onto the premises is prohibited.  
• Moving live poultry onto or off of the premises is prohibited. If necessary, movement of mature 
pullets should be modified to accommodate day-old chick delivery outside of the PMIP. 
 
Operational visits that may continue during the PMIP require specific biosecurity measures and 
may require a permit: 
• Feed delivery should use a dedicated truck and deliver directly from a stand-alone feed mill (no 
poultry on-site at feed mill). Trucks delivering feed or individual feed ingredients that are 
produced or stored on poultry premises will require a permit. Permitting of feed delivery from 
premises with poultry on-site will require PCR surveillance of poultry on premises sufficient to 
satisfy Incident Command.  
• Emergency fuel delivery and emergency repair or replacement of critical mechanical 
equipment.  
• Service visits to address changes in bird health.  
 
To Move Confined* Poultry During an HPAI Outbreak following the Secure Poultry Supply Plan, 
Producers Need to Implement a Pre-Movement Isolation Period (PMIP) Prior to Movement 
• Most activities that create exposure risks are prohibited 
• Only feed delivery and emergency operational visits to the premises may continue 
• Enhanced biosecurity for people and vehicles is in place  
Goal of the PMIP: Reduce the risk of HPAI transmission onto the farm prior to movement using enhanced 
biosecurity procedures 
 
*Confined poultry means poultry that do not have access to the outdoors 
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Specific biosecurity measures during the PMIP: 
In addition to standard biosecurity protocols, the following enhanced biosecurity measures must be 
implemented during the PMIP: 
• All people who are going to cross a line of separation (LOS): 
o Should shower and change clothes prior to or at the time of entering the premises.  
o Must wear necessary protective clothing and footwear dedicated to that LOS area as 
described in appropriate biosecurity protocols. 
• All vehicles and equipment entering the premises shall be cleaned and disinfected using a 
protocol acceptable to regulatory personnel prior to entering premises. 
o Driver must mitigate the risk of moving insects on and off the farm 
o Driver must mitigate the risks of contaminating themselves and their vehicle interior 
due to exiting and re-entering the vehicle. 
 
 
NOTE: When a Control Area is first established or is expanded, or when rapid/early marketing is being 
considered, PMIP biosecurity should be implemented as soon as possible and additional information 
may need to be provided to regulatory officials in order to obtain a permit in the event that a full PMIP 
cannot be implemented. (See PMIP FAQ for more information.) 
 
Originally approved PMIP document (i.e., PMIP FAQ):  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
TO MOVE BIRDS DURING AN HPAI OUTBREAK, PRODUCERS NEED TO AGREE TO 
A PMIP FOR A SET NUMBER OF DAYS PRIOR TO MOVEMENT. DURING THE PMIP: 
1. No live or dead poultry will be moved onto or off the premises. 
2. Only critical operational visits to the premises will continue. 
3. Manure, litter, and garbage will not be removed from the premises; 
the producer is responsible for managing the risks associated with 
any on-site movement that must occur.  
4. Enhanced biosecurity for people and vehicles; no off-site equipment 
will be pre-staged. 
GOAL: for producers to actively and effectively implement enhanced biosecurity procedures in 
the critical time period before live poultry is moved, thus reducing the risk of lateral HPAI 
transmission. 
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What is PMIP? 
• The Pre-Movement Isolation Period (PMIP) is a critical biosecurity component of the process 
to obtain a continuity of business permit that involves a defined period of greatly intensified 
biosecurity for an entire premises prior to permitted movement of live poultry. 
• The PMIP is a component of the Secure Poultry Supply Plan, which provides guidelines for 
poultry premises that seek to move poultry products or live poultry within, into, or out of a 
regulatory Control Area during an HPAI outbreak.  
What poultry movements require a PMIP? 
• The PMIP is required for these live poultry movements:  
○ Terminal movements (e.g., broilers to processing, turkeys to processing). 
 All out movements, and 
 Movements that do not remove all birds from a premises (e.g., multi-age premises). 
○ Transfer movements (i.e., live bird movements between farms) 
 All out movements, and 
 Movements that do not remove all birds from a premises. 
• These live poultry movements have a moderate to high risk of causing lateral disease 
transmission if infected but undetected poultry are moved. 
• Movement of poultry that are infected but undetected will have subsequent epidemiologic, 
regulatory, and economic consequences. 
What poultry movements do not require a PMIP? 
• The PMIP does not apply to day-old chicks or poults (however, a post-move quarantine does 
apply to these birds). 
• The PMIP does not apply to poultry by-products (except as specifically related to live bird 
movement). 
• The PMIP does not apply to eggs or egg products. 
When does the PMIP start and end? 
• The PMIP starts the specified number of days prior to the scheduled movement date and ends 
when load-out begins (i.e., the hours or days of load-out are not considered part of the PMIP).  
• The load-out period begins when the first crew, vehicle, or equipment arrives on the premises 
and ends when the last load of birds departs the premises. Pre-staging of equipment during the 
PMIP is prohibited.  
How long is the PMIP? 
• The PMIP takes place for a defined number of days immediately prior to the permitted 
movement of poultry. This period is as follows (determined by some combination of  95% 
probability of detection for the type of poultry, the type of housing [contact rate], and the 
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characteristics of HPAI viruses [mean death time], as well as by the ultimate consequences of 
moving an infected, undetected specific type of flock): 
○ For 8 days prior to movement of turkeys to processing 
○ For 5 days prior to movement of broilers to processing 
• Movements of other types of live poultry may not be advised or may require additional post-
movement quarantine. 
What operational visits to a premises may continue during the PMIP (when specific 
biosecurity measures are in place)? Please defer to designated regulatory officials to 
determine what types of movements require a permit in the Control Area; while these 
operational visits need to continue during the PMIP, a permit may or may not be 
required. 
1. Feed delivery in a dedicated truck directly from a stand-alone feed mill. Trucks delivering 
individual feed ingredients that are stored on poultry premises will require a permit. 
2. Emergency repair of critical mechanical equipment. 
3. Service visits to address changes in bird health. 
What is the specific biosecurity for these feed delivery and emergency operational 
visits? 
• People who have contact with other poultry must shower and change clothes before entering 
the premises and also wear necessary protective clothing and footwear as described in 
appropriate biosecurity protocols. 
• All vehicles and equipment will be cleaned and disinfected prior to entering premises. 
What activities are prohibited during PMIP? 
Activities that pose a risk for lateral transmission of HPAI virus are prohibited. Specific prohibited 
activities are: 
1. Off-farm disposal of mortality is prohibited. Risks associated with dead birds on-site must be 
managed. 
2. Off-farm removal of manure or litter is prohibited. Risks associated with manure or litter 
movement on-site must be managed. 
3. Off-farm garbage disposal is prohibited. Risks associated with garbage storage on-site must be 
managed. 
4. Visiting other poultry farms is prohibited for people who work on poultry farms. People should 
have contact only with their assigned flock. 
5. All non-critical visitors are prohibited from entering farms. All non-critical, routine, or 
operational visits must be replaced by telephone communication or must be scheduled outside 
of the PMIP. Non-critical visitors who work with or have contact with another commercial 
poultry operation (farm, hatchery, processing plant, etc.) or have contact with a noncommercial 
poultry flock (backyard birds, hobby farms with birds, or game birds) are prohibited from 
entering farms.  
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6. Entering a poultry house is prohibited unless the person is wearing clothing dedicated to the 
farm and footwear dedicated to the house. 
7. Noncritical equipment from off-site is prohibited from being moved on-site.  
8. Moving live poultry onto or off the premises is prohibited. 
Why is the PMIP critical? 
• The PMIP biosecurity requirements will minimize the likelihood of a flock being exposed to 
HPAI close to its scheduled movement date.  
• The PMIP will increase the likelihood of detection of an infected flock prior to movement of 
birds.  
• The PMIP will decrease the likelihood of moving infected but undetected poultry, thus 
reducing the risk of lateral transmission of HPAI virus from specific categories of live poultry. 
• The PMIP assists regulatory officials evaluating movement permit requests, since producers 
seeking permits will actively document, for the record, that they have achieved specific 
biosecurity requirements. 
How does the PMIP work?  
• Signs of disease take time to develop following exposure to and infection with HPAI virus.  
• If a flock is exposed to HPAI virus close to its scheduled movement date, signs of disease (or 
significant disease spread and mortality) within the flock may not be evident yet, and thus the 
probability of virus detection is relatively lower.  
• If the flock is exposed to and becomes infected with HPAI virus prior to the implementation of 
the PMIP, disease signs of HPAI are likely to be detected by the day of scheduled movement 
(i.e., by the end of the PMIP); thus, movement can be halted and the flock is unlikely to pose a 
movement-associated risk. 
What can be done for birds scheduled to move before a PMIP can be completed?  
• When a Control Area is first established or is expanded, some flocks newly in that Control 
Area may already be scheduled to move before a full PMIP can be completed. Additionally, 
rapid marketing to reduce the susceptible poultry population in a Control Area may be 
beneficial for HPAI outbreak control, provided that birds can be moved in a biosecure manner. 
In such situations, PMIP biosecurity measures should be implemented as soon as possible, and 
additional information must be provided to the designated regulatory officials to request 
movement prior to a full PMIP.  
• Additional information that must be provided to the designated regulatory officials includes: 
mortality and morbidity data, test results, destination premises location, farm visitor and farm 
activity records from the days prior to the Control Area designation, additional equipment 
requirements, route to be used for transport, defined load-out duration and situation, and 
defined biosecurity and downtime protocols for load-out crews. 
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Appendix 9: Supplementary Modeling Results 
Likelihood of Detecting HPAI in a pullet Flock Prior to Movement: Additional protocols 
The protocol evaluated in the main risk assessment document involving testing all dead birds in pooled 
samples of 11 swabs taken for rRT-PCR for 8 days prior to movement. The extensive testing under this 
protocol was required to obtain an acceptable probability of detection and duration of PMIP under the 
slow spread scenario. Appendix 9 Table 1 compares the results for  testing all dead birds with two 
other active surveillance protocols with daily testing of either one or two 11-swab pooled samples 
beginning 8 days before starting load-out. 
Appendix 9 Table 1. Likelihood of AI detection and mean number of infectious undetected 
birds for three different active surveillance protocols and four scenarios varying by the strain or 
contact rate. A 100% effective 8-day PMIP is assumed to have been implemented. 
 Active surveillance protocol 
Strain/contact rate 
scenario 
Testing all dead 
birds in pools of 11 
(up to a maximum 
of 4) 
Testing 2 pools of 11 
daily 
Testing 1 pool of 11  
swabs daily b 
Predicted detection probability c 
Mean number of infected undetected birds (5th, 95th percentile) 
PA HPAI H5N2 
(Fast Contact rate) 
0.99 
0.12(0,0) 
0.99 
0.12 (0, 0) 
0.99 
0.76 (0, 0) 
PA HPAI H5N2 
(Slow Contact rate) 
0.99 
0.08(0, 0) 
0.99 
0.10 (0, 0) 
0.97 
0.3 (0, 2) 
EA/AM HPAI H5N2: 
MTD 4.8; Fast contact 
rate 
0.99 
0.29 (0, 0) 
0.99 
1.1 (0, 3) 
0.99 
2.8 (0, 21) 
EA/AM HPAI H5N2: 
MTD 4.8; slow 
contact rate 
0.97 
0.42 (0, 3) 
0.96 
0.57 (0, 4) 
0.92 
1 (0,7) 
a Samples taken for rRT-PCR testing consist of 11 swabs. 
c Probabilities are estimated from 10,000 simulation iterations. 
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Likelihood of at least 50, 100, or 200 Infectious but Undetected pullets in a Flock at the 
Time of Movement following Exposure during Load-out 
The likelihood of at least 80 infectious but undetected pullets in a flock at the time of movement 
following exposure to HPAI during load-out was used in section 9.4.3 (Likelihood of Moving 
Infectious but Undetected Pullets Following Exposure during Load-out) to demonstrate that despite 
lower probabilities of detection, the likelihood of releasing large numbers of infectious but undetected 
birds is predicted to be low. Similar probabilities are provided in Appendix 9 Tables 2-4 for the cases 
in which at least 50, 100, and 200 infectious but undetected pullets are present in a flock at the time of 
movement. Appendix 9 Table 4 provides evidence that the likelihood of releasing 200 or more 
infectious pullets is extremely low. Similarly, Appendix 9 Table 3 suggests the likelihood of releasing 
100 or more infectious pullets would be quite low. The likelihood of moving at least 50 infectious but 
undetected pullets, on the other hand, is nontrivial in a couple of the cases given in Appendix 9 Table 
2 and reiterates the possible risk related to exposure during load-out and the importance of practicing 
the suggested biosecurity measures during this period.  
Appendix 9 Table 2. Predicted percent probability of at least 50 infectious but undetected pullets 
at the time of movement. PA HPAI H5N2 strain parameters were used in simulations 
Adequate 
Contact 
Rate 
Initial number 
of birds 
infected 
Days post-exposure 
2 3 4 5 6 
Predicted percent probability of at least 50 infectious but 
undetected pullets at the time of movementb 
Fast 
1 0.235% 3.943% 3.556% 1.442% 0.260% 
5 14.270% 5.380% 0.450% 0.030% 0.000% 
Slow 
1 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 
5 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 
aThe initial number of birds infected represents the level of contamination present on the load-out crew and equipment.  
bPercent probabilities are estimated from 10,000 simulations based on the Pennsylvania HPAI H5N2 strain and an active surveillance 
protocol of testing all dead birds (up to a maximum of 4 pools) daily via rRT PCR during load-out. 
 
  
Workin g Draft 
Pullets Out of the Barn Risk Assessment 
Page 235 of 296 
Appendix 9 Table 3. Predicted percent probability of at least 100 infectious but undetected 
pullets at the time of movement. PA HPAI H5N2 strain parameters were used in simulations 
Adequate 
Contact 
Rate 
Initial number 
of birds 
infected 
Days post-exposure 
2 3 4 5 6 
Predicted percent probability of at least 100 infectious 
but undetected pullets at the time of movementb 
Fast 
1 0.000% 0.465% 1.120% 0.633% 0.083% 
5 1.060% 2.740% 0.260% 0.000% 0.000% 
Slow 
1 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 
5 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 
aThe initial number of birds infected represents the level of contamination present on the load-out crew and equipment.  
bPercent probabilities are estimated from 10,000 simulations based on the Pennsylvania HPAI H5N2 strain and an active surveillance 
protocol of testing all dead birds (up to a maximum of 4 pools) daily via rRT PCR during load-out. 
Appendix 9 Table 4. Predicted percent probability of at least 200 infectious but undetected 
pullets at the time of movement. PA HPAI H5N2 strain parameters were used in simulations 
Adequate 
Contact 
Rate 
Initial number 
of birds 
infected 
Days post-exposure 
2 3 4 5 6 
Predicted percent probability of at least 200 infectious 
but undetected pullets at the time of movementb 
Fast 
1 0.000% 0.021% 0.290% 0.145% 0.042% 
5 0.000% 0.690% 0.110% 0.000% 0.000% 
Slow 
1 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 
5 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 
aThe initial number of birds infected represents the level of contamination present on the load-out crew and equipment.  
bPercent probabilities are estimated from 10,000 simulations based on the Pennsylvania HPAI H5N2 strain and an active surveillance 
protocol of testing all dead birds (up to a maximum of 4 pools) daily via rRT PCR during load-out. 
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Appendix 10: Pullet Industry Survey on Vaccination Practices 
A convenience sample of veterinarians and other managers in the commercial pullet growing industry 
was surveyed between January and March 2018 on standard practices for vaccination on farms that 
they manage or supervise. A total of 47 individuals responded to the survey. Respondents represented 
single-age pullet premises (n=12), multi-age pullet premises (n=35), and premises housing both pullets 
and layers simultaneously (n=10), with some respondents representing more than one of these 
management types. Surveys were administered by the University of Minnesota HPAI Team using the 
online polling service Qualtrics.m  
A convenience sample of participants with significant experience in the poultry industry was solicited. 
No additional analyses were conducted for these data beyond descriptive statistics. Still, the results are 
informative for the purpose of the risk assessment, and serve to illustrate the variations in industry 
practice and potential differences between types of premises that may operate in the same geographic 
area. As such, readers should note that absence of an affirmative response to a high-risk activity does 
not definitively indicate it is not occurring. The results of the survey are shown in Appendix 10 
Figures 1- 12. Of note, some survey questions included the option to write in additional information; 
some of this information has been aggregated into categories for analysis. Additionally, some 
participants declined to answer all questions within the survey. 
Size and makeup of vaccination crews 
Appendix 10 Figures 1-3 show the range of crew size (number of crew members) reported by 
respondents and the work assignments of crews relative to their status as ‘company-owned’ (i.e., 
internal employee) vs. ‘contracted’ crews.  
 
 
Appendix 10 Figure 1. Responses from representatives (n=44) when asked how many people make up 
a typical vaccination crew on their premises. 
 
Respondents noted that the type of crew (internal vs. contracted) and size of crew can vary based on 
the weather conditions, duration of vaccination activities, disease status of flock, personnel availability, 
and management system (e.g., cage-free). 
                                                 
m Qualtrics© 2015 Provo, UT, USA. http://www.qualtrics.com 
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Appendix 10 Figure 2. Responses of 
representatives (n=16) with company-owned 
vaccination crews describing the places those 
crews may work during normal operations; 
respondents were allowed to ‘check all that 
apply.’   
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 10 Figure 3. Responses of 
representatives (n=28) with contracted 
vaccination crews describing the places those 
crews may work during normal operations; 
respondents were allowed to ‘check all that 
apply.’ 
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Vaccination crew identification systems and biosecurity on pullet premises  
Appendix 10 Figures 4-7 provide information on current identification systems used on pullet 
premises, and biosecurity requirements for vaccination crews. It was also noted that in the event 
of a disease outbreak, additional measures may be put in place such as shower in/shower out 
facilities, shoe covers and single use coveralls, additional truck or van washing stations, routing 
changes for vehicles, procedures for foot sanitation between van and poultry house, and 
downtime requirements when working on multiple farms. 
  
Appendix 10 Figure 4. Responses of industry representatives (n=42) to the question ‘do you 
have an identification system in place with regard to vaccination crews?’. Types of identification 
(ID) systems specified by respondents include sign-in sheets, work shirts with name patches, ID 
badges, visual ID by managers/employees, biometric scan, and direct supervision of crews. 
60%
14% 12% 14%
0
10
20
30
Yes No In some
cases
Other/NA
Nu
m
be
r o
f I
nd
iv
id
ua
l 
Re
sp
on
de
nt
s
Is there a vaccination crew ID system in 
place?
Pullets Out of the Barn Risk Assessment 
Page 239 of 296 
 
Appendix 10 Figure 5. Responses of industry representatives (n=42) regarding the hygiene 
procedures for vaccination crews on their pullet operations; respondents were allowed to ‘check 
all that apply.’ PPE provided on-farm may include dust masks/respirators, gloves, boots, shoes, 
or shoe covers, coveralls or Tyvek suits, sleeves or arm covers, safety glasses, hairnets, baseball 
caps, footbath, and hand sanitizer. Some respondents noted that crews may bring their own PPE, 
including dust masks/respirators, gloves, shoes, and pants or shirts. 
  
Appendix 10 Figure 6. Responses of industry representatives (n=42) regarding verification of 
vaccination crew hygiene/sanitation upon arrival at a pullet operation. Responses of ‘in some 
cases’ were explained as either crews are asked to sign a document that they have completed 
hygiene activities (but this is not verified) or a foreman/supervisor/manager supervises or 
visually inspects for hygiene (but some noted that protocols are not always followed). 
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Appendix 10 Figure 7. Responses of industry representatives (n=41) regarding traceability of 
crews who work on multiple poultry farms. Of note, some respondents interpreted this question 
at the level of the crew, while others noted that the individuals making up a crew may change 
daily between tasks. Respondents noted that for contracted crews, traceback could be requested 
from the contract company or crew manager, or via verbal questioning of crew members at farm 
gate; however, confirmation of this data would be challenging. 
Use of vaccines administered via aerosol spray on pullet farms 
When asked if spray vaccinations are used on their pullet farms, 95% of respondents (n=36 of 
38) responded yes. Appendix 10 Figure 8 shows survey results of a follow-up question related 
to spray vaccine use. Out of the 35 responses to the follow-up question, 74% (n=26) report that 
the person administering the vaccine is supervised by a supervisor, manager, flock foreman, 
owner, or via occasional third-party monitoring, audits, vaccine representatives or veterinarians. 
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Appendix 10 Figure 8. Responses of industry representatives (n=35) to the question of who 
administers spray vaccine(s) on their pullet premises.   
Reusable equipment needed to administer spray vaccines includes the sprayer (backpack or cart 
model), respirator, water from a reverse osmosis system, coolers, ice packs, timers, and buckets to 
mix vaccine.  Some equipment may be barn or farm specific, while others are used on multiple 
farms. 20% of respondents (n= 7 of 35) report that some equipment, especially sprayers, 
vaccinators, and respirators, are difficult to adequately clean and disinfect between uses. 
Use of vaccines administered via water supply on pullet farms 
When asked if vaccines administered through the water supply are used on their pullet farms, 
46% (n=17 of 37) responded yes. Appendix 10 Figure 9 shows survey results related to water 
vaccine use.  Of those who use water vaccines, 88% (n=15 of 17) report that the person 
administering the vaccine is supervised by a supervisor, manager, flock foreman, owner, or via 
occasional third-party monitoring.   
 
Appendix 10 Figure 9. Responses of industry representatives (n=17) to the question of who 
administers vaccine(s) through the water on their pullet premises.   
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Reusable equipment needed to administer water vaccines includes the medication 
pump/injector/proportioner, tanks, barrels, buckets, and hoses. Some equipment may be barn or 
farm specific, while others are used on multiple farms. 18% of respondents (n= 3 of 17) report 
that some equipment, especially tanks, are difficult to adequately clean and disinfect between 
uses, and that hoses used to drain or prime water lines are usually rinsed but not disinfected in 
routine use. 
Use of vaccines administered via individual bird handling on pullet farms 
When asked if vaccines requiring individual bird handling were used on their pullet farms, 100% 
(n=37) responded yes. Appendix 10 Figure 10 shows survey results to a follow-up question 
related to individual bird vaccine use. Out of the 36 responses to the follow-up question, 100% 
(n=36) of the respondents report that the person administering the vaccine is supervised by a 
supervisor, manager, flock foreman, or owner who is present in the house or on-site, or via 
occasional third-party monitoring, spot checking, or serology to confirm vaccination. 89% of 
respondents (n=32 of 36) use crews that are certified in biosecurity practices, while others noted 
that crews are trained or instructed on biosecurity rules but not necessarily certified. 
 
Appendix 10 Figure 10. Responses of industry representatives (n= 36) to the question of who 
handles the birds to administer vaccines [requiring individual bird handling] on their pullet 
premises.   
Reusable equipment needed to administer individual bird (wing web, leg injection, or eye drop) 
vaccines includes the vaccine or injection gun, syringes, pliers, warming devices (such as crock 
pot), coolers, ice packs, carts, gloves, sleeves, replacement part kits for injectors, air compressor, 
hoses, catch panels, vaccine bottles and vaccine holders. Some equipment may be barn or farm 
specific, while others are used on multiple farms. 8% of respondents (n=3 of 36) use single-use 
supplies only. 6% of respondents (n=2 of 36) report that some equipment is difficult to 
adequately clean and disinfect between uses, and carts used are often made of porous wood, so 
disinfection cannot be confirmed. 
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Use of reusable equipment, personal items, and vehicles by vaccination crews 
Crews may arrive with tools, equipment, or personal belongings when entering a pullet premises.  
Additionally, they may arrive in personal or company vehicles. Appendix XX Figures 11–12 
show survey results regarding vaccination crew equipment, personal items, and vehicles. 
 
  
Appendix 10 Figure 11. Responses of industry representatives (n=38) regarding practices 
pertaining to use of vaccination crew supplies, equipment, and personal belongings when 
working on a pullet farm; respondents were allowed to ‘check all that apply.’  
Respondents noted that there is often a combination of on-site equipment that remains in a single 
house, is transferred between houses, and may come with crews. Premises may have a variety of 
mechanisms to discourage personal belongings from crossing the LOS, including locating a 
break room outside the LOS, direct observation, providing clothing for use on farm, and using a 
pass-through system where all objects passing through are disinfected. 
Protocols for crossing the LOS may be affected by weather (e.g., warm vs. cold tempearture, wet 
vs. dry conditions), duration of vaccination activities, or disease status of flock. 
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Appendix 10 Figure 12. Responses of industry representatives (n=38) regarding practices 
pertaining to vaccination crew vehicles when working on a pullet farm. Of note, participants who 
responded ‘other’ did not offer further explanation. 
Respondents noted that protocols for vehicle cleaning and disinfection may vary because of 
weather, use of different crews/companies with differing protocols, or disease status of flock. 
Insect mitigation measures are often weather dependent and dependent on fly populations. 
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Appendix 11: Poultry Industry Survey on Garbage Management 
Practices 
A convenience sample of veterinarians and other managers in the turkey (n=15), broiler (n=8), 
and layer (n=40) industries was surveyed between June and August 2016 on standard practices 
for garbage management on farms that they manage or supervise. Surveys were administered by 
the University of Minnesota HPAI Team using the online polling service Qualtrics.n  
A convenience sample of participants with significant experience in the poultry industry was 
solicited; however, this survey was limited by small sample size. No additional analyses were 
conducted for these data beyond descriptive statistics. Still, the results are informative for the 
purpose of the risk assessment, and serve to illustrate the variations in industry practice and 
potential differences between poultry sectors that may operate in the same geographic area. As 
such, readers should note that absence of an affirmative response to a high-risk activity does not 
definitively indicate it is not occurring. The results of the survey are shown in Appendix 11 
Figures 1- 19. Of note, some survey questions and answer choices were modified to better match 
the industry to which the survey was distributed. Additionally, some participants declined to 
answer all questions within the survey. 
Types of Items Disposed in the Garbage on Poultry Premises  
Appendix 11 Figures 1-3 show items disposed in garbage which may be potentially infectious 
or contaminated with HPAI in the event of an outbreak. Respondents answered the question: 
Which of the following are disposed of in trash/garbage on your premises (check all that 
apply)?o 
 
 
                                                 
n Qualtrics© 2015 Provo, UT, USA. http://www.qualtrics.com 
o Item abbreviated for graphic display (*). Full text prompt as used in survey: “Used needles/syringes/diagnostic 
supplies that have contacted birds;” “Household garbage from farm manager residence or any other residence” 
0 20 40 60 80 100
Dead wildlife/wild birds
Rodents
Mortality or poultry carcasses
Eggs or egg products
Manure
Spilled feed
Disposable chick transport boxes
Used needles/syringes/diagnostic supplies*
PPE
Feathers
Offal
Percentage of Responses (%)
Ite
m
s D
isp
os
ed
 in
 th
e 
Ga
rb
ag
e
Broiler Sector: Which of the following are disposed of in 
trash/garbage on your premises? (Check all that apply)
Appendix 11 Figure 1. Responses of broiler industry representatives (n=8) to types of items 
disposed in the garbage on broiler premises. Respondents in the broiler industry wrote in 
additional items such as boxes, buckets, jugs from disinfectants, litter treatments, disposable 
chick feeder lids, cans, and bottles. 
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Appendix 11 Figure 2. Responses of layer industry representatives (n=39) to types of items 
disposed in the garbage on layer premises. 
 
  
Appendix 11. Figure 3. Responses of turkey industry representatives (n=15) to types of items 
disposed in the garbage on turkey premises. Respondents in the turkey industry wrote in 
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additional items such as trash from farm manager residence, empty medication containers, poult 
box papers, and supply containers.   
Disposal of Potentially HPAI Infectious or Contaminated Items in the Garbage on 
Poultry Premises  
Appendix 11 Figures 4-7 show percentages of poultry industry respondents surveyed that 
reported disposing in the garbage potentially high-risk items, such as wild bird carcasses, poultry 
carcasses, and other items that may act as fomites. 
 
Appendix 11 Figure 4. Responses of poultry industry representatives to disposal of wild bird 
carcasses in the garbage (layer sector: n=40; broiler sector: n=8; turkey sector: n=15). The 
answer choice “not sure” was not available in the survey of layer industry representatives.  
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Appendix 11 Figure 5. Responses of poultry industry representatives regarding the frequency of 
disposing poultry carcasses in the garbage (layer sector: n=39; broiler sector: n=8; turkey sector: 
n=15). The carcass type (layer/pullet, broiler, or turkey) cited in the question matched the 
industry sector to which the survey was distributed.  
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Appendix 11 Figure 6. Responses of poultry industry representatives regarding disposal of 
poultry carcasses in the garbage in the event of an outbreak (layer sector: n=39; broiler sector: 
n=8; turkey sector: n=15). The carcass type (layer/pullet, broiler, or turkey) cited in the question 
matched the industry sector to which the survey was distributed.     
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Appendix 11 Figure 7. Responses of poultry industry representatives regarding disposal of other 
items that may act as fomites (layer sector: n=39; broiler sector: n=8; turkey sector: n=15). The 
answer choice “maybe” was not available in the survey of layer industry representatives.  
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Transportation of Garbage to Landfill  
Industry representatives indicated that most commercial poultry operations utilize an off-site 
landfill for garbage disposal (BWG, TWG; personal communication, May 2016). Appendix 11 
Figures 8–10 show survey results related to garbage transportation to landfill, such as use of a 
contracted service and the garbage truck route.  
 
Appendix 11 Figure 8. Responses of poultry industry representatives regarding methods of 
transporting garbage to landfill (layer sector: n=39; broiler sector: n=7; turkey sector: n=15). 
Respondents wrote in that some premises may use a combination of grower transport and 
contracted hauling services. 
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Appendix 11 Figure 9. Responses of poultry industry representatives regarding whether their 
garbage hauler collects waste from multiple poultry premises (layer sector: n=36; broiler sector: 
n=7; turkey sector: n=15).  
 
Appendix 11 Figure 10. Responses of broiler and turkey industry representatives concerning 
their awareness of other farms on the garbage truck route (broiler sector: n=7; turkey sector: 
n=15). This question was not asked of layer industry representatives.  
  
3%
61%
33%
3%
43%
57%
53%
47%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Yes No Not sure/Unknown Not applicable - no
garbage truck used
Pe
rc
en
t o
f R
es
po
ns
es
Garbage Truck Collects Waste from Multiple Poultry Premises
Does the garbage truck collect waste from multiple poultry 
premises before depositing the load at a landfill?
Layer Sector
Broiler Sector
Turkey Sector
71%
29%
40%
60%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Yes No
Pe
rc
en
t o
f R
es
po
ns
es
Other Premises on the Garbage Truck Route
Are you aware of the presence of other farms on the garbage 
truck route?
Broiler Sector
Turkey Sector
Pullets Out of the Barn Risk Assessment 
Page 252 of 296 
Location of Garbage Collection Area on Commercial Poultry Premises  
Premises often have dumpsters or a designated location where trash is collected for 
transportation to a landfill. Appendix 11 Figures 11–15 show survey results related to location 
of the garbage collection area on the premises relative to other features on the farm, such as 
poultry barns, other premises, and rendering collection point. 
Note that in Appendix 11 Figure 14, the option “no rendering used” was available to 
respondents in the layer sector. The low number of responses from the broiler and turkey sectors 
may suggest that some individuals declined to answer this question because it was not applicable 
to their premises. An additional question about biosecurity practices at the dumpster site was 
posed only to layer industry representatives (Appendix 11 Figure 15). 
 
 
Appendix 11 Figure 11. Responses of broiler and turkey industry representatives regarding the 
location of the dumpster or trash collection point on their premises (broiler sector: n=7; turkey 
sector: n=15).  
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Appendix 11 Figure 12. Responses of layer industry representatives (n=39) regarding the 
location of the dumpster or trash collection point on the premises.  
 
 
Appendix 11 Figure 13. Responses of poultry industry representatives regarding the distance of 
the dumpster or trash collection point from the nearest poultry barn (layer sector: n=36; broiler 
sector: n=7; turkey sector: n=14). In the survey of layer industry representatives, it was specified 
that the nearest poultry barn may be on the same premises or neighboring premises.  
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Appendix 11 Figure 14. Responses of poultry industry representatives regarding the distance of 
garbage collection from the rendering area (layer sector: n=36; broiler sector: n=3; turkey sector: 
n=7). A majority (75%) of layer industry respondents indicated no rendering is used (not shown). 
 
Appendix 11 Figure 15. Responses of layer industry representatives (n=34) concerning 
maintenance of the trash collection equipment/dumpster area.  
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Feasibility of Suspending Garbage Collection during PMIP 
Premises that wish to move product out of a Control Area during an HPAI outbreak likely will 
need to observe a Pre-Movement Isolation Period (PMIP), during which no non-critical 
operations (including off-site disposal of poultry mortality and garbage) are allowed. Appendix 
11 Figure 16 shows survey results related to the feasibility of suspending garbage collection 
during PMIP. The duration of PMIP may vary by industry sector and type of movement 
requested. In addition to the results shown, respondents indicated their answers may depend on 
the size of the farm and the duration of PMIP. For suspension of garbage services to be feasible, 
some respondents noted they would need more on-site trash storage.   
 
Appendix 11 Figure 16. Responses of poultry industry representatives concerning the feasibility 
of suspending garbage collection on the farm during PMIP (layer sector: n=36; broiler sector: 
n=7; turkey sector: n=15).  
Frequency of Garbage Pickup and Responsibility of Contracting Garbage Service  
The person responsible for contracting third-party garbage hauling services and the frequency of 
garbage collection on a poultry premises may vary by farm size and type of operation and are not 
uniform across the poultry industry. Appendix 11 Figures 17-19 show survey results related to 
frequency of garbage pickup and responsibility of contracting garbage service. 
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Appendix 11 Figure 17. Responses of poultry industry representatives regarding the frequency 
of garbage pickup (layer sector: n=36; broiler sector: n=7; turkey sector: n=15). Turkey industry 
respondents wrote in that frequency of garbage pickup may depend on the size of the farm and 
on some premises it is not pre-scheduled but occurs as needed.  
 
Appendix 11 Figure 18. Responses of broiler and turkey industry representatives concerning the 
responsibility for contracting garbage pickup/disposal service (broiler sector: n=7; turkey sector: 
n=15). 
 
31%
53%
11% 6%
86%
14%
7%
60%
7%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Daily Multiple times
per week
Weekly Every other
week
Once a month
Pe
rc
en
t o
f R
es
po
ns
es
Frequency of Garbage Pickup
How often is your garbage picked up?
Layer Sector
Broiler Sector
Turkey Sector
14%
86%
33%
53%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Integrator Grower
Pe
rc
en
t o
f R
es
po
ns
es
Responsibility to Contract Garbage Service
Who is responsible for contracting a garbage pickup/disposal 
service?
Broiler Sector
Turkey Sector
Pullets Out of the Barn Risk Assessment 
Page 257 of 296 
 
Appendix 11 Figure 19. Responses of layer industry representatives regarding the responsibility 
of contracting garbage pickup/disposal service (layer sector: n=36). Answer choices presented in 
the layer sector survey were modified from those presented to broiler and turkey representatives 
to better align with industry practices.  
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Appendix 12: Load-out Mitigation Measures for Pullets Off the Farm  
If load-out equipment and/or crew introduce HPAI virus to a premises, simulation modeling 
demonstrates that the probability of moving a small number of infected but undetected pullets 
(e.g., 20-80 birds) increases initially (e.g., over the first few days of a multiple-day day load-out) 
and then decreases once the detection probability increases (i.e., as more birds die due to HPAI 
disease). The SES WG has agreed to continue additional biosecurity measures throughout pullet 
load-outs at the premises level. Additional biosecurity and mitigation measures are summarized 
below: 
1. All PMIP biosecurity measures must be continued throughout the load-out process except 
that the load-out crew and equipment are allowed on-site (see Appendix 8): 
○ No off-farm movement of mortality, manure, litter, or garbage. 
○ No visitors (except emergency and feed delivery) enter the premises. Feed (or feed 
ingredients) delivered from a premises with poultry on-site requires a permit and PCR 
testing of the poultry on the premises where the feed/ingredients are produced or 
stored.  
○ All vehicles and equipment entering the premises shall be C&D using an acceptable 
protocol (this includes personal vehicles and vehicles transporting load-out crew). 
○ All persons crossing a line of separation (LOS), to include load-out crew entering 
barn to be loaded out, must use LOS-specific footwear and LOS-specific clothing.  
○ No pre-staging of equipment in a barn prior to beginning load-out in that barn. 
○ No movement of other non-critical (non-load-out) equipment from off-site, on-site.  
2. Additional load-out equipment, load-out crew, and barn-to-barn biosecurity must be 
implemented: 
○ Load-out trucks and equipment are C&D prior to first arrival at pullet premises.  
• C&D of load-out trailers and dollies must be verified upon first arrival at the 
premises (e.g., inspected for cleanliness by a person NOT with the load-out crew). 
○ Load-out dollies move only from the truck directly into the bird area of the pullet 
barn to be loaded out. 
○ The pullet barn must be completely empty at the end of the move. 
○ Load-out crews must shower and change into to clean clothes and clean footwear 
prior to or at the time of arrival at the pullet premises on a daily basis. 
○ Load-out crews only enter the barn in which they are working. Appropriate hand and 
boot sanitation must occur at the time when crossing any LOS. 
○ Every load-out crew shall have on-farm supervision throughout load-out activities 
(especially observing/monitoring what the crew does, including watching the crew 
cross the LOS and following barn entry/exit protocols). 
○ Crew using restrooms, lunchrooms, or common areas should not co-mingle with other 
employees. 
• A sanitation protocol is implemented for disinfection of common areas at the 
frequency needed to guard against cross-contamination (e.g., at minimum, daily). 
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3. Daily PCR testing is required of all pullet houses, 28-days and older, throughout the load-
out process. 
○ Negative results of tests taken within 24 hours of scheduled movement (at barn level) 
must be documented before birds are moved off the premises. 
4. The destination for the entire pullet flock being loaded out is a single location (no split 
flocks); that is, load-out trucks/equipment are only moving between the pullet premises 
and one other location. 
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Appendix 13: Modeling Technical Details 
This appendix provides the technical details for the methods applied in estimating the detection 
probabilities evaluated in section 9.4, Likelihood of Detecting HPAI in an Infected Pullet House. 
The probability of detection before the start of load-out and the probability of detection prior to 
movement to processing are estimated from simulation models consisting of a stochastic disease 
transmission model and active surveillance model. A description of the transmission and 
surveillance model algorithms can be found in Weaver et al. (2016).330 The models from Weaver 
et al. (2016) were reparametrized according to broilers for use in the analyses presented in this 
risk assessment.330 The derivation of the pullet-specific parameters is detailed in the section 
following the introduction.  
The probability of detection prior to the start of load-out as estimated from the simulation models 
is a critical component in estimating the overall likelihood of not detecting HPAI in a flock prior 
to the start of load-out. The overall likelihood combines the probability of two events: First, the 
probability a susceptible flock is infected given it is some distance from an infectious premises; 
and second, the probability the infection is not detected in the flock prior to the start of load-out. 
As previously mentioned, the second probability is estimated using the simulation models. The 
first probability, that a susceptible premises a given distance from an infectious premises is itself 
infected, is estimated using a spatial transmission kernel, which estimates the hazard rate posed 
by an infectious premises to a susceptible premises at a given distance. The two probabilities are 
combined into the overall likelihood following a method outlined in Weaver et al. (2016).330 Two 
different transmission kernels were used to estimate the overall likelihood: a transmission kernel 
derived from data on the 2003 HPAI H7N7 outbreak in the Netherlands by Boender et al. (2007) 
,a transmission kernel estimated from data on the 2015 HPAI H5N2 outbreak in Minnesota and a 
transmission kernel estimated from the 2015 HPAI outbreak in Iowa (Amy Delgado, personal 
communication).133 Details on the estimation of the Minnesota transmission kernel are given 
following an explanation of the estimation of disease transmission model parameters used in the 
simulation. 
Estimation of Transmission Model Parameters 
Adequate Contact Rate 
The distribution for the contact rate was chosen based on a literature review of estimates from 
experimental and outbreak data for chickens. Considerable uncertainty exists in the parameter 
estimates: (1) Contact rate estimates are highly sensitive to assumptions about the length of the 
latent period, and (2) estimates based on experimental data were generally lower.  
In the fast spread scenario, we used a uniform (1-2) per day as the distribution for the adequate 
contact rate (Spekreijse et al., (2011), Tiensin et al., (2007). As mentioned in section 9.4 
(Likelihood of Detecting HPAI in an Infected Pullet House Using Modeling Simulations), 
mortality and test result patterns consistent with slow or inefficient within flock spread have been 
observed in several pullet flocks in the 2015 EA/AM HPAI outbreak in the US (J. Erickson, P. 
Stonger-Lonsdale, S. Malladi; personal communication, March 2018). Specifically, in several 
flocks there was no observable increase in mortality for up to 9 days after initial detection via 
diagnostic testing. In addition, in some of the infected flocks, there was a pattern of intermittent 
positive and negative rRT PCR test results on progressive days after initial detection. These 
observed mortality and test result patterns are consistent with a low adequate contact rate. A slow 
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contact rate scenario was also evaluated for all the model results given these field observations. 
We used an adequate contact rate of Uniform (0.296 to 0.518) per day in the slow contact rate 
scenario (Bouma et al., 2009). For the PA HPAI H5N2 scenario, this contact rate results in a 
basic reproductive ratio R0 ranging from 1 -1.75. 
Latent and Infectious Period Distributions 
Due to a scarcity of adequate experimental data for Pennsylvania HPAI H5N2, the latent period 
distribution for this strain was estimated from a mixture of Pennsylvania HPAI H5N2 and HPAI 
H5N1 (multiple clades) experiments using a maximum likelihood method. HPAI H5N1 data 
from Bouma et al. (2009),123 Das et al. (2007),63 and Poetri et al. (2011),329 and Pennsylvania 
HPAI H5N2 data from Spackman et al. (2014)368 and van der Goot et al. (2003)121 were used in 
estimating the latent period for the Pennsylvania HPAI H5N2 strain. Except for Das et al. (2007), 
the experiments tested for HPAI in each inoculated bird at regular time intervals (e.g., daily or 
half-day intervals).63 The latent period is assumed to begin once the bird has been inoculated and 
to end sometime between the last negative test and first positive test for that particular bird. Let ta be the time of the last negative test and let tb be the time of first positive test, so the transition 
from the latent to the infectious period occurs in (ta, tb]. The probability of observing the 
transition in this time period is given by F(tb) - F(ta), where F is the distribution of the latent 
period, here assumed to be gamma distributed.  
In Das et al. (2007), pools of inoculated birds were periodically sampled without replacement 
and tested for HPAI. Let tc be the sampling time. The probability that the transition from the 
latent to the infectious period occurred prior to tc in birds for whom the test is positive is F(tc), 
while the probability the transition occurs after tc in birds testing negative is 1 – F(tc). 
Parameters for the gamma distribution were estimated by maximizing the cumulative likelihood 
of the observed transition from the latent to the infectious period in each inoculated chicken in 
each of the cited experiments. The likelihood was maximized using the “nlminb” algorithm, a 
bounds-constrained quasi-Newton method in R’s “optimx” function.369-371 The shape parameter 
was estimated to be 0.82 and the scale parameter was estimated to be 0.44. 
A similar method was used to estimate an infectious period distribution, assumed to be gamma 
distributed. The estimated shape parameter is 5.15 and estimated scale parameter is 0.656 on the 
basis of Pennsylvania HPAI H5N2 data from van der Goot et al. (2003) and Swayne et al. (2012) 
and experimental inoculation data from SEPRL (E. Spackman, personal communication).65,119,167 
As of this writing, limited data are available on the EA/AM HPAI H5N2 strain due to the relative 
recency of the outbreak. In an experiment performed at the USDA Southeast Poultry Research 
Laboratory (SEPRL), two mean times to death were identified in chickens, 3.2 days observed in 
8-week-old broilers and adult breeders, and 4.8 days observed in 5-week-old broilers (D. 
Swayne, personal communication, Oct 2016). However, bird-specific inoculation data, as were 
used in estimating the latent and infectious period distribution for the Pennsylvania HPAI H5N2 
strain, are not available. Since only the mean time to death is known, distributions from other 
strains were used to approximate EA/AM HPAI H5N2. The latent period distribution used to 
model EA/AM HPAI H5N2 for both mean times to death was estimated from HPAI H5N1 data 
available in Bouma et al. (2009), Das et al. (2007), Poetri et al. (2011), Spekreijse et al. (2011a), 
and Spekreijse et al. (2011b) by the same method used to estimate the Pennsylvania HPAI H5N2 
latent period distribution.123,329 106,171 The latent period distribution, assumed to be gamma 
distributed, has an estimated shape parameter of 0.8926 and scale parameter of 0.7145.  
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The infectious period distribution used differs depending on the mean time to death of the 
EA/AM HPAI H5N2 strain. To model the variability in the infectious period, the scale parameter 
of the Weibull distribution estimated for the Pennsylvania HPAI H5N2 infectious period was 
adjusted until the sum of the expected values of the latent and infectious period distributions 
matched the desired mean time to death. The shape parameter was kept the same. The resulting 
parameters of the Weibull infectious period distributions are a shape of 1.965 and scale of 4.70 
for the EA/AM HPAI H5N2 strain with mean time to death of 4.8 days based on experimental 
data from 5 week old broiler chicken (D. Swayne, personal communication).  
Number of pullets per House 
The flock size is randomly generated from a uniform distribution from 37000 to 308000, 
estimated from industry data.  
Estimation of Active Surveillance Model Parameters 
Daily Mortality 
Weekly mortality data for 100 pullet houses prior to movement and daily mortality from 33 
pullet houses for 4 weeks prior to movement were provided by the industry. Normal mortality is 
simulated by first selecting 28 consecutive days of daily mortality from one of the 33 pullet 
houses for which daily data were was available. The daily mortality is then rescaled by a random 
number generated from a lognormal distribution with a mean of -7.437 and standard deviation of 
0.8516 estimated from the weekly mortality data, thereby introducing variability into the daily 
mortality. A histogram of the simulated normal mortality is given in Appendix 13 Figure 1. The 
simulated normal mortality has a mean of 1.52 birds per 10000 with a 5th percentile of 0.10 and 
95th percentile of 4.66 birds per 10,000. Disease mortality is selected from the disease 
transmission model output.  
  
Appendix 13 Figure 1. Histogram of simulated daily mortality in a pullet house in the last 4 
weeks prior to movement  
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Diagnostic Test Sensitivity 
The sensitivity of the rRT-PCR test is estimated to be 86.5 percent, meaning there is a 13.5 
percent chance the infection will not be detected even when the pooled sample contains an 
HPAI-positive swab.372 AI experts noted this sensitivity estimate is conservative considering 
recent enhancements to test protocols.119 
Estimation of the 2015 HPAI H5N2 Minnesota Outbreak Spatial Transmission 
Kernel 
Spatial Transmission Kernel Model Comparison 
Four candidate parameterizations of the spatial transmission kernel were assessed for best fit 
based on the 2015 HPAI H5N2 Minnesota outbreak data using Akaike’s Information Criterion 
(AIC).373 The likelihood function used in the evaluation of AIC takes the form given in Boender 
et al. (2007).133 The resulting AIC values from the comparison of the four spatial transmission 
kernel parameterizations were all within 2 of each other, meaning none of the parameterizations 
is a definitive best fit. The same parametrization as was used in Boender et al. (2007) was chosen 
for use in the Minnesota outbreak analysis in order to make the two spatial transmission kernels 
be more comparable.133 The spatial transmission kernel is given below as a function of distance 
between susceptible premises i and infectious premises j: 
ℎ�𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� = ℎ01 + �𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟0 �𝛼𝛼 
ℎ0, 𝑟𝑟0, and 𝛼𝛼 are constants to be estimated from outbreak data, where ℎ0 is the maximum daily 
hazard rate (occurring when the inter-premises distance is zero), and 𝑟𝑟0 and 𝛼𝛼 determine the 
decline in the hazard rate as inter-premises distance increases from zero.  
Due to phylogenetic evidence of primary introductions occurring concurrently with lateral 
spread, an additional parameter was added to the force-of-infection equation from Boender et al. 
(2007).133,161 The force of infection describes the overall hazard faced by susceptible premises i 
at time t, and in Boender et al. (2007) it depends solely on the number of infectious premises.133 
The force of infection from Boender et al. (2007) is given below as a function of t: 
𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) = �ℎ�𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�1{𝑗𝑗 is infectious}
𝑖𝑖≠𝑖𝑖
 
This equation is modified for use in the Minnesota outbreak through the addition of a parameter, 
k, allowing for infection to occur independently of the number of infectious premises: 
𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) = �∑ ℎ�𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�1{𝑗𝑗 is infectious}𝑖𝑖≠𝑖𝑖 � + 𝑘𝑘  
Note that k is constant and distance-independent in addition to not being reliant on the number of 
infectious premises at time t. Therefore, k largely expresses the risk posed by distance-
independent environmental factors such as wild birds. However, as some of the risk from long-
distance movements of people and equipment may be captured by k, a third force-of-infection 
equation was evaluated with a constant, distance-independent parameter, 𝛿𝛿, that varies with the 
number of infectious premises: 
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𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) = �∑ �ℎ�𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� + 𝛿𝛿�1{𝑗𝑗 is infectious}𝑖𝑖≠𝑖𝑖 � + 𝑘𝑘  
Infection risk related to distance-independent movements of people and equipment and distance-
independent environmental factors is therefore partitioned between 𝛿𝛿 and k, respectively. The 
three different force-of-infection equations were compared using AIC. Adding k to the force of 
infection significantly improved the model fit based on the resulting AIC values. The addition of 
𝛿𝛿, on the other hand, resulted in a larger AIC (AIC = 1393.393 with k, compared with 1395.332), 
which suggests that the inclusion of 𝛿𝛿 is trivial, and that long-distance movements of people and 
equipment provide only marginal contributions to the risk represented by k. Thus, the force of 
infection with k only was chosen for use in the analysis of the Minnesota outbreak. 
Estimation of the Spatial Transmission Kernel Parameters 
The four parameters, ℎ0, 𝑟𝑟0, 𝛼𝛼, and k, were estimated following the maximum likelihood method 
approach described in Boender et al. (2007).133 The method depends only on inter-premises 
distance and premises-level infection status. As the exact days on which the infectious period of 
a case premises started and ended are unknown, a number of simplifying assumptions must be 
made. For the Minnesota outbreak, case premises are assumed to be infected eight days prior to 
the detection date. The infectious period is assumed to begin three days later, five days prior to 
the detection date. The infectious period lasts up to and including the day on which disposal of 
the depopulated poultry carcasses begins. The mean parameter estimates and 95% confidence 
intervals under these assumptions regarding infection status are given in Appendix 13 Table 1, 
along with the parameters estimated from the Netherlands outbreak by Boender et al. (2007).133 
Infection risk in Minnesota—with its higher mean hazard rate, significantly higher 𝑟𝑟0, which 
suggests higher infection risk persisted over significantly longer distances, and additional 
parameter k representing distance-independent environmental risk factors—would be expected to 
be considerably higher and less responsive to changes in distance, thereby posing an overall 
greater threat of HPAI spread.  
Appendix 13 Table 1. Mean estimates and 95% confidence intervals of spatial transmission 
kernel model parameters estimated from HPAI outbreaks in Minnesota and the Netherlands. 
Description 𝒉𝒉𝟎𝟎 𝒓𝒓𝟎𝟎 𝜶𝜶 𝒌𝒌(𝟏𝟏𝟎𝟎−𝟒𝟒) 
Minnesota 2015 HPAI H5N2: 
Case premises are infected 8 days 
prior to detection; infectious period 
starts 5 days prior to detection and 
lasts up to and including compost 
start date. 
    
0.0061 
 (0.0025, 0.0137) 
7.02 
 (3.07, 16.16) 
2.46 
(1.80, 4.38) 
3.2 
 (1.6, 5.2) 
    
Netherlands 2003 HPAI H7N7: 
Case premises are infected 6 days 
prior to the first rise in mortality; 
infectious period starts 2 days later 
and lasts until depopulation. 
Estimates from Boender et al. 
(2007).133 
    
0.0020 
 (0.0012, 0.0039) 
1.9 
 (1.1, 2.9) 
2.1 
 (1.8, 2.4) 
NA 
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Estimation of the Probability of Infection 
The spatial transmission kernel is used to estimate the probability that a susceptible premises 
becomes infected given it is some distance from an infectious premises through the force of 
infection. The probability that a susceptible premises i becomes infected on day t, 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡), is given 
below: 
𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) = 1 − 𝑖𝑖−𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) 
The mean parameter estimates from the Minnesota and Netherlands outbreaks are used to 
estimate the probability of infection applied in the estimation of the overall probability. Note that 
as the force of infection increases, the probability of infection increases. As the mean hazard rate 
is uniformly higher over distance, and with the addition of k, the force of infection is higher 
under the Minnesota outbreak model. Thus, the Minnesota outbreak transmission kernel poses a 
higher probability of infection, which then results in a higher estimated overall probability of not 
detecting HPAI in a flock prior to the start of load-out. 
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Appendix 14: Potential Mitigations to Lower Risk 
Moving pullets from premises in an HPAI Control Area is a high-risk activity unless significant 
mitigation measures are in place. Even with mitigation measures in place, risk will vary by 
specific pullet premises depending on many individual variables. Mitigation options to decrease 
risk are complex and potentially not attainable by all stakeholders, thus, with variable mitigations 
in place, the risk rating for moving pullets off a grow premises cannot be determined with 
certainty. Measures outlined in Appendix 14 Table 1 below are meant to assist industry and 
Incident Command when considering pullet movement off a premises in a Control Area and 
more precisely determine risk for a specific movement and conditions. Feasibility, verifiability, 
and potential level of effectiveness or unintended consequences for each measure should be 
taken into account. The extent to which risk is mitigated by the measures in Appendix 14 Table 
1 cannot be quantified; however, those mitigations that are expected to have a significant impact 
on risk are italicized and in bold print.  When mitigations are implemented, documentation and 
record-keeping are crucial, as it is unlikely that regulatory officials will have capacity to verify 
that all stipulations are met in real-time. 
This appendix may also be useful for situations where a complete 8-day pre-movement isolation 
period (PMIP) is not possible. Such a scenario is outside the scope of the Pullets Out of the Barn 
risk assessment, as a full 8-day PMIP is required for the risk ratings and conclusion of the risk 
assessment to be valid. For example, premises could be placed into a Control Area within a few 
days of a planned move, without sufficient time to implement a full 8-day PMIP. Another 
scenario could occur for some multi-age pullet farms where they may not be able to shift 
scheduled crew activities with younger flocks on the premises (e.g., vaccination or beak-
trimming) to avoid the entire 8 days prior to mature pullet flock movement (i.e., when a PMIP 
should occur). If crews or equipment are brought onto a pullet premises during the 8 days 
immediately before pullet movement, then the PMIP is effectively broken. Ultimately, 
movements requested without a PMIP should minimized. Additionally, combining movements 
into a single event should be prioritized.    
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Appendix 14 Table 1. Risk impact of various mitigation measures that could help lower risk 
when moving pullets off a premises in a Control Area. Mitigations that are expected to have a 
significant impact on risk are italicized and in bold print 
Scenario or Mitigation Measure That Could Help  
LOWER Risk 
Is the Scenario/Mitigation 
in Place? 
EQUIPMENT & VEHICLES 
Yes = Lower 
 Risk 
No = Higher 
 Risk 
Company-owned equipment is used for load-out and is only 
used for moving pullets (i.e., load-out equipment/vehicles are 
not used to move spent hens). 
  
Traceability of equipment and vehicles (past and future use) 
is feasible and in place 
  
Cleaning and disinfecting (C&D) of equipment and vehicles 
is effective (check all or fill in all that apply): 
• C&D (on-site or off-site) is conducted in a manner that 
limits cross-contamination between vehicles entering and 
exiting the facility. 
• Cleaning method ensures organic material (e.g., feathers & 
manure) is thoroughly removed. 
• Disinfection method follows manufacturers label directions 
for inactivation of avian influenza virus. 
• Adequate C&D is verified by an accountable individual not 
associated with crew. 
  
In addition to vehicles being cleaned and disinfected (C&D) 
before entering a pullet premises (a PMIP requirement), 
vehicle wheels and undercarriage are also C&D after leaving 
the pullet premises before going on road to another destination.  
Adequate C&D is verified by an accountable party. 
  
In addition to standard “at the gate” vehicle C&D during an 
outbreak, load-out vehicles and batteries are also C&D after 
leaving a layer complex before returning to the pullet premises 
to pick up another load of pullets.  
Adequate C&D is verified by an accountable party.  
  
Off-farm equipment and vehicles used by crews have 
sufficient downtime (i.e., >72 hours) between last use and 
use on the pullet premises. 
  
Crew equipment (e.g., vaccination equipment, beak-trimming 
equipment) is farm-specific and in place 8 or more days before 
the scheduled movement date. 
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Scenario or Mitigation Measure That Could Help  
LOWER Risk 
Is the Scenario/Mitigation 
in Place? 
PEOPLE 
Yes = Lower 
 Risk 
No = Higher 
 Risk 
Crewmembers are all dedicated ‘in-house’ employees (i.e., 
crewmembers do not work on other farms). 
  
Dedicated load-out crews are used (i.e., load-out crewmembers 
do not also move spent hens, rather they only move pullets). 
  
All crewmembers receive training in biosecurity protocols.   
Traceability of all crewmembers (past and future work 
locations) is feasible and in place. 
  
All necessary personal protective equipment (PPE) for crews 
and other needs such as personal items must be on-site and 
food and refreshments are company-controlled for 8 or more 
days prior to movement date.  
  
Crewmembers (i.e., all visiting personnel) have sufficient 
downtime (i.e., >72 hours) between last poultry contact or 
poultry premises contact and current pullet premises work.  
• Assuring minimum downtime requires a means of 
verification and known work history (see “People 
Considerations” section below table). 
• If crews are paid to observe downtime, they may need to 
be housed in a hotel or location distant from the Control 
Area to limit potential cross-contamination with 
individuals responding to the outbreak. 
  
Crews start work (e.g., on vaccination) 8 or more days before 
any pullets are to be moved (i.e., before all other PMIP 
mitigations begin).  
  
All visitors must shower in/shower out when working on the 
pullet premises. 
  
All personnel and visitors must use farm-dedicated clothing 
and footwear. 
  
Crew size is limited to the fewest necessary individuals to 
complete a task. 
  
An identification system is in use to verify daily compliance. 
Compliance should be verified at the farm gate. 
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Scenario or Mitigation Measure That Could Help  
LOWER Risk, continued 
Is the Scenario/Mitigation 
in Place? 
PREMISES  
Yes = Lower 
 Risk 
No = Higher 
 Risk 
Pullet premises is located more than 3 km from an infected 
premises (i.e., out of the Infected Zone). 
(see also “Geographic Considerations” section below table.) 
  
Pullet flock being moved is small (i.e., requires short load-out 
with small crew). 
  
The perimeter buffer area (PBA) is adequately sized, provides 
adequate buffer space surrounding pullet housing, and 
observance is strictly enforced. Vehicles, other than those 
associated with emergency or the designated bird move, must 
not travel beyond the PBA. Insect control for vehicles crossing 
the PBA must be in place. 
  
Pullets are being moved to a single-age premises (i.e., load-out 
trucks are not moving between pullet premises and a multi-age 
premises). 
  
OTHER 
Yes = Lower 
 Risk 
No = Higher 
 Risk 
All other PMIP and load-out measures are utilized as described 
in Appendices 7 and 11 (e.g., only variance is allowing 
vaccination or beak-trimming crew on-site to work in other 
pullet houses – not the pullet house being moved). 
  
PCR surveillance beyond the standard permit requirements 
(i.e., daily testing of all pullet houses, 28-days and older, 
throughout PMIP and load-out) are implemented: 
• Where crew/equipment work history is known, flocks of 
previous contact undergo PCR surveillance to increase 
the confidence that previous flocks/premises are not 
likely to have heavily contaminated the crew/equipment 
to be brought onto the pullet farm. 
  
Route used to move pullets avoids all known poultry premises.   
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Geographic Considerations 
It is likely that the amount of potential HPAI virus contamination within a Control Area will vary 
based on a number of conditions. The following factors do not represent a comprehensive list; 
rather, they represent some issues to consider when analyzing the potential risk of environmental 
contamination within a Control Area. 
• Type of Operations within Control Area. The types of operations, size of flocks, and 
number of Infected Premises within a Control Area affect the amount of virus production 
and thus contamination within the Control Area. The type and number of Infected 
Premises may also influence the number of people engaged in control efforts, where 
more, larger or more complex Infected Premises within an area will increase the number 
of responders required. 
• Farm Density. The density of poultry farms may affect the risk of environmental spread, 
where farms in high-density regions have an increased risk comparative to low-density 
regions (Boender et al., 2007;133 Bonney et al., 2018).374 
• Distance. The distance between a farm which seeks to move pullets off the premises and 
its closest neighbor farm may vary; it is assumed that fewer or no near neighbors with 
poultry may decrease the risk of environmental contamination (and thus potential source 
of exposure) comparative to farms with close neighbors. 
• Community Resources. The community shared resources (e.g., churches, schools, gas 
stations, restaurants, farm supply or convenience stores) and availability of hotel space 
for people engaged in control efforts are potential areas for cross-contamination between 
those working on Infected Premises and those working on pullet premises.   
○ In the 2014-2015 HPAI outbreak in the Midwestern US, limited availability of local 
housing accommodations resulted in proven risk for cross-contamination in the 
community; samples taken from the floor of a hotel lobby where outbreak responders 
were staying were PCR positive for HPAI virus (C. Cardona, personal 
communication, August 2018) 
• Weather. Season and climate conditions can impact virus survival; HPAI virus survival 
is longer at lower temperatures, when shielded in fomites (e.g., from UV light), and in 
humid conditions. Inclement weather and season may also impact effectiveness of 
cleaning and disinfection protocols. In addition, changes in wind speed and precipitation 
may impact virus spread. 
Vehicle and Equipment Considerations 
• Crew vehicles may or may not cross into the perimeter buffer area (PBA); on some 
premises, effective C&D of vehicles (other than load-out) may not be verified (SES WG, 
personal communication, March 2018). 
• Effectiveness of vehicle and equipment C&D needs to be considered and verified; 
feathers and manure should be thoroughly removed during the cleaning process. 
○ HPAI virus concentrations in feathers, feces, and blood from HPAI-infected poultry 
generally range between 103 and 108 EID50 per gram or per milliliter (mL) of tested 
substrate. 
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○ HPAI virus can be present in high concentration in feathers and can persist beyond 12 
days (personal communication, E. Spackman, August 2018). 
• Disinfectant should be applied following manufacturer recommended conditions 
including contact time, temperature, and pH. 
• Measures should be taken to avoid cross contamination of vehicles and equipment during 
and after cleaning (e.g., from incoming vehicles/equipment). 
• If crew use personal vehicles, they must also follow the same C&D guidelines. 
People Considerations 
During a PMIP, visitors are prohibited from entering a pullet-growing premises unless they are 
necessary feed delivery visits or emergency visits to address changes in bird health or equipment 
failure (see Appendix 8: Cross-Commodity Pre-Movement Isolation Period). Activities such as 
beak trimming and administering vaccines that require individual-bird handling, are usually 
accomplished by crews that do not work on that particular pullet premises full-time and thus are 
prohibited during a PMIP. As crew visits represent a known risk for HPAI virus introduction into 
a flock and consequently represent a high risk if they occur close to movement, crew visits 
during the 8 days prior to pullet movement (i.e., when a PMIP should take place) were not 
assessed in the Pullets Out of the Barn risk assessment.   
• Crew members may become contaminated while working on a previous farm (either 
known positive or infected but undetected).   
○ In some cases, personnel that make up a given crew may change depending on 
availability and job requirements, and identifying previously visited premises may be 
challenging or nearly impossible due to the available resource restraints in the face of 
an outbreak (SES WG, personal communication, March 2018). In a survey of pullet 
industry representatives, identification systems for crews vary and may not be in 
place or may lack verification on some premises (See Appendix 10, Pullet Industry 
Survey on Vaccination Practices for full report). 
○ In a survey of pullet industry representatives, approximately 2/3 of respondents 
reported using contracted vaccination crews; these crews may work with other types 
of poultry and/or on premises managed by multiple companies (See Appendix 10, 
Pullet Industry Survey on Vaccination Practices for full report). 
○ Poultry workers with bird handling experience may be used in depopulation activities 
in addition to vaccination activities or may be working at another farm without 
authorization. 
○ In the 2014-15 HPAI outbreak, there was at least one report of employees from other 
farms visiting infected premises to watch the depopulation procedures (personal 
communication, C. Cardona, August 2018). 
• Crew members could be contaminated while at other community sites where cross-
contamination has occurred (see “Geographic Considerations” section above).  
○ Crew members may be exposed to poultry at their home residence.   
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 It is known that in some locations, persons who work on multiple different poultry 
premises may reside in the same residence (personal communication, SES WG, 
June 2018). 
○ Poultry workers from both Infected Premises and other poultry premises in the 
Control Area were known to have participated in recreational soccer games together 
during the 2014-2015 outbreak (P. Stonger, personal communication, August 2018). 
• Crew members may enter some pullet premises carrying contaminated fomites such as 
personal belongings, PPE, or beak trimming or vaccination equipment. The risk increases 
if this contaminated person crosses a LOS and comes into contact with poultry on the 
pullet farm.  
○ Crew members may share clothes, shoes, or other supplies with other farm workers 
(SES WG, personal communication, March 2018). 
○ Some equipment used for vaccination procedures is shared between multiple premises 
and can be difficult to disinfect (SES WG, personal communication, March 2018). 
This may include, but is not limited to, air compressors, movement carts, washing or 
cleaning equipment, hoses, respirators, or beak trimming equipment (see Appendix 
10, Pullet Industry Survey on Vaccination Practices). 
• Facilities sufficient to limit contact between regular employees and visiting crew may be 
limited on some farms. Potential areas for cross-contamination include hallways, break 
rooms, and restroom facilities. 
• Models show that risk of infection transmission increases as the number of people in a 
crew increases, or as the duration of crew activities (e.g., the number of days working on 
pullet farm during PMIP) increases (Appendix 14 Figure 1). 
○ Direct data to estimate the probability of transmission per crew member is not 
available. In this case, exploratory models can be useful to illustrate how the overall 
probability of transmission increases as the crew size or the duration of crew 
activities increases. Ssematimba et al., 2012 estimated that a general professional 
contact would likely result in 2% or higher probability of transmission when they 
visit an infectious farm based on HPAI outbreak data in Netherlands.81 Suppose the 
probability of transmission via a single crew member (who may potentially have had 
contact with infectious poultry or material) working for a day is pcr. Then the overall 
probability of infection via a n member crew working for d days is given by Ptotal= 1-
(1-pcr)n d. This equation assumes that there is no decrease in the probability of 
transmission over successive days the crew works on the pullet premises. Appendix 
14 Figure 1 shows how the probability of transmission (Ptotal) can add up as the crew 
size and duration increases under two scenarios. 
○ For example, if the probability of transmission via a single crewmember on 1 day is 
0.005 (0.5%), then the probability of transmission for 75 person-visits (estimate for 
15 crewmembers working over 5 days) would be 0.31 (31%). (Appendix 14 Figure 
1a). In an alternate scenario, if the probability of transmission via a professional 
contact was 2% and there were 10 such contacts in a farm, then the overall risk would 
be ~ 18%. (Appendix 14 Figure 1b).  
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Appendix 14 Figure 1.  a. and b.  The probability of HPAI transmission increases both 
as the number of individuals in a crew increases, and as the duration of work on a farm 
during PMIP increases. Of note, this assumes the individuals making up a crew remains 
constant from day to day and individuals visit no other premises during this time. 
• The likelihood of HPAI transmission via crew would be arguably lower on each 
successive day after the crew had last worked on a previous farm (which may have been 
infected). While direct data to quantify the extent of virus contamination on crew is not 
available, exploratory modeling can show the impact of virus decay and the value of 
beginning vaccination of a farm at least 8 days before movement. We evaluated an 
exploratory modeling scenario where it was considered that virus concentration 
externally present on crew members or fomites decays during subsequent days of crew 
work (i.e., the level of potential contamination on vaccination crew, equipment, and 
associated fomites might be highest on first day of work).  
○ We used the single parameter exponential dose response model for infection of 
chicken with HPAI viruses. There is considerable variability among the 50 percent 
chicken infectious dose for HPAI viruses. Swayne and Slemons found the chicken 
infectious dose to vary from 101.2-104.7 EID50 via intranasal route.105 For this analysis, 
we used a 50% infectious dose of 103.5 EID50 as a central value resulting in the 
parameter r of the exponential dose response model of 0.000219. 
○ The virus decay rate in feces and other organic material is dependent on 
environmental conditions such as temperature and moisture content. In a literature 
review performed for a previous risk assessment, several studies (e.g., Wood et al., 
2010) suggest more than 1 log EID50 per day inactivation at room temperature.271  
○ To illustrate the impact of virus decay, we considered a hypothetical scenario with a 
15-person crew and a 2% likelihood of transmission per day per crew member. The 
likelihood of transmission depends on the likelihood of exposing one or more birds 
and the exposure dose for each bird. We assumed that each crew member exposes 5 
birds to 18.44 EID50 resulting in an overall likelihood of transmission of 0.02 =1-exp 
(-0.000219*5*18.44) according to the exponential dose response model.  
○ Appendix 14 Table 2 shows the results on the impact of the decay of HPAI virus at 
room temperature on the likelihood of exposure on various days after the crew last 
b. a. 
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worked on an infected farm in an exploratory model scenario. When virus decay is 
not considered, the likelihood of exposure remains constant on different days the 
crew work on. With a conservative decay rate of 1 log EID50 per day, there is a 
substantial decrease in the probability of exposure on each successive day after the 
crew last worked with a potentially infectious flock. These results suggest that 
downtime after working on a previous pullet premises can help reduce the likelihood 
of transmission via crew. However, we note that downtime may have a lesser impact 
if there is gross contamination at levels much higher than the 50% infectious dose 
(e.g., fresh feces). In that case, the probability of transmission may remain high even 
after virus decay due to downtime because of the high initial virus concentration.  
Appendix 14 Table 2.  Impact of the decay of HPAI virus at room temperature on the likelihood 
of exposure of a pullet flock on various days after the crew last worked on an infected farm in an 
exploratory model scenario 
Day(s) after crew  
last worked on a 
different infected farm 
Likelihood of exposure without 
virus decay over different days 
crew work on 
Likelihood of exposure with 
decay: room temperature 1 log 
EID50 per day 
1 Person 15 Persons 1 Person 15 Persons 
1 2.000% 26.143% 2.000% 26.145% 
2 2.000% 26.143% 0.202% 2.985% 
3 2.000% 26.143% 0.020% 0.303% 
4 2.000% 26.143% 0.002% 0.030% 
5 2.000% 26.143% 0.000% 0.003% 
6 2.000% 26.143% 0.000% 0.000% 
 
• The likelihood of a pullet flock becoming exposed via crewmembers resulting in 
movement of infected and undetected birds is dependent on the days prior to movement 
that the crew worked on. Given active surveillance with daily testing of all dead birds on 
the premises (in flocks older than 28 days), the chances of detection are considerably 
higher when exposure occurs several days prior to movement. It is therefore preferred 
that a non-load out crew (e.g., vaccination crew) does not work with pullet flocks close to 
movement so that there is adequate time for any potential exposures to be detected. 
Appendix 14 Table 3 shows the overall likelihood of exposure via crew and HPAI not 
being detected by the time of movement when testing all dead birds (up to a maximum of 
4 pools) daily under the exploratory modeling scenario. The Pennsylvania HPAI strain 
characteristics and slow contact rate parameters were used to obtain these results. From 
the results shown in Table 3, the likelihood of exposure via crew and subsequent 
movement of infected and undetected birds can decrease considerably when the decay of 
virus concentration at room temperature is considered. The likelihood of moving infected 
and undetected birds is much lower when crew start work on the farm at least 8 days 
prior to movement (in cases where PMIP is not followed). This is because there is a 
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greater chance of detection in this case due to the longer interval between the day crew 
first start working (where virus concentration and flock exposure is more likely) and the 
time of movement.  
Appendix 14 Table 3.  The overall likelihood of exposure via crew and HPAI not being detected 
by the time of movement when testing all dead birds (up to a maximum of 4 pools) daily under 
the exploratory modeling scenario 
Days prior to movement 
the crew worked on 
vaccinating 
No Decay of 
virus over 
different days 
Decay of Virus at 
room Temperature 
(1 log per day) 
Decay of Virus at 
somewhat colder temp 
(0.5 log per day) 
12 to 9 0.175% 0.026% 0.042% 
8 to 5 5.4% 0.64% 1.1% 
2 to 1 43.17% 26% 8.8% 
Other Considerations 
Diagnostic testing at the previous farm where a crew last worked enables additional mitigations 
to be taken if it is confirmed that the crew had last worked on an infected farm. It is important to 
note that crewmembers may have worked on more than one previous farm, thus necessitating 
testing of multiple flocks to achieve this mitigation. The potential number of infectious birds in 
an undetected flock that the crew last worked on is expected to be low if HPAI test results taken 
on subsequent days are negative. A lower number of infectious birds improves confidence that 
crew sanitation and equipment C&D measures are effective in mitigating the transmission risk. 
The impact of testing the previous premises a crew worked on is illustrated in Appendix 14 
Table 4. The results indicate that an undetected flock may have much higher number of 
infectious birds when active surveillance is not implemented and the primary detection 
mechanism is via observation of increased mortality. In contrast, the expected number of 
infectious birds in an undetected flock is very low when dead bird testing is performed 4 days 
after the crew had last worked on the previous flock and the test results are negative.   
 
Appendix 14 Table 4. Impact of active surveillance at previous farm(s) the crew worked on.  
Active surveillance protocol 
Probability of detection and number of 
infectious birds if infection is not detected in 
previous farm when the crew were 
vaccinating (PA H5N2 fast spread scenario)* 
Mortality greater than 1 per 1000 66%; 519 (0-2434) 
Testing all dead birds on 2 consecutive days 
on previous farm, 4 days after crew started 
vaccinating the current flock 
97%; 8 (0-34) 
Testing 2 pools of 11 dead birds on 2 
consecutive days on previous farm, 4 days 
after crew started vaccinating the current 
flock 
97; 9 (0-36) 
*Assuming that the farm where crew last worked was infected for 1-14 days 
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